2 4 2011 8 Philosophical Analysis Vol.2 No.4 Aug. 2011 : : ( ) ; : ; ; ; ; :B81 :A :2095-0047(2011)04-0014-15 : : 1 : : 1 M. Dummett FREGE: Philosophy of Language Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 1981 p. 413. 14
: 1 : ( ) ( ) (purporting to) ( ) : ; ( ) ( ) 1 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 1994 p. 68. 15
2011 4 ; : ;? 16
: ( ) ; 1 (H. P. Grice) ( ) 1 : ; (predicating) (referring) (stating) : ( ) : : : (singular term) (general term) ( ) ( R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment pp. 84-85) 17
2011 4 (I-We) (Jonathan Bennett) (convention) : ( ) (modest) : 1 : ;? 1 (full-blooded) 18
: : ( ) (nondiscursive creature) (discursive creature) (differentiation) (assimilation) (Jerry Fodor) (Fred I. Dretske) (Ruth Millikan) 1 ( ) (rational agency) (linguistic practice) 2 : : 1 R. B. Brandom Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press 2000 pp. 2-3 2 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. 148 19
2011 4 (discursive commitment) : : : 1 : ( ) ; (conditionals) (locu- 1 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. 149. 20
: tion) 1 (Wilfrid Sellars) (material inference) : ; ;! (derivative category) 2 : (enthymeme) ( ) : 3 1 R. B. Brandom Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism p. 17 2 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. 98 3 Ibid. 21
2011 4 : ( ) ( ) ( )? : ( ) : ; ; : (knowing-that) how) : : that ; ( ) : ( ) 22
: ( ) 1 2 ( ) ; ; ; :? : (nondiscursive) : ; 1 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. 134 2 ( ) S ( ) (discursive) ; 23
2011 4 :? (subsentence)? ( ) ( ) ( )? 1 : (deictic) 1 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment pp. 335-336 24
: : ( ) (deontic status) : ; 1 (substitutional principle) (anaphora) (1) : ( ) (freestanding) (ingredient) ( ) : ( ) ( ) (multivalve): ( ) 1 ; 25
2011 4 (bottom-up) : (topdown) : 1 : : 2 ( ) ; : (2) ( ) 1 : ( : ) (declarative) (R. B. Brandom Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism pp. 12-13.) 2 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. 348. 26
: (deictic)? (pointing): ; 1 : ; 2 : : (recurrence) ( ) (occurrence) 3 : 1 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. 460. 2 Ibid. p. 462 3 Ibid. p. 465 27
2011 4 : : ( ) : ( ) (intellectualism)( ) : 1 ( : ) 1 R. B. Brandom Making It Explicit: Reasoning Representing and Discursive Commitment p. xvi 28
Philosophical Analysis 2011. 4 Abstracts and Key Words Formalization in Philosophy Sven Ove Hansson Abstract: The advantages and disadvantages of formalization in philosophy are summarized. It is concluded that formalized philosophy is an endangered speciality that needs to be revitalized and to increase its interactions with non-formalized philosophy. The enigmatic style that is common in philosophical logic must give way to explicit discussions of the problematic relationship between formal models and the philosophical concepts and issues that motivated their development. Key words: idealization; formalization; philosophy; logic From Formal Inference to Material Inference: On R. B. Brandom s Inferential Semantics LIU Gang Abstract: The fundamental purpose of R. B. Brandom's inferential semantics is against formal semantics which has its central idea of naturalism and representationalism and it wants to substitute formal inference for material inference. Therefore Brandom's material inference takes the method which combined the interpretation of pragmatics and semantics. It totally based on the belief and representation of the speaker s intentional contents. That is why Brandom repudiates that we should take the representation as the deixis of the object. In his story the representational contents can only be understood in terms of inferential content. Key words: formal semantics; Naturalism; formal inference; material inference; the representational contents On the Conceptual Relation Between Normativity in Brandom s Theory and in Philosophy of the Social Sciences XU Zhu Abstract: The Rationalist Pragmatism has been claimed in Robert Brandom s thought of normative practice. This article argues that the questions as following could be answered successfully only within the conceptual framework in terms of socialization of the logic space of reasons. First how could nonnormative reality for instance causal events be understood normatively? Second how could implicit rules which usually direct actors unreflectively be possible to be explicated explicitly? Finally how could normative interpretation in social sciences be objectively valid while also revisable in the foregoing practice of communication? Rationalist Pragmatism actually constructs a self-contained conception of normativity by answering those three questions. Key Words: normative practice; Robert Brandom; Pragmatism; Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Further Studies on the Connotations of Nature in the Dao De Jing YANG Jia-you Abstract: nature ( zi ran ) in the Dao De Jing is an evolving concept. The starting point and destination of nature are all human beings and their society so natural is a humanistic concept. It is Mainly reflected in: at the starting point in its history nature is a word for the description of the 196