9 2 2010 1 ( ) China Econo mic Quarterly Vol19, No12 J anuary, 2010 3,,, 2 451,,,,,,,, ( ),, (, 2005), 1 (, 1996a), (, 2004), : W + q, W, ( ), q,, : ( ),,, 3 :,, 510632 ; E2mail :zqx831118 @163. com, (08J ZD0014) (70573041) 1,, (,2001),,
572 ( ) 9 (1997),,,,,, (, 1997),, (, 1998), (, 2006),,,,,,,, (, 1997),, ( Naughton, 1994) (Lipton and Sachs, 1990 ;, 2004 ; ),,, (, 1997) (1998),,,,,,, TCL,,, 2, 2, 30, 15,, 10,,,,, 2008 7 21 :,
2 : 573, (, 1996b),, 3 (1998),,, (1999),,,, ;,, (2004),, ( ), :??, (1998),,,,, ( ) (1998), (, 1996a),,,,, (, 2007),, Lazear and Rosen (1981) :, 3
574 ( ) 9 ( ),, Lazear and Ro sen (1981),,, (Lazear and Rosen, 1981 ; Green and Stokey, 1983 ; Franckx et al1, 2004),, :? ( )?,?, :,,,,,,? 4, (, 2007), 5,,,,,, 6,, (1997) (, 2006),, 4 5 ( ),,, ( Green and Stokey,1983) 6, (,,2000 ;,2000 ;,2003 ;,2003 ; ), (2000)
2 : 575,,, (2001),, 7 (2001),,,,,, (2004) 1993 2002,,,,, (, 2005),,,?,,?, (Qian, 1996) ( Ra2 jan and Zingales, 2003), (Lin et al1, 1998), 8,, :, (, 2005), ( ) 7, 24. 3,, (,2001) 8,, 2005 3 6
576 ( ) 9,,,, (, 1995),, :, 9 ; ; 1981 Lazear and Rosen, Franckx et al1 (2004),,,,,,,?,, ( ),,,,,, (, 1996a ; Zhou and Wang, 2000 ;, 2005), n,,,,,, ; u ( x) = - e - rx, r, x, ( ),, 9, (common agency)
2 : 577, (Bai et al1, 2000 ; Siqueira et al1, 2009),,, :,, ;,,, Lazear and Rosen (1981) Franckx et al1 (2004) (2004),, : q11 = a11 + u11, q12 = a12 + u12, q21 = a21 + u21, q22 = a22 + u22 ;, a11 q11, a12 q12 ; a21 q21, a22 q22, u11 u21 u12 u22 0 2 ( 0),,, 1 : c1 = 1 2 a2 11 + a11 a12 + 1 2 a2 12, c2 = 1 2 a2 21 + a21 a22 + 1 2 a2 22,, c1, c2 a11 a21 a12 a22,, = - 1 < < 1 9c1 9c2 =, 9 a11 a12 9 a21 a22 < 0,, ( ), ( ),, ( ), ( ), ( ) > 0,, ( ) ( ),, = 0,, ( ) ( ),,,
578 ( ) 9,, : (W 11 ), (W 21 ) ; (W 12 ), ( W 22 ), ( ) ( ) w1 = W 11 - W 21 > 0, w2 = W 12 - W 22 > 0,, w1 w2,,,, n, n v i 1 + 6 v ( - i) 1 = v1, W i 11 + 6 W ( - i) 11 = W 11, W i 21 + 6 W ( - i) 21 = W 21, v i 2 + 6 v ( - i) 2 = v2, W i 12 + 6 W ( - i) 12 = W 12, W i 22 + 6 W ( - i) 22 = W 22,, v i 1 W i 11 W i 21 v i 2 W i 12 W i 22 i, v ( - i) 1 W ( - i) 11 W ( - i) 21 v ( - i) 2 W ( - i) 12 W ( - i) 22 i, v1 W 11 W 21 v2 W 12 W 22 ( ), i (, 1996a ;, 2005), i, (, 1996a) i E i = E[ v i 1 ( q11 + q21 ) + v i 2 ( q12 + q22 ) - W i 11 - W i 21 - W i 12 - W i 22 ] = v i 1 ( a11 + a21 ) + v i 2 ( a12 + a22 ) - W i 11 - W i 21 - W i 12 - W i 22., i ( Franckx et al1, 2004),, ; ( Slqueira, 2001 ; Slqueira, 2007 ; Slqueira et al1, 2009), i,
