( ) ( ) ;Tsui(2008) (accountable) (2006) ; (2007) (JIJIANZHICHU) 1994 ÁÂÃÁÃÂÄÁÄÂÅÁ ÃÆÄÃÆÇÃÆÈÃÆÉÄÁÄÁÄÁÇ 8.46% %; (GOVERNFEE) 19

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1 ~ ( 2005) ( 2006) (responsiveness) (Shah1998) (preference-matching)? (Inman and Rubinfeld1997;Oates ); Brueckner(1982) ( Massachusetts ) ;Faguet(2004) ; Zhurarskaya (2000) Shah(2004)

2 ( ) ( ) ;Tsui(2008) (accountable) (2006) ; (2007) (JIJIANZHICHU) 1994 ÁÂÃÁÃÂÄÁÄÂÅÁ ÃÆÄÃÆÇÃÆÈÃÆÉÄÁÄÁÄÁÇ 8.46% %; (GOVERNFEE) % %; ( (WENJIAOKEWEI) ) GDP % % (FUXUJIUJI) %?? (2004) ; (2006) Logit (Multinomial Logit) ; (2007) ; 1 ; Logit ; 7 ; ~ ; 1991~2005 Logit ;

3 1. Borcherding Deacon (1972) Bergstrom Goodman (1973) Means Mehay (1995) Turnbull Mitias(1995) (2) (1) ;(2) ; (3) ;(4) ; GDP ;(5) GDP ;(6) (Bergstrom and Goodman1973) GDP G G m =G/N r N ;r (3) r=1 ; r=0 ;0<r<1 U m =U m (X m G m ) (1) X m q 1 τ m s.t. X m +τ m q G m N γ Y m (2) Y m G m* =G * (τ m qn γ Y m ) (3) (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Denzau and Mackay 1976; Gramlich and Rubinfeld1982) C-D G m* =c(τ m qn γ ) α Y m β (4) G m* G= N γ G m G * G * =cq α τ mα N γ(1+α) Y m β (5) (5) ln(g)=c'+αlnτ m +βlny m +γ(1+ α)lnn+ε (6) ~ (1)

4 ( ) ÂÃÂÃÂÃÂ ÁÂÃÄÅÁÂÃÄÅÁÂÃÄÅÁÂÃÄÅ )Á (SUR) ~ ( RE Ayres Levitt(1998) (j=1 7;i=1 28;t=1 7) (9) f ij j????????? (1 )?(ln N ) (ln N )??(ln ) (ln )? (ln???? (j=1 7;i=1 28;t=1 7) (10) (2) 0.25 GDP (tax25) (grosspop) )Á ~2005 GDP GDP 2 GDP ) ( ~ ) GDP (0.25 ) 85% (FE) (RE) GDP (4) Bergstrom Goodman (1973) Gramlich Rubinfeld (1982) Berstrom SUR Pooling (1982) ; Borcherding Deacon(1972) 0.25?(ln G ) (ln G )??(ln ) (ln )??(ln Y ) (ln Y??????? 0.25 τ 0.25 = (7)?????????????? (5) ln(g)=c'+αlnτ βlny γ(1+α)lnn+φz+ε (8) G ;Y 0.25 τ 0.25 ; 0.25 GDP ; ;Z ;C' pop65 65 ;pop15 ;ε ; (gdp25) 3 15 ;eduyear ; 9 ; 12 ; 18 4 ; ;popurban ;employ ; ; 7 stateworker ;sec- ond (1) (3) 2000~2006 ; GDP 2000~

5 ; ~ GDP 7 (1)~(7) edu fuxujiuji health security governfee taxsector jijian (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) gdp25 (10.64)Á(8.47)Á(10.70)Á(4.84)Á(11.25)Á(6.64)Á(6.44)Á taxprice25 (-2.02)Á(-1.05) (-2.14)Á(-1.5) (-0.87) (-1.68)Á(0.51) grosspop (1.70)Á(0.09) (1.19) (1.78)Á(0.29) (1.41) (0.09) eduyear (5.26)Á(3.22)Á(2.67)Á(5.43)Á(2.95)Á(2.97)Á(3.07)Á pop (2.76)Á(2.45)Á(2.23)Á-0.84 (0.84) (1.89)Á pop15 - (-4.41)Á(-6.82)Á(-4.17)Á(-5.39)Á(-7.02)Á(-4.84)Á popurban - (5.46 Á(4.33)Á(4.86)Á(0.53) (3.07)Á(2.23)Á % ; ; ; ~2006 GDP 3. ; 7 (SUR) ( R 2 ) ; Wald % ; empoly (2.76)Á(-1.05) (-0.20) (-2.65)Á stateworker (-5.03)Á(-3.11)Á(-0.41) second (2.29)Á(-1.37) γ? (1.69)Á(0.09) (1.19) (1.76)Á(0.29) (1.41) (0.086) RMSE Adj-RÂ ChiÂ(k) P (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ; (2)γ ;(3)k ;(4)edu fuxujiuji health security governfee taxsector jijian ; 6 ( ) ;

( ) 2009 1 ; )* +-.!"# 46.43 60.71 67.86 46.43 53.57 50 46.43 1999 $%& 46.43 32.14 21.43 53.57 42.86 42.86 39.29 ( $ 7.14 7.14 10.71 0 3.57 7.14 14.29!"# 60.71 67.86 57.14 71.43 67.86 57.14 71.43 2000 $%& 32.

