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1 Ξ ( ) ( ), :,,, (Nelson, 1995 ) (A. Alchian) (Alchian,1950 ),, (,1995 ),, :,,,,,,?,,,,,,, (, ) Ξ ( ), :Christopher Hall,, ; Yoram barzel,, ( ),,,,,,, 70

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7 x1 S, A x1 D, (1 - x1) H ; x2 S, A x2 D, (1 - x2) H B y, A, y D, (1 - y) H : max[ 3yx1 + 2 (1 - y) x1 + 4y (1 - x1) + (1 - y) (1 - x1) ], x1, y ; max[ 2yx2 + (1 - y) x2 + 3y (1 - x2) ], x2, y ; max[p (yx1 + 2 (1 - y) x1 - (1 - y) (1 - x1) ) + (1 - p) (2yx2 + y (1 - x2) + 3 (1 - y) x2) ], y, x1, x2 y (x1,x2) : x1 x2, y = 0 ;, y = 1 ;, y, p < 1 p = 1,, : (D,H), ( H,D), (x1 = 015,y = 015) x 2 x 2 = 1 2 (1 - p) - P 1 - p x 1 Y y 0 y 1,, ( ) ( [ 11 ]),,,,,?,,,,,,, ( ), :,,,,, ( Sharpley Value), 76 x 1

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9 , ( F. Hayek,1937,1945, 1949,1952,1988 ), (D. Kreps, 1990 a,b) ( K. binmore,1994 ), (A. Schotter,1981 ), (Fudenberg and Tirole,1991 ), ( I. Gilboa,et al,1995 ), (B. Klein,et al, 1978,1991 ), :,,,, : n p (t1,t2 tn), tj Tj,j = 1,2,n, [ j tj,j = 1,2,,n ],, p (t - j tj),j = 1,2,,n : j tj, j,,, ( Gilboa and Schmeidler,1995 ),,,,,,,,,, : [ 1 ] : (,1992 ), ( Y. Barzel) [ 2 ] : (Zweckrational), ( Wertrational) [ 3 ] :,, ( ),,, [ 4 ] : (1996 ) 1985 [ 5 ] :,,?,, 78

Klein,et al, 1978,1991 ), :,,,, : n p (t1,t2 tn), tj Tj,j = 1,2,n, [ j tj,j = 1,2,,n ],, p (t - j tj),j = 1,2,,n :

10 [ 6 ] :, [ 7 ] :, X N, (1 - X) C,, M, : max[ P(xV - (1 - x) (V - t) ) + (1 - p) (x (V - 4t) + (1 - x) (V - t) ) ] X, [ 8 ] :,,, :? [ 9 ] :,, ;, ,7 [ 10 ] :,,, [ 11 ] : : x1 = 0, y > 015 ; =, y = 015 ; = 1, y < 015 ; x2 = 0, y > 015 ; =, y = 015 ; = 1, y < 015 ; y = 0, 1-2px1-2 (1 - p) x2 < 0 ; =, 1-2px1-2 (1 - p) x2 = 0 ; = 1, 1-2px1-2 (1 - p) x2 > 0 p < 1, 1-2px1-2 (1 - p) x2 = 0 x2 x1,,, y 1, 0 [ 12 ] :,, 1996,, ( ) : Alchian,A. A., uncertainty,evolution and economic theory.journal of Political Economy 58,no. 3 (J une 1950) : Alchian,A. A.,1965, some economics of property rights,pp ,in A. A. Alchian,Economic Forces at Work. lndianapolis :Liberty Press,1977. Barzel, Y., transaction costs :are they just costs?,journal of lnstitutional and Theoretical Economics 141 (1), (1985) :4-16. Barzel, Y., Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University Press,1989. Binmore, K., Game Theory and the Social Contract Vol. l. Cambridge,MA :MIT Press,1994. Cheung,S. N. S., the structure of a contract and the theory of a non - exclusive resource.journal of Law & Economics 13, no. 1 (April 1970) : Cheung,S. N. S., economic organization and transaction costs, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Macmillan,1987). Coase,R., the nature of the firm :origin, in O. Williamson and S. Winter,eds., The Nature of the Firm. Oxford Universit y Press,1991a. Coase,R., the nature of the firm :meaning, in O. Williamson and S. Winter,eds., The Nature of the Firm. Oxford Universit y Press,1991b. Coase,R., the nature of the firm :influence, in O. Williamson and S. Winter,eds., The Nature of the Firm. Oxford Univer2 sity Press,1991c. Cooter,R.,and Ulen,T.,Law and Economics. Harper Collins,1988. Demsetz,H., toward a theory of property rights, American Economic Review Vol. 57 (2) (May 1967) : Feinberg,J.,Social Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs,N. J. : Prentice - Hall,1973. Fudenberg,and Tirole, Game Theory. MIT Press,1991. Gllboa,l.,and David Schmeidler, case - based decision theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics CX(August 1995) :

- p) x2 = 0 ; = 1, 1-2px1-2 (1 - p) x2 > 0 p < 1, 1-2px1-2 (1 - p) x2 = 0 x2 x1,,, y 1, 0 [ 12 ] :,, 1996,, 1996 3 ( ) : Alchian,A. A., uncertainty,evolution and economic theory.

11 Hayek,F. A., economics and knowledge, Economica ( February 1937). Hayek,F. A., the use of knowledge in society, American Economic Review (September 1945). Hayek,F. A.,Individualism and Economic Order. London :Routledge & Kegan Paul,1949. Hayek, F. A., The Sensory Order : An inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology. London : Routledge & Kegan Paul,1952. Hayek,F. A.,The Fatal Conceit. University of Chicago Press,1988. Klein,B.,Crawford R.,and Alchian,A. A., vertical integration,appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process, Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 21, (1978) :297. Klein,B., vertical integration as organizational ownership :the Fisher Body - General Motors relationship revisited, PP ,in O. Williamson and S. Winter,eds., The Nature of the Firm. Oxford University Press,1991. Kreps,D.,1990a, corporate culture and economic theory, pp ,in J. Alt and K. Shepsle,eds.,Perspectives on Posi2 tive Political Economy. Cambridge University Press. Kreps,D.,1990b,A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press. Nelson,R., recent evolutionary theorizing about economic change. Journal of Economic Literature XXXlll, no. 1 ( March 1995) : North,D.,lnstitutions,lnstitutional Change,and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press,1990. Schotter,A.,The Economic Theory of Social lnstitutions. Cambridge University Press,1981. Umbeck,J.,1977, the California gold rush :a study of emerging property rights. Explorations in Economic History 14,no. 2 : Wang,D.,1995, transaction cost and knowledge structure,unpublished manuscript.,1992 :, 5,1995 :, 9,, 1995 ( : ) ( : ), ,, :, :,,,,, 20,16 128, 4150, 27, :78 82, 80 : 270 ( ) : (0811) : 22 ( ) : : :

University of Chicago Press,1988. Klein,B.,Crawford R.,and Alchian,A. A., vertical integration,appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process, Journal of Law and Economics Vol.

Microsoft Word - 01 - Sun Tzu - Chinese translation.doc

Microsoft Word - 01 - Sun Tzu - Chinese translation.doc 用博弈论来解读孙子兵法 Emerson M.S. Niou 杜克大学 Peter C. Ordeshook 加州理工学院英文原文刊登于 Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Sun Tzu's The Art of War," Journal