210023 20042013 A F275. 4 A 1672-6049 2015 03-0078-11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 80% 1 1 2 3 2015-04-22 2014 YJS14065 1990 1978 78
18 Dennis Sibilkov 1982 EOPP 19 19982000 174 3 Lenoard Holzer > 10% 9 10 Fernie Metcalf 1 20 11 12 Liu Mauer 13 21 22 14 Change 20012007 15 2001 2009 16 1980 1985 17 Mahrt-Smith 1 79
1992 25 1996 2007 33% H1a 2008 H1b 26 2009 A 19% 27 28 1 /5 Homstrom Milgrom 23 Jensen 3 Harford 29 20 70 80 Shapiro Stiglitz 24 80
ST PT 3. 17 4. 10 7233 13286 1% Winsorized STATA12. 0 Lnwage i t = α + β 1 Roa i t + β 2 Cashhold i t + β 3 UP + β 4 Size i t + β 5 Lev i t + β 6 Growth i t + β 7 Top1 i t + β 8 Soe i t + β 9 Labornum i t + β 10 Capex i t + β 11 Pegdp i t + β 12 Layoff i t + β 13 CPI i t + β 14 Labor + 30 β 15 Y08 + β 16 Industry + ε Lnwage i t = α + β 1 Roa i t + β 2 Cashhold i t + β 3 Roa i t * Cashhold i t + β 4 Size i t + β 5 Lev i t + β 6 Growth i t + β 7 Top1 i t + β 8 Soe i t + β 9 Labornum i t + β 10 Capex i t + β 11 Pegdp i t + β 12 Layoff i t + β 13 CPI i t + β 14 Labor + β 15 Y08 + β 16 Industry + ε 31 H2a H2b Opler 15 17 31 / CSMAR / 2004 2013 10 A 1. 2. GDP 81
2008 Soe = 1 2008 Soe = 0 Y08 1 Pewage Lnwage Roa Cashhold Size Lev Growth Top1 Soe Labornum Capex / / + + / / 1 0 / GDP Pegdp GDP Layoff CPI Labor 2008 Y08 UP 2007 1 0 UP = 1 UP = 0 Industry CSRC 2 Soe = 0 Soe = 1 6385 6900 10. 98 11. 14-11. 19 *** 10. 96 11. 11-12. 18 *** 2 Labor = 1 Labor = 0 3 Labor = 0 Labor = 1 6646 6639 11. 44 10. 69 60. 00 *** 11. 35 10. 75 56. 47 *** 1% 82
Roa 4 Pewage 13285 91334. 60 10108. 82 39903. 70 61890. 26 96331. 77 958859 121017 Lnwage 13285 11. 06 9. 22 10. 59 11. 03 11. 48 13. 77 0. 77 Roa 13285 0. 03-0. 26-0. 01 0. 03 0. 06 0. 21 0. 06 Cashhold 13285 0. 17 0. 01 0. 08 0. 1 0. 23 0. 62 0. 13 Size 13285 21. 73 19. 04 20. 87 21. 60 22. 42 25. 50 1. 24 Lev 13285 0. 50 0. 06 0. 34 0. 50 0. 65 1. 51 0. 24 Growth 13285 0. 17-0. 36 0. 01 0. 10 0. 22 2. 35 0. 34 Top1 13285 36. 68 9. 11 24. 14 34. 65 48. 27 75. 10 15. 46 Soe 13285 0. 52 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 1. 00 1. 00 0. 50 Labornum 13285 7. 50 3. 53 6. 71 7. 54 8. 36 10. 84 1. 37 Capex 13285 0. 06 0. 00 0. 02 0. 04 0. 08 0. 26 0. 05 Pegdp 13285 10. 47 8. 37 10. 07 10. 53 10. 97 11. 53 0. 61 Layoff 13285 3. 39 1. 21 3. 03 3. 49 3. 98 6. 50 0. 79 CPI 13285 103. 02 97. 70 102. 20 102. 80 104. 80 110. 10 1. 96 Labor 13285 0. 50 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 1. 00 0. 50 Y08 13285 0. 74 0. 00 0. 00 1. 00 1. 00 1. 00 0. 44 5 Lnwage 2004 425 10. 50 9. 22 9. 88 10. 38 10. 92 13. 77 0. 88 2005 820 10. 62 9. 22 10. 00 10. 50 11. 12 13. 77 0. 89 2006 1089 10. 69 9. 22 10. 12 10. 59 11. 16 13. 77 0. 85 2007 1157 10. 85 9. 22 10. 29 10. 74 11. 28 13. 77 0. 84 2008 1245 11. 00 9. 22 10. 47 10. 89 11. 38 13. 77 0. 81 2009 1392 11. 02 9. 22 10. 49 10. 91 11. 43 13. 77 0. 81 2010 1437 11. 14 9. 22 10. 63 11. 05 11. 52 13. 77 0. 75 2011 1603 11. 25 9. 32 10. 81 11. 16 11. 57 13. 77 0. 67 2012 1947 11. 25 9. 41 10. 88 11. 20 11. 56 13. 77 0. 56 2013 2170 11. 34 9. 22 10. 99 11. 27 11. 62 13. 77 0. 52 Cashlevel = 1 Cashlevel = 0 6 Lnwage Cashlevel = 0 Cashlevel = 1 6752 6533 11. 00 11. 12-8. 92 *** 10. 99 11. 08-8. 46 *** Roa Cashlevel = 0 Cashlevel = 1 6752 6533 0. 02 0. 05-22. 88 *** 0. 03 0. 04-22. 80 *** 1% 83
