1240 ( ) 11 1 (LaPortaetal.2002) 2 ( 2004) (2008) ( ) ( 2005) 1998 ( 2003) 3 1 (2010) LaPortaetal.(2002) % ; 20% 100% 90% 99.03%

11 4 2012 7 ( ) ChinaEconomicQuarterly Vol.11No.4 July2012 * 2006 2009 ; ; ( 2007; 2007) 20 80 ( 2005) ( 2008) ( 2007; 2007) ( 2007) ; (2008) * : 94 300071;Email:qxhsdu02@163.com (10ZD&035) (71172066) (08JJD630007)

1240 ( ) 11 1 (LaPortaetal.2002) 2 ( 2004) (2008) ( ) ( 2005) 1998 ( 2003) 3 1 (2010) 20 90 90 2 LaPortaetal.(2002) 1995 99.45% ; 20% 100% 90% 99.03% 3 ( 2008-12-04) ( 2009-05-14)

4 : 1241 2006 2009 : ; ; : ; : ; ; ; ( ) (Alenetal.2005) (Easterly2005) (Montinolaetal.1995; Qian and Weingast1997; Qian and Roland 1998) 20 80 Jinetal. (2005)

1242 ( ) 11 ( 1990) ( 2001) (2007) Zhang andzou (1998) (2000) (2005) ( 2007) ( 2008) (2008) (BlanchardandShleifer 2001) ( 2005) ( 20042007)Maskinetal.(2000) (Yardstick Competition) ;LiandZhou (2005) (2005) GDP ;Fanetal.(2009) (2008) (2007) ; (2007) U ; (2008) ( 2009) ( 2010a) ( 2010b) Yao andzhang (2011)

4 : 1243 ( ) Kornai (1979) Shleiferand Vishny (1994) (LaPortaetal.2002;Beck andlevine2002) 4 : Mian (2003) ;Miccoetal.(2007) Nakaneand Weintraub (2005) Boubakrietal. (2005) (2001) DEA ; (2003) X ; (2005) 5 (2004) ; (2007) ; (2009) U Sapienza (2004) ;Dinc (2005) 4 LaPortaetal.(2002) 5 ( 2009 2010; 2009)

1244 ( ) 11 Miccoet al.(2007) (2006) ; (2007) ;Jia (2009) ( ) ; ( 2008) : ( ) 2006 2009 100

4 : 1245 78 2006 2009 241 ; ; 21 2006 2009 ; (2007) (2008) ; (2007) 6 ( ) ( 2008) 1 (2008) :(1) 6 :(1) ;(2)

1246 ( ) 11 ; 7 (2) ; 8 (3) ; 9 (4) 10 1 2006 2009 116 11 56 48.28%; 33 28.45%; 20 17.24%; 7 6% (2008) 1 56 48.28 32 55.17 7 6.03 9 15.52 20 17.24 14 24.14 33 28.45 3 5.17 116 100 58 100 :(1) 2010 58 50% ; (2) ( ) ; 12 (3) ; 13 (4) (2008) ;(5) 14 1 58 32 55.17%; 14 7 8 9 10 11 2003 2 2006 11 2006 11 12 2008 ( ) 13 ( ) 14 3 (2006) (2006) (2008)

4 : 1247 24.14% (2008) (43%) (34%) ; 9 15.52% 3 (2008) 77% 79% : ; 1 3 241 ; 116 1 1 10 2.66 1.68 1 2 69 ( 28.6%) 3 ; 3 4 5 6 10 ( 97 40.2%) 7 3 8 9 10 1 (2007 2009 ) 1 2 66 57%; 20 4 3

1248 ( ) 11 2 3 42 60 53.2 3.36 53 (36 ) 42 50 43 17.8%;51 55 141 58.5%; 55 57 23.7% ( ) (la) 2 PanelA 2 t la Bootstrap 300

