476 ( ) 2 ( ),2003),,,,,, 932,Berle and Means(932), ;,, (,2005;,2004;,2005;,2006;,2004;,2005),, (2008),,,RajanandZingales(2000), (Knight),,RajanandZin

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1 ( ) ChinaEconomicQuarterly Vol.2,No.2 January,203 王哲兵韩立岩 * 摘要,,,,,,,,,, 关键词,, 一引言,,,,,, ;,, (Boot,etal.,2006),,Burkart etal.(997), ( ),, *, ;,, 37,009; ; hanly@63.com (708300) (708206) (300297) (202XJQ009),,

2 476 ( ) 2 ( ),2003),,,,,, 932,Berle and Means(932), ;,, (,2005;,2004;,2005;,2006;,2004;,2005),, (2008),,,RajanandZingales(2000), (Knight),,RajanandZingales(2000),,,,,, (AlenandPanian,982;Chandler,990;Gomez-Mejiaetal.,2003;Per- ez-gonzalez,2006;schulzeetal.,2003),, AndersonandReeb (2003,2004) McConaughyetal.(998) VilalongaandAmit(2006) , q (2006)

3 2 477 ( ) ( ),,, ;, U,,,,,,,,,,,,, CEO CEO, 50% ;,,, ;,, CEO,,,, 二模型的假设,

4 478 ( ) 2 CEO r (r [0,]) Berleand Means(932) (2008),, CEO r=0,, ;r=,,r 2 CEO, CEO ω= ω+rπ 珔, ω珔 CEO,r (r [0,]) CEO, CEO,π 3 CEO a, π CEO p ; a 2,, π2 CEO a π,ceo CEO a 2 (Gugleretal.,2008),CEO,, CEO,,, π2, CEO, CEO, CEO, CEO R, CEO 4 3 a 2 r, π2 r, π2= π2(r) π2 = kr (-r), 烄 0 r</2; 烅 /4k, 烆 /2 r ; k >0, k,k CEO 50%,CEO 00% (,2007), CEO 50%, 0 r</2, π2 r, π 2 (r)>0,π 2 (r)<0; /2 r<,

5 2 479 CEO /2, π2 r, π 2 (r)=0, 0 r</2,π2 ; /2 r<,π2, CEO R, BarclayandHolderness(989),,Barclayand Holderness,,, (Leaseetal.,984;DeAn- geloanddeangelo,985) CEO R r, R=R(r)=k 2r, k 2, k 2>0 CEO,, CEO R, R=R(r) k 2r a 2 C 2, C 2>0 C 2>0, C 2= b2,,b 2 R2 2>0 b 2, CEO r CEO, R,, rr, CEO (-r)r CEO U R=(-r)R- b2, 2 R2 R r MaxU R = (-r)r- b2 2 R2 ; s.t.r k 2r. (), DyckandZingales (2004),k 2 ( ),CEO,,, CEO, b 2,b 2 k 2, b 2=/k 2

6 480 ( ) 2 b 2=/k 2 (), 烄 R = k2r, 0 r</2; 烅 k 2 (-r), 烆 /2 r.,, /2k <k 2<k, R π2 (0,/2), (2) 三治理结构选择对公司业绩影响模型,,CEO r CEO,,, π (3) E(π)= E(π)+E(π2)-E(R)- 珔 ω 烄 = E (a )+k (-r)r-k 2r- ω, 珔 0 r</2; 烅烆 E(a )+/4k -k 2 +k 2r- ω, 珔 /2 r<., CEO (4) ω= 珔 ω+re(π)+r (3) 烄 ω+r[e(a 珔 )+k (-r)r-k 2r- ω]+k 珔 2r, 0 r</2; = 烅烆 ω+r[e(a 珔 )+/4k -k 2 +k 2r- ω]+k 珔 2 -k 2r, /2 r<. (4)

