2014 5 72 1 2 1. 361005 2. 300071 1998 ~ 2011 A F062. 6 F062. 9 A 1671-9301 2014 05-0092-12 DOI:10.13269/j.cnki.ier.2014.05.010 30 30 GDP 1-2 3 4-5 political connection 2014-03-10 2014-07-02 1990 1970 12YJA790222 2010221056 92
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH Julio Yook 6 7 8 Shleifer 9 Sultz Williamson 10 Dyck Zingales 11 the largest minority shareholder 12 13 Jones and Olken 14 1945 ~ 2000 130 2 Maskin et al 15 Li and Zhou 16 2 17 18 policy uncertainty Julio et al 6 1998 ~ 2005 48 4. 8% Frederico Belo et al 19 6. 9% 7 1999 ~ 2009 Julio Yook 6 7 93
2 20 GDP 21 22-23 H1 24 H2 H3 25 94
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH H4 26 27 H5 1998 ~ 2011 A 2 CSMAR 1 ST 2 3 14 2108 17406 0 ~ 1% 99% ~ 100% winsorize 1999 ~ 2012 Servaes 28 Tobin's Q Richardson 2006 0 0 change 1 0pcexp Tobin's Q size lev cashflow ROA grth 1 1. H1 H2 1 H1 β 2 2 H2 3 β 3 95
1 investment Tobin's Q ROE investment = + + - - / Tobin's Q = + / = + ROE = / change pcexp / / change = 1 change = 0 pcexp = ln / size lev cashflow grth Industrydummy size = ln lev = / cashflow = / grth = - / 12 11 Yeardummy 13 investment i j t = β 0 + β 1 change i t -1 + ε i j t investment i j t = β 0 + β 1 change i t -1 + yeardummy t + ε i j t + γ i control i t -1 + industrydummy j + yeardummy t + β 2 pcexp i t + γ i control i t -1 + industrydummy j 1 2 investment i j t = β 0 + β 1 change i t -1 + β 2 pcexp i t + β 3 pcexp i t * change i t -1 γ i control i t -1 + industrydummy j + yeardummy t + ε i j t 3 j t control i t -1 i Tobin's Q size lev cashflow ROA grth industrydummy j jyardummy t ε i j t 2. H3 5 6 performance β 1 H3 performance i j t = β 0 + β 1 change i t + γ i control i t-1 + industrydummy j + yeardummy t + ε i j t 5 performance i j t = β 0 + β 1 change i t β 2 pcexp i t + γ i control i t -1 + industrydummy j + yeardummy t + ε i j t 2 2 1998 ~ 2011 8. 2% 49% 5. 4% 96 6
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 23. 8% 2 T Wilcoxon rank-sum Investment 0. 0820 0. 0880 0. 0580-0. 0540 0. 490 17604 Tobin s Q 1. 684 1. 056 1. 302-7. 669 6. 435 17604 ROE 0. 0320 0. 0680 0. 0310-0. 248 0. 234 17604 Change 0. 238 0. 426 0 0 1 17604 pcexp 8. 149 0. 796 8. 186 6. 295 10. 13 17604 size 21. 60 1. 190 21. 51 18. 90 24. 95 17604 lev 0. 522 0. 214 0. 523 0 1. 230 17604 Cashflow 0. 0490 0. 0820 0. 0480-0. 205 0. 273 17604 3 T - 3. 7012 H1 grth 0. 232 0. 623 0. 137-1. 046 4. 226 17604 H2 5% 1% Q ROE H3 3 1 change = 1 2 change = 0 T Z 0. 0939205 0. 0882198-3. 7012 *** - 4. 330 *** Panel A 0. 0912588 0. 0845081-3. 1946 *** - 4. 109 *** 0. 0968526 0. 0920258-2. 15 ** - 2. 137 ** Panel B Tobin s Q 1. 581875 1. 656504 4. 7958 *** 2. 704 *** ROE 0. 030345 0. 038724 2. 3481 ** 2. 321 ** * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 1. 4 1 ~ 3 1 0. 0051% 0. 5% H1a 7 2 pcexp 10% - 0. 005 1% 1% 0. 5 3 2 change* pcexp 1% H2 29 22 7 97
4 1 2 3 4 5 change 0. 005 *** 0. 002 * 0. 003 ** 0. 003 *** 0. 002 * 3. 01 1. 59 2. 71 5. 72 1. 61 pcexp - 0. 005 *** - 0. 004 *** - 0. 003 ** - 0. 004-5. 29-5. 28-2. 45-1. 01 1254 change* pcexp 0. 001 *** 0. 001 ** 0. 001 * 4 2. 93 2. 04 1. 62 size 0. 006 *** 0. 008 *** 0. 008 *** 0. 008 *** 0. 002 * 5 10. 74 11. 42 11. 41 23. 41 1. 34 lev - 0. 116 *** - 0. 113 *** - 0. 113 *** - 0. 115 *** - 0. 130-36. 65-33. 48-33. 43-34. 24 0. 91 4 5 4 cashflow 0. 157 *** 0. 155 *** 0. 155 *** 0. 161 *** 0. 125 * 19. 09 17. 76 17. 79 22. 12 1. 78 0. 003 grth 0. 