284 ( ) 9,,,, 1,, ,,, 2005, , , 2004, , , ( 1), % 1 : ( ) : ( ), ( ), %, %

9 1 2009 10 ( ) China Eco nomic Quarterly Vol19, No11 October, 2009 3 30 1999 2005, :,,, 2002 2003,,,,, 20 80,,, 1986 1998 2004, 2002 4 ( ), ( ),,,,,,, 3 : 422,361005 ; : (0592) 2092938 ; E2mail :ruobingliang @gmail. com Ake Blomqvist,

284 ( ) 9,,,, 1,, 2 1998,,, 2005, 1999 153 562, 28 100, 2004, 85 176, 70 130 3, ( 1), 2002 80 % 1 : ( ) : (2000 2006 ), ( ), 2004 30 %, 2000 2001 40 %, 2000 2001 40 %, 50 %, 2004 65 % ( 2 1),, 1,, (2007) (2007) 2, 176,2005 8 31 3,,,, (2000 2006 )

1 : 285 4,, ( ),, 2003,,, (4716 %) (47 %),,, 2003 1, 2004 0173, 0140 ( 1) 2 : ( ) : (2000 2006 ) 1,1999 2005 ( %) ( %) ( ) 1999 0. 31 0. 69 0. 53 0. 30 0. 59 0. 14 2000 0. 44 0. 56 0. 26 0. 29 0. 80 0. 11 2001 0. 41 0. 59 0. 48 0. 39 0. 94 0. 14 2002 0. 33 0. 67 0. 55 0. 43 0. 87 0. 18 2003 0. 30 0. 70 0. 49 0. 52 1. 20 0. 34 2004 0. 21 0. 79 0. 56 0. 53 1. 60 0. 73 2005 0. 19 0. 81 0. 52 0. 55 1. 23 0. 47 :, : (2000 2006 ), 2003, 4,,,,, http :/ / news. xinhuanet. com/ house/ 2007203/ 21/ content_5875154. ht m,2007 3 21 ; :,, http :/ / news. xinhuanet. com/ politics/ 2006205/ 16/ content _ 4552819. ht m,2006 5 16 ; :,,,http :/ / news. xin2 huanet. com/ lianzheng/ 2006205/ 15/ content_4546057. ht m,2006 5 15

286 ( ) 9,,, ( ),,,,,, (2008) ;, (2007) ;, (, 2007), (, 2007),, : ; ; ; ;,,, ( Montinola, Qian and Weingast, 1995 ; Qian and Weingast, 1996, 1997) (market preserving federalism) 5,,,,, GDP,, Blanchard and Shleifer (2000) Tsui and Wang (2004),, (yardstick competition),,,, Li and Zhou (2005) (2005),, 5 MPF, (2008) Cai and Treisman (2006) 30

1 : 287,, (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005 ; Jin and Zou, 2005 ;, 2005) 6,,, (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000),,,, Tiebout (1956) :, ;, ( Zhuravskaya, 2000),, ( Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005 ; Wedeman, 2003 ; Zhang, 2006 ;, 2007 ;, 2003 ;, 2006 ;, 2007 ;, 2007 ;, 2008),,, (2007) : 7, (2007), :, GDP,,,,,, 6,,,Jin and Zou (2005) 1994,, (2005) ( ), 1994 7 Zhang (2006),,,,,

288 ( ) 9,,,,,,,,, GDP, :?,,, (Qian and Weingast, 1997),, :, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,, 8,,,,,,,,,,, 9, 8,2003 10, 2004 27, 956,, 1998 :, 9 : ( ), 6 10, 4 6,,

1 : 289,,,,,,,,,, 35 70,,,, 2007, 10,,, 2007 10 % 11,,,,, (2007), 2002,,, 2008 6 11 2004 2006, ( ), 12,,,,, 10, 39,2007 10 9 11, 27,2007 8 7 ;, 64,2007 10 30 12, 1 541. 05, 1 864. 11, 11 71. 18 %,,,2008 4, 28,2008 6 4

290 ( ) 9,, 2002,,,,,,, :,, ;, ;,,,,,, ( ) ( ),, GDP,,,,,,,,,,,,, 13 ;,,,, ( Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005 ;, 2006 ;, 2006),,, 13 2003 8 2004 6,,, ( 60 %),,,,2005 6 21

