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1 D035 A Vol.8 No.2 Apr., [1] - - [2] Mark Granovetter BZZ035 NCET James Coleman

2 Vol.8 No.2 Apr., [6] [10] GDP GDP [7] [7] [11] GDP [8] L [9] L 1 30 [7] L 2 Tournament Theory 1 Lazear Rosen 1 L L GDP

3 1 L L % L 8 100% GDP 87.5% L L L [7]193 86% L Journal of Public Management

5 12-0 0 13-0 0 2006 7 2003 2010 L 8 100% GDP 87.5% L 2.

4 Vol.8 No.2 Apr., A 2 1 XBA L SM B 20 XBA SM XBA C SM SM CTS 4 25 D CTS 2003 CTS CTS % % CTS 39% CTS CTS 32.4% XBA 2005 L CTS XBA XBA 2.3 L XBA SM XBA Back Stage XBA 2010

CTS 4 25 D CTS 2003 CTS 2003 4 25 CTS 3000 105 2009 11 26 1

5 3 1 [13] [7]207 [14]17 25 The Soft Budget Constraint 2 [9] L Ianos Kornai Journal of Public Management

6 Vol.8 No.2 Apr., L L GDP % L KMD KMD L 2 LGB ZRJ L ZQR 90 3 GDP WGA ZRJ WGA WGA 12 KMD 10 ZRJ WGA L KMDLGB ZRJLCZQRWGA KMD 36 L A LC L L L L

10 31 12 12 ZQR 90 3 GDP WGA 32 11 6 6 2009 10 20 8 96 ZRJ WGA WGA 12 KMD 10 ZRJ WGA L

7 [16] [16]644 GDP 2008 L GDP [17] Tendency 50% NY Condition Sources Power NY L [18] L L NY [4] L GDP 1 GDP 3.3 Kreps Milgrom Roberts Wilson 1982 [15] KMRW Journal of Public Management

05 1 2008 4836 [18]131-145 L 5 2009 10 22 L NY [4] 1 3 1 262.

8 Vol.8 No.2 Apr., ZRJ L L [4] Z L L ZRJ LGB L 2009 KMD L ZRJ 2 1 KMD KMRW 19 2L KMD ZRJ 2010 L

9 [20] 3 [21]68 4 Erving Goffman 4.1 [22]151 [23]372 Back Stage Journal of Public Management 29

10 Vol.8 No.2 Apr., Front GDP Stage KMD Human Capital ZRJ Social Capital KMD 34 ZRJ KMD 2009 ZRJ KMD KMD ZRJ KMD ZRJ Robert Michels [25]326 L 4 KMD ZRJ GDP KMD GDP ZRJ % GDP 1999 NJ LT YQ SD DH ZS L L % Proposition The Strength of Position

11 Kenneth J.Arrow [28] 3 L 1 W X L Z L L Arrow Paradox [26] ~2 4 3 L W L Z L L L Unanimity Rule Majority Rule [27] L L Journal of Public Management

Paradox 2010 2 [26]29-33 6 1~2 4 3 L W L Z L

12 Vol.8 No.2 Apr., L 1 4 Mediated Politics J 觟 rgen Hermansson J 觟 rgen Hermansson

13 12. M M M LI BWALDER A G. Career Advancement as Party Patronage Sponsored Mobility into the Chinese Administrative Elite J. The American Journal of Sociology ZHAO WZHOU X. Chinese Organizations in Transition Changing Promotion Patterns in the Reform Era J. Organization Science GRANOVETTER M. The Strength of Weak Ties J. American Journal of Sociology J J J J. 21. M OPPER SBREHM S. Networks versus PerformancePolitical Leadership Promotion in ChinaR. Working paperthe Lund University M. 24LIN N. Social CapitalA Theory of Social Structure and ActionM. New YorkCambridge University Press J. M J LAZEAR E PROSEN S. Rank -Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts J. The Journal of Political Economy EASTERLY W. National Policies and Economic GrowthA Reappraisal R. Working PapersCenter for Global Development M M M MARSDEN PLIN N. Social Resources and Instrumental ActionIn Social Structure and Network AnalysisC. Beverly HillsCASage M M ARROW K J. Social Choice and Individual ValuesM. LondonJohn Wiley & SonsInc.New York Chapman & HallLimited M N Journal of Public Management 33

3 GRANOVETTER M. The Strength of Weak Ties J. American Journal of Sociology1973785 1360-1380. 4 5 J. 20093 95-101.. J. 2003 20. J. 2 46-59. 20092 172-196.. J. 21. M 20002 41-46. 6 OPPER SBREHM S.

