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1 * *, - 1 -

2 - 2 -

3 / (1) (2) (3) (4) - 3 -

5 1., 2003 adverse selection, (agent problem) (moral hazard)

6 - 6 - (free ride)

7 /

8 - 8 - / (free ride) / / /

9 Myers 2000 partnership model (corporate model) Myers value of continuing Myers, (2003) Fama, Jensen(1983), De Angelo (1985) La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer Vishny (1997,1999) Jensen & Meckling (1976) (tunneling), (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 2000) - 9 -

10 Barclay Holderness(1989) % Dyck Zingale(2003) Bargaining Power

11 2 2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Green, 1984) Brennan and Kraus(1987); Brennan and Schwartz (1988)) Constanides and Grundy(1989) Stein(1992) Constanides and Grundy(1989) Sten(1992) (adverse selection)

12 (Stage Finance) (Sequential Finance) Mayers (1998) 2 3 Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986) Grossman and Hart (1982)

13 Jensen (1986) Rajan 1992 Free-rider problem Rajan 1992 / 2003 :

14 (break even) / Rajan I e 1 e 0,

15 1 G B G q B 1-q 2 1 G X H X L X H Pg X L 1-P g 1 B X L 0 X L P b 0 1-P b 1 L : X H >X L >I>L>P b X L 1 q(e,θ) G P g X H I X L B P b q q = q(e, ),e q 1 (e,θ)> 0, q 11 (e,θ)< 0, q 2 (e,θ)> 0, A1 k k 1 max q( e, θ )( P X + (1 P ) X ) + (1 q( e, θ )) L e (1) e g H g L 1 q1( e, θ ) = ( PX + (1 P) X ) L g H g L (2) 1 1 (1)

16 2. 2 D D 1 X L >D 1 >0 G B 0 qeθ D 1 + qeθ PD 1 1 (, ) (1 (, )) b e max q( e, θ )( P X + (1 P ) X D ) + (1 q( e, θ )) P ( X D ) e (3) e g H g L 1 b L 1 c e 1. (q(e, θ) + (1 qe (, θ)) P) D I (4) c c 1 1 b 1 c * e 1. = e 1 (5) D 1 (4) (3) (4), q ( e, θ ) = 1 1 (1 Pb ) I XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XLPb qe ( *, θ) + P qe ( *, θ) P 1 b 1 b (6) (6) (2) (A1) q 11 (e,θ)< 0 qe ( *, θ)( PX + (1 P) X ) + (1 qe ( *, θ)) PX e* (7) 1 g H g L 1 b L 1 (7) (2), 3 D 2 µ 2 X X

17 µ X D µ X > > (8) 2 H 2 2 L qe (, θ )( µ X P + (1 P) D) + (1 qe (, θ)) PD I (9) c c 2 2 H g g 2 2 b 2 e max qe (, θ )((1 µ ) X P + (1 P)( X D)) + (1 qe (, θ )) P( X D) e (10) e 2 H g g L 2 b L 2 (9) µ 2, D 2 (9) (10) q ( e, θ ) = 1 1 I Pb D2 XHPg + (1 Pg) XL PbXL qe ( *, θ ) 2 (11) µ X > D q(e c, θ)d +(1-q(e c, θ ))P D < I e*>e* 2 H b 2 2 g H g L 2 b L qe ( *, θ )( PX + (1 P) X ) + (1 qe ( *, θ )) PX e* (12) (12) e* 2 2 e* 2 e*>e* 1 2 (12) (7) 4. I 1 B, L 1, µ ( (1 ) ) 3 pgxh + pg XL L + L 3 [0,1] µ µ L

18 qe (, θ )( µ ( p X + (1 p ) X L) + L) + (1 qe (, θ)) L c c 3 3 g H g L 3 max q( e, θ )(1 µ )( P X + (1 P ) X L) e (13) e 3 g H g L 1 q1( e, θ ) = (1 µ )( X P + (1 P ) X L) 3 H g g L (14) qe ( *, θ )( PX + (1 P) X ) + (1 qe ( *, θ )) L e * (15) 3 g H g L 3 3 µ 3 [0,1] (15) (12),(7) µ 3 θ Rajan θ [0,1], θ θ θ > θ 2002 θ

20 - 20 -

21 / CSMAR 2003 WIND A 1 A A B B B A A

22 2 2 A N Std Dev N Std Dev N Std Dev CSMAR % 38.85%, 33.93% 45.53% 38.64% % 25.31% 36.66%

23 4 N ( (%) (%) N ( (%) (%) N ( (%) (%) CSMAR N (%) Std Dev (%) N (%) Std Dev (%) N (%) Std Dev (%)

24 N (%) Std Dev (%) N (%) Std Dev (%) N (%) Std Dev (%) Stien(1992) 2 t Wilcoxon

25 / (book-to-market ratio) / 7 / / 7 / N / (%) Std Dev (%) N / (%) Std Dev (%) N / (%) Std Dev (%) / panel data Y 2001 Y=1 Y=

26 % 8 A B C D E F G H I J K L M

27 9 n mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum (%) (%) (%) (%) / (%) (Probit ) : ' ( ) ( ) P= Pr Y = 1 = f X β 10 1% % 2002 / % /

