~ - 10 - ( 2005) ( 2006) (responsiveness) (Shah1998) (preference-matching)? (Inman and Rubinfeld1997;Oates19992005); Brueckner(1982) ( Massachusetts ) ;Faguet(2004) ; Zhurarskaya (2000) Shah(2004)
( ) 2009 1 ( ) ;Tsui(2008) (accountable) (2006) 1994 1 ; (2007) (JIJIANZHICHU) 1994 ÁÂÃÁÃÂÄÁÄÂÅÁ ÃÆÄÃÆÇÃÆÈÃÆÉÄÁÄÁÄÁÇ 8.46% 2005 10.64%; (GOVERNFEE) 1994 13% 2005 16.68%; ( (WENJIAOKEWEI) ) GDP 1994 27.19% 2005 21.93% (FUXUJIUJI)10 2.38%?? (2004) ; (2006) Logit (Multinomial Logit) ; (2007) ; 1 ; Logit ; 7 ; ~ ; 1991~2005 Logit ; - 11 -
1. Borcherding Deacon (1972) Bergstrom Goodman (1973) Means Mehay (1995) Turnbull Mitias(1995) (2) (1) ;(2) ; (3) ;(4) ; GDP ;(5) GDP ;(6) (Bergstrom and Goodman1973) GDP G G m =G/N r N ;r (3) r=1 ; r=0 ;0<r<1 U m =U m (X m G m ) (1) X m q 1 τ m s.t. X m +τ m q G m N γ Y m (2) Y m G m* =G * (τ m qn γ Y m ) (3) (Bergstrom and Goodman 1973; Denzau and Mackay 1976; Gramlich and Rubinfeld1982) C-D G m* =c(τ m qn γ ) α Y m β (4) G m* G= N γ G m G * G * =cq α τ mα N γ(1+α) Y m β (5) (5) ln(g)=c'+αlnτ m +βlny m +γ(1+ α)lnn+ε (6) ~ (1) - 12 -
( ) ÂÃÂÃÂÃÂ ÁÂÃÄÅÁÂÃÄÅÁÂÃÄÅÁÂÃÄÅ 2009 1 )Á (SUR) 7 1999~2005 28 ( RE Ayres Levitt(1998) (j=1 7;i=1 28;t=1 7) (9) f ij j????????? (1 )?(ln N ) (ln N )??(ln ) (ln )? (ln???? (j=1 7;i=1 28;t=1 7) (10) (2) 0.25 GDP (tax25) (grosspop) )Á 392 1999~2005 GDP GDP 2 GDP ) (2007 6000~12000 481 ) GDP 20000 (0.25 ) 85% (FE) (RE) 2 0.25 GDP (4) Bergstrom Goodman (1973) Gramlich Rubinfeld (1982) Berstrom SUR Pooling (1982) ; Borcherding Deacon(1972) 0.25?(ln G ) (ln G )??(ln ) (ln )??(ln Y ) (ln Y??????? 0.25 τ 0.25 = (7)?????????????? (5) ln(g)=c'+αlnτ 0.25 +βlny 0.25 +γ(1+α)lnn+φz+ε (8) G ;Y 0.25 τ 0.25 ; 0.25 GDP ; ;Z ;C' pop65 65 ;pop15 ;ε ; (gdp25) 3 15 ;eduyear 2. 7 7 0 6 ; 9 ; 12 ; 18 4 ; ;popurban ;employ ; ; 7 stateworker ;sec- ond (1) (3) 2000~2006 ; GDP 2000~2006-13 -
; 65 15 2000~2006 0.25 GDP 7 (1)~(7) edu fuxujiuji health security governfee taxsector jijian (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 0.5785 0.7774 0.5766 0.652 0.6296 0.5043 0.7658 gdp25 (10.64)Á(8.47)Á(10.70)Á(4.84)Á(11.25)Á(6.64)Á(6.44)Á -0.0525-0.045-0.0535-0.089-0.0226-0.0581 0.0284 taxprice25 (-2.02)Á(-1.05) (-2.14)Á(-1.5) (-0.87) (-1.68)Á(0.51) 0.6125 0.0518 0.4165 1.4819 0.106 0.7224 0.0734 grosspop (1.70)Á(0.09) (1.19) (1.78)Á(0.29) (1.41) (0.09) 1.6736 1.7247 0.8265 4.0344 0.9333 1.2667 1.9254 eduyear (5.26)Á(3.22)Á(2.67)Á(5.43)Á(2.95)Á(2.97)Á(3.07)Á 0.0966 0.1575 0.0903 0.0734 0.0653 pop65 - - (2.76)Á(2.45)Á(2.23)Á-0.84 (0.84) (1.89)Á -0.6914-1.9051-0.6546-2.0355-1.1238-1.1223 