: : 2001 2003, :, ;,,,,, ( ), :,,,,,,,, (Williamson,2000 ;,2004 ;,2005),,,La Porta,,,, (La Porta et al,1998),, (La Porta et al,1999) Roe (2000), 3,(Center for Institutions and Governance), :200433,: sufexlj @163. com ;,,:200433,:xychen @mail. shufe. edu. cn ( :05JJD630028) ( :06BJ Y016), 82 转载
2007 7,,, Faccio (2006) 47,,, Leuz Oberholzer2Gee (2006),,,,,,,,Fan Wong Zhang (2007a),,, Chen Li Su (2005),, ;, Fan Rui Zhao (2006) 23,,,,Fan Wong Zhang(2007b),,,,,,,, (Roe,2004),,, Fan Wong Zhang(2007b) (1, 1 ),,,,,,,,,,, (2002), (2002),(2006) IPO, IPO,,,,, 83
:,,,,, :, ;; ;,,,, ( ) :,, 1978, (), ( ),GDP (Blanchard and Shleifer,2001 ;,2004 ;Jin et al,2005 ;Li and Zhou,2005 ;,2007),,,,,,,, : 2003, 2002,, ; 1997, 2001,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :(600547) 1975,,1979,1988 ;(000962),2000, ;2001, (000060),2003 12 16,2003, 70, 12,(,2003) 84
2007 7,, (2003),,,,,?,,,,,,,,,,,, (Jensen and Meckling,1992 ;,1998) ;,,, (,1997),,,,,,,,,: H1 :,, ( ) :,,:, ;,,1995,,,,,,, ( ), ( ),,,,,,,,,, (2005),,,, 1995,,,,, 1999,,,;, 2003,,,, 85
:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,: H2 :, () ( ) ( ) 2001,, 2001 2003 : (1),,, (2),,(3), (4) (2003),,,1674,,2001 2002 2003 556 561 557 1 1 2001 2002 2003 3671 100 % 1160 100 % 1224 100 % 1287 100 % : 706 19. 23 % 216 18. 62 % 237 19. 36 % 253 19. 66 % 682 18. 58 % 217 18. 71 % 228 18. 63 % 237 18. 41 % 596 16. 24 % 166 14. 31 % 193 15. 77 % 237 18. 41 % 13 0. 35 % 5 0. 43 % 5 0. 41 % 3 0. 23 % ( ) 1674 45. 60 % 556 47. 93 % 561 45. 83 % 557 43. 28 %, 86
2007 7,, (2005), () 30 %() 30 %( ),30 %,,,,, CSMAR 2 2, 2001 2003 2001 2002 2003 718 42. 89 % 229 41. 19 % 243 43. 32 % 246 44. 17 % 590 35. 24 % 190 34. 17 % 204 36. 36 % 196 35. 19 % 128 7. 65 % 39 7. 01 % 39 6. 95 % 50 8. 98 % 35 2. 09 % 16 2. 88 % 12 2. 14 % 7 1. 26 % 683 40. 80 % 213 38. 31 % 231 41. 18 % 239 42. 91 % 728 43. 49 % 252 45. 32 % 243 43. 32 % 233 41. 83 % 522 31. 18 % 180 32. 37 % 173 30. 84 % 169 30. 34 % 206 12. 31 % 72 12. 95 % 70 12. 48 % 64 11. 49 % 146 8. 72 % 60 10. 79 % 50 8. 91 % 36 6. 46 % 582 34. 77 % 192 34. 53 % 193 34. 40 % 197 35. 37 % 228 13. 62 % 75 13. 49 % 75 13. 37 % 78 14. 00 % 158 9. 44 % 53 9. 53 % 51 9. 09 % 54 9. 69 % 70 4. 18 % 22 3. 96 % 24 4. 28 % 24 4. 31 % 44 2. 63 % 15 2. 70 % 15 2. 67 % 14 2. 51 % 184 10. 99 % 60 10. 79 % 60 10. 70 % 64 11. 49 % 1674 100. 00 % 556 100. 00 % 561 100. 00 % 557 100. 00 % 1270 75. 87 % 423 76. 08 % 428 76. 29 % 419 75. 22 % 404 24. 13 % 133 23. 92 % 133 23. 71 % 138 24. 78 % 225 13. 44 % 91 16. 37 % 77 13. 73 % 57 10. 23 % 1449 86. 56 % 465 83. 63 % 484 86. 27 % 500 89. 77 %,,,, (2005), Fan Wong Zhang(2007b),,,, 20 % 25 % 35 % 40 % 45 % 50 %, 87
: 42189 % 43149 % 13162 %,75187 % 24113 %, 13144 % 86156 %, 2,,, 2,, 2003 10123 % (2003),, 1999 2000,,2000, 1,,,,, CSMAR, Stata 810 ( ) 1 ( ), : (1) : Descend = 0 + 1 3 IndexMrk + 2 3 ReguSize + 3 3 ReguInd + 4 3 Develop + 5 3 HaveBH + 6 3 List97 00 + 7 3 List01 03 + 8 3 Year02 + 9 3 Year03 + (2) : Disperse = 0 + 1 3 IndexMrk + 2 3 ReguSize + 3 3 ReguInd + 4 3 City + 5 3 Province + 6 3 Develop + 7 3 HaveBH + 8 3 List97 00 + 9 3 List01 03 + 10 3 Year02 + 11 3 Year03 + (3) : Indirect = 0 + 1 3 IndexMrk + 2 3 ReguSize + 3 3 ReguInd + 4 3 City + 5 3 Province + 6 3 Disperse + 7 3 Develop + 8 3 HaveBH + 9 3 List97 00 + 10 3 List01 03 + 11 3 Year02 + 12 3 Year03 +, 0, 1 12, : 11 Descend,, (2003),, (2005) (2005) Fan Wong Zhang(2007b) (2006), 88