1 : 291,,,,, 14 ;,,,,, :,, 15,, 16 :, ( GDP),,,,,, GDP ( ), ( ) ( ), GDP ( ) :,,, ;,, ( ) :,,, 17 ; 14,, 35, 42 2. 1 15, (,2007),,,2005 73. 3 % 16,,,, 220,2005 10 26 17,,

292 ( ) 9, ( ) ( ), 18,,, :,, ( ),,,, 19,, ( ),,, 20, (one2way panel data) 21 : Y it = DCit + lnlandrevit + shlocgit + lnpcgdp it + locsh it + lnoveremit + shhisit + X it + i + it, (1), Y it ; DCit ; landrevit ; pcgdp GDP ; locsh it i t, locsh it = locf undit / locadmrevit,, locf undit, locadm2 revit ; lnoveremit, overemit = loclandemp it - loclandausize it, loclandemp it i, loclandausizeit ; 18,, 19,,,, 20, : ;,, 21, (two2way),, F (0. 55),

1 : 293 shlocgit, shlocgit = (numperf it + numcou it ) / numlocgovit, numperf it numcouit i ( ), numlocgovit i, ; shhisit, ; X it, 22 ; i ; it,,, : Y it = DCit + lnlandrevit + lnpcgdp it + locsh it + shhisit + Dumt Y it = DCit + lnlandrevit + shhisit + lnoveremit + shlocgit lnlandrevit + X it + Dumt + i + it, (2) + lnpcgdp it + locsh it + lnoveremit + shlocgit + Dumt shhisit + X it + Dumt + i + it, (3), 2002, Dumt 2002 2005 (2), ; (3), 2,,,,, :,, (2005),, ( ) : (DCalrev) (DCalexp) (DCalnet),,,, :,,, ;, 22,,,,,

294 ( ) 9,, 2 lawb ( ) pcgdp GDP ( / ) + landrev ( ) + DC + locsh ( %) - overem ( ) - shhis ( %) + shlocg popu ( ) ( %) + / - 3, :,, 2000 2006 ; GDP, 2000 2006 ;, 2000 2006,,,, ;, 210 3 lnlawb 208 6. 726 1. 105 3. 757 9. 969 lnpcgdp GDP 210 9. 126 0. 610 7. 814 10. 921 lnlandrev 209 11. 660 2. 602 4. 146 16. 276 DCalrev 210 4. 089 3. 457 0. 085 17. 090 DCalexp 201 9. 108 5. 747 1. 071 31. 538 DCalnet 201 6. 081 5. 156-0. 044 26. 624 locsh 210 62. 766 21. 235 9. 868 99. 094 lnoverem 208 7. 568 1. 433 3. 258 9. 884 shlocg 210 5. 887 2. 465 0. 658 11. 346 Shhis 3 208 29. 299 24. 263 0. 000 99. 900 lnpopu 210 8. 106 0. 784 6. 234 9. 182 3, 0, 2001 ; 99. 9, 1999 2 007. 77, 2. 05,

1 : 295 ( 4),,,, 1999 41 % 2000 60 %, 2004 70 %,,,, 2000, 2618 % 2003 4814 % 2004 5218 %, 2005 43 %, 2003 2004,, 4 ( %),1999 2005 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 locsh 41. 01 63. 90 58. 10 64. 13 62. 13 71. 04 73. 27 shhis 33. 97 26. 80 28. 97 35. 44 48. 41 52. 80 43. 01 ( ) 5 (1) 23, (1) (3),,, GDP,, ;,,,,, ;,, ;,, ;,, 23, Hausman 1 %,

296 ( ) 9,, ;,,, 5 ( ) (1) (2) (3) lnpcgdp 1. 784 3 3 3 1. 774 3 33 1. 783 3 3 3 (0. 271) (0. 270) (0. 270) lnlandrev 0. 066 3 3 3 0. 066 3 33 0. 066 3 3 3 DCalrev 0. 037 3 3 (0. 023) (0. 023) (0. 023) (0. 016) DCalexp 0. 023 3 3 (0. 010) DCalnet 0. 026 3 3 (0. 011) shlocg 0. 048 3 3 0. 047 3 0. 049 3 3 (0. 021) (0. 021) (0. 021) locsh - 0. 011 3 3-0. 011 3 3-0. 011 3 3 (0. 005) (0. 005) (0. 005) lnoverem - 0. 134-0. 141-0. 140 (0. 091) (0. 095) (0. 091) shhis 0. 015 3 3 3 0. 015 3 33 0. 015 3 3 3 (0. 003) (0. 003) (0. 003) lnpopu - 0. 866-0. 837-0. 859 (2. 117) (2. 117) (2. 113) Constant - 2. 242-2. 193-2. 315 (17. 647) (17. 721) (17. 637) Observations 205 205 205 Number of code 30 30 30 R 2 0. 358 0. 359 0. 360 :, 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 % 5 % 1 % ( ) : 6,, GDP, ( ),, ( ),,,

