Vol.1, No.1, Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) 1 Brandenburger Nalebuff(1996) Brandenburger Nalebuff(1996) (Dowling et al., 1996) (Porter s (Mono

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1 Vol.1, No.1, Resources Sharing Analysis through Game Theory under Coopetitive Environment 1 2 (Received: Dec. 21, 2004First Revision: Jan. 25, 2005Accepted: Apr. 6, 2005) 3 Nash Abstract Cooperation has become an efficient way of improving firms competence in business environment. However, the new concept of cooperating with enemies certainly associated with some risks. Based on the framework of Game Theory, this paper intends to analyze the consequences of resources sharing occurred among competitors. First of all, the reasons for coopetition are elaborated; secondly, examining the possible consequences and risks from coopetition for firms. In particular, synergy, leverage ability and negative-reverse-impact are discussed in terms of resources sharing conflicted for firms. Through Nash Equilibrium, the suitable strategies are created for firms; meanwhile, this paper suggests how resources are strategically shared and coordinated under the situation of coopetition. Keywords: Game Theory, Coopetition Theory, Synergy, Negative-reverse-impact, Value Net 1. (Coopetition) Competition Collaboration Brandenburger Nalebuff1996 (Stakeholders) Value Net,

2 Vol.1, No.1, Brandenburger & Nalebuff (1996) 1 Brandenburger Nalebuff(1996) Brandenburger Nalebuff(1996) (Dowling et al., 1996) (Porter s (Monopolistic Value) (Leverage Value) (Synergetic Value) (Negative Reverse Impact Value) 2

3 2. (Doz & Hamel, 1998) (Basic Value) (Monopolistic Resources) (Gomes-Casseres, 1994) 2.2 Doz & Hamel, 1998 (Ohmae, 1989) Lei(1997) 3

4 Vol.1, No.1, (Doz & Hamel, 1998) (Dowling et al., 1996) Dowling et al.(1996) 2.3 (Parkhe, 1991) (Kogut, 1989) (Jorde & Teece, 1989) 4

5 3. Park & Russo(1996) 3.1 Khanna et al. (1998) 担双双 3.2 (Khanna, 1998) (Bleek & Ernst, 1991) 3.3 5

6 Vol.1, No.1, 2005 (Lei, 1997) (Received Values) (Bleek & Ernst, 1991) 4. (Synergy) (Leveragability) (negative reverse impact) (Loebbecke & van Fenema, 1998) (1) (sv>2r) Thompson(1967) & Van de Ven et al. (1976) (2) (Williamson, 1985) (Incomplete Contracts Theory) (Hart, 1991) (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) (3) (Yoonga & Molinab, 2003) 6

7 (Levy et al., 2000) (Dyadic) (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 5. Von Hippel(1994) & Schrader(1990) (Axelrod, 1984) Schrader ( ) (bv) (mav) Nash (Nash Equilibrium) Nash Nash 1 II I II I 2 2 (Strategic Grid) (1) I II (bv+bv=2bv) (2) I II I (bv+bv=2bv) (mav) II bv (3) I II II (bv+bv=2bv) (mav) I bv (4) I II bv (mav) 7

8 Vol.1, No.1, bv 2bv+mav 2bv bv 2bv+mav bv bv+mav bv+mav Schrader, (1990) Basic value (bv) = Monopolistically Added value (mav)= 2 (5) Nash a. 2bv+mav>2bv, bv+mav>bv; II I b. 2bv+mav>2av, bv+mav>bv; I II Nash ( 2 ) (Symmetric) bv+mav 2bv Nash II Nash Nash 8

9 2 (nriv) (lv) (sv) 3 (1) bv+mav>bv-nriv; 2bv+mav+lv>2bv+sv+lv-nriv mav>sv-nriv II I I (2) bv+mav>bv-nriv; 2bv+mav+lv >2bv+sv+lv-nriv mav>sv-nriv I II II (3) mav>sv-nriv Nash mav>sv-nriv I II 2bv+sv+lv-nriv 2bv+mav+lv 2bv+sv+lv-nriv bv-nriv 2bv+mav+lv bv-nriv bv+mav bv+mav bv = mav = synergic value (sv)= leveragetic value (lv)= negative-reverse impact valure (nriv)= 3 9