2007 7, 1 2 3 ; Disperse,, 30 %, 1, 0 ; Indirect,,,,, 0, 1 Descend, Disperse Indirect,(1) Ordered Logit, (2) (3) Logit,Z Huber2White 21 IndexMrk,,, ReguSize,, ReguInd,,, 1, 0,, : (B) ; (C4) ; (C6) ; (D) ;(F) ; ( G) 2001, ReguSize ReguInd 31 Develop GDP, ( ),,, HaveBH B H,B H, 1, 0 B H A, B H A, (2) (3), City Province,,City 1, 0 ;, Province 1, 0,,,,,;,,,,(3),Disperse,, (2) List97 00 List01 03, 1997 2000,List97 00 1, 0 ;2000, List01 03 1, 0 1997 2000 2000 1997,, 89
: (1997 ) (1997 2000 ) (2000 ), Year02 Year03, 2002, Year02 1, 0 ; 2003, Year03 1, 0 3 3 ( 1674) ReguSize 21. 11 0. 90 18. 47 21. 05 26. 64 HaveBH 0. 13 0. 33 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 ReguInd 0. 34 0. 47 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 List97 00 0. 45 0. 50 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 Develop 9. 39 0. 67 7. 97 9. 40 10. 75 List01 03 0. 11 0. 31 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 ( ) 4 (1) Ordered Logit,,, Descend IndexMrk 0101, ReguSize ReguInd 0101,, ;, Descend Develop 0101,,Descend HaveBH 0105,B H, B H,B H,,,,,,4, Descend IndexMrk 0101, ReguSize ReguInd 0101, IndexMrk ReguSize ReguInd, Descend Develop HaveBH,,,,, :,1, 0 70,,, 2 1, 3 90
2007 7,,,, (1), 4, Descend IndexMrk 0101, ReguSize ReguInd 0101,, 4 Ordered Logit : Descend (, ) Z Z Z IndexMrk + 0. 565 12. 19 333 0. 375 6. 66 333 0. 428 6. 67 333 ReguSize - - 0. 250-4. 67 333-0. 355-4. 88 333-0. 247-4. 49 333 ReguInd - - 0. 558-5. 49 333-0. 627-5. 57 333-0. 540-5. 35 333 Develop? - 1. 128-9. 48 333-0. 272-1. 51-0. 924-7. 15 333 HaveBH? - 0. 309-2. 46 33-0. 196-1. 21-0. 226-1. 80 3 List97 00? - 0. 062-0. 60-0. 095-0. 82-0. 059-0. 58 List01 03? - 0. 009-0. 06-0. 092-0. 51-0. 060-0. 38 Year02? 0. 055 0. 48 0. 016 0. 12 0. 041 0. 36 Year03? 0. 231 1. 95 3 0. 080 0. 57 0. 192 1. 62 1674 1319 1674 2 228. 37 333 140. 34 333 128. 34 333 Pseudo R 2 0. 077 0. 052 0. 042 : 333, 33 3 0101 0105 0110 () 3,Ordered Logit Cut,: ; OLS, IndexMrk,, ReguSize,0101 ;,IndexMrk OLS ( ),, 4 5 (2) Logit, Disperse IndexMrk 0105 1980 8 26,,;1984 5 15,4, 14 ;1985 3, ;1988 4 13,,;1990 4 18,,6,,Acemoglu Johnson Robinson(2001),,,,,,, 91
:, ReguSize 0105, ReguInd 0101,, ;,, Disperse IndexMrk, ReguSize ReguInd,,,5, Disperse City, Province,,,,,,, Disperse HaveBH, B H,, B H Disperse List97 00 List01 03,,, 5 Logit : Disperse (, 1 30 %) Z Z Z? 5. 090 2. 63 333 7. 598 3. 38 333 5. 375 2. 70 333 IndexMrk + 0. 126 2. 17 33 0. 113 1. 65 3 0. 166 1. 95 3 ReguSize - - 0. 202-2. 31 33-0. 311-3. 31 333-0. 205-2. 32 33 ReguInd - - 0. 370-2. 70 333-0. 523-3. 52 333-0. 379-2. 74 333 City? - 0. 127-0. 72-0. 203-1. 01-0. 142-0. 80 Province? - 0. 540-2. 96 333-0. 522-2. 41 33-0. 518-2. 76 333 Develop? - 0. 217-1. 64-0. 222-1. 13-0. 269-1. 70 3 HaveBH? - 0. 847-3. 91 333-0. 618-1. 97 33-0. 853-3. 92 333 List97 00? - 0. 661-5. 20 333-0. 724-5. 17 333-0. 663-5. 21 333 List01 03? - 0. 897-4. 00 333-1. 103-4. 41 333-0. 905-4. 01 333 Year02? 0. 053 0. 36 0. 066 0. 40 0. 057 0. 40 Year03? 0. 191 1. 29 0. 174 1. 04 0. 203 1. 36 1674 1319 1674 2 83. 21 80. 24 82. 44 Pseudo R 2 0. 053 0. 064 0. 052 :333,33 3 0101 0105 0110 () : ; OLS,IndexMrk,, ReguSize,0101 ;,IndexMrk OLS 92
