( 2012) ( 2007) ( 2011) 2010 (2009) BlanchardShleifer(2000) ( 2005) : : ( 2006) (2005) Rona-Tas(1994) (1995) : : 123

2012 9 9 (294 ) China Industrial Economics Sep. 2012 No.9 1 2 3 ( 510275) [ ] [ ] ; ; [ ]F276.5 [ ]A [ ]1006-480X(2012)09-0122-13 ( 2005) ( 2011; 2012) () ( 1998) (2005) : (BianLogan1996) ( 1998) (Zhou Xueguang2000) 122 [ ] 2012-08-10 [ ] : ( 71272204); ( S2011010001771) [ ] (1983 ) ; (1967 ) ; (1980 )

( 2012) ( 2007) ( 2011) 2010 (2009) BlanchardShleifer(2000) ( 2005) : : ( 2006) (2005) Rona-Tas(1994) (1995) : : 123

20 60 (Szelenyi1982) Nee(1989)Szelenyi (Market Transition Theory) 1984 ( 2007) Szelenyi(1982) Nee(1989) Rona-Tas(1994) Rona-Tas(1994) ; (1998) 1992 (Rona-Tas1994; 1997) Rona-Tas(1994) Bian and Logan(1996) ( 2008) ( 2003) Nee(1989) : : 1. () 2010 31 4614 8 124

3 5 8 12 (Kazanjian et al.1990) 8 1612 2. (1) (Barrier) (2003) (2004) (2011) 2009 (2) (Ability) (Edu) ( 2006) ( 2006) (Pcapital) Bertrand et al.(2007) CEO 1 / 0 / ( ) ( ) ( )( ) PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 PC 00 PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 PC 00 1 / 0 / ( ) ( ) ( )( ) PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 PE 00 PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 PE 00 ( 1 ) 125

1 (Ability) (Edu) (1) (0) (1) (0) (1) PC 11 (11) PC 10 (10) PE 11 (11) PE 10 (10) (Pcapital) (0) PC 01 (01) PC 00 (00) PE 01 (01) PE 00 (00) (3) (Market) (2011) (2011) (2007) (2012) (2012) 2010 2009 2009 0 12 40 80 10 (4) ( 2009) (Shareholder) (lnsize) (Firmage) (Highrate) (Sexual) (Age) 2 3. 5 (1) (5) X i (1) (2) (4) (1) PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 PC 00 PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 ; (1) PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 PE 00 PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 (3) (5) (2) PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 Market PC 00 PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 Market ; (4) PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 Market PE 00 PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 Market M 1 M 5 (1) (5) 126

Barrier Ability Edu Pcapital Sexual Age Shareholder Firmage lnsize Highrate Market 2 12009? (1= 2= 3= 4= 5= 6= 100 ( + 7= 8= 9= 10= 11= ) 12= 13= 14= 15= 16= 17= 18= 19= );2 : (2010) 1? (1= 2= 3= 4= 5= 6= );2 1 6 2 5 3? (1= 2= 3= 4= 5= 2 4 6 0 );3? (1= 2= 1 4? (1= 2= 3= 4= 5= 6= ) (1= ;2= ;3= ;4= ; 1 2 3 0 5= ;6= ) 1 1 2 3 4 5? (1= 2= 3= 4= 1 0 5= 6= ) (1= 2=) 1 1 0 2010 2009 (%)?? 2010 2009? ln( ) (2010) 1 : (2011);2 ( 10) : (2012) Barrier=α 0 + 6 i=1 α ix i +α 7 Market (1) Barrier=β 0 + 6 i=1 β i X i +β 7 Market+β 8 PC 11 +β 9 PC 10 +β 10 PC 01 (2) Barrier=δ 0 + 6 δ i=1 ix i +δ 7 Market+δ 8 PC 11 +δ 9 PC 10 +δ 10 PC 01 +δ 11 PC 11 Market +δ 12 PC 10 Market+δ 13 PC 01 Market (3) Barrier=γ 0 + 6 i=1 γ ix i +γ 7 Market+γ 8 PE 11 +γ 9 PE 10 +γ 10 PE 01 (4) Barrier=θ 0 + 6 θ i=1 ix i +θ 7 Market+θ 8 PE 11 +θ 9 PE 10 +θ 10 PE 01 +θ 11 PE 11 Market +θ 12 PE 10 Market+θ 13 PE 01 Market (5) 1. 3 21.73% 94.04% 127

64.06% : 3 :% 58.86 14 28.02 16 64.21 12 62.38 13 22.54 18 72.67 9 83.76 7 92.67 2 67.16 11 42.70 15 91.07 3 88.57 4 74.28 8 87.73 5 25.48 17 67.20 10 21.73 19 94.04 1 85.34 6 64.06 : (2010) 4 (2011) : ; 18 (2011) 0.085 0.650 0.972 1.640 1.590 1.575 1.324 1.295 1.241 16 17 18 5 5 43.68% 64.06% PC 11 0.105PC 10 0.041 14.6% 73% 14.6% 1 (1998) PE 11 0.127PE 10 0.019 1 128 2004 129988 2004 3540 ( 2009) 2004 2.72% 14.6%

