- 1978 2012-2012 1 100028 hedexu@ vip. sina. com 710075 chinadragon_miao@ 163. com 15AJY017 14BJY192 2015T80173 42 1
2016 2 2005 Qian & Roland 1998 2001 1993 1995 2002 1994 1997 1997 1998 2005 2002 2006 2011 1 1 2013 6 206988. 65 29256. 49 66504. 56 30. 27497 108859. 17 2013 32 http / /www. audit. gov. cn 43
2003 1998 2013 1. U cg = ψ 1 y t - y - ψ 2 π t - π 2 y t y π t π ψ 1 ψ 2 0 < ψ 1 < 1 - ψ 2 π t - π 2 0 γ y = ln gc t - 珔 g gc t 珔 g 2003 π t = Δm t 1 U cg = ψ 1 ln gc t - 珔 g - y - ψ 2 Δm t - π 2 1 Gct i t - 1 Bc t - 1 Lce t - Lce t - 1 Tct M t - M t - 1 Bc t - Bc t - 1 Gc t + Lce t - Lce t - 1 + i t - 1 Bc t - 1 = Tc t + M t - M t - 1 + Bc t - Bc t - 1 + Pce t GDPP t Y t 44 ψ 2
2016 2 m gc t + Δlce t + 珋 t -1 i t -1 bc t -1 = τc t + Δbc t + m t - 1 + π t + pce t Δlce t = lce t - lce t - 1 Δbc t = bc t - bc t - 1 2 2 π t = Δm t gc t = τc t + Δbc t + 1 + m t Δm t + pce 1 + Δm t - Δlce t - 珋 i t - 1 t bc t - 1 y = ln gc t - 珔 g 1 U cg = ψ 1 ln τc t + Δbct + 1 + mt Δm t 1 + Δm t + pce t - Δlce t - 珋 i t -1 bc t -1 - 珔 g - y - ψ 2 Δm t - π 2 3 Δm t U cg = ψ 1 1 + m t Δm t gc t 1 + Δm t - 2ψ 2 Δm t - π = 0 Δm t = - z - π z + 1 + mt + z + z - π z + 1 + m t 槡 2 2 1 + m t + z 3 + z 2-4 1 + m t + z ψ 1 1 + m t 2ψ z = τc t + Δbc t + pce t - Δlce t - 珋 i t - 1 bc t - 1 Δm t 2. U lg = y l t - y l y lt y l y l = ln gl t - 珔 gl t gl t 珔 gl t U lg = y lt - y l U lg = ln gl t - 珔 gl t - y l Glt i t - 1 Bl t - 1 Δllet Tlt Bls t - Bls t - 1 4 45
gl t + 珋 i t -1 bl t -1 = τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δllet 5 Δllet = lle t - lle t - 1 lle t ple t 5 5 gl t = τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δlle t - 珋 i t - 1 bl t - 1 4 U lg = ln τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δlle t - 珋 i t -1 bl t -1 - 珔 gl t - y l Δlle t du lg 1 = dδlle t τl t + Δbl t + ple t + Δlle t - 珋 i t - 1 bl t - 1 - 珔 gl t > 0 6 3. - - - - - 46 1.
2016 2 Oates 1999 20 80 Montinola et al. 1995 Blanchard & Shleifer 2001 Jin et al. 2005 Maskin et al. 2000 2007 1 2. 2012-2005 2 3. 47
2007 1949-20 70 1971 1971 1977 20 80-20 80 1986 1997 1998 9 3 1. / x f_i = 1-48
2016 2 y b_c = 2. y b_d = 7 y b_c = c + αx f_i + βy b_d + ε 7 Anselin 1995 SAM Anselin 1995 geographical weighted regression GWR Moran's I Geary's C Getis Moran's I Geary's C Moran's I Geary's C Moran's I SAM GWR 3. GIS X Y euclidean distance GeoDa 1. 4. 0 threshold distance 1. 6 49
1978 1988 1993 1998 2003 2012 x f_i y b_c y b_d 6 6 2. 2 1 1 1 Moran's I 0. 2 0. 3 0. 1 0. 3 1992 2008 2009 2012 2008 3. 1978 2012 Moran 2 Moran Moran 50
2016 2 1978 Moran - 1 2-1 1. 3 Moran - 1 1. 5-1 1. 3 2012 Moran - 1 1. 7-1 1. 3 Moran - 1 1. 5-1 1. 3 2 4. 1978 2012 Moran 31 30 Jeffrey et al. 1996 20 6 1 R 2 1978 1988 0. 7 1998 0. 95 1978 0. 5 0. 8 1% 1988 1993 0. 3 0. 6 1% 1998 2003 0. 5 1 5% 2012-0. 2 0. 35 2008 Moran's I 51
1 1978 1988 1993 1998 2003 SEM GWR /LAMBDA - 0. 1936-1. 8456 1. 6501 5. 2328 1. 4738 4. 5611 2. 1064 4. 5797 0. 7757 4. 2127 0. 6062 3. 1649 0. 5848 3. 3397-0. 1349-0. 9636 0. 0043 0. 0298 0. 0071 0. 0543 R 2 0. 7091 0. 6748 0. 7001-48. 7948-52. 5597-51. 3438 3. 3416 111. 1190 110. 6880 3. 4804 115. 5170 116. 5510 /LAMBDA - 0. 1514-1. 901 0. 1937 0. 9245 0. 3665 1. 659 0. 8827 2. 5587 0. 3489 2. 5279 0. 4437 2. 9271 0. 4290 3. 1034 0. 6770 6. 3880 0. 5529 4. 5544 0. 5299 4. 7935 R 2 0. 7091 0. 8733 0. 8847-48. 7948-35. 0557-33. 5898 3. 3416 76. 1113 75. 1797 3. 4804 80. 5086 81. 0426 /LAMBDA - 0. 0815-1. 0360 0. 4332 2. 0612 0. 3722 1. 799 0. 6451 1. 9242 0. 2193 1. 4918 0. 2985 2. 3052 0. 3019 2. 4841 0. 6578 5. 0579 0. 6141 5. 2937 0. 5921 5. 3988 R 2 0. 8767 0. 8774 0. 8812-29. 7857-32. 1517 0. 4234 2. 1152 70. 3034 74. 2123 2. 2540 74. 7006 80. 0717 /LAMBDA - 0. 0476-0. 8913 0. 3478 2. 4497 0. 2794 1. 764 0. 4494 1. 8197 1. 0030 4. 0966 0. 8403 4. 7483 0. 8281 4. 9616 0. 3042 2. 6406 0. 4035 5. 0851 0. 3996 5. 3304 R 2 0. 9563 0. 9486 0. 9497-19. 3986-23. 8893-23. 5312 1. 4451 53. 7787 55. 0624 1. 5838 58. 1759 60. 9254 /LAMBDA - 0. 0274-0. 4987 0. 2687 3. 0106 0. 1520 0. 9137 0. 2563 0. 9826 0. 6038 3. 1573 0. 5254 1. 714 0. 5281 1. 8150 0. 6256 7. 0828 0. 6749 4. 7336 0. 6677 4. 8957 R 2 0. 9852 0. 9505 0. 9508-8. 5156-29. 2106-29. 0895 0. 7429 64. 4211 66. 1791 0. 8817 68. 8183 72. 0420 52
