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5 1.2.1 La orta Neubauer (1998) Lucian 1999 OECD controlling minority structure separation of control and cash flow rights

6 La orta 1998 controlling shareholder minority shareholder La orta 1998Claessens 2000 Lemmon 2001 Claessens 2002 Q Jon 2001 Mitton2002Lins

7 MBO 3 1 5

8 % 48.4% 48.2% 67.2% GD / % 5 26% 1/4 6

9 15 GD 84.2% 76.2%48.3%46.7% 39.3% 21.5% 17% 12.9% 2.1% % % % % GD %

10 % % %2.4% % %

11 % % % % % % % % % %

12 % 1/4 2 50% 25% 51% 51% 5% 10% 10% 1% 100% 51% D C B F G A Michael Backman

13 % 2/3 De Angelo(1985) 24% 56.9%

14 25% 11.16% 21.97% A B C D D 6.63% 51% 51% 51% 50% 50% 2 F D 3 G 4 C D 25%C 1 3 C D 50% 25% 3/[25% %]= 50%5 D F A α 12

15 2A F c B β B c 3B i r r > i B 3 F F A B A B B A F c B F B αc B F B x F B B η F d d = ( f 1 x) k η = f 2 ( d, k) F B max x( 1 d) r + ( d η)r d [ 0,1] B NV ( x) = r i ηr NV ( x) 13

16 B F B β H 1 β H B RH αc + ( 1 β H )(1 d( β H )) r = (, ) R H F B U H ( β ) r = αc NV ( β ) = α c + r i η + H H β H R ( β H H ) = i F c B F B β 1 β B R = c + ( 1 β )(1 d( αβ )) r F B U = = = αβ αc + α αc + β R ( β (1 d( αβ )) r + d( αβ ) r η( αβ ) r [( 1 d( αβ ) r i] + [ d( αβ ) η( αβ )] NV ( αβ ) (1 α) [( 1 d( αβ ) r i] ) = i r 14

17 3.1.3 β = V ( 1 d ( = αβ )) r H αβ B B F αβ α c A ( α ) β B β 1 ( 1 α )c 1 ( 1 β )V 4 F αβ α c B 1 αβ ( 1 αβ ) V 1 β (1 α) β (1 β ) V (1 α) β V U = αc + NV ( αβ ) (1 α) [( 1 d( αβ ) r i] U r i d F 1 B r 2 B 3 i 15

18 d R c β d r i ( β ) = + (1 )(1 ( αβ )) = d (αβ r c d β r i (1 )) = + (1 ( αβ )) R H β )) (1 d( αβ r c ( αβ ) = αc + (1 αβ )(1 d( αβ )) r R = αc + (1 β )(1 d( αβ )) r + (1 α) β (1 d( αβ )) r αc + (1 β )(1 d( αβ )) r + (1 α) c = R ( β ) = i ( R ) H αβ ( β ) R H ( β H R H β H > αβ U H ) ( d 1 ( αβ r i )) ( β ) U ( β ) = NV ( β ) NV ( αβ ) + (1 α) 1 d αβ H H [( ( ) r i] NV d r i U H (1 ( αβ )) ( β H ) > U ( β ) F (1 d( αβ )) r < i B B r r r 16

19 β H ( r) β () r F B r B β H () r β ( r) U (r ) = U H ( r ) r NV ( β H ( r )) = NV ( αβ ( r )) ( 1 α ) 1 d αβ ( r ) [( 1 ( r ))) r i ] d αβ 0 ( NV ( r ) H ( ) NV ( β αβ ( r )) [( ( ) r i] NV ( ) β r ( r ) H αβ i r i F B

21 % ST 33.10% % 7.35% 90.00% 15.15% 22.30% 29.69% 29.42% 19

22 4.2.2 Lucian Bebchuk α 1 2 C 1 α C 2 αn C n CON = min( α1, α 2, L, α n ) 1 2 D min(51%,51%,51%,50)+1% 7.63% 4 ST CON A = min( 33.10%,92%,22.30%) = 22.30% CON B CON C CON D = 21.90% = 29.69% = [ min( 33.10%,92%,7.35%) + min(33.10%,92%,15.15%) ] = 22.50% 2 CON E = min( 22.50%,29.42%) = 22.50% % 15.15% 100% 20

23 6 6 % % % 30% 30% α i 1 / 2, i = 1,2LL n CASH = n i= 1 α i 2 21

24 CASH A CASH B CASH C CASH D CASH E = 33.10% 92% 22.30% = 6.79% = 6.67% = 8.14% = 33.10% 92% 7.35% % 92% 15.15% = 6.39% = 22.50% 29.42% = 6.62% 78 7 % % % %

25 % 39.58% 20% 64.48% 30% 89.58% 10% 14.29%20% 49.35%30% 82.82% 10% SQ 3 min( α1, α 2... α n ) = n i= 1 α n SQ A SQ B SQ C = CON A A = = / CASH =

26 SQ D = SQ E = % [01] ] ] ] % [01] ] ] ]

27 % % 95.83% 88.31% % % % % = = n i c i i v V 1 ) 1 ( α 4 4 c i α i La orta 1998 Claessens 2000 Lemmon

28 95.83% 16.66% 4.3 Q Q Yeh 2001 Q Bai 2002 Q La orta 1998Claessens 2000 Lemmon 2001 Q T 132 ST Q Mithchell Lehn 1990 Q ++ / 26

29 Q Q % Q Q

30 Between Groups Within Groups Total Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig Q Q Between Groups Within Groups Total Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig

31 Mean Difference 95% Confidence Interval (I) (J) (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound E E The mean difference is significant at the.05 level. 3 Q 6 [ 2,3) 4 2 [ 3,4) 29

32 [ 1,2) Q 2 Q [1,2] 6 Q Q %

34 Q % 16.66%

35 IO

37 1. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang, (2002), Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings, Journal of Finance European Corporate Governance Network (1997), The Separation of Ownership and Control: a Survey of 7 European Countries, Report repared for the European Commission 3. La orta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, (1999), Corporate Ownership around the world, Journal of Finance Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, (1999), Stock yramids, Cross-ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights, NBER working paper Wolfenzohn, Daniel (1998), A Theory of yramidal Ownership, Harvard University Mimeo

38 1 % % ST ST A T ST

39 B B ST A FSY

40 ST B ST ST UAI ST A FOOD 0708 ST ST

41 % % ST ST ST ST ST ST ST ST ST ST

42 ST ST ST ST ST

43 ST ST

44 ST ST ST ST ST

45 Std. Dev = 2.01 Mean = N = Std. Dev =.95 Mean = 1.69 N =

46 3 Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: AQ LSD (I) GROU (J) GROU Mean Difference 95% Confidence Interval (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound E E E E E E E E The mean difference is significant at the.05 level. 44

47 4 Descriptives Total 95% Confidence Interval Std. for Mean N Mean Deviation Std. Error Lower BoundUpper Bound Minimum Maximum E E E

07D5.FIT\)

$07D5.FIT\)$ 股权结构与信息披露 : 国外文献回顾魏文君 ( 长江大学管理学院, 湖北荆州 434023) 摘要 : 关于股权结构与信息披露关系的研究, 国外文献主要是从股权分散管理层 ( 内部人 ) 持股机构投资者持股和大股东持股等四种不同类型股东持