005 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 004 ** 0. 005 * 4. 19 4. 11 3. 99 2. 23 1. 69 _cons - 0. 007 0. 003 0. 002-0. 013-0. 003-0. 53 0. 20 0. 11-0. 22 0. 65 H4 N 17406 17406 17406 17406 17406 investment r2_a 0. 018 0. 044 0. 096 0. 129 0. 042 F 27. 235 47. 295 84. 242 95. 332 41. 414 1 t 2 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 3 Koenker Bassett 30 location model 31 x y E y x OLS F 5 F 2. 69 P 0. 0677 10% 1 2 3 4 5 0. 1 0. 25 0. 5 0. 75 0. 9 change 0. 002 ** 0. 003 ** 0. 005 *** 0. 004 * 0. 001 * 2. 24 2. 21 2. 68 1. 97 1. 34 5 1 ~ 5 0. 1 0. 002 5% 10% 0. 2% 0. 9 pcexp - 0. 005 *** - 0. 005 *** - 0. 006 *** - 0. 008 *** - 0. 007 *** - 12. 40-8. 17-7. 97-6. 83-3. 41 change* pcexp 0. 000 *** 0. 000 ** 0. 000 *** 0. 001 *** 0. 001 ** 3. 34 2. 19 2. 29 2. 77 2. 49 size 0. 008 *** 0. 008 *** 0. 009 *** 0. 006 *** 0. 002 25. 67 19. 27 13. 49 6. 31 1. 01 lev - 0. 039 *** - 0. 060 *** - 0. 095 *** - 0. 136 *** - 0. 204 *** - 23. 76-28. 59-30. 31-27. 62-22. 21 cash 0. 056 *** 0. 086 *** 0. 138 *** 0. 213 *** 0. 238 *** 12. 84 14. 85 16. 84 17. 61 11. 12 grth 0. 004 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 005 *** 0. 004 *** 0. 001 10% 18. 31 19. 94 24. 25 25. 42 22. 11 _cons - 0. 104 *** - 0. 087 *** - 0. 027 ** 0. 110 *** 0. 296 *** - 16. 57-9. 81-2. 08 5. 50 8. 15 1 t 10% 2 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 0. 1% 0. 5 98
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 1% 6 1 2 3 change 0. 003 ** 0. 008 ** 0. 003 ** 2. 33 2. 18 2. 71 pcexp - 0. 004 *** - 0. 010 *** - 0. 004 *** - 3. 12-4. 26-5. 28 change* pcexp 0. 001 *** 0. 001 *** 0. 001 *** 3. 09 2. 58 2. 93 size 0. 007 *** 0. 010 *** 0. 008 *** 8. 34 6. 65 11. 41 lev - 0. 123 *** - 0. 102 *** - 0. 113 *** - 28. 48-12. 76-33. 43 cash 0. 146 *** 0. 177 *** 0. 155 *** 13. 18 8. 70 17. 79 grth 0. 004 *** 0. 006 ** 0. 005 *** 2. 97 2. 20 3. 99 _cons 0. 012-0. 031 0. 002 0. 66-0. 93 0. 11 2 6 0. 8% 1 N 8985 8421 17406 r2_a 0. 121 0. 118 0. 096 F 177. 026 52. 143 84. 242 t 2 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% H5 2. 7 1 2 Q H3 1 change - 0. 065 6. 5% 7 H3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 change - 0. 065 *** - 0. 056 *** - 0. 107 *** - 0. 050 * - 0. 130 *** - 0. 188 *** - 4. 27-3. 54-10. 62-1. 72-6. 41-5. 81 pcexp 0. 301 *** 0. 292 * 0. 284 *** 0. 284 *** 0. 493 *** 38. 50 1. 65 3. 22 27. 04 24. 69 size - 0. 274 *** - 0. 339 *** - 0. 348 *** - 0. 307 *** - 0. 335 *** - 0. 359 *** - 47. 14-53. 81-57. 82-44. 33-42. 99-24. 72 lev - 0. 163 *** - 0. 218 *** - 0. 223 *** - 0. 204 *** - 0. 247 *** - 0. 400 *** - 5. 22-6. 83-6. 79-6. 34-6. 20-5. 46 cashflow 1. 131 *** 1. 311 *** 1. 425 *** 1. 038 *** 1. 079 *** 1. 939 *** 13. 71 15. 75 16. 21 14. 88 10. 46 10. 24 grth 0. 038 *** 0. 027 ** 0. 034 * 0. 042 * 0. 039 *** 0. 016 3. 52 2. 48 1. 66 1. 74 2. 86 0. 61 _cons 7. 541 *** 6. 553 *** 9. 881 *** 6. 833 *** 6. 582 *** 5. 724 *** 61. 82 50. 96 79. 53 67. 87 40. 24 19. 35 3 4 N 17406 17406 17406 17406 8985 8421 r2_a 0. 123 0. 189 0. 204 0. 177 0. 191 0. 257 F 519. 438 641. 827 674. 324 550. 445 407. 593 175. 247 1 t 2 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 99
