: U 3 U ( 100871) :, U,,, ;,,,,,,, U : (2004),,,,,, Megginson and Netter (2001) Djankov and Murrel (2002),, :,, (Shaprio and Willig,1990),,,,,,,,, (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988),,(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993),,, (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), (Shleifer and Vishny,1998) 3 (70373012), 48
2005 10,Blanchard and Shleifer (2000),1989,,,Che and Qian (1998),Wang et al (2002) Chen et al (2002),,,,,,,,,,,( Tunneling) (Johnson et al, 2000),,,,? ( Panel Data),Tobinπs Q (ROA), (Robust OLS Regression) (Maximum Likelihood Panel Model),,, U (2SLS),, ;,,,,,U,, :;; ; ;U ; Sinofin, 1998 825 1999 923 2000 1060 2001 1139 2002 1208 2003 1266,6421 A - M, C0 - C9 2003, 1266 22 Q ROA Q Tobinπs Q, Tobinπs Q, Chung and Pruitt (1994) Q Tobinπs Q 49
: U,Q Q,,;, 1 Q 218, 214, Q, ROA 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 0 % > 0 % Q 31249 21734 333 31284 21624 333 21944 21647 333 21878 21561 21317 333 21684 21206 333 21514 21309 333 21378 ROA 01034 01032 01037 01031 333 01036 01037 01033 01038 01034 33 01041 01032 333 01039 01039 01036 Observations 1548 4127 2322 3353 683 2205 6421, 1 1 2 ; 3 4, ; 5 6, 0, ;, ; 50 %,,, 1 Student2T, Mann2Whitney U, P 10 %, ; P 5 %, ; P 1 %, 2,Q 21734,1 31249, 1818 % ;1015 % ROA 01032, 01034, 613 % 816 %, 4 3, Q 2512 %,2117 % ;ROA 1914 %, 2811 %,,4 2 2003,44 % 50 %,,6 4 6 5, Q 1112 %, 2512 %, Q ROA, (ME) (NSE), U nse = n nse n me + n nse ( n nsee + 1) 2 n nse n me + n me ( n me + 1) 2 50 - S me - S nse, U me =
2005 10 ROA,,,2 4 6,ROA,Q,,,, : Value = C + Government + B g Control +,Value,Q ROA ; Government,, ( Prilarge) ( State) ; Control, 2,, ( Size) ( Tangible) ( Gear) ( Exchange) ( Industry) ( Year), ( Second) ( Manager) ( Herfindahl) Gomes and Novaes (2002),,,,,,,2,,, HuberΠWhiteΠsandwich, OLS HuberΠWhiteΠsandwich,(Maddala, 1983),,,6421,,(Pooled Data) (OLS), (maximum log likelihood regressions, MLP), ( short) (wide),,coles et al (2005),(cross sectional), fixed effect,, Mundlak (1978),, Baltagi2Li LM,, i, : l i = - 1 2 T i 2 e 1 t = 1 ( y it - x it ) 2 - : y it =+ x it + v i + it 2 u T 2 i u + T i 2 e t = 1 ( y it - x it ) 2 2 u + ln( T i + 1) + T i ln(2 2 e) 2 e 51
: U 2 Q ROA Prilarge, Q,,,, 0 ;,1 + + State State2 State - U Herfindahl (Si^2)Π10 Si i, i 1 10 + + Second, 10 %, 0 ;,1 + 0 Manager + 0 for Q ; + for ROA Size Q,; ROA, + - for Q ; + for ROA Tangible, - - Gear + - Exchange Industry Year, 0 ;,1, 21 1994 1998 0 for ROA : + for Q 3,, 3 Prilarge,, Prilarge 1 ;, Prilarge 0 3 Prilarge, OLS, Q 011261 Q 21624 418 %01074,218 % 1 Q 25 %,,,,,, ROA, 52
2005 10 3, (1) (2) (3) (4) OLS MLP OLS MLP Q Q ROA ROA Prilarge 01126 333 [01041 ] 01074 3 [01043 ] 01004 333 [01001 ] 01003 333 [01001 ] Second 01164 333 [01047 ] 01145 333 [01051 ] 01000[01001 ] 01000[01001 ] Manager 01157[01335 ] 01333[01611 ] 01052 33 [01021 ] 01050 333 [01014 ] Herfindahl 01010[ 01026 ] - 01004[ 01017 ] 01000[ 01001 ] 01000[ 01000 ] Size - 01513 333 [01026 ] - 01451 333 [01020 ] 01005 333 [01001 ] 01006 333 [01000 ] Tangible - 01119[01131 ] - 01069[01143 ] - 01001[01003 ] - 01003[01003 ] Gear 11716 333 [01269 ] 11894 333 [01037 ] - 01041 333 [01008 ] - 01032 333 [01002 ] Exchange 01148 333 [01039 ] 01171 333 [01062 ] 01003 333 [01001 ] 01005 333 [01001 ] Industry Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Year Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Constant 141066 333 [01810 ] 81353 333-01629 - 01047 333 [01013 ] - 01066 333 [01012 ] Observations 5514 5514 5662 5662 R2squared 01494 01181, (Shleifer and Vishny,1998) 20 80 (Megginson et al,1994),,, Biais and Perotti (2002),, (2001),, 3 2 ( Second = 1),( Manager) Q 1 2,ROA 3 4 2002 0107 %,,,, ( Size),,21 5,, (Nominal),(Ratio), Shleifer (1998) 30 40,, 53
