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1 * N031 A Epistemic epistemological contextualism Theory of Knowledge 1 20 relevant alternatives RA * 09FZX Argument from Ignorance AI 1 Peter Unger 1975 Ignorance A case for skepticism AI 1 H 2 H O C O H O AI AI Argument from possibility 1 Hind 2 Hind Oind 3 Oind 4 Oind O 5 O ind 115

2 h h 2 h p p p Peter Unger S P S S S P 1 S S s q s q h s h P. Unger Ignorance A Case for Skepticism. New York Oxford University Press 1975 p. 95. http / /plato. stanford. edu /entries /contextualism - epistemology /3. 2. S. Schiffer Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society pp From Contextualism to Contrastivism Philosophical Studies pp

3 A S P S P A P S A A Nozick Robert subjunctive conditionals account SCA SCA SCA P P P S P P S P SCA 3 S P S P SCA H P H P H P 1 Keith DeRose Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions Philosophy and Phenomenological Research p Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review pp. 4-7 p

4 SCA S P S P P S P M 1 S P P S P P M M S P P S M P S M S P M M SCA M SCA S S SCA SCA P P 2 SCA comparative conditional 3 a b b a b a S P S A B S S A P S B P S B P S P A 2 S P S Q S Q S P S Q S P S P S P S P S 1 Robert Nozick Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge MA Harvard University Press 1981 p Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review p. 23 pp

5 P P S S S P S Q S Q S P S P S Q SCA subjunctive conditional contextualism SCC SCC SCC p p p 1 p SCA S P S P Rule of Sensitivity S P S P O H H O H 2 2 H H O H 1 2 Ibid reprinted in Keith DeRose and Ted A. Warfield eds. Skepticism A Contemporary Reader. Oxford Oxford University Press p H H 119

6 O 1 2 Fred Dretske Mark Heller Stewart Cohen David Lewis 1. 2 S P P P S P P Q P Q P P 3 S Q Q Q Q S Q Q Q S Q 1 Q S Q 2 Q S Q 3 S Q S Q 4 S Q S Q S Q S Q 5 1 T 2 T T 1 Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review p Fred I. Dretske The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge in Perception Knowledge and Belief Selected Essays. Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 p. 52 p Stewart Cohen How to be a Fallibilist Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology 1988 p Mark Heller Relevant Alternatives and Closure Australasian Journal of Philosophy pp

7 T T Expanded Relevant Alternatives ERA S P P P S P ERA T T T T S 1 S T T T T S P P P ERA P P 2 ERA P ERA ERA T T T T T T T T ERA T T T Mark Heller Relevant Alternatives and Closure Australasian Journal of Philosophy p Heller M The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti - Luck Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 Epistemology p

8 Q H S S H S Q 2 S Q p h H r 3 d d d d S q h h 4 S S e e e e q Heller M The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti - Luck Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives 13 Epistemology p Stewart Cohen How to be a Fallibilist Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology 1988 p

9 S q S q q 1 p h S h h 2 S P R R P S P R R P 3 rule of accommodation conversational score S P S P Stewart Cohen How to be a Fallibilist Philosophical Perspectives 2 Epistemology 1988 p. 102 p. 103 p S. Cohen Contextualism Skepticism and The Structure of Reasons Philosophical Perspectives 13 Epistemology 1999 p. 57. D. Lewis Scorekeeping in a Language Game Journal of Philosophical Logic pp Keith DeRose Solving the Skeptical Problem The Philosophical Review p. 9. lottery paradox Henry Kyburg

10 Williams M S P S M. Williams Is Contextualism Statable Philosophical Issues Skepticism pp D. Lewis Elusive Knowledge Australasian Journal of Philosophy p R. Feldman Contextualism and Skepticism Philosophical Perspectives 1 Epistemology1999 p. 110 p

11 p S P S P S P S P P S P S P Skeptical Paradox and Its Solving Strategy of Epistemic Contextualism Wei Yidong Abstract: The form and justification of knowledge is an important problem of epistemology in our times, on which epistemic contextualism and skepticalism debate for a long time. Contextualists argue that the form and justification of knowledge depends on its context, that is, knowing or not - knowing can be justified in its context. But skepticalists think that knowing or not - knowing does not depend on its context, and that knowledge does not need to be justified. For this purpose, skepticalists put forward a skeptical paradox challenging the ideas of contextualism. At the same time, contextualists develope different forms such as conditional contextualism and relevant alternative contextualism to refute skepticalists. No matter what the outcome of the debate, skeptical paradox provides an opportunity for the development of epistemic contextualism. Keywords: Epistemic Contextualism; Skeptical Paradox; Conditional Contextualism; Relevant Alternative Contextualism 125

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