:?? 3 :, 90,, GMM,,, Tiebout : 30 10, 80,,,,,,,,,,,,, 3,, :200433, :junzh - 2000 @fudan. edu. cn ( :05JJD790076),, 2006 9 10, 4
2007 3, ( ) :,, :,, 29 ( ) 1988 2001 11, (1995) Prud homme (2004),, :,,, :,, ;,,,,,, :,,,, : (1) ; (2) ; (3),, 21 1, 90,,,,, (2002), 1991 50 %, 1999 3215 %,, ( ),, 1998 5519 % ;, 5
:? 15 %,,,, 1 1981 2004 ( :10 ) : (1) invest1 ;invest2 ;invest3 (2) 1997, (1995),,,,, :,,,, :, 6
2007 3,,,,,,,,( ),, ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ), 1981 2,,,, ( PCA) 3, PCA 1985 1988 1990 1993 1995 1998 2001 2003, 3, 90 2 (,1981 2003 ) :, 90, PCA, 1988 2003,, ( 1988 1998 ) 31 : (1) : ( ), ( ), ( ),1985 ; (2) : ( ), ( ),1985 ; (3) : ( ), ( ), ( ),1985 ; ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),1998 ; ( ),2001 ; ( ), ( ),1995 ; (4) : ( %), ( %), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ),1985,1993 1990 1995 1985,, ( ),2002 2000 2001 911,2003 611, 2002 (719 ) 2003 (913 ) 2000 (911Π611) 1118 1319,, PCA, 7
:? 80 Aschauer (1989a,1989b,1989c,1993), D murger (2000) Fan Zhang (2004) (2004a,2004b) (2004),, 3 : 84,Randolph,Bogetic Hefley (1996) 1980 1986 27 ( 1980 ),,,,, Henisz (2002) 100,,, 19,,, (developmental states) Evans(1992), Evans, :, ( ) ;,, (career building), Rauch (1995),Rauch (1995) 20 20, : ; (1901 ) ; (1908 ),,,,,, 8
2007 3,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Tiebout (1956) Oates (1972), Tiebout (1956) Oates(1972) 10,,, ( Qian and Weingast, 1997 ; Qian and Roland, 1998 ; Cao, Qian and Weingast, 1999 ), (Shleifer, 1997 ;Zhuravskaya, 2000) Zhuravskaya (2000),,,,,,,,,, (market2hampering federalism) Shleifer (1997), ( ),,,,Shleifer,,,,,Shleifer (1997),,, Young (2000) Poncet (2002), (2002) ( 1994 ) (2006), ( 2004 ) 11 9
:?,,,,,Blanchard Shleifer (2000),, ( ), ;,, Pranab Bardhan,,,, (),,,,, (Bardhan, 2006, p112 13),,, :,,,,,, :,,,, (FDI) (,2005),,, FDI,FDI Tiebout (1956), Li Zhou(2005),, 20 (2006), (yardstick competition),,,, Besley Case (1995) 10
2007 3, Treisman (2000) :,,, ;,,,,,, ( ),, 1996,,Shleifer Vishny,,,, ( ),,,,,,,, (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993), 80,, 20, ( FDI) ( ), Rauch (1995),, (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) (,2004),, (2000) Bardhan (2006) Haggard(1990),, 29 ( ) 1987 2001,, (,2005 ;,2006b) 11
:?,, Rauch, : y i, t - y i, t - 1 = 0 y i, t - 1 + X i, t + i + i, t (1) y,, X y,,, i t (1),, : ( y i, t - y i, t - 1 ) - ( y i, t - 1 - y i, t - 2 ) = 0 ( y i, t - 1 - y i, t - 2 ) + ( X i, t - X i, t - 1 ) + ( i, t - i, t - 1 ) (2) (2),,, ( y i, t - 1 - y i, t - 2 ) ( i, t - i, t - 1 ), ( FDI),, GMM( ), GMM, GMM GMM,, 29 ( ) ( ), 1988 2001 ; ; 2002 Prud homme (2004),, 1991, (2004),X : (loginfinvpc-1) (logrfdipc) ( logdmexpp ) (anticorrpp) (loglocalsavpc) GDP(logrgdppc),log,pc : (1), (2), (3), FDI,,,( FDI) (,2005 ;,2006),,, FDI, ( ),,, (2006) 1994, 1992 1988 12
2007 3 GDP (2002) 4, 29 ( ) ( ) 1988 2001, FDI (logrfdipc) (loginfinvpc),, (), 5, 29 ( ) 1988 2001, (logdmexpp) (loginfinvpc),, GDP Rauch (1995) (),, ( ), Mauro (1998) Tanzi Davoodi (1997),,,, 4 FDI (,29 ( ) ),,,,,,,,,? (2005),,, 1992, 13
:?, : : (5185) (5179) (5174) (5132) (5100) (4145),,,,, (2005),, ( IT) 1988 1992 1992 5, (,29 ( ) ),,,, :, (1989 2003 ),1997 (1993 1997 ),,, 1997,,,,, 15 %, GDP GDP GDP, (, ), Kemmerling Stephan (2002) GDP GDP, (Dummy 89 Dummy 90 Dummy 93 Dummy 94) 1, 0 Dummy 89 Dummy 90 1989 Dummy93 1993 1992,, 1992 14
2007 3, Dummy94 Dummy 99, 1999 1, 0,,, 1 1 GMM, GDP 2, GMM 3 GMM, 4,, GMM,,, Sargan GMM,,, ;,Sargan,, IVRE,GMM GMM 2, (catch2up effect), 1 % ( ),,,,,,,,,, Tiebout,FDI,,, Evans (1992) Rauch Evans (2000),,,,, Tanzi Davoodi (1998), Mauro (1998) :, Tanzi Davoodi (1998),,,,,,,, 1993 1994, 5312 % 3915 %,1995 15 %,, 15