7 7 Lnwage Roa Cashhold Size Growth Lev Capex Labornum Labor Y08 Lnwage 1 0. 157 *** 0. 147 *** 0. 300 *** 0. 081 *** * - 0. 021 ** - 0. 070 *** - 0. 243 *** - 0. 490 *** 0. 302 *** Roa 0. 155 *** 1 0. 297 *** 0. 109 *** 0. 345 *** - 0. 393 *** 0. 202 *** 0. 083 *** - 0. 091 *** 0. 058 *** Cashhold 0. 142 *** 0. 274 *** 1-0. 073 *** 0. 176 *** - 0. 353 *** 0. 004-0. 057 *** - 0. 028 *** 0. 130 *** Size 0. 297 *** 0. 143 *** - 0. 111 *** 1 0. 306 *** 0. 303 *** 0. 138 *** 0. 606 *** - 0. 346 *** 0. 154 *** Growth 0. 051 *** 0. 243 *** 0. 086 *** 0. 213 *** 1 0. 057 *** 0. 274 *** 0. 153 *** - 0. 112 *** 0. 054 *** Lev - 0. 038 *** - 0. 400 *** - 0. 378 *** 0. 189 *** 0. 013 1-0. 155 *** 0. 162 *** - 0. 196 *** - 0. 072 *** Capex - 0. 052 *** 0. 153 *** - 0. 060 *** 0. 122 *** 0. 176 *** - 0. 123 *** 1 0. 289 *** 0. 103 *** 0. 031 *** Labornum - 0. 298 *** 0. 095 *** - 0. 084 *** 0. 628 *** * 0. 078 *** 0. 091 *** 0. 207 *** 1 0. 143 *** 0. 049 *** Labor - 0. 476 *** - 0. 110 *** - 0. 007-0. 350 *** - 0. 084 *** - 0. 141 *** 0. 078 *** 0. 138 *** 1 0. 000 Y08 0. 277 *** 0. 073 *** 0. 129 *** 0. 160 *** 0. 032 *** - 0. 079 *** 0. 009 0. 057 *** 0. 000 1 Pearson Spearman 5% 8 1% H1a 0. 193 < 2 0. 383 1. 81 Top1 0. 233 + 0. 189 /0. 233 CEO H1b Soe Labor 5% 8 0. 956 > 0. 383 84
UP* Roa 0. 189 *** 11. 58 8 1 2 3 4 5 Roa 0. 382 *** 0. 233 *** 0. 383 *** 0. 956 *** 0. 193 ** 7. 04 3. 91 7. 07 8. 83 2. 33 UP - 0. 00525-0. 93 Cashholdadj1 0. 0876 *** 0. 0628 ** 0. 0597 0. 0508 0. 106 ** 2. 72 1. 96 1. 62 0. 76 2. 18 Roa* Cashholdadj 0. 544 1. 609 ** - 1. 157 ** 1. 54 2. 51-2. 31 Size 0. 448 *** 0. 452 *** 0. 449 *** 0. 460 *** 0. 426 *** 66. 03 66. 56 66. 05 47. 02 47. 37 Lev - 0. 00729-0. 0265-0. 00881-0. 0434-0. 0167-0. 35-1. 25-0. 42-1. 40-0. 56 Growth - 0. 119 *** - 0. 116 *** - 0. 119 *** - 0. 119 *** - 0. 128 *** - 14. 08-13. 74-14. 03-9. 09-9. 93 Top1 0. 001 *** 0. 001 *** 0. 001 *** 0. 001 * 0. 001 ** 2. 70 2. 76 2. 72 1. 83 2. 20 Soe 0. 094 *** 0. 093 *** 0. 094 *** 0. 121 *** 0. 112 *** 9. 70 9. 70 9. 73 8. 56 8. 67 Capex 0. 088 0. 090 0. 091 0. 224 ** 0. 094 1. 41 1. 44 1. 46 2. 19 1. 06 Labornum - 0. 531 *** - 0. 530 *** - 0. 531 *** - 0. 512 *** - 0. 486 *** - 98. 09-98. 13-98. 11-65. 54-65. 94 Pegdp 0. 395 *** 0. 394 *** 0. 395 *** 0. 339 *** 0. 355 *** 32. 84 32. 89 32. 86 20. 52 23. 22 Layoff 0. 008 0. 009 0. 008 0. 010 0. 012 0. 96 1. 06 0. 97 0. 93 1. 16 CPI 0. 008 *** 0. 008 *** 0. 008 *** 0. 007 *** 0. 008 *** 6. 05 6. 26 6. 06 3. 25 4. 00 Labor - 0. 137 *** - 0. 136 *** - 0. 137 *** - 0. 126 *** - 0. 165 *** - 14. 85-14. 84-14. 84-9. 07-12. 55 Y08 0. 107 *** 0. 105 *** 0. 106 *** 0. 128 *** 0. 146 *** 12. 04 11. 87 12. 01 10. 03 11. 24 cons 0. 140 0. 047 0. 130 0. 377 0. 677 ** 0. 67 0. 22 0. 62 1. 23 2. 29 Industry N 13285 13285 13285 6428 6857 R - squared 0. 6009 0. 6022 0. 6010 0. 6224 0. 6165 Lnwage *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 1Cashholdadj 2012 85