4 : 1249 la 59% (2008) 52.9% la (la 52.2%) la (la 56.8%) 2 la T BootstrapZ la T BootstrapZ PanelA 0.542 (0.093) 0.18 0.18 0.522 (0.100) -1.82* -1.78 * 0.590 (0.064) 2.48** 3.45 *** 0.560 (0.098) 0.92 0.82 0.529 0.568-1.32-1.28 (0.087) (0.072) 1.73* 1.98 ** 0.533 (0.086) -0.56-0.57 0.542 (0.085) PanelB 0.529 (0.087) -1.32-1.21 + 0.544 (0.089) -1.32 1.22 + 0.12 0.12 0.502 (0.112) -2.15** -1.99 ** 0.535-0.43-0.50 (0.089) : *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 4 4 5 8 3 ; 1 7 4

1250 ( ) 11 15 ( ) : 3 la=α0 +α1govern+α2rq+α3age+α4xl+α5x +α5+i year i +ε. i=1 : (la / ) 16 govern : (waidi 1 0) (lpro 1 0); : (qpro 1 0) (erxian 1 0)rq (2008) (age ) (xl 1 4) X (size ) (s 1 ) (gov 1 0) ( 2004) (area 1 0) (LiandZhou2005) (gdp GDP ) (year 2006 ) 15 (2007) (2008) U ; 3 (2007) 5 5 5 18 6 6 5 16

4 : 1251 ( ) 3 3 s1 0.208 18 0.142 0.04 0.75 gov 0.817 1 0.387 0 1 size 14.27 14.19 0.874 12.07 16.52 area 0.212 0 0.409 0 1 gdp 14.564 14.00 2.762 7.00 29.00 3 20.81% 4% 75%; gov 81.7% size ;area 21.2% ;gdp ( ) 17 1. 4 4 3 waidi 1% 5 2 PanelA 5 17 4 5 F Hausman xl gov area (Wooldridge 2000) FGLS Driscol-Kraay PoolOLS

1252 ( ) 11 ( 2009) (EliteGroup) (PerssonandZhuravskaya2009) ; 4 la (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) waidi 5.428 *** 4.870 *** 5.262 *** (1.42) (1.47) (1.42) lpro -1.729-1.684-0.985 (1.48) (1.57) (1.72) rq 0.669 ** 0.687 ** 0.774 ** 0.772 *** (0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) age -0.215-0.183-0.229-0.209 (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) xl -0.663-1.157-0.721-1.184 (0.86) (0.91) (0.89) (0.94) size -0.050-0.159 (0.77) (0.87) s1-10.375 *** -10.417 *** (3.95) (3.85) gov -1.800-1.406 (1.52) (1.48) area -3.091 ** -2.645 * (1.56) (1.57) gdp -0.051 0.013 (0.26) (0.28) year yes yes yes yes yes yes cons 56.585 *** 67.978 *** 72.947 *** 57.186 *** 69.123 *** 74.863 *** (1.13) (11.49) (13.96) (1.15) (12.65) (15.72) Obs 241 241 241 241 241 241 Adj.R 2 0.048 0.052 0.082 0.026 0.036 0.059 Ftest 6.073 *** 4.098 *** 4.291 *** 2.756 ** 2.558 ** 2.823 *** : *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 Stata wls0

4 : 1253 lpro 2 (2008) ; (Fanet al.2009) lpro rq 4 ; 7 8 s 1 area ; 2. 4 5 qpro 2 ; (2008) (2008) : 22 ; 34 la 2 PanelB la 50.2% 5% la; la 53.5% la