1 : 297,,, 6 + lnpcgdp 2. 227 3 3 3 1. 604 33 3 1. 241 3 3 3 2. 419 3 3 3 (0. 509) (0. 344) (0. 365) (0. 588) lnlandrev 0. 090 3 3 0. 034 0. 045 0. 097 3 (0. 037) (0. 033) (0. 038) (0. 055) DCalnet 0. 040 3 3 0. 020 0. 000 0. 035 (0. 019) (0. 013) (0. 015) (0. 021) shlocg 0. 062 0. 033 0. 011 0. 067 (0. 042) (0. 026) (0. 025) (0. 045) locsh - 0. 007-0. 014 3 3-0. 014 3-0. 016 (0. 007) (0. 006) (0. 008) (0. 010) lnoverem - 0. 113-0. 115-0. 107-0. 261 (0. 152) (0. 116) (0. 126) (0. 196) shhis 0. 009 3 3 0. 022 33 3 0. 003 0. 030 3 3 3 (0. 004) (0. 005) (0. 007) (0. 006) lnpopu - 3. 676 1. 016-3. 038-2. 936 (3. 215) (3. 687) (6. 377) (5. 036) Constant 14. 710-15. 168 22. 476 8. 653 (24. 008) (28. 714) (52. 359) (36. 909) Observations 82 123 63 60 Number of code 12 18 9 9 R 2 0. 401 0. 385 0. 243 0. 545 : ; 3 3 3 33 3 10 % 5 % 1 % ;,, 3,, 2003 2004,,,,,,,, 20 90,,,,,,, 3 2004 6

298 ( ) 9,, 2004,,, 1999 2005,,, 3, 1999 2005 : (2000 2006 ) ( ), 2000 : 2002 4,,, ; 2003 2004,,,, 24 24 :, 45, 2003 2 18 ;, 49,2003 2 26 ;, 30,2003 7 18 ;, 70,2003 7 30 ;, 7,2003 11 3 ;, 2343,2003 12 30 ;, 1,2004 1 10 ;, 12,2004 4 21 ;, 22,2004 4 29 ;,, 20,2004 4 29 ;, 28,2004 10 21 ;, 232,2004 11 1

1 : 299,, 2003 25 7 2002 ( 2) 2003 ( 3),, 7 2, 2002 4, 2002 2003 2004,,, 3, 2004 2005, 2003, 2004,,,, 2005 2003 2004,,,, 2004 7 2 3 Dum2002 lnlandrev 0. 339 3 3 3 Dum2002 shhis 0. 011 (0. 113) (0. 007) Dum2003 lnlandrev 0. 286 3 3 Dum2003 shhis 0. 007 (0. 114) (0. 007) Dum2004 lnlandrev 0. 263 3 3 Dum2004 shhis 0. 019 3 3 (0. 128) (0. 008) Dum2005 lnlandrev 0. 323 Dum2005 shhis 0. 013 3 (0. 214) (0. 007) Constant 6. 435 Constant - 5. 021 (24. 825) (22. 870) Observations 205 Observations 205 Number of code 30 Number of code 30 R 2 0. 411 R 2 0. 407 : ; 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 % 5 % 1 % ;DC DCal2 net ;, 25 2003,,2000 2006, 8 698, 1 221, 2003 2006, 3 094 (35. 6 %) 501 (41 %) 8 893 245,,www. gov. cn,2007 9 17