:?,, 1 ( : ), (1) SYS2 (2) SYS2 (3) DIF2 (4) IVRE (3) GMM GMM GMM(2) - 01140 3 3 3-01119 3 3 3-01465 3 3 3-01107 3 3 3, 1993 1994 Πloginfinvpc - 1 010394 (1) 010304 010649 010380 010349 3 3 010395 3 3 3 010996 3 3 3 010372 3 3, Πlogrfdipc 010161 010124 010241 010167, 01100 3 3 010932 3 01304 3 3 010649 Πlogdmexpp 01052 010496 (4) 01104 010576-010027 3 3-01003 3 3 3-010008 - 010032 3 3 Πanticorrpp 010013 010012 010019 010014 GDP - 010580 Πlogrgdppc 01100, 010831 Πloglocalsavpc 010794 Dummy 1989-010181 - 010323-010567 010837 010826 010873 Dummy 1990 010081 010072-010203 010064 010786 010786 010796 010850, Dummy 1993 01164 3 3 01157 3 3 010906 01163 3 3, 010711 010709 010647 010742 Dummy 1994 01124 3 01119 3 010921 01125 3, 010710 010704 010644 010735 Dummy 1999-010693 - 010562-01147 3 3-010509 010597 010582 010699 010628 01318 01128 010341 3 01709 01328 01388? Sargan 01175 01194 001000 i, t - t - 1 01000 01000 01000 01989 01972 01902, 341 341 281 310 : (1), 3 3 3 1 %, 3 3 5 %, 3 10 % (2) GMM,, (3) Hausman P, 0111, IVFE IVRE, IVRE, (4) P, 1 01046, 2 0106,, 16,, 20
2007 3, 80, 31 ( ) ( 3000 ),,,, : (1), 90,,,,, (2) 20,, 90,,,, (3),, Tiebout, (4),,,,,,, ( ),,,2000 :, 3,5 12 A1 Hillman,2002 :, ( ) 2 1 : 111 30 13,2004a :, 19 2,25 30,2004b : CES, 11,10,2004 :,1,36 43,2006 : :,,,1995 :, 2,106 111 17
:?,2006 :, 2,49 55,2004 : ( ),,1995 : 1994 ( ),2003 ::,,2006 : :,,,2002 :, 4,19 26, 2002 :,12,20 25,2005 :,,1974 :,,,2006a :?, 7,2006b :,,2006 5 22,2005 : :1987 2001, 11, 2004 : :1952 2000, 10,2005 :, Aschauer, D1A1, 1989 (a), Does Public Capital Crowd Out Private Capital?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 24 : 178 235. Aschauer, D. A., 1989 (b), Is Public Expenditure Productive?, Journal of Monetary Economics, 23 : 177 200. Aschauer, D. A., 1989 (c), Public Investment and Productivity Growth in the Group of Seven, Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 13 : 17 25. Aschauer, D. A., 1993, Infrastructure and Macroeconomic Performance : Direct and Indirect Effects, In The OECD Jobs Study : Investment, Productivity and Employment, 85 101, OECD, Paris. Bardhan, P., 2006, Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay : a Comparative Assessment of the Rise of China and India, paper presented at International Conference on the Dragon and the Elephant : China and India s Economic Reforms, July1 2, 2006, Shanghai, China. Besley, T. and A. Case, 1995, Incumbent Behavior : Vote2Seeking, Tax2Setting, and Yardstick Competition, American Economic Review, 85 : 25 45. NBER. Blanchard, O. and A. Shleifer, 2000, Federalism with and without Political Centralization : China versus Russia, Working Paper 7616, Blundell, R. and S. Bond, 1998, Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models, Journal of Econometrics, 87 : 115 143. Cao, Y., Y. Qian and B. R. Weingast, 1999, From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style, Economics of Transition, 7 (1) : 103 131. 244 57. Davoodi, H. and Zou H., 1998, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth : A Cross2country Study, Journal of Urban Economics 43 : D murger, S., 2001, Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth : An Explanation for Regional Disparities in China?, Journal of Comparative Economics, 29 : 95 117. Evans, P. B., The State as Problem and as Solution : Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change, In : Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman ( eds), The Politics of Economic Adjustment. International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State, Princeton University Press, 1992. 214. Fan, S. and X. Zhang,2004, Infrastructure and Regional Economic Development in Rural China, China Economic Review, 15 : 203 Glaeser, E.L., R. La Porta, F. Lopez2de2Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 2004, Do Institutions Cause Growth?,NBER Working Paper 10568, http :ΠΠwww. nber.orgπpapersπw10568. Press. Haggard, Stephan, 1990, Pathways From Periphery : The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries, Ithaca : Cornell University Henisz, W.J., 2002, The Institutional Environment of Infrastructure Investment, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11 (2) :355 389. Justman, M., 1995, Infrastructure, Growth and the Two Dimensions of Industrial Policy, Review of Economic Studies, 62 (1) : 131 157. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi,2005, Governance Matters IV : Governance Indicators for 1996 2004, Working Paper Draft for comments. Washington,D. C. : World Bank. Kemmerling, A. and A. Stephan, 2002, The Contribution of Local Public Infrastructure to Private Productivity and Its Political Economy : Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities, Public Choice, Vol. 113, No. 3 4 : 403 424. 18