: U,, State ML P, State,,? 4 State 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) OLS MLP OLS MLP Q Q ROA ROA State - 21216 333 [01272 ] - 11953 333 [01360 ] - 01023 333 [01006 ] - 01027 333 [01008 ] State2 31477 333 [01374 ] 31019 333 [01519 ] 01039 333 [01008 ] 01047 333 [01011 ] Prilarge 01057[01044 ] 0104[01046 ] 01004 333 [01001 ] 01004 333 [01001 ] Second 01237 333 [01047 ] 01186 333 [01052 ] 01001[01001 ] 01001[01001 ] Manager 01059[01328 ] 0123[01606 ] 01051 33 [01021 ] 01050 333 [01014 ] Size - 01536 333 [01026 ] - 01467 333 [01020 ] 01005 333 [01001 ] 01005 333 [01000 ] Tangible - 01168[01130 ] - 01098[01142 ] - 01001[01003 ] - 01003[01003 ] Gear 11735 333 [01263 ] 11899 333 [01036 ] - 01041 333 [01008 ] - 01032 333 [01002 ] Exchange 01127 333 [01038 ] 01143 33 [01061 ] 01003 333 [01001 ] 01004 333 [01001 ] Industry Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Year Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Yes1 Constant 141674 333 [01826 ] 121833 333 [01549 ] - 01037 333 [01013 ] - 01054 333 [01012 ] Observations 5510 5510 5661 5661 R2squared 01504 01184 Turning point 01319 01323 01295 01287 State, State 2, State,, 4,30 %, 0 %, 8816 %,,, : Q U U,,,,,,,, 1998, (600605) 8816 %, ( ) 54
2005 10 ;, 30 %,,,,,, (robust) 1 4,U,1,, U 1,, U,,,, Bai et al (2004) Wei et al (2005), Tian (2000) U,, U,,,, U, U?,,,(grabbing hand) (helping hand),u : a, V, B, G, S 1, 2, 3 U, U = a V + B - G - S : 0 a 1 V = V 0 + V G + V S - V B,V 0 a, V G G,V S S,V B B,, 55
: U,a V V 0, 5516 %,,,,,V B,,,,,,,,,75 %A 51 % B,,a, a ;, V B, 1, a < 1, 5 B 5 a > 0 5V 5 B < 0 ; a > 1, 5 B 5 a = 0,,,,,,,, G,V G,,,1998, 3117 % 17,1, 0 0 ;1, 3600 ; 15 6812 % 3117 %,,, 2,a > 2, 5 G 5 a > 0 5V > 0 ;a < 2, 5 G 5 G 5 a = 0,, 1998, 58 %, av S 7017 %,S av,,a > 3, 5 S 5 a > 0,5V > 0 ;a < 3, 5V 5 S 5 a = 0, : < 1,< 2 < 3, 5V 5 a < 0 ; 2004 12 06 http :ΠΠfinance1sina1com. cnπrollπ20041206π074546044t. shtml 56
2005 10 <,> 1,> 2 > 3, 5V 5 a > 0,, U 1998 2003,,, U U,,,,,,,,,,,,, U,,,, U, U,,, U,,,,,,,,,,,,, -,,,,, ;,,,,, 2004 :, 2004 9 17 http :ΠΠfinance. sina. com. cnπrollπ 20040917Π14581031740. shtml,2001 :, 8 Bai, Chong2En, Liu, Qiao, Lu, Joe, Song, Frank M., and Zhang, Junxi, 2004, Corporate Governance and Market Valuation in China, Journal of Comparative Economics 32 : 599 616. Blanchard, Olivier and Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Federalism with and without Political Centralization : China versus Russia, NBER Working 57
: U Paper No. 7616. Biais, Bruno and Enrico Perotti, 2002, Machiavellian Privatization, American Economic Review 92 (1) : 240 258. Che, Jiahua and Yingyi Qian, 1998, Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v113, n2, p. p. 467 96. Chen, Gongmeng, Michael Firth, and Oliver Rui, 2002, Have Chinaπs Enterprise Reforms Led to Improved Efficiency and Profitability for Privatized SOEs? Working Paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Chung, Kee H and Stephen Pruitt, 1994, A Simple Approximation of Tobinπs Q, Financial Management 23 (3) : 70 74. Coles, Jeffrey, Felix Meschke, and Michael Lemmon, 2005, Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance : The Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance, Under