9 1 2 3 4 5 droa 0. 225 *** 0. 156 *** 0. 227 *** 0. 160 * 0. 00153 UP UP* droa 4. 68 2. 73 4. 71 1. 77 0. 02-0. 013 ** - 2. 18 0. 020 *** 2. 63 dcashholdadj 0. 120 *** 0. 160 *** 0. 122 *** 0. 021-0. 015 2. 76 4. 12 2. 78 0. 28-0. 21 droa* dcashholdadj - 0. 306 1. 782 ** - 4. 183 *** - 0. 59 2. 14-4. 19 Size 0. 019 *** 0. 021 *** 0. 019 *** 0. 022 *** 0. 020 *** 4. 06 4. 26 4. 05 3. 09 3. 06 Lev - 0. 019-0. 016-0. 018-0. 020-0. 030-1. 25-1. 03-1. 22-0. 85-1. 42 Growth 0. 027 *** 0. 028 *** 0. 027 *** 0. 060 *** - 0. 002 2. 93 3. 04 2. 92 4. 58-0. 15 Top1 0. 0001 0. 0001 0. 0001-0. 0005 0. 0005 * 0. 44 0. 44 0. 45-1. 46 1. 71 Soe - 0. 007-0. 008-0. 007 0. 002-0. 015-1. 05-1. 15-1. 05 0. 22-1. 63 Capex 0. 049 0. 069 0. 049 0. 145 0. 021 0. 73 1. 03 0. 73 1. 35 0. 25 Labornum - 0. 030 *** - 0. 032 *** - 0. 030 *** - 0. 029 *** - 0. 031 *** - 7. 52-7. 77-7. 53-4. 93-5. 58 Pegdp - 0. 021 *** - 0. 021 *** - 0. 021 *** - 0. 026 ** - 0. 017-2. 89-2. 88-2. 89-2. 43-1. 70 Layoff 0. 002 0. 002 0. 001-0. 003 0. 006 0. 32 0. 32 0. 31-0. 37 0. 90 CPI 0. 017 *** 0. 017 *** 0. 017 *** 0. 016 *** 0. 017 *** 10. 90 10. 83 10. 90 6. 83 8. 06 Labor - 0. 017 ** - 0. 016 * - 0. 017 ** - 0. 009-0. 023 ** - 2. 05-1. 95-2. 03-0. 78-2. 07 Y08-0. 023 ** - 0. 021 ** - 0. 023 ** - 0. 030 ** - 0. 013-2. 55-2. 38-2. 54-2. 40-0. 96 cons - 1. 634 *** - 1. 674 *** - 1. 633 *** - 1. 514 *** - 1. 718 *** - 8. 15-8. 31-8. 15-5. 12-6. 23 Industry N 10757 10757 10757 5206 5551 R - squared 0. 0307 0. 0331 0. 0307 0. 0409 0. 0341 dlnwage *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 20042013 A 86
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share Enterprises J. China Journal of Accounting Research 2009 2 2 109-140. 26 Bates T W Kahle K M Stulz R M. Why do US Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used to J. The Journal of Finance 2009 64 5 1985-2021. 27. Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2003 38 2 275-294. J. 2012 3 141-150. 29 Harford J. Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions 28. J. 2013 4 73-80. 2012 2 183-195. J. The Journal of Finance 1999 54 6 1969-1997. 30 Mikkelson W H Partch M M. Do Persistent Large Cash Reserves Hinder Performance J. Journal of 31. J. Cash Levels and the Sensitivity of Employee Compensation-performance Liu Wei Shen YongJian Nanjing University of Finances and Economics Nanjing 210023 China Abstract Starting from the characteristics of cash flow of employee compensation we use the 20042013 data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies to examine that whether employee compensation has the sensitivity of compensationperformance and how cash levels influence it. In control of the connected variables we find employee compensation is sticky and has the sensitivity of compensation-performance. When the performance rises the increased compensation is more expansionary than the declines. When the performance increases cash levels improve the sensitivity of employee compensation-performance when the performance declines cash levels have the opposite effect. Theoretically this paper further enriches the literature of employee compensation and deepens the understanding of motivation of cash holdings in the corporate. Key words Cash holdings Employee compensation Firm performance 88