2007 7 ( ) 6 (3) Logit,, Indirect IndexMrk 0110,,,,,, Fan Wong Zhang(2007b),,, 6, Indirect ReguSize 0101, ReguInd,,,, 6 Logit : Indirect (, 1 ) Z Z Z? - 8. 801-3. 53 333-12. 113-4. 25 333-11. 868-4. 45 333 IndexMrk + 0. 137 1. 91 3-0. 015-0. 19-0. 217-1. 86 3 ReguSize - 0. 290 2. 73 333 0. 371 3. 04 333 0. 294 2. 81 333 ReguInd - - 0. 048-0. 29 0. 167 0. 94-0. 021-0. 13 City? 0. 025 0. 12 0. 087 0. 39 0. 166 0. 77 Province? 1. 626 6. 37 333 1. 803 6. 09 333 1. 459 5. 61 333 Disperse? 0. 115 0. 65 0. 001 0. 01 0. 145 0. 83 Develop? 0. 268 1. 46 0. 534 2. 26 33 0. 836 3. 30 333 HaveBH? 0. 602 2. 05 33-0. 110-0. 33 0. 668 2. 28 33 List97 00? 0. 951 5. 76 333 1. 011 5. 87 333 0. 946 5. 79 333 List01 03? 1. 046 3. 59 333 1. 071 3. 62 333 1. 067 3. 70 333 Year02? 0. 135 0. 76 0. 131 0. 69 0. 088 0. 49 Year03? 0. 392 2. 03 33 0. 335 1. 61 0. 270 1. 36 1674 1319 1674 2 130. 38 333 134. 09 333 130. 16 333 Pseudo R 2 0. 122 0. 133 0. 123 :333,33 3 0101 0105 0110 () : ; OLS, IndexMrk,, ReguSize,0101 ;, IndexMrk OLS 93
:, 6, Indirect City,Province 0101,,,,, Indirect Disperse,,,,,Indirect Disperse Indirect List97 00 List01 03,, ( ),4 6,,, Disperse,20 % 25 % 35 % 40 % 45 % 50 %, 1, 0, Disperse, (1) (2), (1997 ) (1997 2000 ) (2000 ),,,,, 4 6,(2003) 2000, 2001 2003,, 2001 2003, ( ),,;,,,,, ( ),,( ),,,,,,,,,,, 94
2007 7,,,,,2004 : :, 4,2003 : (2001 ),,2006 :, 5,2002 :, 8,2002 :, 8,1997 :,,2003 :, 12 16,2005 :, 5,2007 :, 1,2005 :, 5,1998 :, 12,2006 :IPO :, 2,2004 :, 6 Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson, 2001, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development : An Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review 91 : 1369 1401. Blanchard, O. and A. Shleifer, 2001, Federalism with and without Political Centralization : China versus Russia, IMF Staff Papers 48 : 171 179. Chen, J. P., Z. Li, and X. Su, 2005, Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational Structure : Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China, Working Paper, City University of Hong Kong, and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Faccio, M., 2006, Politically Connected Firms, American Economic Review 96 : 369 386. Fan, J., O. Rui, and M. Zhao, 2006, Rent Seeking and Corporate Finance : Evidence from Corruption Cases, Working Paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Bentley College. Fan, J., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang, 2007a, Politically2connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post2IPO Performance of Chinaπs Partially Privatized Firms, Journal of Financial Economics 84 : 265 590. Fan, J., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang, 2007b, Organizational Structure as a Decentralization Device : Evidence from Corporate Pyramids, Working Paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and City University of Hong Kong. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1992, Specific and General Knowledge and Organization Structure, Chapter 9 in Contract Economics, Werin, L., and H. Wijkander (eds. ), Blackwell, Oxford, pp251 274. Jin, H., Y. Qian, and B. Weignast, 2005, Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives : Federalism, Chinese Style, Journal of Public Economics 89 : 1719 1742. 1155. La Porta, R., F. Lopez2de2Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1999, Corporate Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance 54 : 471 517. La Porta, R., F. Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 106 : 1113 Li, H. and L. Zhou, 2005, Political Turnover and Economic Performance : the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China, Journal of Public Economics 89 : 1743 1762. Leuz, C., and F. Oberholzer2Gee, 2006, Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency : Evidence from Indonesia, Journal of Financial Economics 81 : 411 439. Qian, Y., 1996, Enterprise Reform in China : Agency Problems and Political Control, Economics of Transition 4 : 427 447. Roe, M., 2000, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, Stanford Law Review 53 : 539 606. Roe, M., 2004, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, Working Paper, Harvard University. Williamson, O. E., 2000, The New Institutional Economics : Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of Economic Literature 38 : 595 613. ( 136 ) 95
: The Difference of Portfolio Allocation bet ween State2o wned Banks and Joint2equity Banks in China Jia Chunxin ( Guanghua School of Management, Peking University) Abstract :While the relationship between bank government ownership and performance is a hot topic, there are very few papers focusing on the relationship between government ownership and bank prudential behavior. Based on portfolio allocation proxies, this paper studies the prudential difference of China s state2owned banks and joint2equity banks. Empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that better ownership leads to more prudential behavior. Meanwhile, state banks are getting more and more prudent due to bank system reform. Key Words :Commercial Bank ;Corporate Governance ;Bank Portfolio Allocation ;Bank Prudential Behavior JEL Classification : G210, G280, G340,O530 (: ) (: ) ( 95 ) Marketization, SOE Reform Strategy, and Endogenously Determined Corporate Governance Structure Xia Lijun and Chen Xinyuan ( Institute of Accounting and Finance at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Center for Institutions and Governance at The Chinese University of Hong Kong ; Institute of Accounting and Finance at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics) Abstract :Using the data of listed firms in 2001 to 2003, this paper investigates the endogenous determination of corporate governance structure of listed firms ultimately controlled by Chinese local governments. Specifically, we explore how the degree of regional marketization and the central governmentπs seize big, drop small and strategic restructuring of SOE reform strategies, based respectively on firm size and industry category, influence the ultimate controlling governmentπs level, governmentπs share ratio and governmentπs shareholding method. We find that, in the regions with higher degree of marketization, listed firms are more likely to be ultimately controlled by low level local governments, and the local governments are more likely to control small ratio of shares. However, large firms and the firms in regulatory industries are more likely to be ultimately controlled by high level local governments, and the local governments are more likely to control a block ratio of their shares. The effects of marketization and industry category on governmentπs shareholding method are not robust, and large firms are more likely than small firms to be indirectly controlled by local governments. The results together indicate that regional marketization and the central governmentπs SOE reform strategy shape the corporate governance structure of listed firms ultimately controlled by Chinese local governments. Key Words : Governance Structure ; Endogenous Determination ; Marketization ; SOE Reform Strategy JEL Classification : G340, G320 136 (: ) (: )