2013 2 World Economic Papers April, 2013 * Tiebout 1995 2004 Qian and Roland 1998 2008 Zhang and Zou 1998 2001 1 2007 2009 1993 GDP 4% * E-mail ivannj@ 163. com 1037 212 430074 E-mail junzh_2000@ fudan. edu. cn 11YJC790039 2010308 11049 2011WC001 1
2 2013 2 1 2008 3. 48% 5. 1% 2008 12 1995 35. 8% 2002 46. 6% 1995 41. 7% 2002 1. 42 GDP 1995 2. 3% 2008 3. 48% 4% 2003 Tsui 2005 2004 2007 2010 2 1990 20% 44% 2000 GDP Tsai 2007 1 2 2010 2010 2020 2012 2008 Park and Shi 2008
2013 2 3 Tiebout 1956 Tiebout Boadway 2006 Rhode and Strumpf 2003 Tiebout Gruber 2005 Tiebout Tiebout Tiebout local public goods Tiebout 1994 2007 2010 2011 AFDC Aid to Families with Dependent Children 10% 1. 5 1970 60% 70% 1 Figuieres and Hindriks 2002
4 2013 2 Evans and Owens 2004 Knight 2002 2000 Boadway 2006 Baumol 1967 Bradford et al. 1969 Borcherding and Deacon 1972 Borcherding 1985 flypaper effects 1 1 0. 02 0. 05 Hines and Thaler 1995 Brennan and Pincus 1996 2007 1996 2002 spending power Boadway 2006 Breton 1965
2013 2 5 Waldasin 1991 Pfingsten and Wagener 1997 Qian and Roland 1998 Figuieres and Hindriks 2002 N i K i L i I i 1 f K i I i L i f KI K i I i L i > 0 K 2 N = K I i K i i = 1 i ω L i + u Z i ω l i ω L i = f L K i I i L i Z i 3 ω L i + u Z i = ω L j + u Z j = c i j N = H L i = L i ω i L i i = 1 Z i I Z I i + Z i = t i t i W i = f K i I i L i + u Z i N L i i = 1 L i = L = NL = H I Z N i = 1 W i 1 1 2 3
6 2013 2 f I / I i = u' Z i I Z f K i I i f K K i I i = f K K j I j I 1 I N K i = K i I 1 I N 1 f I / I i + f K / K i dk i /di i = u' Z i 3 2 Tiebout Tiebout f K i I i L i 1 f I / I i + f K / K i dk i /di i = f L / L i L i / Z i + u' Z i 4 4 L i / Z i f K / K i dk i /di i = f L / L i L i / Z i 2 Tiebout I i + Z i = t i - T + sz i s 0 1 sz i T 2 3
2013 2 7 s N Z i = NT I i + 1 - s Z i = t i - T i = 1 1 f I / I i + f K / K i dk i /di i 1 - s = u' Z i 5 5 s u' Z i f I / I i s = f K / K i dk i / di i / f I / I i + f K / K i dk i /di i 2 Qian and Roland 1998 Figuieres and Hindriks 2002 sz i > T t i + sz i - T = t i + Δ > t i I i f K i I i 1 2 1 1999 1997 18% 2002 51% 50% 1994 361. 37 2006 4 411. 58 23. 2%
8 2013 2 2008 1 40% 2005 80% 60% 50% 1 2 1998 1999 1995 18% 2002 76% 15% 2 2004 1 50% 2009 2005 43 2007 337
2013 2 9 i G i t = α i + β 1 Tran i t + λ'x i t + μ i t 6 t G Tran X 1 GDP GDP 2 0 14 Child 65 Old 3 Inequa 4 Urban 5 Popden 6 2010 2011 1 1999 1999 1999 1999 G1 0. 027 0. 021 0. 027 0. 018 0. 051 0. 033 0. 014 0. 007 0. 027 0. 013 G2 /GDP 0. 146 0. 105 0. 094 0. 029 0. 119 0. 036 0. 137 0. 101 0. 196 0. 134 Tran 0. 020 0. 027 0. 007 0. 006 0. 015 0. 013 0. 010 0. 011 0. 038 0. 038 Tran2 0. 018 0. 036 0. 005 0. 006 0. 009 0. 009 0. 010 0. 024 0. 037 0. 052
10 2013 2 1999 1999 1999 1999 Pergdp GDP 0. 864 0. 663 1. 105 0. 496 1. 840 0. 914 0. 434 0. 123 0. 686 0. 216 Urban % 34. 246 16. 12 39. 995 46. 292 27. 413 32. 181 19. 385 19. 885 11. 837 11. 027 Inequa 2. 770 0. 744 2. 105 0. 293 2. 359 0. 329 2. 840 0. 751 3. 239 0. 689 Child 0 14 % 33. 138 9. 338 33. 144 9. 817 23. 663 8. 307 40. 385 6. 291 30. 626 6. 096 Old 65 % 10. 215 2. 689 12. 202 2. 089 12. 396 3. 256 9. 020 1. 680 9. 326 2. 230 Popden / 0. 037 0. 046 0. 066 0. 058 0. 072 0. 068 0. 018 0. 015 0. 025 0. 025 Fiscalde = / 0. 547 0. 172 0. 720 0. 057 0. 734 0. 115 0. 529 0. 102 0. 405 0. 101 2004 1995 2004 30 10 1 2 1999 1999 GDP 1999 1999 1999 72% 73% 1999 52. 9% 40. 5% 1999 Hausman fixed effects random effects 2 1 4
