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1 ( ) :,,,,,,,,,, :, ;, (federalism), Musgrave (1959), Tiebout (1956) Buchanan (1965) Oates(1972),,,,, (yardstick effect) (abuse control),zhang Zou (1998), 20,, (fiscal competition),, 3,, ,; ( ),, 59

2 : Gordon (1983) (horizontal interaction), Wilson (1986), ;Wildasin (1988),, Lee (1997),, (residential2base) (native2base),, (free rider) (psychic attachments,),mansoorian Myers(1997) Bucovetsky(1995), Wildasin (1989), Gong Zou (2001) (federal framework),,,,,,,,,,,, :Cobb2Douglas,,,,,,,,, gn,,i j M ij, i, j = 1,2, i j M ij i E i, s i,,hoyt (1993),, Wildasin(1991,1994), Wellisch(2000) 60

3 f i c i l i,c i, l i, f, s i, s - i, u i ( c i, l i,f, s i, s - i ), i = 1,2 u i ( c i, l i,f, s i, s - i ) = 1ln i c i - i 2 l i + 3lnf i + i ln s i + - i ln s - i (1),L i ( ),F i ( L i ) = A i (L i ), 0 << 1 Cobb2Douglas,, w, i i w, G i g i, f i = 1 ( g is i + G i ) = w 6 2 i = 1 wi N i l i (2) (1 + i ) c i (1 - g i ) s i = i N i c i + wn i i w i l i + G i (3) = (1 - w - i w ) w i l i + E i ΠN i + I ΠN I (4) N i i, w i i, i i,,,, Nash,, L i = N i l i (5),, j, i j 2,(1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L (1 - w - 2 w ) F 2 L - M 12, 1 2,,,,(1 - w - 2 w ) F 2 L (1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L + M 12 (1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L - M 21, M M, l i 11 (1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L = (1 - w - 2 w ) F 2 L - M (6) N 1 + N 2 = gn (7),(4) 1 c i, l i (1), i L i i = F i ( L i ) - w i L i, (5), Keen Marchand(1997),, Boadway Keen(1993), (Modified Samuelson Rule) Wellisch (2000) Mansoorian Myers (1997),Wildasin(1994) 5L 2 Π5 M < 0, M +,M < M 3, 61

4 : l i = l i ( w, i w ), c i = c i ( w, i w, i ) (1), 21, i, (3) V i,l i < 1 l i = 1, l i = l i ( w, G i ), c i = c i ( w, G i ), s i = s i ( w, G i, g i ),V i gv i = gv i ( w, G i, g i ), i w i, i w > i, i w = i, l i = 1,, l i < 1 31, (2) 6 2 igv i ( i = 1 w, G i, g i ) w, 1Π 2,l 2, w =, l 2,, 0, i ( - 1 = 0),,,, M 3,M < M 3, (6) (7),,,1, G 1 0,,,, 9,, 2 5,,,,, 2,, 2Gong Zou (2002), Barro (1990), i 1 = 013, i 2 = 012, i 3 = 012, i = 012, - i = 011,A i = 1,= 1Π3, = 0, i = 1,2, f = , g i = , G i = , i = , w = 0, i w = , c i = , l i = , s i = , w i = ,,,,,, Keen Marchand(1999), U i = 1ln( i c i - l ib Πb) + 3lnf i + i lns i + - i lns - i, l i 62

5 2004 7,M 3,,,M = 015, = [ 015,015 ], A = [ 110,115 ],= 1Π4 30 %, i 2, 1 2 i 2 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i ,,,,,,,,,, i 2,,, i 2 = 011 M > M 3 = , 1 1,2,,,, (),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,? i 2,2 i w - 2 ( i = 1,2) w 013 i ,, 2 1, 1,,,,,, 63

6 :,,,,,,, 2 i 0110,, 1, 2 i 2 = 0115,2 N , 1,, 2,,, i 2, 2, 2 U, 2 1, 1 U, 2 i 2 i 2 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i ,,, 1,,, i 2 ( ) 2,,, 1, 2,, i 2, c 2, 1, g 1,,, 1 2,,,,, 2,,,, 64

7 2004 7,, 1 2,,,, A = [1,2 ], E = [1,2 ], M = 013, w 013, i w - 1 ( i = 1,2), G 1 0,, - 2,,,,,, G N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i ,,,, G 1 > 0 i w > - 1,,, G 1 = 0,,,,,,, U, - 2 = 0, g 1 0,, 1999, 20 90,,,,,,,,,, ( 65