2 : 579 6 W ( - i) 11 6 W ( - i) 21 6 W ( - i) 12 6 W ( - i) 22, W i 11 W i 21 W i 12 W i 22 w i 1 w i 2,,, ;, (1996b) (2005),,,, (, 1996b ;, 2005), Franckx et al1 (2004), gw1 = p1 W11 + (1 - p1 ) W21 gw2 = p2 W12 + (1 - p2 ) W22,, p1 p2 p1 (W11 - gw1 ) 2 + (1 - p1 ) (W21 - gw1 ) 2 p2 (W12 - gw2) 2 + (1 - p2) (W22 - gw2) 2, p1 (1 - p1) w 2 1 p2 (1 - p2 ) w 2 2, p1 W 11 + (1 - p1 ) W 21 + p2 W 12 + (1 - p2 ) W 22 - r 2 p1 (1 - p1 ) w 2 1 - r 2 p2 (1 - p2 ) w 2 2, 1 2 a2 11 + a11 a12 + 1 2 a2 12, p1 W 11 + (1 - p1 ) W 21 + p2 W 12 + (1 - p2 ) W 22, 1 2 a2 11 + a11 a12 + 1 2 a2 12, r 2 p1 (1 - p1 ) w 2 1 + r 2 p2 (1 - p2 ) w 2 2 (1996b) Franckx et al1 (2004), 10 10, : E ( u) = - E ( e - rx ) = - e - r E( x) - r 2 var ( x), E( u) = - E(e - rx ) 1 Ex - var ( x) (,1996b ;,2005) 2
580 ( ) 9 p1 p2 p1 = prob ( q11 > q21 ) = p rob[ ( a11 - a21 ) ] > ) = G( a11 - a21 ), p2 = prob ( q12 > q22 ) = p rob[ ( a12 - a22 ) ] > ) = G( a12 - a22 ),, u21 - u11 u22 - u12 0 2 2, G 9 p1 w1 - ( a11 + a12 ) - 9 a11 9 p2 w2 - ( a12 + a11 ) - 9 a12 r 2 w2 1 (1-2 p1 ) r 2 w2 2 (1-2 p2 ) 9 p1 9 a11 9 p2 9 a12 = 0, = 0.,,, 11,,, Lazear and Rosen (1981) Franckx et al1 (2004) (2007),, aij ( i j = 1 2) : a11 = a21, a12 = a22, p1 = p2 = G(0) = 1 2., a11 = a12 = 1 2 2 w1 = a11 + a12, 1 2 2 w2 = a12 + a11, 1 2 (1 - ) ( w1 - w2 ), 1 2 (1 - ) ( w2 - w1 ). 1 12,,,, 11 (1997),,, 12,, 1,,
2 : 581,, Lazear and Rosen (1981), W 3, W 3,,, : p1 W 11 + (1 - p1 ) W 21 + p2 W 12 + (1 - p2 ) W 22 - r 2 p1 (1 - p1 ) w 2 1 - r 2 p2 (1 - p2 ) w 2 2 W 3. 1 2 a2 11 + a11 a12 + 1 2 a2 12,, p1 = p2 = 1 2, 1 2 ( W 11 + W 21 ) + 1 2 (W 12 + W 22 ) - r 8 w2 1 - r 8 w2 2 = W 3. 1 2 a2 11 + a 11 a12 + 1 2 a2 12 i E i = 6 W ( - i) 11 + 6 W ( - i) 21 + 6 W ( - i) 12 + 6 W ( - i) 22-2W 3 + 2 - - v i 1 2 2 (1-2 ) ( w1 - w2 ) + 1 ( 8 (1 - ) 2 w1 - w2 ) 2-1 8 (1 - ) ( 2 w2 - w1 ) 2 - v i 2 2 2 (1-2 ) ( w2 - w1 ) ( 4 2 (1-2 ) 2 w1 - w2 ) ( w2 - w1 ) r 8 ( w2 1 + w 2 2 ). w1 w2 v i 1 v2 i w1 - - 2 2 2 2 4 2 + w2 r 4 2-4 w1 (1-2 ) = 0, v i 2 2 2 2 - v i 1 2 - w2 4 v1 = nv i 1, v2 = nv i 2, 13 w 3 3 3 3 2 + w1 4 2 - r 4 w2 (1-2 ) = 0. 1 = 2 2 v 1 (1 + r 2 ) - v2 r 2 n 1 + 2 r 2 + r 2 2 4 (1-2 ), 13, i,, ( FOC), Lazear and Rosen (1981) Franckx et al. (2004),,,, w 1 3 3 3 3 w 2 3 3 3 3,,, ( FOC),,,