300 ( ) 9 ( ),, 8 L R P Wool2 dridge P, ; Pesaranπs CD,, AR (1),, Huber (1967) White (1980) Rogers (1993) Driscoll and Kraay (1998),,,, 8,, 8 ( ) OL S Huber2White Rogers Driscoll2Kraay lnpcgdp 1. 783 3 3 3 1. 783 3 3 3 1. 783 3 3 3 1. 783 3 3 3 (0. 270) (0. 246) (0. 226) (0. 235) lnlandrev 0. 066 3 3 3 0. 066 3 3 3 0. 066 3 3 3 0. 066 3 3 3 (0. 023) (0. 023) (0. 019) (0. 014) DCalnet 0. 026 3 3 0. 026 3 3 0. 026 3 3 0. 026 3 3 3 (0. 011) (0. 013) (0. 013) (0. 009) shlocg 0. 049 3 3 0. 049 3 3 0. 049 3 3 0. 049 3 3 3 (0. 021) (0. 020) (0. 021) (0. 011) locsh - 0. 011 3 3-0. 011 3 3-0. 011 3 3-0. 011 3 3 (0. 005) (0. 005) (0. 004) (0. 004) lnoverem - 0. 140-0. 140-0. 140 3 3-0. 140 3 3 (0. 091) (0. 093) (0. 062) (0. 061) shhis 0. 015 3 3 3 0. 015 3 3 3 0. 015 3 3 3 0. 015 3 3 3 (0. 003) (0. 004) (0. 004) (0. 004) lnpopu - 0. 859-0. 859-0. 859-0. 859 (2. 113) (2. 223) (2. 059) (3. 055) Constant - 2. 485-2. 485-2. 485-2. 485 (16. 407) (17. 566) (16. 347) (23. 033) Observations 205 205 205 205 Number of code 30 30 30 30 L R ( P > 2 ) 0. 000 3 3 3 Wooldridge ( P > F) 0. 026 3 3 Pesaranπs CD ( P) 0. 581 F(8,167) ( P > F) 0. 000 3 3 3 R 2 0. 360 0. 360 0. 360 0. 360 :, 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 % 5 % 1 %

1 : 301,, GDP,,, 9 GDP,,,,, GDP,,,,,,,, GDP,, :, GDP ;, Hausman, 9 lnlawb lnpclawb lnpclawb lnpcgdp 1. 783 3 3 3 (0. 270) l. lnpcgdp 1. 162 3 3 3 2. 108 3 3 3 (0. 437) (0. 372) lnlandrev 0. 066 3 3 3 (0. 023) l. lnlandrev 0. 174 3 0. 063 3 3 3 (0. 093) (0. 024) DCalnet 0. 026 3 3 0. 026 3 3 0. 026 3 3 (0. 012) (0. 011) (0. 011) shlocg 0. 053 3 3 0. 049 3 3 0. 054 3 3 (0. 025) (0. 021) (0. 023) locsh - 0. 011 3 3-0. 011 3 3-0. 013 3 3 (0. 005) (0. 005) (0. 005) lnoverem - 0. 181 3-0. 140-0. 127 (0. 100) (0. 091) (0. 102) shhis 0. 012 3 3 3 0. 015 3 3 3 0. 013 3 3 3 (0. 003) (0. 003) (0. 004)

302 ( ) 9 ( ) lnlawb lnpclawb lnpclawb lnpopu 2. 573-1. 858 1. 573 (2. 655) (2. 113) (2. 655) Constant - 7. 777 3 3 2. 120-15. 872 3 3 3 (3. 458) (16. 407) (3. 440) Observations 176 205 169 Number of code 30 30 29 R 2 0. 320 0. 352 0. 348 :, 3 3 3 3 3 3 10 % 5 % 1 %, :,, ;,,, ;,, :, ;,,,,,, GDP,, :,,,, ;,,, ;,,,,,

1 : 303,, 26,, ( Laffont, 2001 ;, 2006),,,, GDP,, 2003,, 9 27,, :, ;,,, :, [ 1 ] Blanchard, O., and A. Shleifer, Federalism wit h and wit hout Political Centralization : China ver2 sus Russia, NBER Working Paper No. 7616, 2000. [ 2 ] Cai, H., and D. Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause Chinaπs Economic Miracle? Worl d Politics, 2006, 58 (4), 505 535. [ 3 ] Driscoll, J., and A. Kraay, Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation wit h Spatially Dependent Panel Data, Review of Economics and S tatistics, 1998, 80 (4), 549 560. [ 4 ] Feltenstein, A., and S. Iwata, Decent ralization and Macroeconomic Performance in China : Re2 gional Autonomy Has It s Cost s, J ournal of Development Economics, 2005, 76 (2), 481 501. [ 5 ], :,,2007 3, 4 12 26,,,,, 27