7 2 48 [ ],, r - r -, 0 r</2, CEO /2,,, /2, CEO /2,CEO CEO, CEO CEO,, CEO, CEO, CEO,,CEO maxe(π)= E(π)+E(π2)-R- 珔 ω = E(p)+k (-r)r-k 2r- 珔 ω, s.t.0 r</2. (5) (5), d[e(π)] dr =-2rk+ (k -k 2 )=0,CEO r - = k-k2 r 2k - (5), E(π r)=e(p)+ 珋 (k -k 2 ) 2 4k - 珔 ω [ ],, 50% /2 r<, CEO /2,CEO, CEO CEO CEO, (6) Maxω = 珔 ω+re(π)+r. (6) (4) /2 r<,ω= ω+r[e(a 珔 )+/4k -k 2+k 2r- ω] 珔 -k 2r+k 2, (7) Maxω =k 2r 2 + [E(p)+/4k -2k 2 - 珔 ω]r+k 2 + 珔 ω,

8 482 ( ) 2 s.t./2 r<. (7) (7), k 2>0,ω r,, ( ) 2k ω 2+ ω-/4k 珔 -E(p) 2k 2 2k2+ ω-/4k 珔 -E(p) > 3 2k 2 4, E (p)</2k 2+ ω-/4k 珔,Maxω r=/2; 2k2+ ω-/4k 珔 -E(p) < 3 2k 2 4, E (p)>/2k 2+ ω-/4k 珔, Maxω r= 2k2+ ω-/4k 珔 -E(p) = 3 2k 2 4, E (p)=/2k 2 + ω珔 -/4k,Maxω r=/2 k k 2 ω珔,, /2 r<,ceo CEO E(p), CEO E(p)>/2k 2+ ω-/4k 珔,CEO, CEO E(p) </2k 2+ ω-/4k 珔,CEO /2 Bitleretal. (2005) 2, 20% CEO 50%, 70% CEO 2 CEO Bitleretal.(2005) CEO r 50%, (3) E(π )= E(p)+ 4 k- 2 k2- ω; CEO 珔 r, (3) E(π)=E(p)+ 4 k- 珔 ω CEO E(p), E(π )<E(π r)<e(π) 珋,CEO, 2, ;CEO,,,, 2

9 2 483 Mileretal.(2007) Miler,Miler,, Mileretal.(2007),,, 四创业者的选择,, ; CEO,,, CEO ;, ( ),, CEO CEO pd, ω= ω+ 珔 re(π), CEO r - = k-k2,, 2k E(πD)= E(pD)+ ( k -k 2 ) 2 4k - 珔 ω. (8) ( ), CEO, 00%

10 484 ( ) 2,, (),E(pA)>/2k 2+ ω-/4k 珔, pa ; (2),, E(πD)=[E(pD)+k (-r)r-k 2r- ω], 珔 r - = k-k2 ; 2k, ω= ω+re(π 珔 D )+R CEO, re(π D ), ω+r 珔 E(πD)+ 珔 ω+r = [E(pD)+k (-r)r-k 2r- 珔 ω]+ 珔 ω+k 2r. (9) (4), ωa =E(pA )+/4k, ωa E(πD)+ ω+r 珔 (9) E(pA)+/4k E(pD)+k (-r)r r - = k-k2 2k E(pA) E(pD)- k2 2 4k. (0) k,k 2>0, k2 2 >0, 4k, E(pA) > /2k 2 + 珔 ω-/4k E(pA) E (pd)- k2 2 4k. E(pD) /2k 2+ ω-/4k 珔, E(pA) E(pD), k 2 2, E(pD )>/2k 2+ 珔 ω-/4k 4k,

11 2 485 E(πA)-E(πD)= [ E(pA)+ k 4 - 珔 ] [ ] ω - E (pd)+ ( k -k 2 ) 2-4k ω 珔 = E(pA)-E(pD)+ k 4 - ( k -k 2 ) 2 kk2 -k2 2 2k. 4k k k,k 2>0, /2k <k 2<k, k 2-k 2 2 >0, E(πA)> 2k E(πD) [ ],, ( ),, r,r [0.5,), CEO,, -r, /2, CEO, CEO,,, PO, [ ], PO, () (-r)e(πa) (-r)e(πd)+v P (-r), (),V P PO -r>0, () E(πA) E(πD )+ V P,

12 486 ( ) 2 (3) (8) E(pA)+ 4 k -k2 +k2r- 珔 ω E(pD)+ ( k -k 2 ) 2, 4k - 珔 ω+v P. E(pA)-E(pD) k k k 2 4k -k 2r+V P. (2) r=0.5,e(pa)-e(pd) k2 2 +V P +V P 4k 4k k 2 2 r=0.5,, E(pA) E(pD ), +V P Bootetal. 4k k 2 2 (2006) Boot,,,, r r,ceo, r 0.5, CEO,,,,,,, 五投票权价值,,,,,,,

