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1 李世刚尹恒,,,,,, ( 00875);, ( 00875) 00,,, 00,, 00.7% %,5 0, (77309) (JZD05) ( ) [00] 00 5,, 8

2 0, % %,00,,,,,,,, GDP, % , - 006,,,, ,005 3, , 003 ;, 004 5, , 59,, 005 0,,,,

3 ,,,,,,,,,,3, 4 Oates968,, 5 97,Oates, 6, (spil-overefect) Besley, ,006, 8 ;007,, 6 4, (005 0 ) [005]43 htp// htm. PaulA.Samulson, ThePureTheoryofPublicExpenditure,"The Review of Economicsand Statistics,vol.36,no.4,954,pp , ( ) ;,, WalaceE.Oates, The TheoryofPublicFinanceinaFederalSystem,"Canadian Journalof Economics,vol.,no.,968,pp WalaceE.Oates,FiscalFederalism,New YorkHarcourtBraceJovanovich,97. (fiscalequivalence), MancurOlson, ThePrincipleof Fiscal Equivalence TheDivisionofResponsibilitiesamongDiferentLevelsofGovernment," The American Economic Review,vol.59,no.,969,pp TimothyBesleyandStephenCoate, CentralizedversusDecentralizedProvisionofLocal PublicGoodsA PoliticalEconomyApproach,"Journalof Public Economics,vol.87, no.,003,pp

4 0,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ), ( ),, Case,3 4, MichaelKeenand Maurice Marchand, FiscalCompetitionandthePaternofPublic Spending,"Journalof Public Economics,vol.66,no.,997,pp Timothy Besley and Anne Case, Incumbent BehaviorVote-Seting,Tax-Seeking,and YardstickCompetition,"The American Economic Review,vol.85,no.,995,pp Anne C.Case and Harvey S.Rosen, Budget Spilovers and Fiscal Policy InterdependenceEvidencefromtheStates,"Journalof Public Economics,vol.5,no. 3,993,pp ,DavidN.Figlio,Van W.Kolpinand Wiliam E.Reid, DoStatesPlay WelfareGames?" Journalof Urban Economics,vol.46,no.3,999,pp ;FedericoReveli, Reactionor Interaction?SpatialProcessIdentificationin Multi-TieredGovernmentStructures,"Journal of Urban Economics,vol.53,no.,003,pp.9-53;Federico Reveli, OnSpatialPublic FinanceEmpirics,"InternationalTax and Public Finance,vol.,no.4,005,pp ; KatherineBaicker, TheSpiloverEfectsofStateSpending,"Journalof Public Economics, vol.89,no.3,005,pp ;johanlundberg, SpatialInteraction ModelofSpilovers from LocalyProvidedPublicServices,"RegionalStudies,vol.40,no.6,006,pp ; JanK.Brueckner, PartialFiscalDecentralization,"RegionalScienceand Urban Economics, vol.39,no.,009,pp.3-3.

5 00 005,,, GDP,3, ( ), ; ;,, ( ),,,, ;4 3 4,, ; , 008 ;, 009 ;, 00 7 ;, 00 3,, 0 7 ;,, 007,, 0,,, 85

6 0 (yardstickcompetition),, i -i ( ) i T i,, P i E i Barro, Y i=k il α i -α Pi -α Y i, L i,k i,0<α<,α,, Y i=kip α i -α,, K E i, i, i U i=βln (K ip α i -α )+ (-β ) lne i,,0<β<, β (GDP), ( ), i ln (E i+ E -i ),,0 <,, =0,, Y i=βln [K i α (P i+φp -i ) -α ] φ,0 φ<, K,K=K i+k -i,, Y i =αk i α- K i (P i+φp -i ) -α = Y-i =αk α- -i K -i (P -i+φp i ) -α P i+φp -i K i= (P i+p -i )(+φ )K () (), K, K i K 86 RobertJ.Barro, GovernmentSpendinginaSimple ModelofEndogenousGrowth," Journalof PoliticalEconomy,vol.98,no.5,990,pp.03-5., GDP, U i=β ln (K ip α i -α )+ (-β )lne i β =β, ; β=, GDP