review of Journal of Financial Economics. Djankov, Simeon and Peter Murrell, 2002, Enterprise Restructuring in Transition : A Quantitative Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 40 (3) : 739 792. Maddala, GS, 1983, Limited2dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Megginson, William L., Robert C. Nash, and Matthias Van Randenborgh, 1994, The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms : An International Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance 49, 403 452. Megginson, William L and Jeffery M Netter, 2001, From State to Market : A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature 39 (2) : 321 389. Mundlak,Yair, 1978, On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data, Econometrica 46 (1) : 69 85. Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez2de2Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 2000, Tunneling, American Economic Review 90, 22 27. Shaprio, Carl, and Robert D Willig, 1990, Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization, In the Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization (ed. E. N. Suleiman and J. Waterbury) Westview Press, London 55 87. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1993, Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3) : 599 617. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W Vishny, 1994, Politicians and Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (4) :995 1025. Shleifer, Andrei, 1998, State Versus Private Ownership, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (4) : 133 150. Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W Vishny, 1998, The Grabbing Hand : Government Pathologies and Their Cures, Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press. Tian, Lihui, 2000, Government Shareholding and the Value of Chinaπs Modern Firms, Institute of Finance and Accounting at the London Business School, Working Paper No. 319. Vickers, John and Yarrow, George, 1988, Privatization : An Economic Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge. Wang, Xiaozhu, Lixin Colin Xu and Tian Zhu, 2002, Is Public Listing a Way Out for State2Owned Enterprises? Economics of Transition 12 (3) : 467 488. Wei Zuobao, Feixue Xie and Shaorong Zhang, 2005, Ownership Structure and Firm Value in Chinaπs Privatized Firms, Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis, 40, 87 108. Two Hands of the Government Shareholder and the U Curve bet ween Government Shareholdings and Corporate Value Tian Lihui ( Peking University) Abstract : In this paper, we develop a view of the government shareholder as an entity that can both damage and benefit the companies in which it holds shares. We examine the ownership and control of 826 corporations listed on Chinaπs stock market, and find that government shareholding therein is notably large. Its effect on corporate value is negative, but non2monotonic. Up to a certain threshold, corporate value decreases as government shareholding stakes increase, but beyond this threshold, as government shareholding stakes continue to increase, corporate value also begins to do so. We argue that this concave relationship comes from the grabbing hand and the helping hand of the government shareholder and the influences of two hands vary upon the size of government shareholding. Key Words :Ownership Structure ; Government Shareholding ; Corporate Governance JEL Classification : G320, G340, G150, L330 ( :) ( :) 58