:,,,,, 20 90 :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 20,,,, 4,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,?,,,,,,,,,,,, Alchian Demsetz (1972) Grossman Hart (1986),,,,, MBO,, MBO 22

2003 9 3 ( 100836) :,,,,,,,,,,,,, : 20,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 3 B Π, 2000 2003,, :, 21

:,,,,, 20 90 :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 20,,,, 4,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,?,,,,,,,,,,,, Alchian Demsetz (1972) Grossman Hart (1986),,,,, MBO,, MBO 22

2003 9,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1. :,,, GCc = F (, ), GRc = F (,, ),, : a),,, b),,, c),,,,,,,,,, d),,,,,,,,, e),,,,,,, (,2003), 23

:,,,,,,,, 2.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :Max U = F (,,, ),,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,?,,,,,,,,, 24

2003 9,,, 3.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 4.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,, 25

: : max R ( a 1, a 2, a n ) - C ( a 1, a 2, a n ) 9R(a 1 a n )Π9a i = 9C(a 1 a n )Π9a i, (a 1, a 2, a n ), R ( a 1, a 2, a n ) - C ( a 1, a 2, a n ), a 3,,,, : min C = a 3 ( nasset, nland, adebt, ll, hc ),nasset,nland,adebt,ll, hc,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, : GR (asset, land) GC (ece),gr GC,asset land,ece,,,, ece,, ;,,, : Rwf = F ( ww, jj, ll, pw ) = jj pw ww + ec + ll ww,rwf, ww jj ll pw 26

2003 9,,,,,,,,,,, jj pw ww ec ece, : ece = jj pw ww + ec,pw,,,,,, 100 %, ;,, ec,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, : Loan = F (adebt, dq ),Loan ;adebt ;dq,,,,,,, min C = a ( nasset, nland, adebt, ll, hc ) ( ) asset + land = > jj pw ww + ec Rwf = jj pw ww + ll ww + ec Loan = adebt + dq ( ) ( ) ( ),,,,,,,,, 27

:,,,,,,,?? 1.,,,,,?,,?,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 28

2003 9,, ( ),,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 3.,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, jj pw ww + ec,,, jj, ec, pw ww,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,?,,,,,,, 29

:,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 30

2003 9,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2003 :, 2,1997 : ( ), G.,2000 :, Alchian, A. and Demsetz, H. 1972, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, Vol. 62 (50) : 777 795. Grossman, S. And Hart, O. 1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94 (4) : 691 719. ( : ) ( : ) 31

Abstracts of Papers in English Choice and Implementation of the Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in China Liu Bin (Research Department, People s Bank of China, Beijing) In this paper, we first formulate and estimate a hybrid model based on the actual data of China, and then use this model as a framework for studying monetaty policy rules. By means of stochastic simulations, we calculate and compare the welfare loss under the completely commitment optimal rule, optimal Taylor rule and discretion. In the meantime, we also calculate the variation of inflation rate equivalent to the welfare loss. The results indicate that the optimal Taylor rule is a good approximator to the completely commitment optimal rule, which provides a guide to further improvement about the decision and implementation of monetary policy in China. Furthermore, we analyze the current issues existing in the decision and implementation of monatary policy in China, inter alia, the issues about money2growth2targeting. Finally, we give some suggestions for the improvement of monetary policy in China. Key Words :Monetary Policy Rules ; Discretion ; Welfare Loss JEL Classification : E420 ; E590 Human Behavior, Sense and Economics Wang Dingding (CCER, Peking University) Rationality is one of three competitive and complementary hypotheses that human reason makes to make sense out of human behavior. The other two are behavioristic and phenomenological. In the past two decades, due to rapid accumulation of data in brain sciences on one hand, and emergence of a phenomenology of the body on the other hand, there is recently a development to converge all the three different approaches aforementioned. This paper is the first effort to outline this possible synthesis in academic rationalization of human behavior. Key Words :Behaviorism ;Brain sciences ;Neuro2economics ;Psychology JEL Classification :A120,B410 The Equilibrium Model for Privatization of Chinese State2o wned Enterprises Liu Xiaoxuan ( Institute of Economic,CASS) This paper is a theoretical summary for privatization practice of Chinese State2owned enterprises during last five years. Based on specific background of Chinese restructure of property rights,the research discussed the relationship of stakeholder of state2owned enterprises and their choice. According to their behavior and trade2off,the equilibrium model for privatization has been built. The core of the model is optimal target function of entrepreneur, and also it is the key to concern the successful restructure. The constraints of the model reflect the basic guarantee of stakeholders. Therefore, satisfied the equilibrium conditions, the optimal restructure could be reached. The important finding from the model is as following. The optimal solution of privatization model depends on the timing for exit of state2owned enterprises. The best opportunities for exit are in the reasonable proportion for firm net fixed assets,share value of entrepreneur purchasing and compensations for employees. The policy implication of the model provides one of the optimal transition frameworks. Any restructure,which would hurt employee s basic interests or would be lack of the entrepreneur s optimal target conduct,could have been away from the optimal equilibrium transition path. Key Words :Privatization ; Transition Economy ; Ownership Restructure ;State2owned Enterprise JEL Classification :D580,P310,D230 92