2013 2 11 1 GDP 0. 922 92. 2% 2 Tran2 GDP 1995 2000 3 3 1 4 1 0. 131 1 2007 16% 2002 754. 74 2006 1 666. 82 31. 4% 37. 8% 2008 5 2 1 RE 2 RE 3 FE 4 FE 5 FE Tran 0. 176 *** 0. 012 0. 023 0. 022 0. 112 *** 0. 033 0. 131 *** 0. 033 0. 320 *** 0. 050 Tran2 0. 171 *** 0. 022 0. 056 0. 036-0. 026 0. 040-0. 006 0. 055 Pergdp 0. 030 *** 0. 030 *** 0. 030 *** 0. 027 *** 0. 031 *** 0. 002
12 2013 2 Urban Inequa Child Old Popden Fiscalde 1 RE 2 RE 3 FE 4 FE 0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 003 *** - 0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 0005 ** 0. 0002 0. 056 *** 0. 018 0. 005 0. 005 5 FE -. 0002 * 0. 0001 0. 002 0. 002-0. 0004 *** 0. 0001 0. 001 *** 0. 0003 0. 463 *** 0. 111-0. 018 ** 0. 008 Within-Rsq 0. 922 0. 934 0. 933 0. 939 0. 941 Obs 300 300 290 290 206 Hausman P 0. 882 0. 002 0. 002 0. 000 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% Knight 2002 1992 1997 1997 2002 2002 2007 1 1 1995 1997 3 Tsui 2005 1 China Vitae http / /www. chinavitae. com / Opper and Brehm 2007
2013 2 13 3 12 5 2 1 7 2 2 4 3 13 1 2 5 9 5 3 19 3 4 7 8 16 4 3 10 8 3 6 14 6 6 10 11 16 4 4 8 http / /www. chinavitae. com / 4 1 1 6 0. 02 3% 0. 832 2 4 Hausman IVFE FE 2 4 Tran Tran2 Pergdp Urban Inequa 0. 899 *** 0. 048 0. 006 *** 0. 002-0. 0005 *** 0. 0001-0. 003 0. 002 0. 448 *** 0. 172-0. 311 ** 0. 157 0. 025 *** 0. 002 0. 0002 * 0. 0001 0. 004 *** 1 2 1 IV Hausman 4 2 OLS
14 2013 2 Child Old Popden Fiscalde - 0. 0002 ** 0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 0004-0. 063 * 0. 033 0. 00001 0. 0001 0. 0004 * 0. 0002 0. 075 *** 0. 023 0. 013 * 0. 007 0. 0006 *** ccl 0. 0002 Within-Rsq 0. 832 0. 916 Obs 290 290 Hausman P 0. 896 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% GDP Persson and Tabellini 1999 6 5 1 GDP 70% 2 1 GDP 0. 02% GDP 2 3 2 Hausman Rodrik 1998 Alesina and Wacziarg 1998 2008 4 GDP 2 1%
2013 2 15 5 /GDP /GDP 1 RE 2 FE 3 IVFE 4 FE Tran 1. 691 *** 0. 170 1. 662 *** 0. 159 2. 788 *** 0. 768 1. 276 *** 0. 266 Tran2 0. 165 0. 187-0. 653 *** 0. 188-1. 676 ** 0. 710-0. 528 * 0. 315 Pergdp 0. 004 0. 003-0. 015 *** 0. 005-0. 023 *** 0. 007-0. 005 0. 008 Urban 0. 001 *** 0. 0004 0. 002 *** 0. 001 Inequa 0. 012 ** 0. 005 0. 020 *** 0. 006-0. 008 0. 009 Child - 0. 001 *** 0. 0003-0. 0005 0. 0004-0. 002 *** 0. 0005 Old 0. 003 *** 0. 003 *** 0. 003 * 0. 002 Popden 0. 256 *** 0. 085 0. 325 *** 0. 104 0. 256 * 0. 143 Fiscalde - 0. 081 *** 0. 024-0. 053 0. 032 0. 026 0. 040 Within-Rsq 0. 703 0. 775 0. 731 0. 436 Obs 290 290 290 290 Hausman P 0. 016 0. 973 0. 000 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% GDP 2005 1 1982 1998 40 29 1 /4 3. 3 1. 6 1999 2002 20% 1 1 50 1 4 000 500 / 2005 2005 77
16 2013 2 739 624 1 3 1995 V 2002 2003 2007 3 6 1 GDP 2 3 1 103 1 2 1 1998 1999 3 18 1
2013 2 17 6 1 RE 2 FE 3 FE 4 FE Tran 101. 654 *** 22. 962 88. 211 *** 27. 409 102. 628 *** 28. 502-11. 722 ** 4. 760 Pergdp - 5. 252 *** 1. 275-5. 800 ** 1. 713-5. 080 *** 1. 853-0. 381 0. 309 Urban 0. 400 *** 0. 140 0. 479 *** 0. 148-0. 046 * 0. 024 Inequa - 8. 215 *** 1. 767-6. 106 *** 2. 363 1. 005 ** 0. 395 Child - 0. 022 0. 110-0. 503 *** 0. 186 0. 063 ** 0. 031 Old - 0. 107 0. 345-0. 124 0. 590-0. 018 0. 099 Popden - 8. 922 34. 607 3. 885 34. 842 4. 558 5. 835 Fiscalde - 0. 004 0. 018 0. 006 0. 018-0. 005 * 0. 003 Year Dummy Within-Rsq 0. 097 0. 192 0. 239 0. 229 Obs 300 300 300 300 Hausman P 0. 064 0. 000 0. 000 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% GDP
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