2004 7 3 ( 100871) :,,,,,,,,,, :, ;, (federalism), Musgrave (1959), Tiebout (1956) Buchanan (1965) Oates(1972),,,,, (yardstick effect) (abuse control),zhang Zou (1998), 20,, (fiscal competition),, 3,, 70271063,; ( ),, 59
: Gordon (1983) (horizontal interaction), Wilson (1986), ;Wildasin (1988),, Lee (1997),, (residential2base) (native2base),, (free rider) (psychic attachments,),mansoorian Myers(1997) Bucovetsky(1995), Wildasin (1989), Gong Zou (2001) (federal framework),,,,,,,,,,,, :Cobb2Douglas,,,,,,,,, gn,,i j M ij, i, j = 1,2, i j M ij i E i, s i,,hoyt (1993),, Wildasin(1991,1994), Wellisch(2000) 60
2004 7 f i c i l i,c i, l i, f, s i, s - i, u i ( c i, l i,f, s i, s - i ), i = 1,2 u i ( c i, l i,f, s i, s - i ) = 1ln i c i - i 2 l i + 3lnf i + i ln s i + - i ln s - i (1),L i ( ),F i ( L i ) = A i (L i ), 0 << 1 Cobb2Douglas,, w, i i w, G i g i, f + 6 2 i = 1 ( g is i + G i ) = w 6 2 i = 1 wi N i l i (2) (1 + i ) c i (1 - g i ) s i = i N i c i + wn i i w i l i + G i (3) = (1 - w - i w ) w i l i + E i ΠN i + I ΠN I (4) N i i, w i i, i i,,,, Nash,, L i = N i l i (5),, j, i j 2,(1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L (1 - w - 2 w ) F 2 L - M 12, 1 2,,,,(1 - w - 2 w ) F 2 L (1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L + M 12 (1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L - M 21, 2 1 1 2 M M, l i 11 (1 - w - 1 w ) F 1 L = (1 - w - 2 w ) F 2 L - M (6) N 1 + N 2 = gn (7),(4) 1 c i, l i (1), i L i i = F i ( L i ) - w i L i, (5), Keen Marchand(1997),, Boadway Keen(1993), (Modified Samuelson Rule) Wellisch (2000) Mansoorian Myers (1997),Wildasin(1994) 5L 2 Π5 M < 0, M +,M < M 3, 61
: l i = l i ( w, i w ), c i = c i ( w, i w, i ) (1), 21, i, (3) V i,l i < 1 l i = 1, l i = l i ( w, G i ), c i = c i ( w, G i ), s i = s i ( w, G i, g i ),V i gv i = gv i ( w, G i, g i ), i w i, i w > i, i w = i, l i = 1,, l i < 1 31, (2) 6 2 igv i ( i = 1 w, G i, g i ) w, 1Π 2,l 2, w =, l 2,, 0, i ( - 1 = 0),,,, M 3,M < M 3, (6) (7),,,1, G 1 0,,,, 9,, 2 5,,,,, 2,, 2Gong Zou (2002), Barro (1990), i 1 = 013, i 2 = 012, i 3 = 012, i = 012, - i = 011,A i = 1,= 1Π3, = 0, i = 1,2, f = 113512, g i = 013333, G i = - 110134, i = 211675, w = 0, i w = - 211675, c i = 110134, l i = 013466, s i = 110134, w i = 016756,,,,,, Keen Marchand(1999), U i = 1ln( i c i - l ib Πb) + 3lnf i + i lns i + - i lns - i, l i 62
2004 7,M 3,,,M = 015, = [ 015,015 ], A = [ 110,115 ],= 1Π4 30 %, i 2, 1 2 i 2 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i 0110 0115 0120 1 111159 013472-015093 0130 118459-119325 018009 018195 018369 012953 1 013333-019927 218087-211333 110000 018369 018369 013750 018802 110827 013459-014115 0130 116140-117180 014640 019052 018120 014893 111198 013527-110665 317809-317223 018755 017041 018120 013806 018502 110379 013454-013995 0130 115941-116995 013304 018990 017784 016479 111498 013523-110228 316858-316344 016363 016577 017784 014740,,,,,,,,,, i 2,,, i 2 = 011 M > M 3 = 012851, 1 1,2,,,, (),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,? i 2,2 i w - 2 ( i = 1,2) w 013 i 2 0110 0125 1,, 2 1, 1,,,,,, 63
:,,,,,,, 2 i 0110,, 1, 2 i 2 = 0115,2 N 2 1 111198, 1,, 2,,, i 2, 2, 2 U, 2 1, 1 U, 2 i 2 i 2 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i 0110 0115 0120 1 111128 013473-015139 0130 118589-119445 018039 018172 018346 012945 1 013333-019843 217369-210000 019654 018346 018346 013850 1 110477 013467-014971 0130 118402-119272 015068 017700 017858 014162 1 013333-019218 216869-210000 016204 017858 017858 015364 1 110055 013463-014863 0130 118276-119156 013645 017394 017541 015329 1 013333-018811 216507-210000 014524 017541 017541 016798 1 2,,, 1,,, i 2 ( ) 2,,, 1, 2,, i 2, c 2, 1, g 1,,, 1 2,,,,, 2,,,, 64