582 ( ) 9 2 = 2 2 v 2 (1 + r 2 ) - v1 r 2 n 1 + 2 r 2 + r 2 2 4 (1-2 ). (1) w 3 3 3 3 n = 1, 1 = 2 2 v1 (1 + r 2 ) - v2 r 2 1 + 2 r 2 + r 2 2 4 (1-2 ), (2) 2 = 2 2 v2 (1 + r 2 ) - v1 r 2 1 + 2 r 2 + r 2 2 4 (1-2 ). w 3 3 3 w 3 3 3 n = 1, = 0, n = 1, = 0, 1 = 2 2 v1 1 + r 2, w 3 3 2 = 2 2 v2 1 + r 2. w 3 3 r = 0, w 3 1 = 2 2 v1, w 3 2 = 2 2 v2., (4), (4),, a 3 11 = v1, a 3 12 = v2,,, 2 ( n = 1) ( = 0) ( r = 0), (3) (4) Lazear and Rosen (1981) (4), : (3) 3 ( n = 1) ( = 0) ( r > 0),,, (3), a 3 3 11 = a 3 3 12 = v1 1 + r 2 < a 3 11, v2 1 + r 2 < a 3 12. (2),, ( = 0) (3) (2) = 0 (3) (5) : 4 ( n = 1) ( = 0) (5)
2 : 583, 5 ( n = 1) ( = 0) ( r > 0), ( 2 ), ( r ), ( v1 ), 5,,,,, : 6 ( v1 = v2 ),, v1 = v2, w 3 3 3 3 1, - 2 2 v 1 [ r 2 + 2 2 r 2 4 (1 - ) + 3 r 3 6 (1 - ) 2 ] n [1 + 2 r 2 + 2 r 2 4 (1-2 ) ] 2 < 0. 7 ( > 0), i ( v Ai 2 ), : 9w 3 3 3 3 9v Ai 2 < 0, 9w 3 3 3 3 2 9v Ai 2 > 0. (2),, (1) n, n, : 8 n, 1/ n, ( ) 1 2, Lazear and Rosen (1981),
584 ( ) 9,,,,,,,,,,, (, 2003),? (1997),,, 3 5,,, ( 2 ), 14,, (, 1997),,,,,,, (, 2004) 5,,, ( 2 ),,, 4 6,, (, 2004),, 14 ( 2 = 0),,
2 : 585 ( > 0) 6,, ( ),, 7,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 8,,,,,,,,,, 15,,,,, 16,,, (, 2002),, 15 2008 6 25 : 16 2008 7 21 :,
586 ( ) 9,, (2006),, ( ),,,, ( ) ( w1 ),, : (1) ; (2), (, 2003 ;, 2007),, ;,,,, (2005),,, (, 2005 ;, 2008),, 1,, : H1,,,
2 : 587,, 7,, : H2,,,,,,, 8,, : H3,,, ( ), 2001 2007 17,,, CSMA R 2 451, ( ROA), (2004), Tobinπs Q, (2007),,, (2005), 17 2001,
588 ( ) 9, (2007) 18, 2001 2007, (2001 2007) 19, 2004,,, 2003,, (2007), ( ) CEO,, Lazear and Rosen (1981),,,, 1 2 1 (1) ( ROA) ( Tobinπ Q) (lngap1) (lngap2) (lnasset s) (lev) ( H10) (industry) (year) / ( + + ) / ln[ / 3 - ( - ) / ( - 3) ] ln[ / 3 - / ] ln ( ) / 13, 11 : 1, 0, 18 (,2005 ;,2008 ; ), (2007) 2001 2005,, 2005 2006 2007 19 2007, 2006
2 : 589 2 (2) (lngap1) (lngap2) ( govern2 ment) (government size1) (government size2) (lnworker) 1 (vice) - 3 ( ROA21) (roi) (two) (indratio) (industry) (year),,,, ln ( - ) / ( - ) /, 1 ;, 0 / 1 1 ( ) 3 4 20 3, 1 %, 5 %, 1 % H1 1, (, 2003 ;, 2007),,,,,,,, (2006),,, 3 20,,,
590 ( ) 9-0. 26 ( - 0. 18) lngap1 0. 008 3 3 3 3 (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (13. 06) - 0. 33 ( - 0. 25) lngap2 0. 014 3 3 3 roi 0. 0008 (1. 15) lev - 0. 15 3 3 3 ( - 13. 06) h10 0. 004 3 3 3 (4. 61) lnasset s 0. 016 3 3 3 (8. 93) (10. 47) 0. 0009 (1. 27) - 0. 15 3 3 3 ( - 13. 11) 0. 004 3 3 3 (5. 01) 0. 014 3 3 3 (7. 76) - 434. 3 3 3 3 ( - 13. 08) 0. 041 3 3 (1. 99) 0. 015 (1. 53) - 0. 82 3 3 3 ( - 4. 34) 0. 027 (1. 52) - 0. 20 3 3 3 ( - 6. 25) - 433. 8 3 3 3 ( - 13. 07) 0. 075 3 3 3 (2. 48) 0. 006 (1. 36) - 0. 81 3 3 3 ( - 4. 28) 0. 021 (1. 16) - 0. 22 3 3 3 ( - 6. 37) industry year N 2 450 2 450 2 450 2 450 R 2 0. 26 0. 28 0. 17 0. 18 F ( p ) 51. 45 (0. 000) 56. 08 (0. 000) 30. 1 (0. 000) 30. 46 (0. 000) : White t ; 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 % 5 % 10 % 4 4, (government), 21,, ; ( government size1), (government size2), 22,,,,,, H2 H3 4, (vice) 21 :, (,2007) 22 :, (,2007)
