2012 7! 2007 2008 13. 0% 20. 2% 12. 6% 2008 1 1990 2007 2010 2000 2007 20% 25% 2007 2010 80 1999 2007 2008 1 1999 2007 * 610074 zangwenbin@ gmail. com 100871 ggliu@ unc. edu 100871 xufei0505@ hotmail. com 100716 xiongxianjun @ mohrss. gov. cn 211 75
2007 2008 DID 13. 0% 20. 2% 12. 6% 30 1 Leland 1968 Zeldes 1989 Zeldes 1989 Carroll 1992 1994 1995 Skinner 1987 Zhang & Wan 2004 1961 1998 1984 1998 2000 2006 Hubbard et al. 1995 Chou et al. 2004 Gruber & