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1 : Ariel Rubinstein John Nash John Nash, John C. Harsanyi Reinhard Selten 1994 Robert J. Aumann, Ken Binmore, David Kreps Ariel Rubinstein 1

2 Lecturer in Rank of Professor 1995 JETRES M. Osborne 1994 M. Osborne linguistic turn

3 19 20 Gottlob Freg Ludwig Wittgenstein Martin HeideggerJohn R. Austin Johann G. HerderWilhelm von Humboldt Gilbert RyleJohn Searle Edmund HusserlHans-Georg Gadamer 20 meta-ethics Charles L. StevensenRichard M. Hare Claude Lévi-StraussClifford Geertz Don Cupitt 1997 Ferdinand de SaussureLeonard BloomfieldEdward SapirNoam ChomskyM. A. K. Halliday 3

meta-ethics Charles L. StevensenRichard M.

4 Alfred Marshall John M. Keynes 1965 J. Marschak 1979 Theodore Schultz W. HendersonT. Dudley-EvansR. Backhouse development

5 Adam Smith Rubinstein2000p. 35 social normspractice, conventions custom genotypephenotype institutions established order by which everything is regulated Lebensformen institutions Austin, 1962Phonepheme (rheme)/ 2003a

6 Lebenswelt 2 Noam Chomskyuniversal Grammarlanguage faculty 6

7 Saul Kripke involved in 0 Rubinstein2000, p. 4 regularity social institutions Wittgenstein, 1953: 201 This was our paradox: no course of action Handlungsweise could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule 7

our paradox: no course of action Handlungsweise could be

8 semantics 1 Choosing the Semantic Property of Language Rubinstein2000, p. 9 linear ordering the grand set Rubinstein2000, p. 13 Rubinstein2000, pp W. V. Quine, 1969, p. 126 John van Benthem Leibnizian Rubinstein, 2000, p

9 linear ordering the grand set 13 Rubinstein2000, pp.

9 evolutionary game theory Maynard SmithESS ESS payoff Rubinstein2000, pp Be careful Be careful Rubinstein2000, p.28 utterance Paul Grice1989p

10 well-developed Rubinsteinp.39 conversational implicature Rubinsteinp.42 10

11 3 discourse Rubinstein, p. 72 strategy Martin Shubik playerjim Freedman John McMillan 11

12 Barton L. Lipmansorites paradox Rubinstein2000linear ordering Hilary Putnam,

13 Rubinstein, 2000, pp Benacerraf & Putman1983 Rubinstein, 2000, p. 114 Ken Binmore Binmore b

14 4 14

15 Rubinstein2000, p.26 classical game theory IQRubinstein, 2000, p. 75 Rubinstein, 2000, p.79 the Nash Solution Rubinstein, 2000, p.82 Rubinstein, 2000, p.86 15

16 discount factorkalai-smorodingsky 2003c 5556 Rubinstein, 2000, p hyper-rational bounded rational Kalai-Smorodingsky Kalai-Smorodingsky Rubinstein, 2000, p.81 N (S, d) = arg max {(u 1 d 1 ) (u 2 d 2 )(u 1, u 2 ) S u i d i i} 16

82 2000 5 hyper-rational bounded rational

17 H H. Peyton Young1998 tautology social institution Rubinstein2000, p.5 may may Ferdinand de Saussure, 1916/1949 social institution 17

18 tautology 2001formation of institutions Searle Searle institutional facts brute facts Searle, 1995p. 2 Searle, 1995:8788institution institutional facts codification institutions institutional facts customconventioninstitutions institutions institutional factsconventioninstitution Schotter, 1980 institution2003c 18

2 Searle, 1995:8788institution institutional facts codification institutions

19 fact stated brute facts intentionality institution John L. Austin, 1962 Sachverhaltenfact state of affaires fact stated Sachverhalten 19

20 social institution consent pooling Rubinstein, 2000, p. 57 social institution social institutions Searle, 1995p. 13 matrix configuration law 20

21 6 Johan van Benthem Rubinstein, 2000, p.93 21

22 Rubinstein, 2000, p.95? Austin, J. L., 1962, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benacerraf., P. & H. Putman, 1983, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings, 2 nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Binmore, 1994, Game Theory and Social Contract, Vol. I, Playing Fair, Cambridge, MASS.: The MIT Press Cupitt, D., 1997, After God: The Future of Religion, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Henderson, W., T. Dudley-Evans & R. Backhouse, 1993, Economics and Language, London: Routledge. Marschak, J. 1965, The Economics of Language, Behavioral Science, vol. 10, pp Putnam, H., 1970, Is Semantics Possible? in H. E. Kiefer and M. Munitz (eds.), Language, Belief and Metaphysics, NY: State University of New York University. A. P Rubinstein, A., 1982, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, vol. 50, pp Rubinstein, A., 1985, A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preference, Econometrica, 53: Rubinstein, A., 1998, Modeling Bounded Rationality, Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press. Rubinstein, A., 2000, Economics and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Rubinstein, A. & M. Osborne, 1990, Bargaining and Market, New York: Academic Press. Rubinstein, A. & M. Osborne, 1994, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press. Saussure, F. de, 1916 / 1949, Cours de Linguistique Général, Payot Paris Schotter, A, 1981, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Schultz, T., 1980, a 2003b 22

23 2003c Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigation, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3 rd ed. (1967), Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Microsoft Word - 01 - Sun Tzu - Chinese translation.doc

Microsoft Word - 01 - Sun Tzu - Chinese translation.doc 用博弈论来解读孙子兵法 Emerson M.S. Niou 杜克大学 Peter C. Ordeshook 加州理工学院英文原文刊登于 Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Sun Tzu's The Art of War," Journal