6 ( ) ; )* +-.!"# $%& ( $ !"# $%& ( $ !"# $%& ( $ !"# ; 2002 $%& ( $ !"# $%& ( $ !"# $%& ( $ !"# $%& ( $ !"# ~ $%& ( $ Breusch-Pagan P 0 SUR RMSE 95% 5% ; j ; j ; j ; (tax effort index) RMSE j j (11) ( 1 );Llavador? (RMSE) 1999~2005 Roemer(2001) 28 edu fuxujiuji health security governfee taxsector jijian ( edu 1 ) fuxujiuji health security govern taxsector jijian Breusch-Pagan test of independence chiá(21)= P

7 Logit (Multinomial 1999 Logit model) π il i l π il Pr(Y i =l)l=012 ;2001 ~2003 k π il Logistic (Fox1997) ; 2004 l=12 7 ; l (baseline category) 1 (12) 1999~2005 (pooling data) 7 l=12 (13) π il π i0 70% β (13) 12%~20% Y i π i0 π i1 π i ; i ; (11) Y i =l E il = 1 E il =0 i E il =1 Y i (14) (11) (15) 1 =0 (12) (15) 1 (11) (Polytomous data Multinomial data) OLS ( =0 ) (12) l-1 (12) =0 N (16)

8 X i ' (1X i1 X ik )β l (β 0l β 1l β kl )' (17) (18) / fissurplus / fisburden /GDP density ( /!"#$ /%& ( avegdp )*GDP+-$./ GDP openness 6789 ; </GDP marketrate =>? +@$ ABCDC /GDP urbanrate EF? EF / ( ) (19) 0 β l l=12 (20) (12) 2006; 2007) m 2000~2006 ; ; 2000~2006 x m β lm ( 2007) 7 7 SUR 7 ( ) ( ) ; ( GDP 5~ 11 7 Logit (SUR) 8 Logit Logit 4 1 ( =2 8 =1) ( =0) Logit =0( ) (2007) ( 1 V.S. 0; 2 V.S. 0) Wald 8 Logit ;

9 (-1.68)Á fissurplus (-1.06) (-1.4) (3.55)Á(2.57)Á(2.55)Á(1.93)Á (1.99)Á(2.22)Á avegdp openness urbanrate (2.75)Á(3.29)Á-0.17 (-0.22) marketrate =0 is the base category Pseudo RÂ= LR chiâ(10)=31.5 Prob>chiÂ= (1) ;(2) =1 1 = ; (-3.88)Á(-2.27ÂÁ (1.77)Á(1.96)Á(0.16) (-0.10) fissurplus 10% avegdp (-1.77)Á(-2.46)Á(-1.69)Á(-1.23) openness urbanrate (2.80)Á(3.19)Á(2.19)Á(2.07)Á marketrate =0 is the base category Pseudo RÃ= LR chiã(6)=16.61 Prob>chiÃ= ; (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) =1 1 =2 2 ; (-2.42)Á(-2.23)Á (2) 5 0 χ 2 Wald =1 1 = SUR (-2.63)Á(-1.09) ~ 11 (1.83)Á(2.15)Á(-1.25) (1) LR ( 8) (-2.8)Á(-3.88)Á(-0.51) (0.04) ( 10) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% % (1.43) (1.49) (-0.53) (-0.73) fissurplus (-1.92)Á(-2.00)Á(1.11) (1.40) avegdp (-3.00)Á -2.96)Á(-1.07) (-0.49) openness (2.61)Á(2.16)Á(1.66)Á(1.34) urbanrate (2.96)Á(2.65)Á(1.74)Á(1.37) marketrate =0 is the base category Pseudo RÂ= LR chiâ(10)=24.88 Prob>chiÂ= (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) %; GDP ; (3) % 5% ; 2