2007 3 Li, Hongbin and Li2An Zhou, 2005, of Public Economics, 89 : 1743 1762. Political Turnover and Economic Performance : Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China, Journal Mauro, P., 1998, Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure, Journal of Public Economics, 69 : 263 279. Oates, W. E., 1972, Fiscal Federalism, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Poncet, Sandra, 2002,?, 1,3 10 Prud homme R. 2004, Infrastructure and Development, Paper prepared for the ABCDE ( Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics), May 3 5. 83 92. Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi, 1993, Political Regimes and Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 : 51 69. Qian Y. and G. Roland, 1998, Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, American Economic Review, 88 (5) : 1143 1149. Qian Y. and B. Weingast, 1997, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (4) : Randolph, S., Z. Bogetic, and D. Hefley, 1996, Determinants of Public Expenditure on Infrastructure Transportation and Communication, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper : Washington D. C. Rauch, J. E., 1995, Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth : Evidence from US Cities during the Progressive Era, American Economic Review, 85(4) : 968 979. Rauch, J. E. and P. B. Evans, 2000, Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in Less Developed Countries, Journal of Public Economics, 75 : 49 71. Shleifer, A., 1997, Government in Transition, European Economic Review, 41 : 385 410. Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi, 1997, Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth, IMF Working Paper, Washington D. C. Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi, 1998, Roads to Nowhere : How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth, IMF Working Paper, Washington D. C. Tiebout, C., 1956, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, 64 (5) : 416 424. Treisman, D., 2000, Decentralization and the Quality of Government, Working Paper, University of California, Los Angeles. Young, A., 2000, The Razor s Edge : Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People s Republic of China, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 :1091 1135. Zhuravskaya, E. V., 2000, Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods : Fiscal Federalism, Russian Style, Journal of Public Economics, 76 : 337 68. Why Does China Enjoy So Much Better Physical Infrastructure? Zhang Jun, Gao Yuan, Fu Yong and Zhang Hong (China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University) Abstract:This paper builds up an analytical framework within which the quicker improvement of infrastructure in China since 1990s is explained. Based on provincial panel data, the authors not only present an evolution of infrastructure spending and a measurement of the aggregate level of infrastructure, but also empirically identify the determinants on infrastructure spending using GMM. The paper finds that, after controlling for level of development, financial depth, and other variables, FDI2driven competition among local governments, and governance are both significant in explaining the growth of spending on infrastructure. This implies that decentralization, Tiebout2type2competition, and governance are all vital to enhancing government s incentive to improve infrastructure. Key Words : Infrastructure ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Governance JEL Classification :P200, E220, H100 ( : ) ( : ) 19