7 , P i, P -i,, ( ) i max U i=βln [K i α (P i+φp -i ) -α ]+ (-β ) ln (E i+ E -i ) P i,e i 烄 P i+e i=t i s.t. K i= (-θ) K +θ P i+φp -i 烅 (P i+p -i )(+φ )K 烆 P -i+e -i=t -i,θ 0/ 0,, K ; θ,, αβθ(-φ )( T -i-e -i ) -θ ( +φ )( T i-e i+t -i-e -i )+θ[t i-e i+φ ( T -i-e -i )] + ( -α) β (T i-e i+t -i-e -i ) T i-e i+φ ( T -i-e -i ) =( -β )( T i-e i+t -i-e -i) () E i+ E -i, (+φ E * = )( -β ) T [αθ(-φ ) +(-α)] β (+ ) +(+φ )( -β ) (3) (3), E θ=<e * θ=0 *,, ( ) E* = -(+φ )( -β )[ αθ(-φ ) +(-α)] β T {[αθ(-φ ) +(-α)] β (+ ) +(+φ )( <0 -β )},, 3 E* φ = 4(-β )( αθ+-α)(+ ) βt {[αθ(-φ ) +(-α)] β (+ ) +(+φ )( >0 -β )}, 3,,,,, 87

8 0, GDP ;, 4 E* β = -(+φ )[ αθ(-φ ) +(-α)](+ ) T {[αθ(-φ ) +(-α)] β (+ ) +(+φ )( <0 -β )},, (), de i (-φ =A{ αθ ) -4(-α) φ de -i αθ(-φ ) +(-α) - β[ αθ(-φ ) +(-α)] -β,a } (4) θ=0 =0 φ =0,, de i de -i =0 (5), θ=0 0< < φ =0,,, de i =-A β ( -α) de -i -β <0 (6) (6),, 3 θ=0 =0 0<φ<,,, de i =-Aφ<0 (7) de -i (7),,,, P i+φp -i,, 4 θ= =0 φ =0,, de i =A α de -i -α >0 (8) (8), -i E, P -i, i -i, i 88

9 P i, E i, θ= 0< < 0<φ<,, dei de -i,,, E i=α+λ w ij E j +X iγ+εi (9) j εi=ρ w ijεj+υi (0) j,e, X w ij E j j λ, (9) (0), w ij E j j Anselin (ML) (9) (0), E=λWE+Xγ+ε,ε=ρWε+υ,υ~N (0,σ I) υ= (I-ρW)(I-λW)E- (I-ρW)Xγ, λ ρ γ Kelejian Prucha (GSSLS) 3, 3,, LucAnselin,SpatialEconometrics Methodsand Models,DordrechtKluwerAcademic Publishers,988. HarryKelejianandIngmarR.Prucha, A GeneralizedSpatialTwo-StageLeastSquares ProcedureforEstimatingaSpatialAutoregressiveModelwithAutoregressiveDisturbances," Journalof RealEstate Financeand Economics,vol.7,no.,998,pp.99-;Harry Kelejian and Ingmar R.Prucha, A Generalized Moments Estimator for the AutoregressiveParameterinaSpatialModel,"InternationalEconomic Review,vol.40, no.,999,pp

