Peking University Law Journal Vol. 24 No. 4 2012 pp. 782-799 20 * 20 1 1908 2 1949 1978 * 1 5 1977 275 2 10 2009 1 782 09CFX002 83
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1978 GDP 20 90 1993 3 2003 219 4 90% 5 1996 325 6 See Jin Hehui Qian Yingyi B. R. Weingast Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentives Federalism Chinese Style Journal of Public Economics 89 9-10 2005 p. 1719. 9 A. 7 2010 356 8 2004 2 52 1993 85 783
2012 4 10 11 3 1978 12 13 14 15 16 17 10 2009 258 11 6 3 12 22 1 p. 172. 13 17 784 1994 See Lixing Li The Incentive Role of Creating Cities in China China Economic Review Mar. 2011 2009 11 29 14 1998 189 15 2003 80 16 2011 1992 26. 21 19. 13% GDP 2 2010 http / /www. stats. gov. cn /tjsj /ndsj /2010 /indexch. htm 83 2011 2
20 80 1986 18 19 20 20 90 21 30 22 1993 18 11 19 17 1986 12 1991 1 20 Geoffrey Brenan & James M. Buchanan The Power to Tax Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution New York Cambridge University Press 1980 p. 175. 21 1992 22 Rajiv Lall & Bert Hofman Decentralization and the Government Deficit in China Macroeconomic Management and Fiscal Decentralization Jayanta Roy ed. Economic Development Institute of the World Bank 2005 p. 195. 785
2012 4 23 24 75 25 1 0. 3 9 1993 9-12 60% 80% 90% 120% 29% 1992 10. 2% 1994 19. 2% 25 1994 8 1 0. 3 26 27 23 24 1993 2007 6 8 25 1993 18 26 1994 47 27 Olivier Blanchard & Andrel Shleifer Federalism with and without Political Centralization China versus Russia Transition Economies How Much Progress IMF 2001 Vol. 48 p. 171. 786
28 20 29 6 30 1950 31 32 28 29 30 31 252 32 2011 5 47 2011 23 2008 2004 167 787
2012 4 33 34 2006 1 35 36 1988 1994 37 1991 1993 1993 8 2008 1 38 4 20 50 1984 1985 33 2004 47 34 1994 7 35 36 37 459 2000 31. 77 2005 16 1989 800 21 38 516 788
39 40 41 42 43 39 40 41 36 2008 12 42 43 2009 1984 1985 2010 2011 2010 29109. 94 213. 2% 1 /3 2007 330 2010 6 85 789
2012 4 44 45 2002 46 47 64 3 48 49 44 1996 24 45 2006 174 46 2002 26 47 26 2006 34 48 2010 169 2010 64 49 5 2003 179 790
50 1990 67. 42% 2011 84. 84% 1993 77. 98% 44. 3% 45% - 51% 2001 60% 20 100% 100% 2007 50 50% 70% 791
2012 4 race to the bottom 51 52 53 54 55 1994 1 1 56 2010 1 1 20% 51 2011 5-9 52 53 54 55 56 57 E 2012 19-20 2007 31. 3% 1993 29% 2008 9. 7% 2010 2 68 2009 7 4 1994 40 1998 61 792
60% 40% 57 80% 32% 10% 58 5% 59 60 61 2012 57 2009 167 2010 70 58 2010 2010 59 2010 60 61 2011 2006 264 793
2012 4 100% 90M 2 70M 2 70M 2 50 /M 2 150 /M 2 62 4 63 2002 60% 40% 64 1980 800 400 65 20 800 1600 1400 1200 2005 10 1600 66 62 2012 63 D W G 2010 368 64 2001 37 65 1993 66 2004 40 794
6 67 2 1990 11 1991 10 3 1991 10 3 1992 3 68 50% 30% 70% 2007 5 30 1% 3% 2005 7. 05% 10. 17 100% 2008 1997 1 1 80% 20% 69 1997 5 10 67 68 69 1990 1992 137 1996 49 795
2012 4 88% 12% 70 2000 10 1 97% 3% 3% 71 1997-1999 2001 2005 2007 2008 72 73 2010 1 4 74 75 2010 6 1 5% 76 70 Victor Thuronyi Tax Law Design and Drafting Vol. 1 International Monetary Fund U. S. Washing- 71 72 ton D. C. 1996 p. 55. 796 1997 5 9 97 2 2000 9 29 73 47 53 74 2010 88 75 2011 14 76 2010 54
2010 12 1 11 2011 11 1 2011 1 27 77 2011 1 28 78 79 80 2008 2012 1 1 77 2011 1 27 78 99% 1 2012 2 3 6 79 2011-2015 80 2012 2012 5 797
2012 4 81 2011 7 4 < > 82 83 84 85 86 81 2011 110 82 2011 82 83 1999 391 84 2004 1036 85 2009120 86 2007 223 798
87 20 2003 88 2011 89 90 20 87 88 89 90 2000 442 2003 79 2005 77 799