3 :1978, 1978 2004 ( ) ( ) ( ),,, U,, ( ), :, (governance) (, La Porta et al, 1999) 20 90, ( Barro,1990) Li (1998) Shleifer (1997),, ( ) ( ) ( Qian and Weingast,1997) (,2007), GDP,,,,Blanchard Shleifer (2001), 3,, :200433, :junzh 2000 @fudan. edu. cn,,, 91
:, ;,, Li Zhou (2005), Huang(2002) 1978,, ( GDP, FDI ),, ( ) ( ),,, 1982 1990 (,, ),,,,, (,,1999),,????? :,,,,80, 1982 ( ),, 65, 80, 1982,Shleifer (1997),, 92
1990 7,,,,,,,,,, (1996),,, ;,,,, (,1998) Huang(2002),,,,, (,,2006),,,,,,,,, Besley Case (1995) 1950 1996,,,,,,,, Johnson Crain (2004) 48,, Drazen (2000) Economides (2003),, Buchanan Congleton (1994),, Garcia2Vega (2005),,,,,,, 65, ( ),,, 1 93
: 1 1978 2004 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2002 (,2001) (www. people. com. cn) 30 ( ) 1 Πtenure 1413 3. 532 2. 393 0. 4 12. 4 Πbirthplace 1413 0. 322 0. 467 0 1 Πrotation 1413 0. 475 0. 499 0 1 Πage 1413 59. 252 5. 376 42 75 Πcentral background 1413 0. 223 0. 416 0 1 Πeducation 1413 0. 581 0. 494 0 1 GDP Πpgdp 1413 10. 273 4. 612-9. 1 40. 2 GDP Πrpgdppc 1413 1265. 9992 1273. 485 144 11132. 22 Πtenureyear 302 4. 774 2. 526 0. 5 12. 4 Πinitialage 302 57. 597 5. 859 42 73 GDP Πpwgdp 302 10. 070 2. 973 0. 25 21. 9 1 GDP, GDP GDP, GDP, ( ) ( ), 94
1 1,,, 302, 1413 1978, 2004 1988 1997, 1988, 1997, 2003,,, 30 26, ( ), 30 26 2 = 1560, ( ) 2003, 1413,, 1, 11, 8, : N, N, (, ), ( ) 1413 :,,, 1, 0,, ( ) 1 ( 302 ),302 302 302 1978 2004,,,,,, 1991, 1991, 1,1992 2, 1995, 1995, 5, 5 (1991 1995 ),, ( ), :, 1991,1994 1991, 1994,, 1993, 1994 4 1991 2002, ( ) ( ),,, ( ),,,, :,,,,,, ( ) 95
: Besley Case (2003),,, GDP,, Levine (2000) Besley (2005) : y i, t - y i, t - 1 = 0 y i, t - 1 + X i, t + s + t + i, t (1) g i, t = 0 gy i, t - 1 + X i, t + s + t + i, t (2) y GDP,, (1) GDP, (2) X GDP,,,, i t,s, 11, 1990 1990,1990,, (2) X : (tenure), ; (tenuresq) ; (rotation),levitt (1996) Jones Benjamin (2005),, : (birthplace), 1, 0 ; (central background), 1, 0 ; (education), 1, 0 gy i, t - 1 GDP (lrpgdppc), GDP, GDP GDP GDP,,,,,,,,,, : ( ) ( ), 1,, 0, :,, ( 5 ), 1, 0, ( ), ( ), : ( ), 1, 0, ( ),, 96
, ( ) 2 OLS (1) 1978 2004 (2) 1978 1990, ( Pande,2003 ;Besley, et al.,2005),, 1000,,, 2,, (3) 1991 2004 0. 393 333 0. 596 333 0. 124 Πtenure 0. 117 0. 257 0. 113-0. 0396 333-0. 0604 33-0. 0123 Πtenuresq 0. 0108 0. 0296 0. 0100 0. 158 0. 0501 0. 755 33 Πbirthplace 0. 256 0. 399 0. 310-0. 0771-0. 250 0. 660 33 Πrotation 0. 245 0. 396 0. 297-0. 174 0. 146 0. 211 Πcentral 0. 269 0. 422 0. 344-0. 118 0. 136 0. 171 Πeducation 0. 221 0. 351 0. 242 GDP - 3. 282 333-10. 85 333-8. 476 333 0. 727 1. 948 1. 997 Πlrpgdppc 2 1 1978 2004 36. 729 333 88. 670 333 86. 148 333, 2 5. 210 13. 653 17. 841 3 1978 1990 1991 2004 1413 652 761 2, 1 R 0. 509 0. 524 0. 589 :,, 333 1 %, 33, 1 % ; 5 %, 3 10 %,,,,, ( 1 ) 2 1, 4. 96, 2 2 3,, 4. 93 5. 04, 3 1 2, 1991 1991, 1991,,, 97