10 0, WE H,H X WX W X, (9),, GMM, λ ^λ, Cochrane-Orcut,E ** =E- ^λwe,x ** =X-^λWX, (9) 3,,,,, ( ),, λ,,, λ, (paneldata), E it=α+λ w ij E jt+x itγ+ωi+εit () j εit=ρ w ijεjt+υit () j ωi () (demean); ωi , 7000, Stata,, ,Sebastian Hauptmeier,Ferdinand Mitermaierand Johanner Rincke, Fiscal CompetitionoverTaxesand PublicInputsTheoryand Evidence," European Central Bank WorkingPaper,no.033,March009;, 009 ;, 0 7, David M.Drukker,IngmarR.PruchaandRafalRaciborski, Maximum- Likelihoodand GeneralizedSpatialTwo-StageLeast-SquaresEstimatorsforaSpatial- Autoregressive Model with Spatial-Autoregressive Disturbances," Stata Technical Report,0.htp//econweb.umd.edu/~prucha/Papers/WP spreg 0.pdf., 0

11 ,, W ;,,, W 50km, 烄 /d ij i j d ij 50km W 50km ij =烅 0 i j d ij>50km 烆 0 i=j,,, 50km,3, ; 50km,, 0, 0,,, 00km W 00km, W city, 烄 i j i j city W ij =烅 0 i j i j 烆 0 i=j, W d-city W city-d, d=50km 00km, 3 htp//nfgis.nsdi.gov.cn/ default.asp.,, Google (htp//maps.eeeeee.org/google/),, Stata spmatidistance,, km,, 0km, 80km, 00km 50km,,, 00km 9

12 0 W d-city ij W city-d ij 烄 = i j i j d, 烅烆 0 i=j i j i j d 烄 = i j i j, d 烅烆 0 i=j i j ,,,,, 800 ( ) X,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 3, 3 9,, ( ),, 00,, ;, 0 ; , 0

13 ,,,,00 005,,,,,, 00 67% %,,00 6.3%, 005, 4.8% GDP GDP GDP 00, 00,,,, ( ), ;,,,,,,,,, 93

14 λ ρ σ GSSLS ML GSSLS ML GSSLS ML GSSLS ML () () (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) *** *** -0.0 *** *** *** *** *** *** (-7.9) (-7.9) (-5.95) (-6.05) (-5.9) (-5.9) (-6.4) (-6.47) *** *** *** *** *** 0.39 *** 0.43 *** *** (4.7) (5.09) (3.87) (4.58) (5.64) (5.96) (8.4) (9.09) *** *** *** *** (9.53) (9.0) (9.) (9.3) * ** *** 0% 5% %,, W 50km, 4 GSSLS, ML,,,,GSSLS,, ML,, 3,,λ 0.0, %,λ, λ,,, ρ, %, 4 W 50km W 00km W city GSSLS ML GSSLS ML GSSLS ML () () (3) (4) (5) (6) λ -0.8 *** *** -0.8 *** *** -0.6 *** *** (4.4) (3.80) (6.45) (0.03) (6.54) (7.09) 0.45 *** *** *** *** *** *** (4.3) (4.5) (4.00) (3.67) (3.60) (3.63) (-0.4) (-0.) (-0.4) (-0.40) (-0.5) (-0.) *** *** *** *** *** *** (-6.47) (-6.6) (-6.37) (-6.4) (-6.4) (-6.3) 94 ; ;

15 *** 0.65 *** 0.63 *** 0.60 *** *** *** (64.00) (64.8) (63.74) (64.6) (64.4) (67.00).9 ***.936 ***.868 ***.85 ***.907 ***.98 *** (39.46) (39.95) (37.3) (36.7) (38.37) (38.93) * * ** ** (-.7) (-.83) (-.08) (-.98) (-0.76) (-0.85) *** *** *** *** *** (0.05) (0.5) (0.3) (9.9) (8.7) (8.45) ** ** (-.5) (-.) (-.53) (-.46) (-.56) (-.43) ** 0.04 ** ** ** * * (.9) (.4) (.0) (.06) (.68) (.76) ρ σ W 50km W 00km W city GSSLS ML GSSLS ML GSSLS ML () () (3) (4) (5) (6) *** *** *** *** *** *** (9.8) (9.05) (8.4) (9.8) (8.6) (8.58) 0.95 *** 0.69 *** 0.50 *** *** 0.50 *** *** (.7) (.7) (.6) (4.9) (3.9) (5.3) *** *** 0.08 *** (49.83) (48.67) (47.4) () () 50km ; (3) (4) 00km, (5) (6) W city,,,,λ %, λ,λ 0,, ( ), (5) (6) λ,,,λ 50km, 00km,,λ,,, ,,,,,,, 5 95

