: 孙秀林 周飞舟 :,,, ;,,, :, E- ( ) ( 200444);, ( 0087) 20,, 990,,,,993 300, 20 2.7,,, 40,,, ( 55 ),990 5 9
:,,,,,,,,,,,, 2,,, (fiscaldecentralization),, 3, (localstatecorporatism), 980,,, 4,980 2 3 4 : :, 2007 ; : :, :,200 : :,, :,2000 CharlesM.Tiebout, A PureTheoryofLocalExpenditures,"Journalof Political Economy,vol.64,no.5,956,pp.46-424;WalaceE.Oates,FiscalFederalism, New York:HarcourtBraceJovanovich,972. JeanC.Oi, FiscalReformandtheEconomicFoundationsofLocalStateCorporatism inchina,"world Politics,vol.45,no.,992,pp.99-26. 4
203 4,, GDP 2, 3,, 4,,, (racetothetop) 994,994,,,, 2 3 4 42 QianYingyiandXuChenggang, WhyChina seconomicreformsdifer:them-form HierarchyandEntry/Expansionofthe Non-StateSector,"Economicsof Transition, vol.,no.2,993,pp.35-70;qian Yingyi, A TheoryofShortagein Socialist EconomicsBasedonthe SoftBudgetConstraint,"The American Economic Review, vol.84,no.,994,pp.45-56;qian Yingyiand Barry R.Weingast, China s Transitionto Markets: Market-Preserving Federalism,Chinese Style," Journalof Policy Reform,vol.,no.2,996,pp.49-85;Qian Yingyiand Bary R.Weingast, FederalismasaCommitmenttoPreserving MarketIncentives,"TheJournalof Economic Perspectives,vol.,no.4,997,pp.83-92;QianYingyiandGerardRoland, Federalism andthesoftbudgetconstrain,"the American Economic Review,vol.88,no.5,998,pp. 43-62. LinJustin Yifuand LiuZhiqiang, FiscalDecentralizationand Economic Growthin China,"Economic Developmentand CulturalChange,vol.49,no.,2000,pp.-2. QianYingyi, How Reform Workedin China,"in DaniRodrik,ed.,In Searchof Prosperity:Analytic Narrativeson Economic Growth,Princeton,N.J.:Princeton UniversityPress,2003,pp.297-333. Zhang Tao and Zou Heng-fu, Fiscal Decentralization,PublicSpending,and Economic GrowthinChina,"Journalof Public Economics,vol.67,no.2,998,pp.22-240; :,, ( ) 2005 5
:, 2,,, 3 994,, 4,,,,, :. 30, 990,,, GDP GDP 994, 98 4.7% 0.8 994 62.5% 8.2, 50% 5,, 989 998,980 990,,, 2 3 4 Pranab Bardhan, Decentralization of Governance and Development," Journalof Economic Perspectives,vol.6,no.4,2002,pp.85-205. :, 2004 6 ; :, 2007 7 :, :,997 ; : :, 2006 6 ; : :, :,2008 :, ( ) 2002 2 43
203 4, 2 985,988,,,, 3,, 00%, ;4,, ( ),, (valueadded) : 2 3 4 : (949 966), :, 988 ; :, :,200 ; :, 2009 3 ;ChrsitineP.W.Wong, FiscalReform andlocalindustrialization:the ProblematicSequencingofReforminPost-MaoChina,"Modern China,vol.8,no.2,992, pp.97-227. : 30,,2008, 37 ( ) 6,,,,, ( ) 985 2.2,, 99 3.5, : :950 99, :,992 44
:,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,2,, 3,,,, 4, 2 3 4 :, :, 2002, :, :,994, :, 993 3 ; : : 3, :,202 45
203 4,, 2.,, 990,,992,,,,,, 2 985, 25, 984 40.5%, 985,,993 22% 3 994, 30,,, 75% 25% ; 2002,2002 50%,2003 60% 40% 2 3 46 992 993 44% 62%, 95% 70%, : 30,,2008 : : 30,,2008
:, ( ) ( ;2002 ),,, ( 2) 2 ( ) (),,, ( 3) 3 : (996 2006), (995 2005) 3.,,,, 47
203 4,,, 993,, ( 75%) 0.3,, 3,,,,,,,,, 992, 990, 90,,,,,2,,,,, 2002, 3, 2002 2 3 48 : : :, :,997, : :, 2006 6 ; : :, 200 3
:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4, 5,,,,, 4 : : 30,,2008,994 994 GDP 3.7%, 0.6%;994, -.%.3%, 994 998, 49
203 4,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,, :,, ( ), 982 2 4, ( 0 ),, 50, :, 2005 5 ; : :, 2007 ; : : 999 2003, 2007 0