13 2 487,,,,, Hermalin (2005),,,, (in- dexedstockoption) Hermalin (2005) Johnson andtian (2000) ( ) CEO ( 0 ), CEO, p0 p0 μ,, 0 τ0,, pm N μm0+r Mt, τ τ0 ( M ) t,r M, μm0 0, τm, y0,, p0,, CEO, s 0 y,y, pm, s, < s 0 s y0 y, p0 pm x ( ;, )

14 488 ( ) 2 p0 pm,y0 y ( ) y0, CEO CEO μ^0,, τ^0 μ^0 = τ0 μ 0 +s0y0 τ0 +s 0, τ^0 =τ0 +s 0. ( DeGroot,970,pp.67 69) r M, t μ M= μ M0+rMt y, μ^m,, τ^m μ^m = τm μm +sy, τ^m =τm +s. τm +s μ^0<μ^m, CEO, CEO; μ^0 μ^m, CEO μ^m ( ) CEO p0, y0 p0 s 0, CEO p0 μ, 0 y0 μ, 0 + pm s 0 τ0 μ, M y μ M s + τm, max{0, μ^m-μ^0} JohnsonandTian (2000), μ^0 μ^m μ^m-μ^0 μ^m -μ^0= τm μ M +sy τm +s = ( μ M -μ 0 )+ - τ0 μ 0 +s0y0 τ0 +s 0 s (y τm +s -μ )- s0 M (y0 [ τ0 +s 0 -μ ] 0 ). y0 y, μ 0 μ M, y0 y

15 2 489 s, τm +s (y-μ )- s0 M τ0+s 0 (y0-μ ) 0 0, s0 τ0(τ0+s 0 ) + s τm (τm +s ), z= 槡 H [ s τm +s (y-μ )- s0 M τ0+s 0 (y0-μ ] 0 ), H=, z 0, s 0 τ0(τ0+s 0 ) + s τm (τm +s ) t V = E[max(0, μ^m -μ^0)] { } = + max 0,( μ M -μ )+ z 0 - 槡 H z 槡 π e- dz = ( μ M -μ 0 )[-N(( μ 0 -μ M ) 槡 H)]+ 槡 2π H e- 2 ( μ 0 -μ ) 2H M, (3) N( ) V μ 0 = N(( μ 0 -μ M ) 槡 H)-, (4) V μ M =-N(( μ 0 -μ M ) 槡 H), (5) V r M = V M = [-N(( μ M μ r M μ 0 -μ ) 槡 M H)]t. (6) N( ), 0<N(( μ M-μ ) 槡 0 H ) <, V <0, V >0, V >0, μ 0 μ M r M CEO μ, 0 μ, M r M, n V n, V P = V n (4) (6), n= CEO μ 0, ; r M, (2), CEO, CEO r r M, CEO μ, 0, CEO, CEO r μ, (2) 0

16 490 ( ) 2 r M,,, ;,, 六结论与展望, CEO, ; CEO,, U,, CEO CEO, 50%,,,, ;,, CEO, 50%,,,,,,