2 : 591 1 %, (lnworker) 1 %,,, - 495. 9 3 3 3 4 (2) lngap1 lngap2 (5) (6) (7) (8) ( - 16. 31) government 0. 07 3 3 3 (8. 62) government size1-2. 32 3 3 3 ( - 2. 65) - 540. 9 3 3 3 ( - 17. 47) 0. 07 3 3 3 (9. 45) government size2 0. 04 3 3 3 vice 0. 04 3 3 3 (9. 23) (3. 74) lnworker 0. 07 3 3 3 two 0. 21 3 3 3 (3. 07) indratio 0. 53 3 (1. 85) ROA21 3. 03 3 3 3 (8. 00) (2. 89) 0. 23 3 3 3 (3. 22) 0. 54 3 (1. 85) 2. 97 3 3 3 (7. 98) - 253. 6 3 3 3 ( - 10. 21) 0. 08 3 3 3 (11. 28) - 1. 57 3 3 3 ( - 2. 55) 0. 03 3 3 3 (6. 89) 0. 11 3 3 (1. 95) 0. 67 3 3 3 (2. 96) 3. 56 3 3 3 (10. 66) - 274. 7 3 3 3 ( - 11. 34) 0. 07 3 3 3 (12. 99) 0. 04 3 3 3 (4. 63) 0. 15 3 3 3 (3. 55) 0. 13 3 3 3 (2. 27) 0. 71 3 3 3 (3. 17) 3. 37 3 3 3 (10. 1) industry year N 2 451 2 451 2 451 2 451 R 2 0. 34 0. 33 0. 31 0. 32 F ( p ) 70. 8 (0. 000) 65. 3 (0. 000) 59. 7 (0. 000) 63. 7 (0. 000) : White t ; 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 % 5 % 10 %, (two),, (indrate),,,,,
592 ( ) 9 ( ),,,,,,,,, ( ),,, (, 2005),,,, (, 2005),,, 23,,,,,,,,,, 23, 2007 8 2 : :
2 : 593,,,,,,,,, [ 1 ] Bai, C., D. Li, Z. Tao, and Y. Wang, A Multi2Task Theory of t he State Enterprise Reform, J ournal of Com parative Economics, 2000, 28 (4), 716 738. [ 2 ],,,2005 2, 92 101 [ 3 ], : :,2001 [ 4 ],,,2003 8, 55 63 [ 5 ], : :, 2004 [ 6 ], :, ( ),2003 3 1 195 216 [ 7 ], :,, 2004 3, 12 17 [ 8 ], : 2006 :,2007 [ 9 ] Franckx, L., D. Alessio, and B. Isabelle, Multitask Rank Order Tournament s, Economics B ul2 letin, 2004, 10 (1), 1 10. [ 10 ] Green, J., and N. Stokey, A Comparison of Tournament s and Contract s, J ournal of Political Econom y, 1983, 91 (3), 349 364. [ 11 ] Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom, Multitask Principal2Agent Analysis : Incentive Contract s, As2 set Ownership and Job Design, J ournal of L aw, Economics, and Organiz ation, 1991, 7 ( special issue), 24 51. [ 12 ],,, 2005 9, 44 57 [ 13 ],,,1995 8 13 15 [ 14 ], :,,2006 3, 82 100