, ;, ( ),,,, 998,, ( (998) 2, ),, ( 43 ),,,,,,, 2002,, ;,,,, 2002, : ( ) ( ); ; ; ;,,,,,,,, ( 43 ),,, ( 2 ) :,,,,, ( ) ( ) 5
203 4,, :(), 3 6 0 ;(2), 3 4 6 ( : = / );(3),,, ( 2 ),,, :, ( 55 ),, 00%, 5% 0%, 25% 30%,60% 70% ( ), 990 ( 5) 5 : (995 997), (999 2006), 2000, 2,, 2 52 :, 996 2002 5 ( ) 2003 2 ( [2003]45 ) 2003 4 2004 3 ( [2004]7 ) 2004 4 ( [2004]20 ) 2004 0
:,,,, 998, 997 8 998 8, :()997 8, ( ), 00% ;(2),998 6, ;(3) 998 8,,,,,, 2,,., :, ; 2 ( [2004]28 ) 2004 0 ( [2004]223 ) 2004 ( 26 ) 2004 ( 27 ) 2006 6 ( [2006]7 ) 2006 7 ( [2006]50 ) 2006 9 ( [2006]3 ), :, 2009 2 : 2000, 2004 : 20 80, 2009 53
203 4,, 2. 994,,, (, ) 998 2005 3.,,, 4.,,,,,,994, 00% 75% ;2002, 50% (2002 60%),, : ()[2002 ] = ( + 0.75)- (2)[2002 ] = ( + 0.75)- + ( + ) 0.50- (3)[2002 ] = ( + 0.75)- + ( + ) 0.60-5., ( ) GDP ( ) ( GDP ) ( ) 54 :, 2005 5 ; : :, 2007
:, (ln) 248-4.85.66-8.96-0.6 (ln) 247-3.69.33-8.46 0.2 (ln) 248 7.20 0.9 4.7 8.42 GDP (ln) 248-8.3.3-9.90-5.50 (%) 248 3.43 5.45 3.80 84.46 (%) 248 44.39 7.87 9.77 59.50 6. yit i t,x it,z it yit=αyit-+β Xit+ β 2Zit+λi+γt+εit λi i ( );γt t ( );εit (paneldata), (fixedefect model) (instrumentalvariable), (yit-),,, (generalizedmethodofmoments,gmm),, (first-diferenced GMM,DIF-GMM) 2, GMM,,, (DIF-GMM), (finite-samplebias) 2 GDP D.Holtz-Eakin,W.Neweyand H.S.Rosen, Estimating Vector Autoregressions withpaneldata,"econometrica,vol.56,no.6,988,pp.37-395;m.arelanoand S.Bond, SomeTestsofSpecificationforPanelData:MonteCarloEvidenceandan ApplicationtoEmploymentEquations,"The Review of EconomicStudies,vol.58,no. 2,99,pp.277-297. 55
203 4, (SYS-GMM), :,,,,, ;, (PooledOSL,POLS) (fixedefect,fe),,, 2 7. 2 Δεit (first-orderserialcorrelation), (second-order serialcorrelation) 3 2 Arelano-BondtestforAR () AR (2),,,, ( 4), (Hansentest) (Diference-in- Hansentest), ( 4), 2, 0.248 0.228 ( 2), 0.207 0.29 ( 3 4), 0.502 ( 5), 0.79 6), M.ArelanoandO.Bover, AnotherLookattheInstrumentalVariablesEstimationof ErrorComponents Models,"Journalof Econometrics,vol.68,no.,995,pp.29-5;R.BlundelandS.Bond, InitialConditionsand MomentRestrictionsinDynamic PanelData Models,"Journalof Econometrics,vol.87,no.,998,pp.5-43. 2 S.Bond, A. Hoefler and J.Temple, GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models,"CEPR DiscussionPaper,no.3048,200. 3 J.Sargan, TheEstimationofEconomicRelationshipsUsingInstrumentalVariables," Econometrica,vol.26,no.3,958,pp.393-45;L.Hansen, LargeSampleProperties ofgeneralized Methodof MomentsEstimators,"Econometrica,vol.50,no.4,982, pp.029-054;s.bond, DynamicPanelData Models:A Guideto MicroDataMethods andpractice," UCL WorkingPaper,2002. 56
, (One-step) (Two- step),.62.84 ( 2); (One-step) (Two-step),.425.396 ( 3 4),, :,, %,.62%.425% ( 4),,,,,,, : 2 (ln) SYS-GMM DIF-GMM POLS FE () (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) One-way Two-way One-way Two-way 0.248 ** 0.228 * 0.207 * 0.29 * 0.502 *** 0.79 ** (0.09) (0.33) (0.08) (0.3) (0.087) (0.065) (ln) GPD (ln) (%) (%).62 ***.84 ***.425 ***.396 *** 0.504 ***.25 *** (0.240) (0.278) (0.272) (0.33) (0.6) (0.76) -0.333-0.422-2.537 0.094 0.660 ** 0.545 (.4) (.947) (9.00) (9.948) (0.256) (4.297) 0.94 0.08-0.757-0.938 0.647 *** 0.47 (0.935) (0.995) (0.707) (0.974) (0.240) (0.500) -0.025-0.09-0.02-0.005-0.024 *** -0.024 (0.037) (0.045) (0.039) (0.043) (0.006) (0.09) 0.04 0.043 0. *** 0.05 ** -0.03 0.053 ** (0.036) (0.040) (0.039) (0.048) (0.02) (0.022) 6.979 7.459-5.32 * -9.264 (2.26) (27.597) (2.623) (74.597) 26 26 84 84 26 26 R 2 0.844 0.83 3 3 3 3 3 AR () 0.025 0.084 0.029 0.046 AR (2) 0.808 0.783 0.994 0.957 Hansentest 0.9 0.9 0.74 0.74 Dif-in-Hansentests 0.994 0.994 :. *** p<0.0, ** p<0.05, * p<0.; 57
203 4 2.Arelano-BondtestforAR () AR (2) (p ) 3.Hansentest(Hansentestofoverid.restrictions), Dif-in-Hansentest (Diference-in-Hansentestsofexogeneityofinstrumentsubsets) SYS- GMM, p 4. (ln),,,,994,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 58 : :, 2006 6
: 998 2005 : (999 2006) 998 2005 (999 2006) : 998 2005 (999 2006) : 2002 2005 : (2003 2006) 2002 2005 : (2003 2006) 998 2005 : (998 2000) : (998 2005) (200 2005) 2002 2005 : (2002 2005) 2002 2005 : (2002 2005) 998 2005 : (999 2006) ( ) 998 2005 : (999 2006) GDP 998 2005 : (999 2006) ( ) 998 2005 : (999 2006) : : 59
ABSTRACTS (3)LandFinanceandtheTax-SharingSystem:AnEmpiricalExplanation Sun Xiulinand Zhou Feizhou 40 (4)ThePsycho-physiologicalMechanismofEducationalInequalityandItsIntervention Strategies:WiththeExampleofMigrantChildren Gao Minghua 60 observethefolowingprinciples:first,thechineseequivalentforbeingshouldreflect theliteralmeaningoftheword;andsecond,thechineseequivalentcanandshould runthroughalbeing-relateddiscussions.inthisregard,only " meetsbothre- quirements.intheprocessoftranslating Westernphilosophyinto Chinese,there doesexisttheproblemofhowtomakethetranslationclearandeasytounderstand, namely,incompliancewiththe mother-tongueintuitions.suchaprobleminvolves boththepeculiarcharacteristicsoftranslationitselfandsometranslationskils.so longastheycanbreakthroughtheexistingdefectiveknowledgestructureand transcendtheconventionalconstrictedview,thechinesepeoplearefulycapableof expressingandgraspingthebeing-relatedissue,therebygainingabeterview of Westernphilosophy. Theregionalcompetition betweenlocalgovernmentshasfacilitatedtherapid growthofchineseeconomy.however,theworkingmechanismforitstilneedstobe explored.localgovernmentalbehaviorisinfluencedbythecentral-localrelationship, particularlybythereforminfiscalandtaxationsystemssincetheimplementationof thetax-sharingsystem.bycentralizingthefinancialpower,thetax-sharingsystem gradualyledlocalgovernmentstoadoptthedevelopmentmodeloflandappropriation, developmentandtransfer,hencetheemergenceoflandfinance;ourstudyverifiesthe closetiesbetweenthetwobyusingannualprovincial-leveldata.inalcaseswhenthe developmentmodelrepresentedbylandfinanceisevaluated,thetax-sharingsystem isamorerationalreformthanthefinancialcontractingsystem,forithasestablished astableframeworkofinteractionbetweenthecentralgovernmentandlocalgovern- ments.andyet,theland-centeredurbanexpansion modelwasanunexpectedoutcome ofthisreform. Thisstudyemploys multiple methodsofquestionnaires,in-depthinterviews, participantobservationsandon-the-spotexperiments,anddiscoverstwosocio-psy- chologicalmechanismsofeducationalinequality:theself-fulfilingprophecyefectarising 205