16 0 W 50km-city W 00km-city 50km 00km, ; W city-50km W city-00km, 50km 00km, ( 50km 00km),λ ( ()),,, W city-50km W city-00km λ, W 50km-city W 00km-city, 5 λ ρ σ W 50km-city W city-50km W 00km-city W city-00km GSSLS ML GSSLS ML GSSLS ML GSSLS ML () () (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ** *** *** * *** *** -0.3 *** (-.) (-0.74) (-6.7) (-6.50) (-.83) (-5.38) (-6.35) (-7.77) 0.59 *** 0. *** *** 0.43 *** 0.66 *** *** 0.86 *** *** (5.3) (5.5) (0.85) (.44) (0.64) (.34) (5.57) (5.83) 0.04 *** *** *** *** (5.09) (48.3) (49.99) (49.53),, 4, ( ), ,,,, de i, =-Aφ<0; de -i de i, = -A β ( -α) de -i -β <0, GDP ( β ),,, 5 5,, 96, 0

17 ,,,,,,,, ;,,,3,,,,,,,,, 4,,,,,,,,, 3 4,,, ( ), AlbertoAlesina,RezaBaqirand Wiliam Easterly, PublicGoodsandEthnicDivisions," The Quarterly Journalof Economics,vol.4,no.4,999,pp ,,,, 97

18 ABSTRACTS importsis innovatively destructive"in nature,and constitutesa goodforcein boosting"thethaieconomy.furtherresearchalsoshowsthatchineseimportsof intermediateproductshavestrongerefectsontheinnovationofthaienterprisesthan thoseoffinishedproducts. (5)AnExternalAnalysisoftheCounty-levelExpenditureonBasicEducationWithan AnalysisoftheEffectivenessofthe County-based"System LiShigang and Yin Heng 8 Theefectivenessof county-based"expenditureonbasiceducationislargely determined by the balance of expenditure externalities against preference heterogeneity.the majorcausesforexpenditureexternalitiesarespil-overefects andcompetitionefects,bothofwhichcancausecounty-levelexpenditureonbasic educationto deviatefrom the eficiencylevel. However,they have resultedin diferentexpenditureinteractionsin naturetheformeris mutualsubstitutionin expenditure,whilethelaterisracetothebotom inexpenditure.anempirical analysisofthecounty-levelfiscalpaneldatarevealsthatexpendituresofneighboring countiesonbasiceducationshowamarkednegativecorrelation,indicatingspil-over efectstobethedominantfactorfortheexpenditureexternalityofbasiceducation. Toredressthelowerexpenditureon basiceducation,theupperfiscalauthorities shouldshoulderupmoreresponsibilitiesofexpenditureonbasiceducation. (6)HigherEducationandSocialTrustAStudyBasedonChineseandBritishSurvey Data Huang Jianand Deng Yanhua 98 ThisstudyemploysdatafromtheChineseGeneralSocialSurveyin003andthe BritishChildDevelopmentStudyin008toexploretherelationshipbetweenhigher educationandsocialtrust.theresultsshowthathighereducationinbothchinaand Britainhasefectively promotedtheformation ofsocialtrust,buthasdisplayed significantdiferencesinspecificfunction mechanism.in China,highereducation mainlyafectstheformationofsocialtrustthroughtheeconomicefectsmechanism, whilethe British highereducation mainly afectsthatthroughthe non-economic efectsmechanism,i.e.throughthestrengtheningofindividualidentification with values,normsandinstitutionalarrangements.thisfindinghasimplicationsforthe 05

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