28 % ( ) ( ) ' 10 P= Pr Y = 1 = f X β Chi Square Pr>Chi A B C D E F G H I J K L *** * *** / *** F Probit *** 1% ** 5% * 10% /

29 WTO Chi Square Pr>Chi A B C E F G H J K L *** ** / *** F Probit *** 1% ** 5% * 10% 11 10% / 1 /

30 A 1 j 0 c c c c ( P P ) ( I I ) AR, = log log 0 1 j,0 j,

31 j 1 c c c c ( P P ) ( I I ) AR, = log log 1 0 j 1 j,1 j,0 c c c c ( P P ) ( I I ) AR, = log log 1 2 j, 1 j, 2 c Pj, 2 P c j, 1 P c j, 0 c c Pj, 1 I 2 I c 1 I c 0 I c 1 A A A AR 1 n t = AR j, t n j = 1 AR t t AR j, t t j t = 40, 19, L,0, L19,60 n CAR t t = i= 40 AR i t 40 t *** 1% ** 5% * 10%

32 % 1% Eckbo (1986) 1.25% %. 12 t AR t AR t AR t AR t AR * * ** ** *** t t Wilcoxon *** 1% ** 5% * 10%

33 % %

35 / / %

37 6 11 (6) (3) (3) y 1 = q( e, θ)( PgXH + (1 Pg) XL D 1 ) + (1 q( e, θ)) Pb( XL D 1 ) e y 1( e) = q11( e, θ )( PgXH + (1 Pg) XL D1 Pb( XL D1)) = q ( e, θ )( P ( X X ) + (1 P )( X D )) 11 g H L b L 1 q 11 ( e, θ ) < 0, X L > D 1, y 1 ( e) < 0 y 1 (3) (11) (10) (10) 2 θ µ 2 H g g L 2 θ b L 2 y = q( e, )((1 ) X P + (1 P )( X D )) + (1 q( e, )) P ( X D ) e y 2( e) = q11( e, θ )((1 µ 2) XHPg + (1 Pg)( XL D2) Pb( XL D2)) = q ( e, θ )((1 µ ) X ( X D )) P + (1 P )( X D )) 11 2 H L 2 g b L 2 q ( e, θ ) < 0, X > D, (1 µ ) X ( X D ) 11 L 2 2 H L 2 (1 µ ) X ( X D ) > 0 2 H L 2 y ( e) 0 2 < y2 (10) (6) e * > q ( e, θ ) < if e * > e > 0 (1 P ) I 1 1 b XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XLPb qe (, θ) + Pb qe (, θ) Pb 16 (3) e +, y 1 e>0 e>e q ( e, θ ) < 1 1 (1 Pb ) I XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XLPb qe (, θ) + P qe (, θ) P b b (6) (16) (10) e * > q1( e, θ ) < if e 2* > e > 0 I Pb D2 XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XLPb qe (, θ )

38 e * > e * 1 2 q(e c, θ)d +(1-q(e c, θ ))P D < I b < I Pb D2 (1 Pb ) I XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XP L b XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XP L b qe (, θ) qe (, θ) + P qe (, θ) P b b q ( e *, θ ) = b 2 XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XLPb qe ( 2*, θ ) I P D 1 (1 Pb ) I XHPg + XL(1 Pg) XLPb qe ( *, θ) + P qe ( *, θ) P 2 b 2 b > q ( e *, θ ) e * > e *

39 Barclay, M., and C. Holdeness, 1989, Private Benefits of Control of Public Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics Brannan, M., and A. Kraus, 1987, Efficient Financing Under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Finance 42, Brannan, M., and E. Schwartz, 1988, The Case of Convertibles, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 1, Constanides and Grundy, 1989, Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals, Review of Financial Studies 2, Dyck, A., and L. Zingales, 2003, Private Benefits of Control: AN International Comparison, Forthcoming in Journal of Finance Eckbo, B., 1986, Valuation Effects of Corporate Debt Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics 15, Fama Eugene, Michael Jensen, 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, Green, R., 1984, Investment Incentives, Debt and Warrants, Journal of Financial Economics 13, Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1982, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, In J. McCall, ed: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, University Chicago Press Jensen, M., and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firms: managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, Jensen, M., 1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, American Economic Review 76, Myers, S., 2000 Outside Equity, Journal of Finance, Rajan, R. 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm s- Length Debt, Journal of Finance,

40 Ross, S., 1977, The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach, Bell Journal of Economics 8, Stein, J., 1992, Convertible Bonds as Backdoor Equity, Journal of Financial Economics 32, , ,

( ) : ,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4), ; (5) ( ), (2003),,,,,,, , 20,, ST,,,, :? ( ) 3 ( ) 77

( ) : ,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4), ; (5) ( ), (2003),,,,,,, , 20,, ST,,,, :? ( ) 3 ( ) 77 2005 4 3 ( 100084) : 1998 2002,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4),; (5) ( ),(2003),,,,,,, 1997 1, 20,, ST,,,,:? ( ) 3 (70473046) 77 :,?,, Modigliani Miller (1958), Jensen Meckling (1976),Grossman