17 2 49 参考文献 [] Alen,M.,andS.Panian, Power,PerformanceandSuccessionintheLargeCorporation,Ad- ministrativescience Quarterly,982,4(27), [2] Anderson,R.,and D.Reeb, Board CompositionBalancing FamilyInfluencein S&P 500 Firms,AdministrativeScience Quarterly,2004,2(49), [3] Anderson,R.,andD.Reeb, Founding-familyOwnershipandFirm PerformanceEvidencefrom thes&p500,journalof Finance,2003,3(58), [4],,,2005 2, 8 27 [5] Barclay,M.,andC.Holderness, PrivateBenefitsofControlofPublicCorporations,Journalof FinancialEconomics,989,2(25), [6] Berle,A.,andG.Means,The Modern Corporationand Pricate Property.New YorkMacmil- lan,932, [7] Bitler,M.,T.Moskowitz,and A.Vissing-Jorgensen, Testing AgencyTheorywithEntrepre- neursefortand Wealth,Journalof Finance,2005,2(60), [8] Boot,A.,A.Gopalan,etal., TheEntrepreneur schoicebetweenprivateandpublicowner- ship,journalof Finance,2006,2(6), [9] Burkart,M.,D.Gromb,andF.Panunzi, LargeShareholders,Monitoring,andtheValueofthe Firm,Quarterly Journalof Economics,997,3(2), [0]ChandlerJr.,A., TheEnduringLogicofIndustrialSuccess,Harvard Business Review,990, 2(68), []DeAngelo,H.,andL.DeAngelo, ManagerialOwnershipofVotingRightsA StudyofPublic Corporationswith DualClassesofCommonStock,Journalof FinancialEconomics,985, (4), [2]DeGroot,M.,OptimalStatistical Decisions.New YorkMcGraw-Hil,970. [3]Dyck,A.,andL.Zingales, PrivateBenefitsofControlAnInternationalComparison,Journal of Finance,2004,2(59), [4]Gomez-Mejia,L.,M.Larraza-Kintana,etal., TheDeterminantsofExecutiveCompensationin FamilyControled Public Corporations,Academyof Management Journal,2003,2(46), [5]Gugler,K.,D.Mueler,etal., InsiderOwnership,OwnershipConcentrationandInvestment PerformanceAnInternational Comparison,Journalof Corporate Finance,2008,5(4), [6]Hermalin,B., Trendsin Corporate Governance,Journalof Finance,2005,5 (65), [7]Johnson,S.,andY.Tian, IndexedExecutiveStockOptions,Journalof FinancialEconomics, 2000,(57), [8]Lease,R.,J.McConnel,etal., TheMarketValueofDiferentialVotingRightsinCloselyHeld Corporations,Journalof Business,984,4(57), [9],,,2004 9, [20],,,2005, [2],,,2006 2, 57 68

18 492 ( ) 2 [22],,,2007 2, [23]McConaughy,D.,M.Walker,etal., FoundingFamilyControledFirmsEficiencyandValue, Review of FinancialEconomics,998,(7), 9. [24]Miler,D.,I.Breton-Miler,etal., AreFamilyFirmsRealySuperiorPerformers,Journalof Corporate Finance,2007,5(3), [25], 49,,2006 3, 4 0 [26]Perez-Gonzalez,F., Inherited Controland Firm Performance,American Economic Review, 2006,5(96), [27]Rajan,R.,andL.Zingales, TheGovernanceofNew Enterprise,NBER Workingpaper,2000. [28]Schulze,W.,M.Lubatkin,etal., ExploringtheAgencyConsequencesofOwnershipDispersion amongthedirectorsofprivatefamilyfirms,academyof ManagementJournal,2003,2(46), [29],,,2004 5, [30],,,2008 6, [3]Vilalonga,B.,andR.Amit, How DoFamilyOwnership,ManagementandControlAfectFirm Value,Journalof FinancialEconomics,2006,2(80), [32],,,2003 5, [33],,,2005 5, [34],,,2008, TheFounder schoicebetweendemocracyand AutocracyinCorporateGovernance ZHEBING WANG (Capital Universityof Economicsand Business) LIYAN HAN (Beihang University) Abstract Wepresentatheoreticalmodeloffounder schoicebetweendemocracyandau- tocracyincorporategovernance.atthestart-upperiod,thechoiceofautocracyismoreefi- cientthoughitrequiresmoreinitialcapital.ifexternalfinanceisneeded,thefounderwouldbear highercapitalcostduetomanager srent-seekingandthelossofvotingrightofminorityshare- holders.weshowthatfounder sowncapitalsandhismanagerialskilsaresubstitutes.the resultsshowthatthehigherthelevelofmanagerialskils,themorelossesinvotingright. JELClasification G32,L32,M3

2 1,2014) , ,, , (2005), ( ),, ;,, ; Mol(2014),,,,

2 1,2014) , ,, , (2005), ( ),, ;,, ; Mol(2014),,,, 3 1 ChinaJournalofEconomics Vol.3,No.11-31 March2016 1 2 3,,,,,, ;,,,,, ; ; DOI10.16513/j.cnki.cje.20160318.001 0, (, 2005;,2010;,2010), (,2011; 1 (71525006) (14ZDB144) (12AZD047) (71173048) 2,,E-mailshiyichen@fudan.edu.cn