高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 Nash 6 Jensen Murphy EO EO 1 John Rob

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 Nash 6 Jensen Murphy EO EO 1 John Rob"

友岑
7 years ago
Views:

1 中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期刘绍娓 1 2, 万大艳 ( 1. 湖南大学工商管理学院, 湖南长沙 ; 2. 厦门大学经济学院, 福建厦门 ) 高管薪酬与公司绩效一直都是学术界和实务界关注的热点本文选取年沪深两市 296 家国有和 176 家非国有 A 股上市公司为样本, 在控制了高管持股比例公司规模股权集中度和两职兼任等因素之后, 实证分析了不同所有权结构的公司高管薪酬对公司绩效影响的差异研究结果表明, 高管薪酬水平与公司绩效显著正相关, 且随着高管持股数量的增加, 非国有上市公司高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响程度更高, 但国有上市公司则相反 ; 公司规模的扩大会降低高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响, 且只有当国有上市公司和非国有企业的股权集中度在不同的区间范围内, 高管薪酬与公司绩效才表现出显著正相关高管薪酬 ; 公司绩效 ; 国有上市公司 ; 非国有上市公司 F270 A Executive ompensation Affects Firm Performance The Empirical omparative Study on State - owned and Non - State - owned Enterprises LIU Shao - wei 1 WAN Da - yan 2 1. Business School Hunan University hangsha hina 2. School of Economics Xiamen University Xiamen hina Abstract Executive compensation and company performance have always been the hot spots of the academic circles and business world. This research's samples select from 463 State - owned A - share listed companies and 176 non - State - owned A - share listed companies in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We take executives holding ratio company size ownership concentration and EO duality as control variables in order that we can analyze the difference of the company's ownership structure's different effect to the relationship of executives pay and company performance. This study arrive at the following conclusions by analyzing the significant relationship between executives pay level and company performance. Additionally when the holding numbers increase the effect of non - State - owned listed companies' executives compensation on company performance will increase. But State - owned listed company is contrast to that. The expanding of company size will reduce the incentive effect on performance. In addition only when the z index of state - owned and non - state - owned listed company are in a specific range can we observe the positive significant relationship between executive pay and company performance. Key words executive pay performance state - owned listed company non - State - owned listed companies ZDB32 11JJB ZK

2 高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 Nash 6 Jensen Murphy EO EO 1 John Robert David 1999 Aggarwal 1999 Kaplan Mehran 1995 oughlan Schmidt 1985 Hall and Liebman Kevin Jensen meckling

3 中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 onyon onyon 1997 ( 一 ) 变量说明 12-1 PEF 92

4 高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 Bartlett's ROA ROE KMO EPS RSD PEF % PEF i = 4 X ij * T ij j = i = 1 2 PEF i i X ij i j T ij i ZZ 1 j = * 1 ZEPS * ZROA * ZROE * ZRSD 1 4 SPSS17. 0 Z 2 PAY ZZ 1 = * 1 ZEPS * ZROA * ZROE * ZRSD 1 2 ZZ 2 = * 1 ZEPS * ZROA 2 + PAY * ZROE * ZRSD 2 3 PAY 1 KMO 1 2 PAY 2 KMO = % % % % Kaiser KMO KMO > < KMO < < KMO < < KMO < < KMO < 0. 7 KMO <

5 中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 EPS ROA ROE RSD SP SIZE 3 ( 三 ) 描述性统计分析 3 Z 3 Z Z 4 BOTH ( 二 ) 样本选择及数据来源 A 2 SMAR 1 B H Z B H A 2 ST PT

6 高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 3 PEF PAY G SP E XSE Z PEF PAY G SP E XSE Z PAY G XSE Z % 2. EVIEWS6. 0 ( 四 ) 面板数据的单位根检验 Z 3 1 ( 一 ) 全样本实证结果分析 4 5 EVIEWS6. 0 PEF 1 PEF 2 OLS

7 中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 ( 二 ) 依高管持股分组样本实证结果分析 PEF * * D PAY ** ** ** ** ** *** SP D SIZE *** *** Z ** ** BOTH R Ad - R F

8 高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 5 PEF * ** d PAY * ** ** ** ** ** SP d SIZE ** *** Z BOTH R Ad - R F * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 2. t F hi - Sq P d 5. 6 PEF 1 PEF * ** ** * d PAY * * * * d SIZE ** ** * * Z ** Ad - R * 7 123* 7 61* 7 57*

9 中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 1% % ~ 10% 10% 16 Z % 0. 29% 0. 19% % 1. 1% 17 Jensen and Murphy ( 三 ) 依公司规模分组样本实证结果分析 1 Z stata11. 2

10 高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 7 PEF < > ** d PAY ** ** * * d SIZE ** ** ** Ad - R * 7 94* 7 12* 7 49* 7 8 PEF < > ** d PAY * * d SIZE ** * Z ** Ad - R * 7 15* 7 32* 7 9 PEF < > ** * d PAY * d SIZE ** ** ** Z * * Ad - R * 7 41* 7 17* 7 52* 7 99

11 中国软科学 2013 年第 2 期 10 PEF < > d PAY ** d SIZE ** * ** Ad - R * 7 57* 7 16* 7 Z ~ Z 3. 4 ~ ( 一 ) 研究结论 Z ~ Z 3. 4 ~ ( 二 ) 政策建议

12 高管薪酬与公司绩效 : 国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究 J. Business and Economics Journal J J Jensen M W H Meckling. Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency osts and Ownership Structure J. Journal of Financial Economics Jensen M Murphy KJ. EO Incentives - it's Not How Much You Pay But How J. Harvard Business Review Mehran H. Executive ompensation Structure Ownership and Firm Performance J. Journal of Financial Economics onyon M. J. orporate Governance and Executive ompensation J. International Journal of Industrial Organization Wright P Kroll M Elenkov D. Acquisition Returns Increase in Firm Size and hief Officer ompensation The Moderating Role of Monitoring J. Academy of Management Journal Firth M Fung P M Rui M. orporate Performance and EO ompensation in hina J. Journal of orporate Finance Brick I. E Palmon O Wald J K. EO ompensation Director ompensation and Firm Performance Evidence of ronyism J Journal of orporate Finance J Hansen B E. Threshold Effects in Non - dynamic Panels Estimation Testing and Inference J. Journal of Econometrics Jensen M Murphy KJ. Performance Pay and Top - management Incentives J. Journal of Political Economy Steven NKaplan. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance A omparison of Japan and the U. S J. Journal of Political Economy Hall J Hall Jeffrey B Liebman. Are EOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats J. The Quarterly Journal of Economics K J Sigler. EO ompensation and ompany Performance J Holderness lifford Sheehan Dennis P. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held orporations An Exploratory Analysis J. Journal of Financial Economics J

( ) : ,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4), ; (5) ( ), (2003),,,,,,, , 20,, ST,,,, :? ( ) 3 ( ) 77

( ) : ,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4), ; (5) ( ), (2003),,,,,,, , 20,, ST,,,, :? ( ) 3 ( ) 77 2005 4 3 ( 100084) : 1998 2002,,, 10 %,,, :,,,,, : (1) ; (2), ; (3), ; (4),; (5) ( ),(2003),,,,,,, 1997 1, 20,, ST,,,,:? ( ) 3 (70473046) 77 :,?,, Modigliani Miller (1958), Jensen Meckling (1976),Grossman