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: ( w), (5) T = s k + c + w (6), w (4) s m,, (4), s m - w,,,,,,,,,, r,?,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,, ;,, ;,,,,, ;,,,,,,,, ;,,,,, ;, Shleifer Vishny(1986),Holderness Sheehan(1988),, ;,,,, : Kaplan Minton (1994), ; Gorton Schmid(1996),Shleifer Vishny(1997), 51 %,, : Hart (1995), 100 %, :,, ;, ;,,,,,,,, 94
2007 2,,,,,,,,,, : (1) ; (2) ; (3) ; (4) ; (5) ; (6),2004 :, 8,2005 :, 2,2002 :, 4,2000 :,,2003 :, : ( ),,1996 :, 9 Barclay, M., and Holderness, C., 1989, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 25, 371 395. Barclay, M., and Holderness, C., 1992, The Law and Large2block Trades, Journal of Law and Economics, 35, 265 294. Bae, K., J. Kang, and Kim, J., 2002, Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups, Journal of Finance, 57, 2695 2740. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and Lang, L., 2002, Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings, Journal of Finance, 57, 2741 2771. DeAngelo, H., and DeAngelo, L., 1985, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights : A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, Journal of Financial Economics,14, 33 69. Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K., 1985, The Structure of Corporate Ownership : Causes and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155 1177. Dyck, A., and Zingales, L., 2004, Private Benefits of Control : An International Comparison, Journal of Finance, 59, 537 600. Fama, E., and Jensen, M., 1983, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 327 349. Fan, J., and Wong, T., 2002, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 401 425. 202. Friedman, E., Johnson, S., and Mitton, T., 2003, Propping and Tunneling, Journal of Comparative Economic, 31, 732 750. Grossman, S., and Hart D., 1988, One Share2one Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics, 20,175 Hart, O., 1995, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press, London. Jensen, M., and Meckling, W., 1976, Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 10, 305 360. 22 27. Johnson, S., R.La Porta, F.Lopez2de2Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000, Tunneling, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 90, La Porta, R., F.Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and Vishny, R., 1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance, 52, 1131 1150. 1155. La Porta, R., F.Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and Vishny, R., 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113 La Porta, R., F.Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and Vishny, R., 1999, Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of Finance, 95
: 54, 471 518. La Porta, R., F. Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and Vishny, R., 2000a, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 471 518. La Porta, R., F. Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and Vishny, R., 2000b, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World, Journal of Finance, 55,1 33. La Porta, R., F.Lopez2de2Silanes, A. Shleifer, and Vishny, R., 2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance, 57,1147 1170. Shleifer, Ahdrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461 488. Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52, 737 783. Zingales, L., 1994, The Value of the Voting Rights : A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, Review of Financial Studies, 7, 125 148. The Paradox of Private Benefits of Control and Excessive Benefits of Control : A New Theoretical Explanation of Large Shareholdersπ Expropriation of Small Ones Liu Shaobo ( Institute of Finance, Jinan University) Abstract :The concept of private benefits of control in present literature is defined as the expropriation of the small shareholders by the large shareholders. This inappropriate definition distorts the nature of the large shareholdersπexpropriation and leaves us several unsolvable theoretical and practical problems. This paper first of all makes amendments to the theory of private benefits of control and large shareholdersπexpropriation, points out and proves that the private benefits of control actually are the compensation for the cost of control, and are the risk premium of control. The benefits are realized as the value increments by controlling the company and influencing the corporate governance of the company and finally improving the performance of the whole company. This has nothing to do with large shareholdersπ expropriation. And the paper further puts forward a new concept, i. e. excessive benefits of control, defines its connotation and extension, analyzes the interest structure of large shareholders. The paper points out the essence of large shareholdersπ expropriation is to snatch the excessive benefits of control. The paper also compares the concepts of private benefits of control and the excessive benefits of control and analyzes the differences between the two. Based on these the paper sets up a new analytical framework and puts forward a new theoretical explanation to large shareholdersπ expropriation of small shareholders. Key Words : Private Benefits of Control ; Excessive Benefits of Control ; Expropriation of Large Shareholders ; Corporate Governance JEL Classification : G300, G320, G340 ( : ) ( : ) 96