1997 2009 * 1997 2009 D625 A 1674-2486 2012 04-0005 - 22 Brenan & Buchanan 1980 * 10BZZ035 985 211 5
2009 2010 Niskanen 1971 2010 6
2007 Brenan & Buchanan 1980 Besley & Case 1995 Marlow 1988 Tiebout 1956 Rodden 2003 Brenan & Buchanan 1980 15 Oates 1985 Brenan & Buchanan 1980 182 7
Grossman 1989 flypaper effect Courant et al. 1979 Oates 1985 Oates-Wallis Chen 2004 Oates 1972 1985 Nelson 1986 Marlow 1988 Grossman 1989 Jin & Zou 2002 Rodden 2003 8
2010 2010 2010 2009 Shih & Zhang 2007 Zhang & Zou 1998 2005 2010 2010 2000 Ma 1997 2009 2011 2011 2011 100% Oates 1972 1985 Jin & Zou 2002 Oates 1985 Nelson 1986 9
1995 2011 2006 2002 2 2006 2007 2011 25% 40% 10
2009 2009 2011 1993 1 1997 2009 1 1997 2009 % % % % 44. 49 51. 65 81. 06 74. 44 55. 24 51. 45 82. 69 73. 45 75. 66 76. 02 76. 08 85. 45 73. 88 71. 51 82. 30 73. 21 84. 23 77. 02 63. 66 64. 70 83. 17 81. 39 61. 69 65. 50 71. 67 66. 76 74. 58 81. 19 67. 96 68. 99 78. 12 70. 43 49. 95 59. 71 80. 60 72. 35 89. 56 82. 15 89. 66 38. 99 88. 36 85. 97 76. 56 60. 76 85. 85 71. 96 71. 38 69. 59 89. 08 78. 23 70. 37 53. 70 85. 14 76. 96 74. 58 57. 83 86. 43 83. 83 89. 17 64. 85 88. 03 79. 25 1997 2009 11
1 1997 2009 2001 2002 75% 20 90 2002 2000 1 1997 2009 1997 2009 Wu & Lin 2012 2010 12
1994 1997 1997 1997 2009 31 Y it = α 0 + Σ βx it + α i + γ t + ε it Y it GDP α 0 i t X it β α i γ t ε it GDP GDP GDP 1997 GDP 2010 GDP 22. 29% 2011 GDP 13
2 1994 2010 GDP 2011 2009 2010 2009 Marlow 1988 1994 75. 3% 1997 70. 43% 2000 50% 2009 17. 11% 2006 2010 14
2002 2009 Wagner 1883 GDP 19 Tobin 2005 Burns 2003 2004 an employer of last resort GDP 1978 15
Alesina & Wacziarg 1998 GDP 2008 2005 2006 2008 1 2 320 90 4 2008 Keen & Marchand 1997 Tanzi 2000 Rodrik 1998 Sanz & Vel zquez 2003 2010 Zou & Jin 2002 16
GDP Cusack et al. 1989 2008 2010 65 15 64 2009 17
2 GDP GDP % % - % - % + % + GDP 1978 + - + 65 15-64 % + GDP % + - + Hausman test p 0. 05 2010 471 3 GDP 2SLS 18
Sargon P 0. 06 0. 055 0. 05 2 1997 GDP 3 GDP FE 1 FE 2 2SLS 3 2SLS 4-0. 173 *** - 0. 278 *** 0. 038 0. 058-0. 268 *** - 0. 241 ** 0. 050 0. 098 0. 099 *** 0. 071 ** 0. 113 *** 0. 087 ** 0. 037 0. 036 0. 040 0. 040-0. 273-0. 133-0. 419-0. 274 0. 308 0. 306 0. 315 0. 320 GDP log - 0. 997 0. 784-1. 244 0. 378 2. 490 2. 476 2. 909 2. 902-0. 091-0. 150 ** - 0. 080-0. 164 ** 0. 066 0. 064 0. 096 0. 068 0. 010 *** 0. 010 *** 0. 009 *** 0. 010 *** 0. 001 0. 001 0. 002 0. 002-0. 055 0. 095-0. 068 0. 102 19
GDP 0. 188 0. 186 0. 192 0. 190 0. 025 * 0. 028 ** 0. 033 ** 0. 027 * 0. 014 0. 014 0. 015 0. 015-4. 487 *** - 4. 550 *** - 4. 502 *** - 4. 481 *** 0. 823 0. 813 0. 856 0. 840 R 2 0. 681 0. 688 0. 642 0. 655 N 403 403 372 372 * ** *** 0. 1 0. 05 0. 01 2009 2011 2010 2002 2009 20
GDP 20 90 0. 1 2009 21
1994 22
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JPA Journal of Public Administration Vol. 5 No. 4 2012 SYMPOSIUM The Benefit and Price of Fiscal Decentralization in China Introduction Guang Zhang 1 Leviathan Hypothesis Fiscal Decentralization and Government Expansion Evidence from Chinese Provincial Panel Data from 1997 to 2009 Yuyi Zhuang & Guang Zhang 5 Abstract The Leviathan model hypothesizes that fiscal decentralization would help to control government size. A major reason for the denial of this hypothesis by previous empirical research at the Chinese provincial level is the failure to use effective decentralization measures. In this paper we measure fiscal decentralization as the proportions of sub-provincial revenues and expenditures to the total provincial revenues and expenditures and utilize a Chinese provincial panel dataset to test how fiscal decentralization would determine government size. It is found that the Leviathan model is applicable to the Chinese provincial level since fiscal decentralization helps to control government size while intergovernmental transfers tend to increase it. We also find that local governments are responsive to local public service demands and to the competitive pressure and social risks brought by openness. Key Words Leviathan Hypothesis Fiscal Decentralization Government Size Provinces Is It a Sustainable Ecnomic Great Leap A Fiscal Analysis of Chongqing's Rapid Economic Growth Yu You 27 Abstract The rapid economic growth in Chongqing receives great attention and many studies summarize the achievements and experience of Chongqing's economic growth. Based on Chongqing's main source of economic growth the structure of its fiscal revenue and expenditure and its local fiscal balance this paper studies Chongqing's economic growth from the public finance perspective and analyzes the panel data of fiscal balance of 178