4 9.87 1.217 5 18 7.65 1.340 14 13 9.43 1.325 6 14 7.39 1.324 16 15 7.27 1.295 17 16 10.42 1.590 4 2 6.11 1.112 22 24 6.17 1.179 21 21 6.27 1.146 20 22 6.400 1.181 19 20 8.76 1.414 9 8 8.14 1.426 10 7 7.09 1.241 18 17 7.56 1.379 15 11 6.11 1.100 23 25 5.56 1.127 27 23 10.96 1.379 3 10 6.06 1.198 24 19 11.54 1.640 2 1 0.38 0.085 31 31 11.8 1.575 1 3 5.65 0.973 26 28 7.88 1.455 12 5 4.98 1.039 29 27 9.02 1.436 7 6 3.25 0.650 30 30 7.65 1.366 13 12 5.94 1.068 25 26 8.93 1.406 8 9 5.12 0.972 28 29 8.04 1.514 11 4 7.34 1.231 5 Barrier 1612 21.730 94.040 43.684 24.975 PC 11 1612 0 1 0.105 0.307 PC 10 1612 0 1 0.041 0.198 PC 01 1612 0 1 0.548 0.498 PE 11 1612 0 1 0.127 0.333 PE 10 1612 0 1 0.019 0.137 PE 01 1612 0 1 0.520 0.500 Market 1612 0.085 1.640 1.381 0.217 Sexual 1612 0 1 0.880 0.325 Age 1612 21 77 47.884 7.796 Shareholder 1612 0.000 100.000 65.402 28.565 Firmage 1612 8 21 12.087 3.302 lnsize 1612 2.080 9.190 4.405 1.363 Highrate 1612 0.252 0.729 0.407 0.101 2. 6 Barrier OLS M 0 M 1 M 0 Market Market -4.065 M 2 PC 11 10.823PC 10 10.828PC 01 6.310 0.01 PC 00 PC 11 10.823% PC 10 10.828%PC 01 6.310% PC 00 PC 11 129

6 OLS Barrier M 0 M 1 M 2 M 3 M 3 * M 4 M 5 C 35.382*** 37.577*** 36.350*** 35.659*** 35.659*** 30.872*** 30.529*** (5.629) (6.037) (5.990) (5.977) (5.977) (6.222) (6.224) Sexual 2.176 2.242 1.750 1.922 1.922 2.336 2.423 (1.914) (1.915) (1.900) (1.895) (1.895) (1.901) (1.899) Age -0.155* -0.154* -0.173** -0.179** -0.179** -0.110-0.125 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) Shareholder 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.013 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) Firmage 0.155 0.165 0.080 0.119 0.119 0.180 0.198 (0.189) (0.190) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.188) (0.188) lnsize -0.008 0.010-0.515-0.375-0.375-0.401-0.357 (0.464) (0.464) (0.478) (0.478) (0.478) (0.474) (0.474) Highrate 28.505*** 22.35*** 25.344*** 25.265*** 25.265*** 26.652*** 28.442*** (6.128) (8.652) (8.585) (8.580) (8.580) (8.633) (8.710) Market -4.065-1.295-13.778** -13.778** -1.640-6.151 (4.040) (4.031) (6.146) (6.146) (4.035) (5.197) PC 11 10.823*** 11.305*** 11.305*** (2.242) (2.259) (2.259) PC 10 10.828*** 10.403*** 10.403*** (3.231) (3.227) (3.227) PC 01 6.310*** 5.826*** 5.826*** (1.444) (1.448) (1.448) PC 11 Market 34.170*** 19.697** (9.776) (9.776) PC 10 Market 1.741 1.741 (15.513) (15.513) PC 01 Market 14.472** (6.598) PC 11 Market+PC 01 Market 14.472*** (6.598) PE 11 10.651*** 11.123*** (2.054) (2.067) PE 10 2.787 3.015 (4.556) (4.556) PE 01 4.796*** 4.676*** (1.431) (1.431) PE 11 Market 19.986** (8.976) PE 10 Market 19.943 (20.116) PE 01 Market 4.117 (6.277) R 2 0.017 0.017 0.038 0.045 0.045 0.034 0.038 ΔR 2 0.017*** 0.001 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.003 F-value 4.507*** 4.008*** 6.245*** 5.825*** 5.825*** 5.693*** 4.817*** ΔF-value 4.507*** 1.013 11.287*** 4.408*** 9.477*** 1.866 :* 0.1 ( ) ;** 0.05 ( ) ;*** 0.01 ( ) M * 3 M 3 ΔR 2 ΔF-value M 4 ΔR 2 ΔF-value M 0 N= 1612 130