304 ( ) 9 [ 6 ], :,,2006 10, 59 68 [ 7 ],,,2006 5, 17 25 [ 8 ], :,,2008 2, 59 64 [ 9 ] Huber, P. J., The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates under Non2Standard Conditions, in Proceedings of the Fi f th Berkeley S y m posium on M athematical S tatistics and Probability, Vol. 1, Berkeley CA : University of California Press, 1967, 221 233. [ 10 ] Jin, H., Y. Qian, and B. Weingast, Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives : Federalism, Chinese Style, J ournal of Public Economics, 2005, 89 (9 10), 1719 1742. [ 11 ] Jin, J., and H. Zou, Fiscal Decentralization, Revenue and Expendit ure Assignment s, and Growt h in China, J ournal of A sian Economics, 2005, 16 (6), 1047 1064. [ 12 ] Laffont, J., Incentives and Political Economy. Oxford University Press, 2001. [ 13 ] Li, H. and L. Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic Performance : The Incentive Role of Person2 nel Control in China, J ournal of Public Economics, 2005, 89 (9 10), 1743 1762. [ 14 ] Montinola, G., Y. Qian, and B. Weingast, Federalism, Chinese Style : The Political Basis for E2 conomic Success in China, W orl d Politics, 1995, 48 (1), 50 81. [ 15 ],, ( ),2006 6 1, 75 90 [ 16 ] Qian, Y., and B. Weingast, Chinaπs Transition to Market s : Market2Preserving Federalism, Chi2 nese Style, J ournal of Policy Ref orm, 1996, 1 (2), 149 185. [ 17 ] Qian, Y., and B. Weingast, Federalism as a Commit ment to Preserving Market Incentives, J ournal of Economic Pers pectives, 1997, 11 (4), 83 92. [ 18 ] Rogers, W., sg17 : Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples, S tata Technical B ulletin, 1993, 13, 19 23. [ 19 ],,,2007 10, 15 27 [ 20 ] Tiebout, C., A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, J ournal of Political Economy, 1956, 64 (5), 416 424. [ 21 ] Tsui, K., and Y. Wang, Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu : Fiscal Decentralization in China, China Quarterl y, 2004, 177, 71 90. [ 22 ], :,,2007 1, 4 16 [ 23 ] Wedeman, A., From M ao to M arket : Rent Seeking, L ocal Protectionism, and M arketiz ation in China. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.

1 : 305 [ 24 ] White, H., A Heteroskedasticity2Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, Economet rica, 1980, 48 (4), 817 838. [ 25 ],, ( ),2008 7 3, 1045 1060 [ 26 ], :,,2008 3, 99 114 [ 27 ],,, 2003 3, 27 33 [ 28 ], :, ( ),2007 7 1, 21 52 [ 29 ] Zhang, X., Fiscal Decent ralization and Political Centralization in China : Implications for Growt h and Inequality, J ournal of Com parative Economics, 2006, 34 (4), 713 726. [ 30 ],, ( ),2005 5 1, 75 108 [ 31 ], :,,2006 6, 100 115 [ 32 ], :,,2007 1, 49 82 [ 33 ],,,2007 7, 36 50 [ 34 ], :,,2005 1 1, 83 96 [ 35 ],,,2007 2, 137 145 [ 36 ] Zhuravskaya, E., Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods : Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style, J ournal of Public Economics, 2000, 76 (3), 337 368. Promotion Incentives, Departmental Interests and Land La wbreaking under Fiscal Decentralization RUOBIN G L IAN G ( X i amen Uni versit y) Abstract This paper employs panel data techniques to study the main influencing fac2 tors of land law violations in 30 regions in China from 1999 to 2005. The main factors singled out include the promotion incentives of local officials and the departmental interest s of local land administration agencies under fiscal decentralization. The paper also analyzes the regional distribution of land law violations as well as the effect s of central government policies. Instead

306 ( ) 9 of putting the blame on local government s for land law violations, the central government is now dealing with the problem at its core : reforming its present cadre performance evaluation and promotion system and the land property right system. JEL Classif ication E61, P48, Q15