2004 7,, 1 2,,,, A = [1,2 ], E = [1,2 ], M = 013, w 013, i w - 1 ( i = 1,2), G 1 0,, - 2,,,,,, - 2 3-2 0 0120 3 G 1-2 - 2 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i 0 0105 0110 0115 016950 113740 010126 011233 0130 016746-018490 012110 114640 016870 110550 113050 013333-116890 216746-110000 012560 017896 110305 111378 017003 113313 012105 010623 0130 017495-019183 012207 114071 018321 110142 112997 013333-117407 217902-110000 012558 017682 019985 111420 017057 112913 013424 010047 0130 018262-019892 012306 113537 019685 019757 112943 013333-117890 219055-110000 012557 017483 019685 111459 017061 112444 014167 0 0130 018330-019956 012315 113493 110889 019725 112939 013333-118475 310519-110000 012557 017213 019333 111462,,,, G 1 > 0 i w > - 1,,, G 1 = 0,,,,,,, U, - 2 = 0, g 1 0,, 1999, 20 90,,,,,,,,,, ( 65
: i = 015, 1 > 015),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Gong Zou (2002),,,,,, 4 A 1 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i 0125 015 110 115 015120 111685 013350 013712 0130 012541-014601 010367 117072 018763 112315 114880 013333-210000 313994-110000 012611 015889 018763 110160 015653 112018 013374 012718 0130 014031-015979 010926 115847 019014 111422 114347 013333-119431 312558-110000 012597 016283 019014 110484 017057 112913 013424 010047 0130 018262-019892 012306 113537 019685 019757 112943 013333-117890 219055-110000 012557 017483 019685 111459 018236 113374 012109 010000 0130 018895-110000 013007 114416 110030 110682 111764 013333-116932 217231-110000 012519 018526 110030 112449,, A 1,,, 4 A 1 0125 210,,, g 1 U, g 2,, g 1,,,,,, A 1 A 2, g 1 U,, 66
2004 7 5 N i f g i G i w i i w l i c i s i w i 1Π8 1Π4 1Π2 017260 113299 013115 010000 0130 017564-019905 011305 114188 019974 019827 112740 013333-118848 217578-110000 011367 017829 019974 111538 017057 112913 013424 010047 0130 018262-019892 012306 113537 019685 019757 112943 013333-117890 219055-110000 012557 017483 019685 111459 015744 112843 013636 011941 0130 015982-016585 012761 116009 019632 112555 114256 013333-118356 314524-110000 015040 016757 019632 111797 5,,,,,,,,, U,U, 4 A 1 4,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Wilson (1991) Hoyt (1993) Buckvostsy (1991) Bucovetsky (1991),,,,,,, 67
:,,,,,,,,, (,2003),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2 ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,2003 :, 3,2002 : Barro, R., 1990,Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal of Political Economy, 98, S103 125. Bradford, D. F. and W1 E1 Oates, 1971,Towards a predictive theory of intergovernmental grants, American Economic Review, 61, 440 448. 1290. 478. Braid, R., 1996,Symmetric tax competition with multiple jurisdictions in each metropolitan area, American Economic Review,86, 1279 Boadway, R. and M. Keen, 1993,Public goods, self2selection, and optimal income taxation, International Economic Review,34, 463 Buchanan, J. M., 1965,An economic theory of clubs, Economica,31, 1 14. Bucovetsky, S., 1991,Asymmetric tax competition, Journal of Urban Economics,30, 167 181. Bucovetsky, S., 1995,Rent seeking and tax competition, Journal of Public Economics,58, 337 363. Gong, L. and H. Zou, 2002,Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government, 68