PC 10 PC 01 M 3 PC 11 Market 34.1700.01 PC 10 Market 1.741 PC 01 Market 14.4720.05 PC 00 1 PC 11 34.170%PC 01 14.472% PC 10 PC 11 PC 01 PC 10 PC 11 Market PC 01 Market (2010) PC 11 Market PC 01 Market PC 11 Market+PC 01 Market M 3 PC 01 Market ( M 3 *) M 3 * PC 11 Market M 3 PC 11 Market PC 01 Market M 3 * PC 11 Market 19.697t 2.015 0.05 0.01 PC 11 Market PC 01 Market PC 11 PC 01 M 4 PE 11 10.6510.01 ;PE 10 2.787 ;PE 01 4.7960.01 PE 00 PE 11 10.651%PE 01 4.796% PE 00 PE 11 PE 01 PE 10 PC 00 M 5 PE 11 Market 19.9860.05 PE 10 Market 19.943PE 01 Market 4.117 PE 00 Market 1 PE 11 19.986% PE 11 PE 01 PE 10 PE 00 1 PC 00 PC 11 PC 10 PC 01 PE 00 PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 PC 00 PC 11 PC 01 PC 11 PC 01 PC 10 0 PC 00 PC 10 PE 00 PE 11 PE 10 PE 01 0 PE 00 PE 10 PE 01 3. (64.06%) 64.06% 64.06% Logistic M 3 PC 01 Market 0.05 6 1 PC 00 PE 00 1 131

PC 11 PC 01 PE 11 PE 01 PC 10 PE 10 I II III 1 :I 0II III II III PC 00 PE 00 M 3 Market 0.05 II PC 00 M 5 Market III PE 00 : : (1) 2005 2010 132

1 : 2012 8 22 (2) : : ; ; ; 1 Bian Y. and J.R. Logan. Market Transition and the Persistence of Power[J]. American Sociology Review1996 61(5). 2 Zhou Xueguang. Economic Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data[J]. American Sociology Review2000105(1). 3 Blanchard Shleifer. Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia [R]. Working Paper NBER2000. 4 A. Rona-Tas. The First Shall Be Last: Entrepreneurship and Communist Cadres in the Transition from Socialism [J]. American Journal of Sociology1994(7). 5 Szelenyi Ivan. The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State Socialist Societies [J]. American Journal of Sociology1982(9). 6 Nee V. A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism [J]. American Sociological Review198954(5). 7 Victor Nee Yang Cao. Postsocialist Inequalities: The Causes of Continuity and Discontinuity [J]. The Future of Market Transition2002(19). 8 Kazanjian R. K. and Drazin R. A Stage-Contingent Model of Design and Growth for Technology Based New Ventures[J]. Journal of Business Venturing1990(5). 9 Bertrand M Kramaraz F Schoar A. and Thesmar D. Politicians Firms and the Political Business Cycle: Evidence from France[R]. Working Paper University of Chicago 2007. 10. [J]. 2005(4). 1 2012 5 133

11. [J]. 2011(1). 12. [J]. 2012 (3). 13. [M]. : 1998. 14. [J]. 2009(5). 15. [J]. 1998(6). 16. [J]. 2007(12). 17. [M]. : 2009. 18. [M]. : 2006. 19. [J]. 1995(6). 20. [J]. 2007(4). 21. [J]. 1998(3). 22. [J]. 1997(2). 23. : [J]. 2008(3). 24. [M]. : 2003. 25. [J]. 2003(1). 26. [J]. 2004 (4). 27. [J]. ( )2011(1). 28. [J]. 2006(5). 29. [M]. : 2011. 30. [J]. 2012(1). 31. [J]. 2004(5). Political Capital Human Capital and Administrative Monopoly Industries Entry An Empirical Study Based on China s Private Enterprises XIE Lin 1 LI Kong-yue 2 ZHOU Ying-hui 3 (School of Business Sun Yat-sen University Guangzhou 510275 China) Abstract: The existing instance on market transition is difficult to distinguish between the redistribution of power and stronger competence of individuals within the system which determines the individual acquired status. This research holds this point: The entrepreneurs work experiences in former redistribution department mean that the company was created with political capital when it was initially established; meanwhile those who gain political arrangements after starting the company primarily demonstrate their ability to get more recognition. Instances of the research show that compared with entrepreneurs who cannot use political capital easily and have limited human capital the marketization does not diminish the role of political capital but instead increases the individuals income brought by their human capital at the same time. However if the human capital and the political capital are combined with this kind of income will be even more this may lead to the generation of crony capitalism. Key Words: political capital; human capital; administrative monopoly industries 责任编辑: 高粮 134