,Blanchard and Shleifer (2000),1989,,,Che and Qian (1998),Wang et al (2002) Chen et al (2002),,,,,,,,,,,( Tunneling) (Johnson et al, 2000),,,,?

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1 : U 3 U ( ) :, U,,, ;,,,,,,, U : (2004),,,,,, Megginson and Netter (2001) Djankov and Murrel (2002),, :,, (Shaprio and Willig,1990),,,,,,,,, (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988),,(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993),,, (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), (Shleifer and Vishny,1998) 3 ( ), 48

2 ,Blanchard and Shleifer (2000),1989,,,Che and Qian (1998),Wang et al (2002) Chen et al (2002),,,,,,,,,,,( Tunneling) (Johnson et al, 2000),,,,? ( Panel Data),Tobinπs Q (ROA), (Robust OLS Regression) (Maximum Likelihood Panel Model),,, U (2SLS),, ;,,,,,U,, :;; ; ;U ; Sinofin, ,6421 A - M, C0 - C9 2003, Q ROA Q Tobinπs Q, Tobinπs Q, Chung and Pruitt (1994) Q Tobinπs Q 49

3 : U,Q Q,,;, 1 Q 218, 214, Q, ROA 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 0 % > 0 % Q ROA Observations , ; 3 4, ; 5 6, 0, ;, ; 50 %,,, 1 Student2T, Mann2Whitney U, P 10 %, ; P 5 %, ; P 1 %, 2,Q 21734, , 1818 % ;1015 % ROA 01032, 01034, 613 % 816 %, 4 3, Q 2512 %,2117 % ;ROA 1914 %, 2811 %,, ,44 % 50 %,, , Q 1112 %, 2512 %, Q ROA, (ME) (NSE), U nse = n nse n me + n nse ( n nsee + 1) 2 n nse n me + n me ( n me + 1) S me - S nse, U me =

4 ROA,,,2 4 6,ROA,Q,,,, : Value = C + Government + B g Control +,Value,Q ROA ; Government,, ( Prilarge) ( State) ; Control, 2,, ( Size) ( Tangible) ( Gear) ( Exchange) ( Industry) ( Year), ( Second) ( Manager) ( Herfindahl) Gomes and Novaes (2002),,,,,,,2,,, HuberΠWhiteΠsandwich, OLS HuberΠWhiteΠsandwich,(Maddala, 1983),,,6421,,(Pooled Data) (OLS), (maximum log likelihood regressions, MLP), ( short) (wide),,coles et al (2005),(cross sectional), fixed effect,, Mundlak (1978),, Baltagi2Li LM,, i, : l i = T i 2 e 1 t = 1 ( y it - x it ) 2 - : y it =+ x it + v i + it 2 u T 2 i u + T i 2 e t = 1 ( y it - x it ) 2 2 u + ln( T i + 1) + T i ln(2 2 e) 2 e 51

5 : U 2 Q ROA Prilarge, Q,,,, 0 ;,1 + + State State2 State - U Herfindahl (Si^2)Π10 Si i, i Second, 10 %, 0 ;,1 + 0 Manager + 0 for Q ; + for ROA Size Q,; ROA, + - for Q ; + for ROA Tangible, - - Gear + - Exchange Industry Year, 0 ;,1, for ROA : + for Q 3,, 3 Prilarge,, Prilarge 1 ;, Prilarge 0 3 Prilarge, OLS, Q Q %01074,218 % 1 Q 25 %,,,,,, ROA, 52

6 , (1) (2) (3) (4) OLS MLP OLS MLP Q Q ROA ROA Prilarge [01041 ] [01043 ] [01001 ] [01001 ] Second [01047 ] [01051 ] 01000[01001 ] 01000[01001 ] Manager 01157[01335 ] 01333[01611 ] [01021 ] [01014 ] Herfindahl 01010[ ] [ ] 01000[ ] 01000[ ] Size [01026 ] [01020 ] [01001 ] [01000 ] Tangible [01131 ] [01143 ] [01003 ] [01003 ] Gear [01269 ] [01037 ] [01008 ] [01002 ] Exchange [01039 ] [01062 ] [01001 ] [01001 ] Industry Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Year Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Constant [01810 ] [01013 ] [01012 ] Observations R2squared , (Shleifer and Vishny,1998) (Megginson et al,1994),,, Biais and Perotti (2002),, (2001),, 3 2 ( Second = 1),( Manager) Q 1 2,ROA %,,,, ( Size),,21 5,, (Nominal),(Ratio), Shleifer (1998) 30 40,, 53

7 : U,, State ML P, State,,? 4 State 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) OLS MLP OLS MLP Q Q ROA ROA State [01272 ] [01360 ] [01006 ] [01008 ] State [01374 ] [01519 ] [01008 ] [01011 ] Prilarge 01057[01044 ] 0104[01046 ] [01001 ] [01001 ] Second [01047 ] [01052 ] 01001[01001 ] 01001[01001 ] Manager 01059[01328 ] 0123[01606 ] [01021 ] [01014 ] Size [01026 ] [01020 ] [01001 ] [01000 ] Tangible [01130 ] [01142 ] [01003 ] [01003 ] Gear [01263 ] [01036 ] [01008 ] [01002 ] Exchange [01038 ] [01061 ] [01001 ] [01001 ] Industry Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Year Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Constant [01826 ] [01549 ] [01013 ] [01012 ] Observations R2squared Turning point State, State 2, State,, 4,30 %, 0 %, 8816 %,,, : Q U U,,,,,,,, 1998, (600605) 8816 %, ( ) 54

