Myers 2003 Ghosh Moon 2005 Blouin 2007 Chen 2008 Hoyle 1978 Lim Tan, 2010 Krishnan 2003 Balsam 2003 DeAngelo 1980 Ferguson 2004 AICPA Palmro

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1 Joumal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University May Vol.36 No ~2011 A F239.6 [ ] A [ ] Auditor Industry Specialization, Economic Dependence and Audit Quality ---- A Perspective of Auditing Tenure LI Si-fei 1, LIU Lian 2, WANG Hua-cheng 3 1. International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing ; 2. Business College, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing Business College, Renmin University of China, Beijing , China Abstract: Based on samples of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2011, this paper examines how auditor specialization and auditors economic dependence affect auditing quality given different auditor tenures. The empirical results show that firms audited by industry specialists have relatively higher audit quality in short tenure, but audit quality will be weakened with the extension of tenure because extended auditor tenure may create negative economic incentives for industry specialists. These findings provide further understanding on the effect of auditor industry specialization strategy and mandatory rotation. Key Words: auditor industry specialization; economic dependence; audit quality; auditing tenure CG

2 Myers 2003 Ghosh Moon 2005 Blouin 2007 Chen 2008 Hoyle 1978 Lim Tan, 2010 Krishnan 2003 Balsam 2003 DeAngelo 1980 Ferguson 2004 AICPA Palmrose 1991 Petty Guganesan ~2011 Johnson 2002 A Meyrs 2003 Stanley 2007 Myers 2003 Ghosh Moon

3 Romanus 2008 Knechel 2007 Carey Simnett Jones U DeAngelo 1980 I- FAC 2004 Krishnan 2003 Ferguson 2004 Balsam Dunn

4 Bell 2005 Stanley DeAngelo 1981 Krishnan 2003 Carcello Nagy 2004 DeAngelo 1980 Johnson 2002 Myers DeAngelo 1981 Bonner 2007 Lim Tan 2010 Balsam Lim Tan, Krishnan Maletta Wright 1996 DeAngelo

5 CFO t A t-1 REV t Lim Tan, 2010 PPE ROA t Baz- erman DA =β 0 +β 1 Special+β 2 Importance+β 3 Size+β 4 Merge +β 5 Turnover+β 6 CFO +β 7 ROA +β 8 Growth +β 9 Lev +β 10 Invratio+β 11 Revratio+β 12 Opinion+β 13 Loss+β 14 LnSu+β 15 Age +β 16 Area+β 17 Industry+β 18 Year+ε 4 Myers 2003 Special+γ 4 Size+γ 5 Merge+γ 6 Turnover+γ 7 CFO+γ 8 ROA+ α 4 ROA t NDA t =α 1 (1/A t -1 ) +α 2 ( REV t /A t -1 ) +α 3 (PPE t /A t -1 ) + 2 DA =γ 0 +γ 1 Special +γ 2 Importance +γ 3 Importance Ghosh Moon 2005 γ 9 Growth +γ 10 Lev +γ 11 Invratio +γ 12 Revratio +γ 13 Opinion + γ 14 Loss+β 15 LnSu+γ 16 Age+γ 17 Area+γ 18 Industry+γ 19 Year+ Jones ε 5 DA DA 4 5 Bartov 2001 Kothari 2005 Special Importance Jones Special Kothari 2005 Jones Special=1 0 ROA DA Importance 1 OLS DA t Size Merge DA Turnover CFO TA t /A t-1 =α 1 (1/A t-1 )+α 2 ( REV t /A t-1 )+α 3 (PPE t /A t-1 )+ ROA Growth α 4 ROA t +ε t 1 Lev Invratio Revratio Opinion Loss LnSu Age DA t =TA t /A t-1 -NDA t 3 Area Industry TA t Year 1 EBXI t 1 DA Jones Special Importantce 1 0 Size Merge Turnover

6 1 CFO ROA Growth Lev Invratio Revratio Opinion 1 0 Loss LnSu 20% Age 1 Area 0 Industry Year Myers 2003 Ghosh Moon 2005 WIND 3 1% 99% >6 3< % 20%~30% Size Lev Growth Age ~2011 A Jones CSMAR