14 2Tournament System, Promotion Game and Local Political Theatre CHEN Tan 1 LIU Xingyun School of Marxism, Central South University, Changsha, , China 2.Hunan University of Commerce Changsha china Abstract ID EA AbstractAs Chinese government officials are concerned, political tournament system is a kind of encouragement paradigm with pressure and a political environment without choice. The basic operation mode of political tournament system consists of administrative contract, quantitative assessment, performance rating and merit promotion and so on. However, the field surveys show that the promotion of the grass-roots government officials is often determined by multiple causes in the "front and back" stages, and such background factors as factional relations, political background, social networks can determine whether an official is promoted or not. With the township cadres in a county-level city as observing targets, the purpose of this paper is to examine the explanatory power of political encouragement paradigm (tournament system) in the competitive promotion of local government officials. This paper has also provided a preliminary description of typology for the promotion of the grass-roots officials and it is found that there are three basic types of promotion game, that is, election game, ranking game and power-based game. Especially, this paper has proposed a political theater model of determining factors for the promotion of the grass-roots officials and concludes that, in political tournament system, democratic centralism will increasingly play a very important role in the selection, appointment and promotion of the grass-roots officials in the future. Key WordsTournament System; Promotion Game; Local Political Theatre 3An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Mechanism Composition of Current Governmental Executive Behaviors in PRC A Case Study of Hubei Province CHEN Shixiang 1 WANG Zhihua School of Political Science and Public Administration, Wuhan University, Wuhan, , China 2.School of Public Administration South-Central University for Nationalities Wuhan China Abstract ID EA AbstractThe dynamic mechanism is the driving forces for governmental executive behaviors to originate, operate and develop. The core theoretical premise of current Western mainstream theories in public management field is the so-called Economic Man hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, the only behavioral motive of civil servants is to optimize their own interests while the public interest is not treated as one of the driving forces of any governmental executive behaviors. However, the empirical study in this paper shows that there has been a leading dynamic mechanism among the current executive behaviors of Chinese Central and local governments, which consists of four elements including one value factor-the public-oriented value factor-and three influential factors-the public interests factor, the external dynamics factor and the internal dynamics factor. However, this functional system doesn't repel all kinds of individualistic-oriented interests. What is more, the leading dynamic mechanism is still on the way of institutionalization and regularization. Key WordsGovernmental Capacities; Executive Behavior; Dynamic Mechanism; Functional System ABSTRACTS IN ENGLISH Journal of Public Management 125 4Housing Satisfaction of Urban Residents and its Influential Factors HE LihuaYANG Chongqi 43 School of Management, Wuhan Institute of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, , China Abstract ID EA AbstractResidents' satisfaction with their housing is always important for social harmony. Differing from general goods, residents' housing satisfaction depends not only on the quality and price of the housing, but also on some external environment factors such as residential environment, property management and housing-related facilities. Based on the "adequacy-importance" model, this paper investigates the main factors that affect housing satisfaction of urban residents from a much more comprehensive view. Results of regressions show that such factors as area of housing, housing quality, residential environment, and property management have significant impact on residents' housing satisfaction. However, those factors have less impact than the number of residents' family members and their subjective feelings about economic burden which also have less effect than housing-related public facilities. In addition, the study finds out that some sub-category factors of housing-related facilities including basic education facilities, health facilities and life service facilities have a significant effect on residents' housing satisfaction. Key WordsHousing; Customer Satisfaction; Influential Factors; Public Facilities

paradigm with pressure and a political environment without choice.

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