Qian & Roland

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Qian & Roland"

呼宾蹇
5 years ago
Views:

1 hedexu@ vip. sina. com chinadragon_miao@ 163. com 15AJY017 14BJY T

2 Qian & Roland http / /www. audit. gov. cn 43

3 U cg = ψ 1 y t - y - ψ 2 π t - π 2 y t y π t π ψ 1 ψ 2 0 < ψ 1 < 1 - ψ 2 π t - π 2 0 γ y = ln gc t - 珔 g gc t 珔 g 2003 π t = Δm t 1 U cg = ψ 1 ln gc t - 珔 g - y - ψ 2 Δm t - π 2 1 Gct i t - 1 Bc t - 1 Lce t - Lce t - 1 Tct M t - M t - 1 Bc t - Bc t - 1 Gc t + Lce t - Lce t i t - 1 Bc t - 1 = Tc t + M t - M t Bc t - Bc t Pce t GDPP t Y t 44 ψ 2

4 m gc t + Δlce t + 珋 t -1 i t -1 bc t -1 = τc t + Δbc t + m t π t + pce t Δlce t = lce t - lce t - 1 Δbc t = bc t - bc t π t = Δm t gc t = τc t + Δbc t m t Δm t + pce 1 + Δm t - Δlce t - 珋 i t - 1 t bc t - 1 y = ln gc t - 珔 g 1 U cg = ψ 1 ln τc t + Δbct mt Δm t 1 + Δm t + pce t - Δlce t - 珋 i t -1 bc t -1 - 珔 g - y - ψ 2 Δm t - π 2 3 Δm t U cg = ψ m t Δm t gc t 1 + Δm t - 2ψ 2 Δm t - π = 0 Δm t = - z - π z mt + z + z - π z m t 槡 m t + z 3 + z m t + z ψ m t 2ψ z = τc t + Δbc t + pce t - Δlce t - 珋 i t - 1 bc t - 1 Δm t 2. U lg = y l t - y l y lt y l y l = ln gl t - 珔 gl t gl t 珔 gl t U lg = y lt - y l U lg = ln gl t - 珔 gl t - y l Glt i t - 1 Bl t - 1 Δllet Tlt Bls t - Bls t

5 gl t + 珋 i t -1 bl t -1 = τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δllet 5 Δllet = lle t - lle t - 1 lle t ple t 5 5 gl t = τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δlle t - 珋 i t - 1 bl t U lg = ln τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δlle t - 珋 i t -1 bl t -1 - 珔 gl t - y l Δlle t du lg 1 = dδlle t τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δlle t - 珋 i t - 1 bl t 珔 gl t >

6 Oates Montinola et al Blanchard & Shleifer 2001 Jin et al Maskin et al

7 / x f_i = 1-48

8 y b_c = 2. y b_d = 7 y b_c = c + αx f_i + βy b_d + ε 7 Anselin 1995 SAM Anselin 1995 geographical weighted regression GWR Moran's I Geary's C Getis Moran's I Geary's C Moran's I Geary's C Moran's I SAM GWR 3. GIS X Y euclidean distance GeoDa threshold distance

9 x f_i y b_c y b_d Moran's I Moran 2 Moran Moran 50

10 Moran Moran Moran Moran Moran Jeffrey et al R % % % Moran's I 51

11 SEM GWR /LAMBDA R /LAMBDA R /LAMBDA R /LAMBDA R /LAMBDA R

12 SEM GWR 2012 /LAMBDA R t SEM GWR Z 1% 5% 10% t 1% D - W P 2 y b_c y b_c y b_c y b_c x f_i y b_c - 1 x f_i D - W P F - statistic % 5%

13 GDP Arye L. Hillman http / /www. doc88. com /p html http / /www. chinabond. com. cn /Info /

14 Anselin L. and R. Florax 1995 Small Sample Properties of Tests for Spatial Dependence in Regression Models Some Further Results New Directions in Spatial Econometrics. Spinger Verlag New York Blanchard O. and A. Shleifer 2001 Federalism with and without Political Centralization China vs. Russia IMF Staff Papers Jeffrey S. A. Tornell and A. Velasco 1996 The Mexican Peso crises Sudden death or death foretold Journal of International Economics Vol Jin Hehui. Yingyi Qian and B. Weingast 2005 Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives Federalism Chinese Style Journal of Public Economics Vol Maskin Eric. Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu 2000 Incentives Scale Economies and Organization Forms Review of Economic Studies Vol Montinola G. Yingyi Qian and B. Weingast 1995 Federalism Chinese Style The Political Basis for Economic Success in China World Politics Vol Oates 1999 An Essay on Fiscal Federalism Journal of Economic Literature Vol Qian Y. and G. Roland 1998 Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint American Economic Review Vol Does the Fiscal Decentralization Impact the Financial Decentralization He Dexu a and Miao Wenlong b a Institute of Finance and Banking Chinese Academy of Social Sciences b Xi'An Branch of PBC Abstract According to the internal logic of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization assuming the internal consistency between their spatial effects and validating by using the economic data of Chinese years the result shows that during the process of fiscal decentralization the financial invisibly has a certain amount of decentralization and is similar to fiscal decentralization on spatial effect. The financial decentralization has double feature with external centralization and internal decentralization which is significantly different from the dominant financial centralization. Under conditions of limited lateral accountability mechanisms and imperfect vertical accountability mechanisms local government must expand their economic interests with the core of fiscal income and the radius of power influence form the budget income bank loans bank table foreign assets and other financial resources and transfer the risks burden to the country which continuous brewing and accumulation of financial risks. The method of financial completely decentralized cannot effectively solve this problem the key lies in two things first how to enable local governments to match the risk and return the second is to finance a modest decentralization. Key Words Fiscal Decentralization Financial Decentralization Spatial Effects JEL Classification E61 G28 H11 55

GDP % See Jin Hehui Qian Yingyi B. R. Weingast Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentiv

GDP % See Jin Hehui Qian Yingyi B. R. Weingast Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentiv Peking University Law Journal Vol. 24 No. 4 2012 pp. 782-799 20 * 20 1 1908 2 1949 1978 * 1 5 1977 275 2 10 2009 1 782 09CFX002 83 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1978 GDP 20 90 1993 3 2003 219 4 90% 5 1996 325 6 See Jin