7 3 DA 3 1 1~3 4~6 6 1~3 4~ % Pearson Pearson Spearman ** ** * * ** * ** * ** * ** ** ** * * * * ** ** ** * * ** * * ** ** * ** * ** ** ** * ** 10% 5% 1% Special 1% 5 118

8 opinion Loss Lev Revratio Revratio Revratio Size Age 2012 Invratio ROA Growth CFO ** ** ** < ** * ** * * > ** ** ** ** ** **

9 ** ** ** ** ** ** * * R % 17.76% 25.24% 25.21% 24.05% 24.02% 19.56% 20.15% F >0 < * * ** DA+ DA DA % 1% 5% DA * * ** Jones DA

10 ** ** OLS α 1 α 2 α * DA t TA t /A t-1 =α 1 (1/A t-1 )+α 2 ( REV t /A t-1 )+α 3 (PPE t /A t-1 ) ε t NDA t =α 1 (1/A t-1 )+α 2 ( REV t /A t-1 )+α 3 (PPE t /A t-1 ) 7 DA t =TA t /A t-1 -NDA t 8 Jones DA R % 46.54% 25.07% 25.12% 5 F Jones DA ** ** ** ** ** ** * * ** ** ** * ** ** * < * * * * * ** ** ** > ** ** ** * ** **

11 R % 18.73% 23.85% 24.01% 24.66% 24.12% 19.91% 20.01% F ** ** ** * ** ** * ** < * ** * * * ** * * * ** ** * > * ** ** ** *

12 R % 17.76% 18.45% 18.26% 20.95% 22.63% 18.02% 29.53% F ~2011 A A 1 Myers, J. N., L. A. Myers, and T.C. Omer. Exploring the term of the auditor-client relationship and the quality of earnings: A case for mandatory auditor rotation J. Accounting Review, 2003, 78:

13 2 Ghosh, A., and D. Moon. Auditor tenure and perceptions of audit quality J. Accounting Review, 2005, 80: Blouin J., B. M. Grein, and B. R. Rountree. An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change: The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients J. The Accounting Review, 2007, 82: Chen, C., C. Lin, and Y. Lin. Audit partner tenure, audit firm tenure, and discretionary accruals: Does long audit tenure impair earnings quality J Contemporary Accounting Research, 2008, 25: Hoyle, J. Mandatory auditor rotation: The arguments and an alternative J. Journal of Accountancy, 1987, 145: Lim, C. Y., and H. T. Tan. Does auditor tenure improve audit quality? Moderating effects of industry specialization and fee dependence J. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2010, 27: Krishnan, G. Does Big 6 auditor industry expertise constrain earnings management? J Accounting Horizons, 2003, 17: Balsam, S., J. Krishnan, and J. S. Yang. Auditor industry specialization and earning quality J. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2003, 22: DeAngelo, L. E. The auditor-client contractual relation: An economic analysis M. UMI Research Press, Ferguson, M. J., G. Seow, and D. Youn. Nonaudit services and earnings management: UK Evidence J. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2004, 21: AICPA, Accounting trends and techniques M. Edited by J. Shoher, New York: AICPA J Palmrose, Z. Trials of legal disputes involving independent auditors: Some empirical evidence J. Journal of Accounting Research, 1991, 29: Petty, R., and S. Cuganesan. Auditor Rotation: Framing the Debate J. The Australian Accountant, 1996, 66: Johnson, V., I. Kurana, and K. Reynolds. Audit firm tenure and the quality of financial report J. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2002, 19: Stanley, J., and T. Dezoort. Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An analysis of industry specialization and fee effects J. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2007, 26: J Carey, P., and R. Simnett, Audit partner tenure and audit quality J. The Accounting Review, 2006, 81: J J J J J J Dunn, K. A., and Mayhew, B. W. Audit firm industry specialization and client disclosure quality J. Review of Accounting Studies, 2004, 9: Romanus, R. N., J. J. Maher, and D. M. Fleming. Auditor industry specialization, auditor changes, and accounting restatements J. Accounting Horizons, 2008, 22: Knechel, W. R., V. Naiker, and G. Pacheco. Does auditor industry specialization matter? Evidence from market reaction to auditor switches J. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 2007, 26: J J J J IFAC. IFAC annual report M. New York: International Federation of Accountants, J

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