2004 7 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,26, 1975 2003. Gong, L. and H. Zou, 2001,Optimal design of government transfer, Working paper,peking University. Gordon, R. H., 1983,An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism, Quarterly Journal of Economics,98, 567 586. Hoyt, W. H., 1993,Tax competition, Nash equilibria, and residential mobility, Journal of Urban Economics,34, 358 379. Keen, M. and M. Marchand, 1997,Fiscal competition and the pattern of public spending, Journal of Public Economics,66, 33 53. Lee, K., 1997,Tax competition with imperfectly mobile capital, Journal of Urban Economics,42, 222 242. Mansoorian,A and G. M. Myers,1997,On the Consequences of Government objectives for Economies with Mobile Populations,Journal of Public Economices 63,265 281. Musgrave,R. 1959,Theory of Public Finance :A Study in Public Economy,New York :McGraw. Oates,W. 1972,Fiscal Federalism,New York :Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Oates, W. E., 1981,On local finance and the Tiebout model, American Economic Review,71, 93 98. Oates, W. E. and R. M. Schwab, 1988,Economic competition among jurisdictions : Efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing? Journal of Public Economics,35, 333 354. Tiebout, C., 1956,A pure theory of local expenditures, Journal of Political Economics,64, 416 424. Wellisch, D., 2000, Theory of Public Finance in A Federal State, Cambridge University Press. Wildasin, D. E., 1988,Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition, Journal of Public Economics,35, 229 240. Wildasin, D. E., 1989,Interjurisdictional capital mobility : Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy, Journal of Urban Economics,25, 193 212. Wildasin, D. E., 1991,Income redistribution in a common labor market, American Economic Review,81, 757 774. Wildasin, D. E., 1994,Income redistribution and migration, Canadian Journal of Economics,27, 637 656. Wilson, J. D., 1986,A theory of interregional tax competition, Journal of Urban Economics,19, 296 315. Zhang, T. and H. Zou, 1998,Fiscal decentralization, public spending, and economic growth in China, Journal of Public Economics,67, 221 240. Interregional Disparity, Factor Mobility, and Fiscal Decentralization Zhang Yan & Gong Liutang ( Guanghua School of Management, Peking University) Abstract :This paper studies the optimal taxation, expenditures and grants polices in a federal framework with mobile population and endogenous labor choices. In addition to the zero federal income tax and negative fiscal gap, we find the taxation competition and service competition in different levels of governments largely influence the optimal governmental and individual choices. With some policy instrument constraints, the matching grants not only meet the individual needs and balance government finance, but also correct the horizontal and vertical distortions. We also consider the relations between fiscal decentralization and interregional disparity. The congestion effect and real endowment effect magnify the usual income effect and give some interesting comparative static analysis about the fiscal policies and various parameters. The central intervention and labor mobility increase the welfare of the regions with low technology and low endowment where implicit interregional redistribution plays an important role. Key Words :Fiscal Competition ; Fiscal Decentralization ; Factor Mobility ; Interregional Disparity JEL Classification :F290,H290,H710 ( : ) ( : ) 69