2016 2 1 SEM GWR 2012 /LAMBDA 0. 0125 0. 1672 0. 1155 0. 4769 0. 0939 0. 3350 0. 0382 0. 0904-0. 3606-2. 1755-0. 2094-1. 1719-0. 1986-1. 1012 1. 1303 20. 4386 1. 0560 17. 2953 1. 0531 17. 4785 R 2 0. 9636 0. 9442 0. 9442-35. 5007-43. 0556-43. 0418 2. 4839 92. 1111 94. 0836 2. 6227 96. 5083 99. 9465 t SEM GWR Z 1% 5% 10% 5. 7 2 2 t 1% D - W P 2 y b_c y b_c y b_c y b_c 1. 2688 17. 93 x f_i 1. 0179 y b_c - 1 x f_i - 1 39. 05-0. 0008-0. 05 1. 0021 142. 09 0. 0382 1. 29-0. 0386-1. 3969 2. 7345 43. 11 0. 3039 10. 92 3. 5816 0. 4509 2. 5714 3. 5916 0. 4714 2. 7161 2. 5999 15. 54 0. 3694 13. 72 D - W 2. 1025 1. 9851 2. 1388 2. 1303 P F - statistic 0. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000 0. 0000 1% 5% 2007 2012 53
2013-2011 GDP 2005 5 Arye L. Hillman 2002 1 2011 http / /www. doc88. com /p - 618723165738. html 2012-6 54 2003 2011 http / /www. chinabond. com. cn /Info /10827554 2007
2016 2 2001 2003 2013 2 2005 8 2013 2011 12 2012 5 1998 2006 6 2005 1987 2001 11 2007 7 Anselin L. and R. Florax 1995 Small Sample Properties of Tests for Spatial Dependence in Regression Models Some Further Results New Directions in Spatial Econometrics. Spinger Verlag New York 21 74. Blanchard O. and A. Shleifer 2001 Federalism with and without Political Centralization China vs. Russia IMF Staff Papers 48 171 179. Jeffrey S. A. Tornell and A. Velasco 1996 The Mexican Peso crises Sudden death or death foretold Journal of International Economics Vol. 41 265 283. Jin Hehui. Yingyi Qian and B. Weingast 2005 Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives Federalism Chinese Style Journal of Public Economics Vol. 89 1719 1742. Maskin Eric. Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu 2000 Incentives Scale Economies and Organization Forms Review of Economic Studies Vol. 67 359 378. Montinola G. Yingyi Qian and B. Weingast 1995 Federalism Chinese Style The Political Basis for Economic Success in China World Politics Vol. 48 50 81. Oates 1999 An Essay on Fiscal Federalism Journal of Economic Literature Vol. 37 1120 1149. Qian Y. and G. Roland 1998 Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint American Economic Review Vol. 77 65 284. Does the Fiscal Decentralization Impact the Financial Decentralization He Dexu a and Miao Wenlong b a Institute of Finance and Banking Chinese Academy of Social Sciences b Xi'An Branch of PBC Abstract According to the internal logic of fiscal decentralization and financial decentralization assuming the internal consistency between their spatial effects and validating by using the economic data of Chinese 1978 2012 years the result shows that during the process of fiscal decentralization the financial invisibly has a certain amount of decentralization and is similar to fiscal decentralization on spatial effect. The financial decentralization has double feature with external centralization and internal decentralization which is significantly different from the dominant financial centralization. Under conditions of limited lateral accountability mechanisms and imperfect vertical accountability mechanisms local government must expand their economic interests with the core of fiscal income and the radius of power influence form the budget income bank loans bank table foreign assets and other financial resources and transfer the risks burden to the country which continuous brewing and accumulation of financial risks. The method of financial completely decentralized cannot effectively solve this problem the key lies in two things first how to enable local governments to match the risk and return the second is to finance a modest decentralization. Key Words Fiscal Decentralization Financial Decentralization Spatial Effects JEL Classification E61 G28 H11 55