8 : i = 015, 1 > 015),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Gong Zou (2002),,,,,, 4 A 1 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i ,, A 1,,, 4 A ,,, g 1 U, g 2,, g 1,,,,,, A 1 A 2, g 1 U,, 66

9 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i 1Π8 1Π4 1Π ,,,,,,,,, U,U, 4 A 1 4,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Wilson (1991) Hoyt (1993) Buckvostsy (1991) Bucovetsky (1991),,,,,,, 67

10 :,,,,,,,,, (,2003),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2 ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,2003 :, 3,2002 : Barro, R., 1990,Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal of Political Economy, 98, S Bradford, D. F. and W1 E1 Oates, 1971,Towards a predictive theory of intergovernmental grants, American Economic Review, 61, Braid, R., 1996,Symmetric tax competition with multiple jurisdictions in each metropolitan area, American Economic Review,86, 1279 Boadway, R. and M. Keen, 1993,Public goods, self2selection, and optimal income taxation, International Economic Review,34, 463 Buchanan, J. M., 1965,An economic theory of clubs, Economica,31, Bucovetsky, S., 1991,Asymmetric tax competition, Journal of Urban Economics,30, Bucovetsky, S., 1995,Rent seeking and tax competition, Journal of Public Economics,58, Gong, L. and H. Zou, 2002,Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government, 68

11 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,26, Gong, L. and H. Zou, 2001,Optimal design of government transfer, Working paper,peking University. Gordon, R. H., 1983,An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism, Quarterly Journal of Economics,98, Hoyt, W. H., 1993,Tax competition, Nash equilibria, and residential mobility, Journal of Urban Economics,34, Keen, M. and M. Marchand, 1997,Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending, Journal of Public Economics,66, Lee, K., 1997,Tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital, Journal of Urban Economics,42, Mansoorian,A and G. M. Myers,1997,On the Consequences of Government objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations,Journal of Public Economices 63, Musgrave,R. 1959,Theory of Public Finance :A Study in Public Economy,New York :McGraw. Oates,W. 1972,Fiscal Federalism,New York :Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Oates, W. E., 1981,On local finance and the Tiebout model, American Economic Review,71, Oates, W. E. and R. M. Schwab, 1988,Economic competition among jurisdictions : Efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing? Journal of Public Economics,35, Tiebout, C., 1956,A pure theory of local expenditures, Journal of Political Economics,64, Wellisch, D., 2000, Theory of Public Finance in A Federal State, Cambridge University Press. Wildasin, D. E., 1988,Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition, Journal of Public Economics,35, Wildasin, D. E., 1989,Interjurisdictional capital mobility : Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy, Journal of Urban Economics,25, Wildasin, D. E., 1991,Income redistribution in a common labor market, American Economic Review,81, Wildasin, D. E., 1994,Income redistribution and migration, Canadian Journal of Economics,27, Wilson, J. D., 1986,A theory of interregional tax competition, Journal of Urban Economics,19, Zhang, T. and H. Zou, 1998,Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China, Journal of Public Economics,67, Interregional Disparity, Factor Mobility, and Fiscal Decentralization Zhang Yan & Gong Liutang ( Guanghua School of Management, Peking University) Abstract :This paper studies the optimal taxation, expenditures and grants polices in a federal framework with mobile population and endogenous labor choices. In addition to the zero federal income tax and negative fiscal gap, we find the taxation competition and service competition in different levels of governments largely influence the optimal governmental and individual choices. With some policy instrument constraints, the matching grants not only meet the individual needs and balance government finance, but also correct the horizontal and vertical distortions. We also consider the relations between fiscal decentralization and interregional disparity. The congestion effect and real endowment effect magnify the usual income effect and give some interesting comparative static analysis about the fiscal policies and various parameters. The central intervention and labor mobility increase the welfare of the regions with low technology and low endowment where implicit interregional redistribution plays an important role. Key Words :Fiscal Competition ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Factor Mobility ; Interregional Disparity JEL Classification :F290,H290,H710 ( : ) ( : ) 69

Microsoft Word - 1.2.Local government organization and finance in China.doc

Microsoft Word - 1.2.Local government organization and finance in China.doc 1. 简介 : 中国政府组织概况中国地方政府的组织及财政 Local government organization and finance in China 乔宝云 (Baoyun Qiao) 沙安文 (Anwar Shah) 中国不仅被世人誉为人类的诞生地之一, 同时也是世界文明的重要发源地