8 ;, 30 %,,,,,, (robust) 1 4,U,1,, U 1,, U,,,, Bai et al (2004) Wei et al (2005), Tian (2000) U,, U,,,, U, U?,,,(grabbing hand) (helping hand),u : a, V, B, G, S 1, 2, 3 U, U = a V + B - G - S : 0 a 1 V = V 0 + V G + V S - V B,V 0 a, V G G,V S S,V B B,, 55

9 : U,a V V 0, 5516 %,,,,,V B,,,,,,,,,75 %A 51 % B,,a, a ;, V B, 1, a < 1, 5 B 5 a > 0 5V 5 B < 0 ; a > 1, 5 B 5 a = 0,,,,,,,, G,V G,,,1998, 3117 % 17,1, 0 0 ;1, 3600 ; % 3117 %,,, 2,a > 2, 5 G 5 a > 0 5V > 0 ;a < 2, 5 G 5 G 5 a = 0,, 1998, 58 %, av S 7017 %,S av,,a > 3, 5 S 5 a > 0,5V > 0 ;a < 3, 5V 5 S 5 a = 0, : < 1,< 2 < 3, 5V 5 a < 0 ; http :ΠΠfinance1sina1com. cnπrollπ π t. shtml 56

10 <,> 1,> 2 > 3, 5V 5 a > 0,, U ,,, U U,,,,,,,,,,,,, U,,,, U, U,,, U,,,,,,,,,,,,, -,,,,, ;,,,,, 2004 :, http :ΠΠfinance. sina. com. cnπrollπ Π shtml,2001 :, 8 Bai, Chong2En, Liu, Qiao, Lu, Joe, Song, Frank M., and Zhang, Junxi, 2004, Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China, Journal of Comparative Economics 32 : Blanchard, Olivier and Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Federalism with and without Political Centralization : China versus Russia, NBER Working 57

11 : U Paper No Biais, Bruno and Enrico Perotti, 2002, Machiavellian Privatization, American Economic Review 92 (1) : Che, Jiahua and Yingyi Qian, 1998, Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v113, n2, p. p Chen, Gongmeng, Michael Firth, and Oliver Rui, 2002, Have Chinaπs Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency and Profitability for Privatized SOEs? Working Paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Chung, Kee H and Stephen Pruitt, 1994, A Simple Approximation of Tobinπs Q, Financial Management 23 (3) : Coles, Jeffrey, Felix Meschke, and Michael Lemmon, 2005, Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance : The Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance, Under review of Journal of Financial Economics. Djankov, Simeon and Peter Murrell, 2002, Enterprise Restructuring in Transition : A Quantitative Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 40 (3) : Maddala, GS, 1983, Limited2dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Megginson, William L., Robert C. Nash, and Matthias Van Randenborgh, 1994, The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms : An International Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance 49, Megginson, William L and Jeffery M Netter, 2001, From State to Market : A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2) : Mundlak,Yair, 1978, On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data, Econometrica 46 (1) : Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez2de2Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Tunneling, American Economic Review 90, Shaprio, Carl, and Robert D Willig, 1990, Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization, In the Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization (ed. E. N. Suleiman and J. Waterbury) Westview Press, London Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1993, Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3) : Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W Vishny, 1994, Politicians and Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4) : Shleifer, Andrei, 1998, State Versus Private Ownership, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (4) : Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W Vishny, 1998, The Grabbing Hand : Government Pathologies and Their Cures, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press. Tian, Lihui, 2000, Government Shareholding and the Value of Chinaπs Modern Firms, Institute of Finance and Accounting at the London Business School, Working Paper No Vickers, John and Yarrow, George, 1988, Privatization : An Economic Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge. Wang, Xiaozhu, Lixin Colin Xu and Tian Zhu, 2002, Is Public Listing a Way Out for State2Owned Enterprises? Economics of Transition 12 (3) : Wei Zuobao, Feixue Xie and Shaorong Zhang, 2005, Ownership Structure and Firm Value in Chinaπs Privatized Firms, Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 40, Two Hands of the Government Shareholder and the U Curve bet ween Government Shareholdings and Corporate Value Tian Lihui ( Peking University) Abstract : In this paper, we develop a view of the government shareholder as an entity that can both damage and benefit the companies in which it holds shares. We examine the ownership and control of 826 corporations listed on Chinaπs stock market, and find that government shareholding therein is notably large. Its effect on corporate value is negative, but non2monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this threshold, as government shareholding stakes continue to increase, corporate value also begins to do so. We argue that this concave relationship comes from the grabbing hand and the helping hand of the government shareholder and the influences of two hands vary upon the size of government shareholding. Key Words :Ownership Structure ; Government Shareholding ; Corporate Governance JEL Classification : G320, G340, G150, L330 ( :) ( :) 58

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IPO 1 1 3 1.1 3 1.2 3 1.3 4 2 7 2.1 7 2.1 8 3 10 3.1 10 3.2 15 3.3 18 3.4 19 4 23 4.1 23 4.2 28 4.3 33 4.4 39 5 45 5.1 45 5.2 47 5.3 IPO 48 5.4 50 6. 54 56 2 3 1 1.1 1.2 1.1 2002 2003 2003 6 30 A 217 94 123