10 =1 1 =2 2 = (-1.96)Á(-0.59) (0.12) (0.40) (-1.55) (-1.69)* (1.63)* (1.52) (0.94) (0.62) fissurplus fissurplus avegdp avegdp (-1.46) (-1.10) (-0.99) (-0.81) openness (0.77) (0.46) (2.47)** (2.42)** openness urbanrate urbanrate marketrate marketrate _0 is the base category (0.49) (0.11) (2.00)Á(1.93)Á Pseudo RÂ= LR chiâ(4)=6.97 Prob>chiÂ= =0 is the base category (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% Pseudo RÂ LR chiâ(6) 8.11 Prob>chiÂ ;(2) (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) =1 1 =2 2 =1 1 = (-2.70)Á(-4.36)Á (0.05) (-0.88) (0.53) (0.06) (3.17)Á(3.66)Á fissurplus (-1.61) (-1.93)* (1.97)** (2.27)** fissurplus avegdp (-0.51) (0.06) (-3.35)*** (-3.45)*** (0.18) (0.57) (-2.06)Á(-2.45)Á openness avegdp (0.21) (0.68) (-2.16)** (-2.94)*** urbanrate openness (1.09) (0.78) (2.43)Á(2.53)Á urbanrate marketrate marketrate =0 is the base category =0 is the base category Pseudo RÂ LR chiâ(6) Prob>chiÂ Pseudo R LR R 2 chi2(6) Prob>chi ( ) = (-1.69)* (-3.19)Á (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) ;(2) ; GDP ; GDP ; (5) 9 1 (4) 7 ; 2 1 5% 2 ; 1 ; GDP 10% 2 ;

11 (6) % ; 2 5% 2 GDP ; 5% 1 IMF 28 ( ) 3 ( GDP ) (T/GDP) ; ; Logit (Piancastelli2001;Gupta2007) SUR 1. (median voter rule) ( ; ( 0.25 WB ; ; 2 (single-peaked) ) (0.25 ) ) ; 1(pooling Means Mehay(1995) GDP )

12 ( ) Ayres Levitt(1998) 2SLS 1183~1205. (14)Borcherding T.E. Deacon R. T The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Government The American E- F R 2 AIC conomic Reviews 62 No. 5. (December) pp. 891~901. (15)Brueckner J. K A Test of Allocative Efficiency in The Local Public Sector 19 pp. 311~331. Journal of Public Economics Vol. (16)Denzau A. T. Mackay R. J Benefit Shares Z and Majority Voting The American Economic Review Vol. 66 No.1. (March) pp. 69~76. t (17)Faguet J. P Dose Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia Journal of Public Economics Vol.88 pp. 867~ (18)Fox J Applied Regression Analysis Linear Tao Zhang Hengfu Models and Related Methods SAGE Publications. Zou(1998) (19)Gramlich E. M. Rubinfeld D. L Micro Esti- mates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-voter Hypotheses The Journal of Political (1999) Economy Vol. 90 No. 3. (January) pp. 536~560. (20)Gupta A. S Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries IMF Working Paper WP/07/184. (21)Inman R. P. Rubinfeld D. L Rethinking Fed- Journal of Economic Perspective Vol. 11 pp. 43~64. Wald (density) eralism (fisburden) (22)Llavador H. G. Roemer J E An Equal-opportunity Approach to the Allocation of International Aid Jour- 3 nal of Development Economics Vol. 64 pp. 147~171. (23)Means T. S. Mehay S. L Estimating the Publicness of Local Government Services 4 Alternative Congestion Function Specifications Southern Economic Journal Vol. 61 No. 3. (January) pp. 614~627. (1) ( 5 ) (24)Oates W. E An Essay on Fiscal Federalism 2007 Journal of Economic Literature Vol.37 No.3. (Sep) pp. 1120~ (2) (3) 2006 (25)Oates W. E Theory of Fiscal Federalism Toward A Second -Generation International Tax and Public Finance 12 pp. 349~373. (4) (26)Piancastelli Marcelo 2001 Measuring The Tax Effort (5) ( 3 ) of Developed and Developing Countries Cross Country Panel 2007 Data Analaysis-1985/95 IPEA Working Paper. ISSN 1415~ (6) (7) (27)Shah A Balance Accountability and Responsiveness Lessons about Decentralization World Bank Washington DC Policy Research Working Paper (8) (28)Shah A Fiscal Decentralization in Developing and Transition Economies Progress Problems and the Promise (9) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No (10) (11)Ayres I. Levitt S. D Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution An Empirical Analysis of Lojack Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 pp.43~ 77. (12)Bergstrom T. C. Goodman R. P Private Demands for Public Goods The American Economic Reviews 63 (June) pp.280~297. (13)Bergstrom T. C. Rubinfeld D. L. Shapiro P Micro-Based Estimates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures Econometrica Vol. 50 No. 5. (September) pp. (29)Tao Zhang Heng-fu Zou 1998 Fiscal Decentralization Public Spending and Economic Growth in China Journal of Public Economics Vol.67 pp.221~240. (30)Tsui K. Y. Wang Y. Q Decentralization with Political Trump Vertical Control Local Accountability and Regional Disparities in China China Economic Review Vol. 16 pp.403~418. (31)Turnbull G. K. Mitias P. M Which Median Voter? Southern Economic Journal Vol. 62 No.1. (July) pp. 183~191. (32)Zhurarskaya E. V Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods Fiscal Federalism Russian Style Journal of Public Economics Vol. 76 pp. 337~

Microsoft Word - 1.2.Local government organization and finance in China.doc

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