* Qian and Roland 1998 Blanchard and Shleifer 2000 Li and Zhou 2005 2007 Young 2000 2004 2002 2010 32341. 09 2010 1 0. 36 0. 41 1 0. 67 0. 87 1 * 200433 fu. wenlin@ mail. shufe. edu. cn 210093 shenkr@ nju. edu. cn 07&ZD009 71073075 201002 NCET-10-0475 1 2010 2011 14 45
Oates 1999 Stein 1997 1994 2009 2008 1 2 3 Flypaper Effect Fungibility Oates 1999 Melitz and Zumer 1999 Hepp and von Hagen 2010 2002 1 2002 Tsui 2005 2009 1 1995 2001 5% 1995 2000 2001 0. 8% 1. 8% 3. 1% 2002 23 44 46
Buttner 1999 Smart 1998 Egger et al. 2010 2006 Flypaper Effect Oates 1999 1 Stein 1997 2007 2011 2 2009 2008 1980 2004 2008 Li and Zhou 2005 2007 Flypaper Effect Fungibility 3 4 1 Brennan and Buchanan 1980 Oates 1985 2 2007 3 4 Pack & Pack 1993 2011 Feldstein 1975 Case et al. 1993 Karnik and Lalvani 2008 47
Snoddon & Wen 2003 Wyckoff 1998 1 Musgrave 1969 Cai and Treisman 2005 2012 1 1 1995 2008 2 1 1 1 48 2 1
2008 OLS 2008-0. 50 1 0. 5 2008 2008 1995 1 1995 2 2 1995 2008 2 1994 2004 2004 1 2004 2 2001 0. 66 0. 67 2005 0. 59 1 2012 1999 8. 4% 2009 71. 7% 49
2005 0. 38 2004 0. 48 2008 0. 54 2006 1 Besfamille 2003 2 n E 0 t = 0 β t lnc t + δlnh t 0 < β < 1 1 c H 1 δ β G H 3 GDP GDP φ 4 H i t = τy i t + y珋 t - y i t - G i t 0 < τ 0 < 2 τ y i i GDP y珋 t n GDP y珋 t = y 1 t + y 2 t + + y i t + y n t / n θ c i t + θk i t = 1 - τ - y i t + 珋 y t 3 Devarajan et al. 1996 1 2006 7 1 2 2008 3 2011 Kormendi & Meguire 1985 Barro 1990 4 Gong & Zou 2002 GDP 50
Barro 1990 C-D y t +1 = A t +1 k α t G 1 - α t 0 < α < 1 4 y α A ξ t + 1 0 lna t +1 = ρlna t + ξ t +1 5 2 3 4 5 1 G i t = 1 - α β 1 + δ [ ( τ - ) y i t + y珋 t ] [ 1 - β δ + 1 - α β 1 + δ ] 6 δ 1 - α β 6 φ G i t 6 φ = 1 - α β 1 + δ [ 1 - β δ + 1 - α β 1 + δ ] y珋 t - y i t 7 7 y i t < y珋 t i i G i t 2007 1993 6 2 g it = a 0 + a 1 g it -1 + a 2 y it + a 3 tr it + a 4 fi it + a 5 mpk + ε it 8 i t g + y GDP tr 1 fi GDP mpk GDP mpk ε 1 2 6 β δ GMM 51
8 y tr GDP 8 y tr fy gf 9 g it = a 0 + a 1 g it -1 + a 2 y it + a 3 tr it + a 4 fi it + a 5 mpk + a 6 y it tr it + b t X it Θ + ε it 9 2007 1995 2006 30 1994 = 100 OLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM robust GMM 1 1 0. 51 0. 88 2 1 52