10 Vol.1, No.1, mav<sv-nriv (1) I 2bv+mav+lv<2bv+sv+lv-nriv mav<sv-nriv I bv+mav>bv-nriv I II II I I (2) II 2bv+mav+lv<2bv+sv+lv-nriv mav<sv-nriv II II (3) mav<sv-nriv Nash mav<sv-nriv I II 2 3 sv<nriv+mav sv>nriv+mav 4 I II Nash (Mixed Strategies) Nash(1951) II p, q I Indifferent 3 II p(2bv+sv+lv-nriv)+q(bv-nriv)=p(2bv+mav+lv)+q(bv+mav) p(sv-nriv-mav)=q(nriv+mav) p+q=1 p=(nriv-mav)/svq=(sv-nriv-mav)/sv II p=(nriv-mav)/svq=(sv-nriv-mav)/sv I I II I 10

11 3 I (Population Dynamics) 3 p q (Evolutionary Game Theory) (1) 11

12 Vol.1, No.1, 2005 (2) (3) sv>mav+nriv 6.2 (1) (2) 双 (3) (4) 12

13 (5) ( ) 7. 双 1. Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York. 2. Bleek, J., D. Ernst (1991), The way to win cross-border alliance, Harvard Business Review, Nov, pp Brandenburger, A. M. and B. J. Nalebuff (1996), Competition, Doubleday, New York. 4. Dowling, M. J., W. D. Roering, B. A. Carlin and J. Wiesneski (1996), Multifaceted 13

14 Vol.1, No.1, 2005 relationships uder coopetition: Description and Theory, Journal of Management Inquiry, Vol. 5, No. 2, June, pp Doz, Y. L. and G. Hamel (1998), Alliance advantage: The art of creating value through partnering, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, pp.33-pp Gomes-Casseres, B. (1994), Group versus group: How alliance networks compete, Harvard Business Review, Jun, pp Hamel, G., Y. L. Doz and C. K. Prahalad (1989), Collaborate with your competitors? And win, Harvard Business Review, Jan, pp Hart, O. D. (1991), Incomplete Contracts and the theory of the firm in The Nature of the firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development, Williamson and S.G. Winter (Eds.), Oxford University Press, New York. 9. Jorde, T. M. and D. J. Teece (1989), Competition and cooperation: Striking the right balance, California Management Review, Spring, pp Khanna, T., R. Gulati and N. Nohria (1998), The dynamics of learning alliances: competition, cooperation and relative scope, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, pp Kogut, B. (1989), The stability of joint venture: Reciprocity and competitive rivalry, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Dec, Vol. XXXVIII, pp Lei, D. (1997), Offensive and defensive uses of alliance, in Vernon-Wortzel, H., Wortzel, L.H. (Eds.), Strategic management in a global economy, John Wiley & Sons, pp Levy, M., C. Loebbecke and P. Powell (2000), Knowledge Transfer and Small Businesses, University of Bath, Working paper. 14. Loebbecke, C. and P. C. van Fenema (1998), Towards a theory of inter-organizational knowledge sharing during coopetition, in proceedings of European Conference on Information Systems, Axi-en-Provence, France, pp Nash, J. F. (1951), Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 54, pp Ohmae, K. (1989), The global logic of strategic alliances, in Bleeke, J., Ernst, D. (Eds.), 1993, Collaborating to compete: Using strategic alliances and acquisitions in the global marketplace, John Wiley & Sons, pp Park, S. H. and M. V. Russo (1996), When competition eclipses cooperation: An event history analysis of joint venture failure, Management Sciences, June, Vol.42, No.6, pp Parkhe, A. (1991), Interfirms diversity, organizational learning, and longevity in global strategic alliances, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol.22, pp Schrader, S. (1990), Zwischenbetrieblicher informationstransfer, Eine empirische Analyse kooperativen Verhaltens, Dunker & Humbolt, Berlin. 14

15 20. Thompson, J. D. (1967), Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York. 21. Van de Ven, A. H., A. L. Delbecq and Jr. R. Koenig (1976), Determinants of Coordination Modes Within Organizations, American Sociological Review, Vol. 41, April, pp Von Hippel, E. (1994), Sticky information and locus of problem solving: implication for innovation, Management Science, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, Free Press, New York. 24. Yoonga, P. and M. Molinab (2003), Knowledge Sharing and Business Clusters, 7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13, pp , Adelaide, South Australia. 15

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Microsoft Word - ä¸ﬁé¢Ÿæ−¥å‚−_å“ıå¼‹è®º_1104 中国博弈论新近进展及展望摘要 1944 年著名数学家冯诺伊曼和经济学家莫根施坦合著并出版的博弈论与经济行为标志着博弈论作为一门独立学科的诞生在国际上, 从 1994 到 2012 年, 博弈论学家已先后获得 6 届诺贝尔经济学奖, 对于