90% 10% % 1994 GDP % % % % 26% % % 8% 30

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1 * % 5% 17% 13% % * fuminjie2003@ 163. com 14ZDB132 15ZDC011 29

2 90% 10% % 1994 GDP % % % % 26% % % 8% 30

3 U % 69. 7% % % % % 54. 3% 1 GDP % % % % % 56% 78% 44% % % 40% 31

4 % % % / % 94% 2 60% 70% 1 43% 67%

5 % 50% % S % 30% 50% 3. 6% 50% 60% 2% 60% 70% 1. 6% WDI /3 2 / % % 20% % 56%

6 2 World Development Indicators Wind Deng et al Glaeser et al % 2 70% % Fang et al / 2213 / / 1409 /

7 Wind % 2 Wind TAX % % 3 4 7% 5% 1% 3% 1% 2% 35

8 TAX1 RTAX1 ETAX1 2 TAX % RTAX2 ETAX2 TAX2 RTAX1 ETAX1 RTAX2 ETAX2 RTAX i = αlandprice t + μx t + δ + ε t 1 ETAX i = βlandprice t + ηx t + σ + ε t 2 X t LANDPRICE t δ σ RTAX1 RTAX2 ETAX1 ETAX2 LANDPRICE 3 RTAX1 Hausman RTAX2 Hausman RTAX1 RTAX2 RTAX RTAX RTAX1 RTAX % % RTAX1 RTAX % RTAX1 RTAX ETAX1 ETAX2 Hausman ETAX ETAX ETAX1 ETAX ETAX ETAX ETAX1 ETAX % ETAX1 ETAX

9 FE RE-GLS FE RE-GLS FE RE-GLS FE RE-GLS RTAX1 RTAX2 LANDPRICE ** *** *** *** URBANRATE *** *** *** *** Hausman chi *** * *** ETAX1 ETAX2 LANDPRICE *** *** *** *** URBANRATE * *** *** Hausman chi *** *** *** *** P *** ** * 0. 1% 1% 5% 2 CPI CPI FE 11% 5% 17% 13% 37

10 GDP GDP 10% 50% GDP 50% 2005 Musgrave & Musgrave 1988 Rostow

11 Lindert Hirschman 1978 Merton Merton 3 Merton GDP Lindert 2004 GDP Lindert

12 4 Lindert Hirschman Mirrlees

13 Wagner Glaeser 2013 Boadway & Shah

14 % % % Oates

15 Glaeser et al % % % % % CEO 10% Piketty & Saez 2003 Kaplan & Rauh 2010 Aghion et al Piketty et al /4 60% 2013 S

16 Aghion P. U. Akcigit A. Bergeaud Richard Blundell and David Hemous 2015 Innovation and Top Income Inequality NBER Working Paper No Boadway Robin and Anwar Shah 2009 Fiscal Federalism Principles and Practices of Multiorder Governance Cambridge University Press. Deng Yongheng Joseph Gyourko and Jing Wu 2012 Land and House Price Measurement in China Property Markets and Financial Stability Heath A. Packer F. and Windsor C. eds. Bank of International Settlement and Reserve Bank of Australia. Fang Hanming Quanlin Gu Wei Xiong and Li-An Zhou 2015 Demystifying the Chinese Housing Boom Chap. 2 in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2015 Vol. 30 edited by Martin Eichenbaum and Jonathan Parker University of Chicago Press. Glaeser E. J. Kolko and A. Saiz 2001 Consumer City Journal of Economic Geography Glaeser Edward L Urban Public Finance Handbook of Public Economics Vol Glaeser Edward Wei Huang Yueran Ma and Andrei Shleifer 2017 A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics Journal of Economic Perspectives Hirschman A. O The Strategy of Economic Development W. W. Norton & Company. Kaplan Steven N. and Joshua Rauh 2010 Wall Street and Main Street What Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes Review of Financial Studies Lindert P. H Growing Public Vo. 1 Cambridge University Press. Merton R. K Social Theory and Social Structure The Free Press. Mirrlees James A Welfare Incentives and Taxation Oxford University Press. Musgrave R. A. and P. B. Musgrave 1988 Public Finance in Theory and Practice New York McGraw-Hill Book Company. Oates W. E On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization in A. J. Auerbach and D. N. Shaviro eds. Institutional Foundations of Public Finance Economic and Legal Perspectives Harvard University Press. Piketty T. and E. Saez 2003 Income Inequality in the United States Quarterly Journal of Economics February Piketty Thomas. Li Yang and Gabriel Zucman 2017 Capital Accumulation Private Property and Rising Inequality in China NBER Working Paper No Rostow W. W The Stages of Economic Growth Cambridge University Press. Wagner A Three Extracts on Public Finance Classics in the Theory of Public Finance eds. R. A. Musgrave and A. T. Peacock MacMillan