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 g - 1 y tr fi mpk y tr fy gf cons AR 1 AR 2 Hansen test obs 0. 83 *** 0. 074 0. 24 *** 0. 055 0. 20 *** 0. 027 0. 17 * 0. 099-0. 07 0. 085-2. 12 *** 0. 328 0. 02 0. 28 0. 90 328 0. 66 *** 0. 10 0. 41 * 0. 206-0. 07 0. 584 0. 19 0. 133-0. 14 0. 12-0. 01 0. 055 0. 02 0. 815-0. 96 *** 0. 315-0. 97 2. 182 0. 03 0. 32 0. 85 328 0. 88 *** 0. 036 0. 17 *** 0. 059 0. 22 *** 0. 067 0. 01 0. 108-0. 04 0. 134-1. 76 ** 0. 675 0. 00 0. 17 0. 98 328 0. 85 *** 0. 047-0. 28 0. 471-0. 85 1. 239 0. 19 0. 231 0. 02 0. 187 0. 13 0. 125-3. 20 * 1. 603 0. 36 0. 592 1. 95 4. 570 0. 00 0. 13 328 0. 71 *** 0. 069 0. 53 *** 0. 112 0. 59 *** 0. 113 0. 63 *** 0. 169-0. 19 0. 192-6. 32 *** 0. 828 0. 00 0. 53 0. 82 328 0. 51 *** 0. 146 2. 85 *** 0. 642 4. 98 *** 1. 245-0. 01 0. 40-0. 55 * 0. 285-0. 52 *** 0. 132 6. 36 * 3. 425-1. 91 1. 466-23. 4 *** 4. 994 0. 00 0. 61 0. 95 328 0. 81 *** 0. 064 0. 23 *** 0. 054 0. 24 *** 0. 039 0. 19 0. 156-0. 06 0. 081-2. 34 *** 0. 428 0. 05 0. 24 0. 94 329 0. 61 *** 0. 115 0. 98 ** 0. 420 1. 20 0. 827-0. 02 0. 217-0. 31 0. 209-0. 15 0. 099 0. 47 1. 138-1. 26 * 0. 666-5. 40 * 2. 947 0. 07 0. 12 0. 85 329 1 1 2 ** *** 10% 5% 1% * 3 Hansen AR 1 AR 2 p 2 1% 1 World Bank 2002 9 GDP 0 GDP 0 GDP 1 2010 32341. 09 48. 4% 2010 1927. 5 2010 53
1 Santerre 1985 1 7-0 1 7 GMM 2 2 g - 1 y tr fi mpk cons AR 1 AR 2 Hansen test obs 0. 81 *** 0. 074 0. 26 *** 0. 046 0. 30 *** 0. 063 0. 29 ** 0. 120 0. 06 0. 071-2. 89 *** 0. 381 0. 05 0. 32 251 0. 90 *** 0. 038 0. 16 ** 0. 061 0. 26 *** 0. 09 0. 06 0. 13 0. 06 0. 14-2. 08 ** 0. 766 0. 00 0. 23 251 0. 65 *** 0. 06 0. 63 *** 0. 113 0. 78 *** 0. 141 0. 59 *** 0. 197-0. 36 ** 0. 142-7. 40 *** 1. 326 0. 00 0. 72 251 0. 70 *** 0. 055 0. 33 *** 0. 043 0. 31 *** 0. 044 0. 22 * 0. 111-0. 11 0. 106-2. 83 *** 0. 378 0. 07 0. 05 251 0. 99 *** 0. 053-0. 01 0. 083-0. 04 0. 066-0. 00 0. 041-0. 02 0. 033 0. 43 0. 557 0. 12 0. 86 77 0. 79 *** 0. 109-0. 03 0. 073 0. 16 0. 221 0. 22 0. 233-0. 20 * 0. 092 0. 37 0. 723 0. 07 0. 07 77 0. 79 *** 0. 062 0. 47 ** 0. 186 0. 33 0. 209 0. 26 0. 147 0. 32 ** 0. 125-5. 18 ** 1. 921 0. 04 0. 88 77 1. 04 *** 0. 115-0. 02 0. 067-0. 05 0. 056-0. 05 0. 092-0. 10 0. 065 0. 51 * 0. 505 0. 04 0. 38 77 1 1 2 54 1
0. 9 2012 10% 2007 Crumpler and Grossman 2008 1995 2006 2004 55
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