594 ( ) 9 [ 15 ] Lazear, E., and S. Rosen, Rank2order Tournament s as Optimum Labor Contract s, J ournal of Political Econom y, 1981, 89 (5), 841 864. [ 16 ], :,,2006 1, 124 131 [ 17 ],,,2007 4, 1 6 [ 18 ],,, 2003 3, 95 100 [ 19 ],,,2000 1, 24 30 [ 20 ],,,2003 4, 31 40 [ 21 ] Lin, J., F. Cai, and Z. Li, Competition, Policy Burdens, and State2Owned Enterprise Reform, A merican Economic Review, 1998, 88 (2), 422 427. [ 22 ], :,1997 [ 23 ],,,2001 9, 60 70 [ 24 ],,, 2004 2, 17 27 [ 25 ],, ( ),2005 7, 913 936 [ 26 ], :,,2007 9, 76 84 [ 27 ] Lipton, D., and J. Sachs, Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe : The Case of Poland, B rookings Papers of Economic A ctivit y, 1990, 75 147. [ 28 ],,,1998 8, 3 12 [ 29 ],,, 2006 6, 16 20 [ 30 ],,,2005 4, 50 54 [ 31 ] Mi, Z., and X. Wang, Agency Cost and t he Crisis of Chinaπs SOE, China Economic Review, 2000, 11 (3), 297 317. [ 32 ] Naughton, B., Chinese Institutional Innovation and Privatization from Below, A merican Eco2 nomic Review, 1994, 84 (2), 266 270. [ 33 ],,,2008 4, 41 52 [ 34 ],,,2004 4, 107 112 [ 35 ] Qian, Y., Enterprise Reform in China : Agency Problems and Political Control, Economics of T ransition, 4 (2), 427 447. [ 36 ] Rajan, R., and L. Zingales, S aving Capitalism f rom the Capitalists : Unleashing the Power of Financial markets to Create Wealth and S pread Op portunity. New York : Crown Business, 2003.
2 : 595 [ 37 ] Siqueira, K., Common Agency and Partial Cooperation, J ournal of Public Economic Theory, 2001, 3 (3), 309 339. [ 38 ] Siqueira, K., Common and Exclusive Agencies and Partial Delegation, J ournal of L aw, Eco2 nomics & Organiz ation, 2007, 23 (1), 141 160. [ 39 ] Siqueira, K., T. Sandler, and J. Cauley, Common Agency and State2owned Enterprise Reform, China Economic Review, 2009, 20 (2), 208 217. [ 40 ], :, :,1998 [ 41 ],,2004 3, 91 98 [ 42 ], :,, 2005 5, 40 51 [ 43 ], :,, 2001 8, 71 78 [ 44 ],,,2000 3, 32 39 [ 45 ],,,2006 1, 90 100 [ 46 ],,,1999 2 3 12 [ 47 ], : :,2005 [ 48 ], :,,2007 2, 4 11 [ 49 ],,,1996 1, 13 19 [ 50 ], :,1996 [ 51 ],,,2005 2, 1 17 [ 52 ], :,,2004 6, 33 40 [ 53 ],,,2007 9, 36 50 On the Incentive Effects of SOE Tournament Q UANXION G ZHOU WEIPIN G ZHU ( J i nan U ni versit y) Abstract This paper studies the performance of SO E executives from the perspective of tournament incentives. Our theoretic model suggest s that larger degree of payoff dispersion leads to more managerial effort s and thus better performances. However, government inter2 ventions and common agent problem negatively affect the tournament incentives. We test the
596 ( ) 9 theory with the salary data of 2 451 listed SO E companies of China. The results do support the theory. Key Words Government Intervention, Common Agent, Tournament Incentive JEL Classif ication H11, D82, M52