pop15 - (-4.41)Á(-6.82)Á(-4.17)Á(-5.39)Á(-7.02)Á(-4.84)Á 0.2161 0.2947 0.2129 0.04941 0.1241 0.2381 popurban - (5.46 Á(4.33)Á(4.86)Á(0.53) (3.07)Á(2.23)Á 2000 2001 1% ; ; ; 6 2000~2006 GDP 3. ; 7 (SUR) 1 7 0.6465 ( R 2 ) 0.5065 0.8 ; 1.6266 Wald 0 0.1 7 1% ;65 15 5 1.1578-0.1494-0.052-1.2018 empoly - - - (2.76)Á(-1.05) (-0.20) (-2.65)Á -0.5648-0.32-0.144 stateworker - - - - 15 (-5.03)Á(-3.11)Á(-0.41) 1.0658-0.3183 15 15 second - - - - - (2.29)Á(-1.37) 0.6465 0.0542 0.44 1.6266 0.1085 0.767 0.0714 γ? (1.69)Á(0.09) (1.19) (1.76)Á(0.29) (1.41) (0.086) RMSE 0.1154 0.1895 0.1104 0.262 0.1173 0.1555 0.248 Adj-RÂ0.8545 0.8398 0.8324 0.7649 0.8821 0.7995 0.5065 ChiÂ(k) 1209.03 1071.46 1014.24 673.14 1639.82 844.35 221.98 P 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ; (2)γ ;(3)k ;(4)edu fuxujiuji health security governfee taxsector jijian - 14 - ; 6 ( ) ;
( ) 2009 1 ; )* +-.!"# 46.43 60.71 67.86 46.43 53.57 50 46.43 1999 $%& 46.43 32.14 21.43 53.57 42.86 42.86 39.29 ( $ 7.14 7.14 10.71 0 3.57 7.14 14.29!"# 60.71 67.86 57.14 71.43 67.86 57.14 71.43 2000 $%& 32.14 25 32.14 17.86 25 35.71 21.43 ( $ 7.14 7.14 10.71 10.71 7.14 7.14 7.14!"# 89.29 89.29 96.43 71.43 82.14 67.86 67.86 2001 $%& 0 7.14 0 3.57 0 3.57 3.57 ( $ 10.71 3.57 3.57 25 17.86 28.57 28.57!"# 64.29 78.57 89.29 75 89.29 57.14 67.86 ; 2002 $%& 0 0 3.57 0 0 0 0 ( $ 35.71 21.43 7.14 25 10.71 42.86 32.14!"# 89.29 71.43 67.86 89.29 85.71 71.43 96.43 2003 $%& 3.57 3.57 3.57 0 10.71 7.14 3.57 ( $ 7.14 25 28.57 10.71 3.57 21.43 0!"# 82.14 82.14 82.14 75 71.43 75 78.57 2004 $%& 10.71 17.86 17.86 21.43 21.43 25 21.43 ( $ 7.14 0 0 3.57 7.14 0 0!"# 64.29 67.86 57.14 60.71 50 64.29 71.43 2005 $%& 7.14 10.71 10.71 17.86 14.29 21.43 7.14 2 ( $ 28.57 21.43 32.14 21.43 35.71 14.29 21.43!"# 70.92 73.97 73.98 69.89 71.43 63.27 71.43 1999~ $%& 14.29 13.78 12.76 16.33 16.33 19.39 13.78 2005 ( $ 14.8 12.24 13.27 13.78 12.24 17.35 14.8 Breusch-Pagan 1557.481P 0 SUR RMSE 95% 5% ; j ; j ; j ; (tax effort index) RMSE j j (11) ( 1 );Llavador? (RMSE) 1999~2005 Roemer(2001) 28 edu fuxujiuji health security governfee taxsector jijian ( edu 1 ) fuxujiuji 0.783 1 health 0.7561 0.6872 1 3 security 0.6153 0.4946 0.4088 1 3 govern 0.8495 0.6899 0.6787 0.5872 1 taxsector 0.6859 0.6369 0.4939 0.6398 0.6806 1 jijian 0.5592 0.3729 0.4738 0.4677 0.58 0.5217 1 Breusch-Pagan test of independence chiá(21)=1557.481 P 0-15 -
