150,, 1,, ;,, ( ),,,,, : 1992,,1992,,,, ,, :,,, 3,,,,,, (, ) 1992, , 284.,1993. ( ), [2001]14

Transcription

1 3 1 ChinaJournalofEconomics Vol.3,No.1: March : 2, 3 4,, GDP,,,,,, : ( ) ; ( ); ; ; DOI: /j.cnki.cje , 20 80,, , : 1 ( ) (WT1410) (2014ssxm61) ; 2,,, d [email protected] 3,, [email protected] 4,, [email protected] 1 2, ; 3, 331.,1993.

2 150,, 1,, ;,, ( ),,,,, : 1992,,1992,,,, ,, :,,, 3,,,,,, (, ) 1992, , 284.,1993. ( ), [2001]14

3 ,, : :, ;1992,, ( ), 1992 ( 1 ) 1 1,,,, : (1983) (1986) (1989) (1996) (1999) ( ) (2001) (2008) (2009) 1992, ( ), ( ) 1 ( ) 1 GDP ( ), :,,, :, ( ), ( ), : 1,,

4 152 ( FDI) : 1 ; 2, ; 3 ; 4, ; 5, ; 6 ; 1,,, (Younisetal., 2008), VenierisandGupta(1986) Gupta(1990), (politicalinstability),,barro(1991) , [ (politicalassassinations) (revolution) (coup)] Alesinaetal.(1996) ,, AisenandVeiga(2010) GMM , [ (cabinet change) ],, Younisetal.(2008) 9, , (economicfreedom) Jong-A-Pin(2009) 26 : (mass civilprotest); (politicaly motivatedaggression); (instabilitywithinthepoliticalregime); (instabilityofpolitical regime) , CamposandKaranasos(2007) ,

5 ,, : : (informalpoliticalstability), (formalpoliticalstability), ;,, ;, Munoz(2009) , ;, (Asteriouand Price,2001) (Asteriouand Siriopoulos,2000),,Drazen(2000), ;, (AlesinaandPeroti,1996),, (AisenandVeiga,2010), FDI(Bradaetal,2006), (AisenandVeiga,2006), (Drazen,2000),, (AisenandVeiga,2010),, (Santhirasegaram,2008),,,, (AisenandVeiga,2010), CamposandNugent(2002),,,, :, ;,, GrochovaandKouba(2011) : (elite) ( ) ( ),, Jong-A-Pin(2009), EasterlyandRebelo (1993) Sala-i-Martin(1997),, ( Jong-a-Pin,2009; Younisetal.,2008) Younisetal.(2008),

6 154,,,, 2,, : (AisenandVeiga,2010) (LondreganandPoole,1990) (Barro,1991;Camposand Nugent,2002) (Alesinaetal.,1996),, (discriminantanalysis) (principalcomponentsanalysis) (exploratoryfactoranalysis) (AlesinaandPeroti,1996;Gupta,1990),,Jong-A-Pin (2009) 26,, (Knight,2013),,,,,, 1, 1, ,,,,,,, ( ), ( ),

7 ,, : :,,,,, 20 80,,, 1, :, ,, (1992 ) 1982,,,,, ,, : ;,,, :, 瑏瑠, 瑏瑡 : , , , [N]., (4). 5 [N]., (4). 6. [N]., [N]., [N] (4). 9. [N]., (3). 瑏瑠. [N]., 瑏瑡. [N]., (9).

8 156, 1, ,,,,,,,, : (1983) (1986) (1989) (1996) (1999) ( ) (2001) (2008) (2009), ( ) ( ), 5,,,,, :,,,, : 1, [N]., (2). 2,. [N]., (4). 3. [N]., (1). 4. [N]., (9). 5. [N]., [N].,

9 ,, : : ; 1 2,1992 ( ) 2 ;1992,,,, 1992,,, 4.2,, 2 ( : ) (1992 ) (1992 ),, 1, :,,,. 70 [N]., (12) , 2, : (. [N] (1))

10 158 Hsiangetal.(2011) (, ), Hsiangetal. (2011), : yit =β 0 + β 1instabt +γxit +θit+ μ i +εit (1), yit i t GDP( ) GDP ; instabt t, ;Xit ;θit, ; μ i ;εit, β, 1 Xit, :(1) (2004),, ;(2), (2004), GDP ;(3), GDP ;(4), ;(5) GDP ;(6) GDP ;(7) GDP ;(8) GDP, ;(9) ;(10) ;(11) ,,,,, 828,, ( ), (1992 ) (1992 ) ; ( )