10. 7% 5. 7 7 5 6 8 0. 1 0. 25 0. 5 0. 75 0. 9 Q change 5 change - 0. 045 *** - 0. 020 *** - 0. 031 *** - 0. 082 *** - 0. 191 *** - 8. 85-3. 61-3. 35-4. 03-5. 62 6 pcexp 0. 031 *** 0. 062 *** 0. 152 *** 0. 327 *** 0. 580 *** 14. 26 23. 96 32. 91 30. 30 29. 83 change size - 0. 069 *** - 0. 101 *** - 0. 196 *** - 0. 340 *** - 0. 506 *** - 41. 06-50. 72-52. 44-35. 06-25. 98-0. 130 change lev - 0. 139 *** - 0. 156 *** - 0. 226 *** - 0. 336 *** - 0. 354 *** - 0. 188-14. 36-14. 39-11. 98-7. 58-4. 29 cashflow 0. 176 *** 0. 284 *** 0. 558 *** 1. 124 *** 1. 938 *** 6. 66 9. 82 11. 32 9. 77 8. 94 grth 0. 016 *** 0. 018 *** 0. 019 *** 0. 032 ** 0. 057 ** H5 3. 82 4. 37 2. 96 2. 26 2. 33 _cons 2. 276 *** 2. 860 *** 4. 461 *** 6. 656 *** 8. 891 *** 67. 71 70. 83 58. 61 35. 15 24. 74 1 t 2 * ** 8 *** 10% 5% 1% 0. 9 0. 191 1998 ~ 2011 35 wind 1893 7 ROE Q ROE pcexp ROE 30 32 3 18 33 1998 ~ 2011 A 100
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INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 2 11 20 335 Does the Governors' Turnover Affect the Behavior and Performance of Corporations Sun Jingxiao 1 Zong Jiafeng 2 1. The School of EconomicsXiamen UniversityXiamen 361005China 2. Nankai UniversityTianjin 300071China Abstract Based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges this paper examines the impact of the governors' turnover on the investment behavior and market performance of the listed companies in the area. Study found that the turnover leads the companies in the area to increase investmentand get decreased market performance which that effect is more obvious when the company is state-owned listed companies. The per capita fiscal expenditure in the region strengthens the effect of governors' turnover on the investment of listed companies in the area. The paper also found that the impact of the governors' turnover is heterogeneouswhich the companies in the Midwest with the lower marketization degree are more easily affected by the governors' turnover. The results indicate the effect of turning over baking cake caused by the governors' turnover may exist in each area on the different level. To enhance the efficiency of enterprise behavior and performance it is necessary to optimise the corporate governance mechanismand the effect also depends largely on the improvement of the government management. Key words governors' turnover investment behavior firms' performance 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 檪 91 Market Reform Synchronization and Dynamics of Firm Productivity Yan Daying Li Lei Nankai UniversityTianjin 300071China Abstract This paper investigates the dynamic influential mechanism of temporal synchronization of China s market reform on the firm productivity. An innovative synchronization index is constructed based on the marketization index. Using Chinese industrial firms as sample an empirical analysis is conducted by introducing an innovative index of marketization synchronization. The results implicate that the market reform synchronization exhibits a three-phase nonlinear relationship with firm productivity i. e. as the level of marketization synchronization exceed the second turning point it will lead to accelerated increase of firm productivity. Extensive investigation further illustrates that the productivities of non-state owned and larger scaled enterprises are more sensitive to the degree of synchronization of their local region. The results indicate further coordinating marketization progress is a key driver for the sustainable increase of firm productivity which provide additional micro-evidence for China s stable-while-progressive economic growth. Key words market reform temporal synchronization firm productivity ownership property firm size 103