3 1999 2000 Logit (Multinomial 1999 Logit model) π il i l π il Pr(Y i =l)l=012 ;2001 ~2003 k π il 2001 2003 Logistic (Fox1997) ; 2004 l=12 7 ;2005 1 l 2004 7 (baseline category) 1 (12) 1999~2005 (pooling data) 7 l=12 (13) π il π i0 70% β (13) 12%~20% Y i π i0 π i1 π i2 0 1 2; i ; (11) Y i =l E il = 1 E il =0 i E il =1 Y i (14) (11) (15) 1 =0 (12) (15) 1 (11) (Polytomous data Multinomial data) OLS - 16 - ( =0 ) (12) l-1 (12) =0 N (16)
X i ' (1X i1 X ik )β l (β 0l β 1l β kl )' (17) (18) / 0.506 0.151 fissurplus / 0.091 0.042 fisburden /GDP 0.069 0.019 density ( /!"#$ /%& ( 403.66 512.05 avegdp )*GDP+-$./012345 GDP 1.12 0.839 openness 6789 ; </GDP 0.306 0.371 marketrate =>? +@$ ABCDC /GDP 38.481 6.062 urbanrate EF? EF / 0.341 0.177 ( ) 2009 1 (19) 0 β l l=12 (20) (12) 2006; 2007) m 2000~2006 ; ; 2000~2006 x m β lm ( 2007) 7 7 SUR 7 ( ) ( ) ; ( GDP 5~ 11 7 Logit (SUR) 8 Logit Logit 4 1 ( =2 8 =1) ( =0) Logit =0( ) (2007) ( 1 V.S. 0; 2 V.S. 0) Wald 8 Logit ; - 17 -
(-1.68)Á fissurplus (-1.06) (-1.4) (3.55)Á(2.57)Á(2.55)Á(1.93)Á (1.99)Á(2.22)Á avegdp openness urbanrate (2.75)Á(3.29)Á-0.17 (-0.22) marketrate =0 is the base category Pseudo RÂ=0.0999 LR chiâ(10)=31.5 Prob>chiÂ=0.0005 (1) ;(2) =1 1 =2 2-4.692-2.847 ; (-3.88)Á(-2.27ÂÁ 4.388 0.471 0.392-0.023 (1.77)Á(1.96)Á(0.16) (-0.10) fissurplus 10% -1.609-0.16-1 -0.08 avegdp (-1.77)Á(-2.46)Á(-1.69)Á(-1.23) openness 7.214 0.703 5.566 0.467 urbanrate (2.80)Á(3.19)Á(2.19)Á(2.07)Á marketrate =0 is the base category Pseudo RÃ=0.0563 LR chiã(6)=16.61 Prob>chiÃ=0.0108 ; (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) =1 1 =2 2 ; -3.332-2.795 (-2.42)Á(-2.23)Á (2) 5 0 χ 2 Wald =1 1 =2 2-3.775-1.45 SUR (-2.63)Á(-1.09) 7 5.071 0.559-3.133-0.464 5~ 11 (1.83)Á(2.15)Á(-1.25) -6.652-0.824 9.698 1.29 (1) LR ( 8) -3.154-0.31-0.392 0.003 (-2.8)Á(-3.88)Á(-0.51) (0.04) -0.04 ( 10) 3.461 0.306 2.561 0.257 0 7.051 0.701 0.4424-0.06 1 Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 1 0.55% 3.748 0.367-1.263-0.188 (1.43) (1.49) (-0.53) (-0.73) -11.378-1.139 5.734 0.78 fissurplus (-1.92)Á(-2.00)Á(1.11) (1.40) -2.177-0.196-0.582-0.035 avegdp (-3.00)Á -2.96)Á(-1.07) (-0.49) 2.518 0.214 1.641 0.147 openness (2.61)Á(2.16)Á(1.66)Á(1.34) 6.28 0.539 3.665 0.321 urbanrate (2.96)Á(2.65)Á(1.74)Á(1.37) marketrate =0 is the base category Pseudo RÂ=0.0842 LR chiâ(10)=24.88 Prob>chiÂ=0.0056 (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) - 18-2 1 0.464%; GDP ; (3) 6 1 10% 5% ; 2