1254 ( ) 11 lqpro ( 1 0) nlqpro ( 1 0) 5 lqpro nlqpro (la 4.6 ) la qpro lqpro la ( 2010) ; ( 2008) (YaoandZhang2011) lqpro 5 la (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) qpro -3.581 ** -3.345 ** (1.48) (1.41) erxian 2.492 * 3.148 * (1.45) (1.78) lqpro -4.108 ** -4.577 ** (2.01) (2.05) nlqpro -2.505 (1.75) rq 0.759 ** 0.748 ** 0.609 * 0.718 ** (0.34) (0.31) (0.33) (0.34) age -0.256-0.328-0.186-0.238 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) xl -0.809-1.201-0.759-0.765 (0.86) (0.88) (0.87) (0.87) size -0.313-0.368-0.058-0.135 (0.77) (0.76) (0.79) (0.80) s1-9.092 ** -8.396 ** -9.756 ** -9.065 ** (4.08) (3.68) (4.10) (4.07) gov -1.237-1.582-1.411-1.149 (1.35) (1.39) (1.32) (1.36) area -2.286-1.707-2.332-2.276 (1.56) (1.57) (1.52) (1.56) gdp -0.127-0.022-0.182-0.140 (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19)

4 : 1255 la ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) cons 58.322 *** 81.119 *** 56.298 *** 83.585 *** 74.440 *** 77.735 *** (1.22) (13.64) (1.21) (14.16) (13.82) (14.23) year yes yes yes yes yes yes Obs 241 241 241 241 241 241 Adj.R 2 0.048 0.083 0.030 0.080 0.077 0.082 Ftest 4.075 *** 2.819 *** 2.830 ** 2.735 *** 2.659 *** 2.657 *** : *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 Stata wls0 erxian (Fanetal.2009) 56 52.6 ( 2.66 ) erxian 18 (YaoandZhang2011) area 4 la la 3. 6 la la 8 4 5 la 18 60 (56 ) (2.66 )

1256 ( ) 11 10% ; ; 6 la rq 0.765 *** 1.276 ** -1.957 * 0.586 0.498 1.509 ** 3.048-0.497-0.004 (0.29) (0.56) (0.86) (0.69) (0.652) (0.743) (6.32) (1.57) (0.59) Obs 241 118 19 43 61 56 18 29 134 Adj.R 2 0.105 0.279 0.678 0.308 0.255 0.138 0.219 0.139 0.011 Ftest 3.073 *** 5.742 *** 4.791 ** 2.701 ** 2.874 *** 2.933 *** 1.43 1.41 1.14 : *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 4 waidi lpro 100 OLS Stata wls0 5 qpro ; ; ; (2008)

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1260 ( ) 11 [48] 2009 12 1 na Journalof Public Economics199867(2)221 240. [52] ( )2005 5 1 75 108 [53] 2005 1 91 101 [54] 2004 6 33 40 [55] 2007 7 36 50 [56] : 2008 [57] : 2005 1 83 96 [58] 2003 6 72 79 LocalOfficialGovernanceandCreditSupplyof thecitycommercialbanks WEI AN LI XIANHANG QIAN (Nankai University) 18 [49] : 2005 4 101 105 [50] 2007 11 91 103 [51]ZhangT.andH.Zou FiscalDecentralizationPublicSpendingandEconomicGrowthinChi- Abstract Thepaperexamstherelationshipbetweengovernancecharacteristicsoflocal oficialsandcreditsupplyofthecitycommercialbanks (CCB)usingthecorresponding sampleofmunicipalpartycommiteesecretary (MPCS)andCCBduring2006 2009.The resultsindicatethattherehavesignificantdiferencesincreditsupplyamongccblocatedin diferenttypesofmpcs.fromthepointofsourcetheccblocatedin where MPCSfrom othercitywilsignificantlyexpandcredit.andfromthepointofdestinationtheccblocated inwherempcspromotedtoprovinceorcenterwilnotablytightencreditandfurtheranaly- sisshowthatthisefectisduetothe MPCSfrom provinceorcenterandthenpromotedto provinceorcenter.howevertheccblocatedinwhere MPCSrelegatedtosecond-tierwil alsosignificantlyexpandcredit.fromthepointoftenurempcs stenurehasapositivecor- relationwith CCB screditoveralbuttherehavediferentcorrelationsbetweentenureof MPCSwithdiferentgovernancecharacteristicsandCCB scredit. JELClasification G21O17R51