11 ,, : : ; 1 1 log GDP GDP GDP GDP (1992 ) ( [ ] ) ( : ) log /, /GDP /GDP /GDP /GDP / ( : km/ ) / ( : ) / ( : ) / / : 28 ( ), (1)~ (3) GDP ; (4)~(6) GDP (1) (4)

12 160 ; (2) (5), ; (3) (6), 2 log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) ** *** *** *** *** *** (-2.18) (-5.62) (-6.19) (-12.14) (-10.93) (-11.06) log *** *** (10.06) (10.35) *** *** (4.07) (4.08) ** ** (2.55) (2.41) *** *** *** *** (4.96) (2.88) (4.53) (4.11) * ** (1.89) (2.64) (-0.66) (-0.18) ** ** *** *** (2.41) (2.48) (3.08) (3.86) (0.33) (-0.17) (-0.41) (-0.19) ** (-2.63) *** (-2.99) (-1.01) (0.01) ** (1.48) (-2.09) ** (2.06) (0.64) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES *** *** *** *** *** *** (741.49) (45.45) (50.49) (41.52) (27.63) (5.05) N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01

13 ,, : :, 2,, (1) 5%, 1%, ( ), ( ), :, GDP, : ( ) ;, GDP,,,, (3) (6), : ( 2), GDP 0.56%, GDP 0.538% 2,, ; ;,, ( ) ( ), ;, 4.2,, ,, 3 (1)~(3), +, GDP ; (4)

14 162 ( ) GDP (5) ( ), (6)~(10) 1 (3) (6),, 1 3, ( GDP) 3 ( ) log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) *** (-6.52) *** (-11.17) *** (-6.29) *** (-6.43) *** (-10.02) *** (-10.79) ( ) *** (-5.52) *** (-5.46) *** (-9.65) *** (-6.25) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1)~(5) 2 (3) ; (6)~(10) 2 (6),,, 1992,, ;, ;, 1992, , (1) (2), ; (5) (6),

15 ,, : :, 2008,, 4 (2) 2008, 4 (3) (7),, 1% ( ) 2008,,1989, 1991, 4 (4) (8) ,, 4 ( ) log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) t 1989 t t 1989 t *** * *** *** *** *** *** *** (-4.20) (-1.94) (-5.43) (-6.04) (-6.49) (-5.91) (-5.45) (-7.13) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1)~(4) 2 (3) ; (5)~(8) 2 (6),, %, 25.6%, ( ) 3% 97%, 5 (1) (5),, (2)~(4) (6)~(8) ,,, log GDP, 3% [ 2 (3)] ; , 2

16 164 (3), (, ) 5 ( ) log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 3% % *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** (-6.28) (-6.08) (-5.18) (-5.29) (-7.61) (-10.14)(-12.13) (-9.59) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES N R-square : t, (1) (5), (2)~(4) (6)~(8) Bofinger(1975) *p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1)~(4) 2 (3) ; (5)~(8) 2 (6),,,,, 1 ;, 2 ;,,, 3, 6, ( ), 5%, ( ),,, ;, 1. [N] (9). 2. [N]., (9). 3. [N]., (8).

17 ,, : : 6 ( ) log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ** *** *** *** *** ** *** (-2.81) (-7.48) (-1.95) (-6.33) (-5.35) (-7.83) (-3.01) (-10.27) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1)~(4) 2 (3) ; (5)~(8) 2 (6),, 7 ( (1)~ (4) (5)~ (8), ),, 1%, 7 (, ), 7 ( ) log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** (-3.19) (-3.68) (-5.54) (-5.83) (-9.02) (-9.66) (-9.81) (-10.18) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1)~(4) 2 (3) ; (5)~(8) 2 (6) ;,

18 ,,,, 2,,,,,,,,,, ( ),, (,2014), (AzengandYogo,2013), , :, ( );, ( ) 8, GDP( GDP ) 1,,, 1,,

19 ,, : :,, 1 8 log log log log log log (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) *** *** * *** *** *** (8.04) (9.25) (1.85) (6.58) (5.65) (2.95) log GDP (-1.04) (-1.23) (-1.61) GDP (0.97) (-0.20) (1.35) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1)~(3) (4)~(6) 2 (3) (6),, 9, GDP,,, ( GDP );, GDP, 9 log GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) *** (-3.31) *** *** *** (-4.60) (-4.54) (-5.18) (-1.08) 1,,