=1 1 =2 2 =1 1-1.777-0.554 (-1.96)Á(-0.59) 0.239 0.105-3.387-0.389 2.868 0.389 1.738 0.151 (0.12) (0.40) (-1.55) (-1.69)* (1.63)* (1.52) (0.94) (0.62) fissurplus fissurplus avegdp -0.523-0.067-0.432-0.043 avegdp 0.634 0.047 1.89 0.201 (-1.46) (-1.10) (-0.99) (-0.81) openness (0.77) (0.46) (2.47)** (2.42)** openness urbanrate urbanrate marketrate 0.022 0.008 0.082 0.011 marketrate _0 is the base category (0.49) (0.11) (2.00)Á(1.93)Á Pseudo RÂ=0.0217 LR chiâ(4)=6.97 Prob>chiÂ=0.1375 =0 is the base category (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% Pseudo R 0.0227 LR chiâ(6) 8.11 Prob>chi 0.2304 ;(2) (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) =1 1 =2 2 =1 1 =2 2-3.543-5.844 (-2.70)Á(-4.36)Á 0.042-0.757 1.397 0.016 7.75 0.922 (0.05) (-0.88) (0.53) (0.06) (3.17)Á(3.66)Á -3.048-0.451 4.464 0.462 fissurplus (-1.61) (-1.93)* (1.97)** (2.27)** 0.101 0.033-1.358-0.167-2.461 0.038-22.656-2.072 fissurplus avegdp (-0.51) (0.06) (-3.35)*** (-3.45)*** (0.18) (0.57) (-2.06)Á(-2.45)Á 0.088 0.03-1.262-0.119 openness avegdp (0.21) (0.68) (-2.16)** (-2.94)*** 2.547 0.175 5.255 0.599 urbanrate openness (1.09) (0.78) (2.43)Á(2.53)Á urbanrate marketrate marketrate =0 is the base category =0 is the base category Pseudo R 0.0798 LR chiâ(6) 24.82 Prob>chi 0.0004 Pseudo R2 0.0683 LR R 2 chi2(6) 21.32 Prob>chi2 0.0016 2 2 ( ) 2009 1 =2 2-2.903-4.893 (-1.69)* (-3.19)Á (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% (1) Z *** ** * 1% 5% 10% ;(2) ;(2) ; GDP ; GDP ; (5) 9 1 (4) 7 ; 2 1 5% 2 ; 1 ; GDP 10% 2 ; - 19 -
(6) 11 1 10% ; 2 5% 2 GDP ; 5% 1 IMF 28 ( ) 3 ( GDP ) (T/GDP) ; ; Logit (Piancastelli2001;Gupta2007) SUR 1. (median voter rule) ( 0.25 2. ; ( 0.25 WB ; ; 2 (single-peaked) ) (0.25 ) ) ; 1(pooling - 20-0.25 Means Mehay(1995) GDP )
( ) 2009 1 Ayres Levitt(1998) 2SLS 1183~1205. (14)Borcherding T.E. Deacon R. T. 1972 The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Government The American E- F R 2 AIC conomic Reviews 62 No. 5. (December) pp. 891~901. (15)Brueckner J. K. 1982 A Test of Allocative Efficiency in The Local Public Sector 19 pp. 311~331. Journal of Public Economics Vol. (16)Denzau A. T. Mackay R. J. 1976 Benefit Shares Z and Majority Voting The American Economic Review Vol. 66 No.1. (March) pp. 69~76. t (17)Faguet J. P. 2004 Dose Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia Journal of Public Economics Vol.88 pp. 867~893. 0 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 3 0 1 999 (18)Fox J. 1997 Applied Regression Analysis Linear Tao Zhang Hengfu Models and Related Methods SAGE Publications. Zou(1998) (19)Gramlich E. M. Rubinfeld D. L. 1982 Micro Esti- mates of Public Spending Demand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-voter Hypotheses The Journal of Political (1999) Economy Vol. 90 No. 3. (January) pp. 536~560. (20)Gupta A. S. 