17 The Evolution of the Tax System during China s Industrialization and Urbanization Facts Logics and Policies FU Minjie ZHANG Ping and YUAN Fuhua Institute of Economics Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Summary China has an industrial tax system in which firms are the main taxpayers and the added value of taxable products is the main tax base. It is most typical in the manufacturing sector which has the highest tax rate and the strongest performance in the whole economy after the value-added tax is extended to the service sector. Industrial taxes include the value-added tax consumption tax business tax and the urban maintenance and construction tax which is levied based on a fixed rate of the value-added tax. These taxes accounted for 51% of China s total tax revenue in The urbanization rate in China exceeded 50% in 2011 and the manufacturing industrial proportion continues to decline. Industrial Tax growth has stagnated following this rapid decline resulting in a decrease in the growth of tax revenue from 25% in 2011 to 4. 8% in Meanwhile the urbanization process has increased demand for public services. The long-lasting and everexpanding fiscal gap brought about by the sustained rise in demand for public services and the slowing growth of industrial tax revenues can be solved by land sales in the short term but three long-term challenges /contradictions arise 1 the contradiction between the declining proportion of industrial tax and increasing demand for public services brought by urbanization 2 the contradiction between the continued rise of the urbanization rate and the unsustainable growth of land finance and 3 the contradiction between the imbalance of local fiscal revenue caused by urban differentiation and equal access to basic public services nationwide which sharpens the asymmetry between regional financial risks and the overall arrangement across the country. Under the development path of bilateral tax incentives i. e. by boosting industrialization through industrial tax and boosting urbanization via land finance the growth of the two forms of government revenues namely tax and land rent due to the different development trends of industrialization and urbanization and local governments focus on land management displays a pattern of rent substituting tax. In this study we find that 1 the increase in the urbanization rate is almost synchronous with the increase in the land price. Generally if the urbanization rate increases by 1% the land price will increase by 6% accordingly and 2 the promotion of urbanization or the rise in the price of land significantly inhibited the proportion of industrial tax. Specifically if the land price doubles the proportion of industrial tax in the local government tax revenue will decline by 0. 87% and the proportion of industrial tax in the local government expenditure will fall by 1. 44%. Furthermore 3 the development of land and population urbanization will not increase the tax income under the current industrial tax system. We make three propositions based on international comparison and historical experiences. Further based on our research we make the following policy recommendations 1 Matching the personal tax to public service enjoyment. To this end citizens demands for public service in the pursuit of a better life can meet the principle of Do as you can. 2 Taxing consumption and reducing fiscal stimulus distortions caused by overconcentration on the production of the indirect tax system. 3 Holding 30% as the bottom line of the industrial proportion as this is equally important for the robust functioning of the public sector and the construction of industrial powers target in Establishing a national unified land market strictly controlling the land bubble and curbing speculation on land by local governments. 5 Transforming income distribution from resource rent to knowledge rent and preventing the formation of a wealth trap. Keywords Industrial Tax Urban Economy Industrialization Urbanization Rent Tax substitution JEL Classification H71 O23 45

49 Schroeder & Aoki 2009 Li Bird & Ebel SSCI Journal of Public Economics Zhang & Zou DC cbe = + 2 DC be =

49 Schroeder & Aoki 2009 Li Bird & Ebel SSCI Journal of Public Economics Zhang & Zou DC cbe = + 2 DC be = 48 2011 6 158 Shirk 1993 Montinola et al. 1996 1997 2010 2010 10BZZ035 2010 2010R0083 49 Schroeder & Aoki 2009 Li 2010 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Bird & Ebel 2006 504 1 SSCI 2 1998 Journal of Public Economics Zhang