20 168 log GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) *** (-2.76) (-1.28) ** (-2.14) * (-1.71) N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p< (3),,,, 8 9,,,, ( 11),,, 5.2,,,,,,,1992,, ( ) (1996) (1999) (2001) ( ) ( ) (2008) (2009)

21 ,, : :,,, 1992, 4 (3) (7),, (1991,1992,1996,1999,2000,2001,2005,2008,2009,2010,2012) ( 10 (1)~(2) ), ( GDP) GDP, 1% ;,,, : ,,, : = / 1 1, (, 9%); 1,, ;, 2 10,,,, 3, 4,,, :,, ( ) ;,,, (Santhirasegaram,2008),, ;,,, , 2000, 3 4 :, ;, ;

22 , ; 10 log GDP GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) >=1 < *** (-5.29) *** (-5.71) (-1.40) (-1.54) (-0.58) (-1.23) (-0.84) (-0.90) N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 (1) (2) 2 (3) (6) ; (1)~(6), (7)~(8),, (3)~(8),, 11 (1)~(3), (1),, , 1.3 ( = ) (3), ( (2), 25.7%), (5% ); : (4)~(6), ( 1) (4), ,, 0.36 ( =0.0036) (6), ( (5) ) 27.6%, ( 1% ), 1% 11, ( )

23 ,, : : 11 log GDP log GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) *** *** ** *** *** *** (2.91) (-2.81) (-2.41) (-7.20) (-7.57) (-5.04) *** (-8.21) *** (5.09) N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p< (3), (2) (5) 2 (3),,, , ( 12), ( GDP );,, ;, 12 log GDP log GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) *** *** *** *** *** *** (-9.05) (-6.19) (-5.66) (-4.36) (-6.79) (-6.19) ** (2.50) ** (2.48) N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p< (3), 5.3,,

24 172, 13 (1)~(4),, ( ),,, 1,, (Camposand Nugent, 2002),,, 1 13 (5)~(7),,, 3 13 ( :log GDP) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) *** *** ** *** *** *** *** (-5.15) (-4.89) (-3.07) (-5.95) (-5.65) (-5.06) (-5.66) *** *** *** (-3.53) (-3.52) (-3.18) ** ** (-2.44) (-2.51) (-1.14) * * * (1.71) *** (2.97) N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05, *** p< (3), 1,,

25 ,, : : 6 :,,, ,, (1),, 1.095,, (2) (6),, ( GDP), ( (3) (7) ) 14 (1) (2) Log GDP (3) (4) (5) (6) GDP (7) (8) (9) # ** ** *** ** & (-1.65) (-1.99) (0.06) (-2.31) (-3.10)(-2.52)(-1.54) (-0.74) *** (3.99) NO NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES N R-square : t,,*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01,#p= 0.1,&p<0.15 (2) (6) ; (3)~(5) 2 (3) ; (7)~(9) 2 (6) ; (1),,,,, , 20,

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30 178 HostileForcesWeFacedovertheYears: PoliticalStabilityandEconomicDevelopment AnEmpiricalStudyon DengXiaoping shypothesis ZhiqiangDong 1,2,WenlianLin 1,XiahaiWei 1 (1.Schoolof Economicsand Management,South China Normal University; 2.South China Centerfor MarketEconomy Research,South China Normal University) Abstract DengXiaopinghademphasizedtimeandagainthatpoliticalstabilityis vitaltotheeconomicdevelopmentofchina.therehasbeennoformalresearchto evaluatetheefectofpoliticalstabilityontheeconomicdevelopmentofchina.this paperadoptedthefrequencyof bourgeoisliberalization and hostileforces in People s Daily byyearasameasureofpoliticalinstability,andpercapitagdpand GDPgrowthrateofeachprovinceasameasureofeconomicdevelopment.Wedetermined thatpoliticalinstability hassignificantnegativeimpactoneconomicdevelopment, whicharealsorobustwhenweconsiderdiferenttimeperiods,abnormalsamplesand diferentmodelseting.wefurtherprovedthatthefrequencyof bourgeoisliberalization and hostileforces couldbeagoodproxyvariableforpoliticalinstabilityandpolitical instabilityafectsoureconomicdevelopmentinatleastthreeways:destroyingthe socialwealthdirectlybyworseningsocialorder,changingthestructureofeconomic resourcealocationbyreducingtheproductiveexpenditureorincreasingthenon- productiveexpenditure,andinhibitingthedomesticinvestmentandfdi. JELClasification O10,P16