2007 Determinants of Tax Revenue Efforts in Developing Countries IMF Working Paper WP/07/184. (21)Inman R. P. Rubinfeld D. L. 1997 Rethinking Fed- Journal of Economic Perspective Vol. 11 pp. 43~64. Wald (density) eralism (fisburden) (22)Llavador H. G. Roemer J E. 2001 An Equal-opportunity Approach to the Allocation of International Aid Jour- 3 nal of Development Economics Vol. 64 pp. 147~171. (23)Means T. S. Mehay S. L. 1995 Estimating the Publicness of Local Government Services 4 Alternative Congestion Function Specifications Southern Economic Journal Vol. 61 No. 3. (January) pp. 614~627. (1) ( 5 ) (24)Oates W. E. 1999 An Essay on Fiscal Federalism 2007 Journal of Economic Literature Vol.37 No.3. (Sep) pp. 1120~ (2) 1149. 2007 3 (3) 2006 (25)Oates W. E. 2005 Theory of Fiscal Federalism Toward A Second -Generation International Tax and Public Finance 12 pp. 349~373. (4) 2006 2 (26)Piancastelli Marcelo 2001 Measuring The Tax Effort (5) ( 3 ) of Developed and Developing Countries Cross Country Panel 2007 Data Analaysis-1985/95 IPEA Working Paper. ISSN 1415~ (6) 4765. 2004 3 (7) 2005 7 (27)Shah A. 1998 Balance Accountability and Responsiveness Lessons about Decentralization World Bank Washington DC Policy Research Working Paper 2021. (8) (28)Shah A. 2004 Fiscal Decentralization in Developing 2007 6 and Transition Economies Progress Problems and the Promise (9) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3282. 2006 2 (10) 1999 11 (11)Ayres I. Levitt S. D. 1998 Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution An Empirical Analysis of Lojack Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 pp.43~ 77. (12)Bergstrom T. C. Goodman R. P. 1973 Private Demands for Public Goods The American Economic Reviews 63 (June) pp.280~297. (13)Bergstrom T. C. Rubinfeld D. L. Shapiro P. 1982 Micro-Based Estimates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures Econometrica Vol. 50 No. 5. (September) pp. (29)Tao Zhang Heng-fu Zou 1998 Fiscal Decentralization Public Spending and Economic Growth in China Journal of Public Economics Vol.67 pp.221~240. (30)Tsui K. Y. Wang Y. Q. 2008 Decentralization with Political Trump Vertical Control Local Accountability and Regional Disparities in China China Economic Review Vol. 16 pp.403~418. (31)Turnbull G. K. Mitias P. M. 1995 Which Median Voter? Southern Economic Journal Vol. 62 No.1. (July) pp. 183~191. (32)Zhurarskaya E. V. 2000 Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods Fiscal Federalism Russian Style Journal of Public Economics Vol. 76 pp. 337~368. - 21 -