: 1 2, 3 (1991 ) 1 2, 0, 3 ( 1991 ) 0, GDP 0. 66 %,, 2,,, GDP, GDP 21,,, (tenure) ( ) 4 5,4 5 2, ( ) 4 5,,, ;, 4 5, 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 5 1978 2004 > 5 1978 2004 5 1991 2004 > 5 1991 2004 4 1991 2004 > 4 1991 2004 Πtenure 0. 196 333-0. 242 333 0. 0710-0. 118 0. 120-0. 106 0. 0785 0. 0895 0. 0826 0. 0838 0. 116 0. 0680 Πbirthplace 0. 0716 0. 186 0. 533 1. 042 3 0. 680 3 0. 820 333 0. 301 0. 589 0. 397 0. 595 0. 410 0. 488-0. 0928 0. 346 0. 689 33 0. 943 3 0. 709 3 0. 750 3 Πrotation 0. 277 0. 558 0. 352 0. 528 0. 400 0. 399-0. 0904-0. 321-0. 0378 0. 789 0. 191 0. 316 Πcentral background 0. 361 0. 544 0. 456 0. 546 0. 505 0. 388 Πeducation 0. 0036 0. 127 0. 222 0. 473-0. 383 0. 488 0. 267 0. 392 0. 316 0. 354 0. 353 0. 308 GDP - 3. 182 333-5. 897 333-9. 663 333-7. 513 333-9. 127 33-7. 036 333 Πlrpgdppc 0. 838 1. 765 3. 071 2. 015 3. 453 2. 124 36. 226 333 53. 290 333 91. 203 333 54. 973 333 87. 038 333 63. 368 333 6. 000 14. 130 24. 141 16. 868 27. 086 17. 055 1101 312 536 225 453 308 R 0. 506 0. 699 0. 599 0. 757 0. 475 0. 581 : 2 3 2, 2 (1978 2004), 5, 98
, 5 4, (1) (2) (3) (4) (1978 (1978 (1991 (1991, 2004) 2004) 2004) 2004) U 2, 1991 Πtenure 0. 499 33 0. 309 33 0. 402 3 0. 175 3,1991 0. 199 0. 140 0. 230 0. 106, - 0. 0461 33-0. 0278 33-0. 0378 3-0. 0137 Πtenuresq 0. 0197 0. 0128 0. 0204 0. 0099 Πbirthplace 0. 148 0. 303 0. 892 0. 741 33 0. 367 0. 319 0. 624 0. 332 1991, 1991, - 0. 362 0. 248 0. 653 0. 408 Πrotation 0. 360 0. 313 0. 598 0. 258, 0. 151-0. 159 0. 688-0. 113 ( Πcentral background 0. 360 0. 368 0. 688 0. 227 ) Πeducation - 0. 0404 0. 0036-0. 165-0. 200, 0. 355 0. 265 0. 531 0. 260 GDP - 2. 394 333-6. 383 333-2. 516-10. 73 333 3, Πlrpgdppc 1991 2004, tenure 5 0. 907 1. 426 2. 169 1. 627 ( 3 ) 15. 708 333 16. 770 333 28. 370 68. 702 333 tenure > 5 ( 4 ), 3. 649 3. 228 17. 004 9. 666 10 % ; 264 497 264 497, 5 6, tenure R 0. 529 0. 452 0. 616 0. 567 4 tenure > 4, : 2 3 4,, (tenure) > 4 ( > 5), (tenure) 4 ( 5),,, 31 (2004),, 4 4,,,,, 1991,,,,, 99
:,,,, 44. 7 %, 47. 9 % ( ),,,,, 4, 1991,,,, 11, GDP, GDP,, :, GDP,,,,,,,,,, GDP, GDP GDP,, GDP, : g i = g i, n + X i, t + s + i, t (3) g i ( ) GDP, g i, n GDP, X,, ( 0. 493, - 0. 0347) 0. 249 ; (0. 406) 10 %, 302 30, 21,, : U,,,,, 100
, ( ) ( ), ( ),, ( ) ( ),,, 1, 0, 10 %,, ( )?,, 1, 0,,,, 3 4 5,,,, ( ) 5, 3,, 4,,,,, 5 3,,,,,,, 1991,,?,,,,, 1978 2004 ( ) ( ) ( ),,,, U,,,,, 3 (tenure > 3), (tenure) 0, (rotation), 5 %, (rotation), 101
:,, ( ),,, 5 ( ),,, ( ),,,??,,, ( ),,,,,, 1996 :, 3, 2004 :, 1,, 2006 :, 5, 1998 :, 3, 1999 :,, (1990), (1999), (2006), www. people. com. cn ( ),2001 :,, 2004 :,, : 2004,, 1, 2007 : :, Barro, R. J., 1991, Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2) : 407 43. Besley, T. and A. Case, 1995, Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choice? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (3) : 769 798. Besley, T. and A. Case, 2003, Political Institutions and Policy Choices : Evidence from the United States, Journal of Economic Literature, 41 (1) :7 73. Besley, T., T. Persson and D. Sturm, 2005, Political Competition and Economic Performance : Theory and Evidence from the United States, NBER Working Paper No. 11484. Besley, T. and T. Persson, 2006, Economic Approaches to Political Institutions, forthcoming in Durlauf, S. and L. Blume (eds. ), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition : McMillan. Blanchard, O. and A. Shleifer, 2001, Federalism with and without Political Centralization : China versus Russia, IMF Staff Papers 48, 171 179. Buchanan, J. and R. Congleton, 1994, The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators, Public Choice, 79 : 47 60. Drazen, A., 2000, Political Economy in Macroeconomics : Princeton University Press. Economides, G., A. Philippopoulos and S. Price, 2003, How Elections Affect Fiscal Policy and Growth : Revising the Mechanism, European Journal of Political Economy, 19 : 777 792. paper. Garcia2Vega, Maria and Jose A. Herce, 2005, Does Tenure in Office Affect Regional Growth? The Case of Spanish Regions, unpublished Huang, Yasheng, 2002, Managing Chinese Bureaucrats : An Institutional Economics Perspective, Political Studies, 50 : 61 79. Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken, 2005, Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II, Quarterly 102
Journal of Economics, 120 : 835 864. Johnson, J. M. and W. M. Crain, 2004, Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance : Evidence from Democratic Nations, Public Choice, 119 : 73 90. La Porta, R., F. Lopez2De2Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1999, The Quality of Government, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15 (1) : 1113 1155. Levine, R., L. Norman and B. Thorsten, 2000, Financial Intermediation and Growth : Causality and Causes, Journal of Monetary Economics, 46 (1) : 31 77. Levitt, Steven D., 1996, How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senate Ideology, American Economic Review, 86 : 425 41. Li, D., 1998, Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy, American Economic Review, 88 (2) : 393 397. Li, Hongbin and Li2An Zhou, 2005, Political Turnover and Economic Performance : Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China, Journal of Public Economics, 89 : 1743 1762. Pande, Rohini, 2003, Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India, American Economic Review, 93 (4) : 1132 1151. Qian, Y. and B. R. Weingast, 1997, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (4) : 83 92. Shleifer, A., 1997, Government in Transition, European Economic Review, 41 : 385 410. Term Limits and Rotation of Chinese Governors : Do They Matter to Economic Growth? Zhang Jun and Gao Yuan (China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University) Abstract : One of the motivation and control mechanisms established in Chinaπs political and bureaucratic hierarchy is an introduction of term limits and rotation system into higher level government officials. Using a panel data covering detailed information for all the provincial governors (including provincial party secretary, mayor for municipal cities, and chairman for autonomous regions) between 1978 and 2004, this paper finds a positive impact of both term limits and rotation of governors across provinces on local economic growth. It also finds that term limits and economic growth exhibit a weakly inversed U relationship. Though the rotation of governors matters to local economic growth, regional variation is observed, and the positive impact of rotated governors on local growth turned out to be more obvious in the eastern provinces than rest provinces. Key Words : Term Limits ; Rotation ; Economic Growth JEL Classification : H83, P26 ( : ) ( : ) 103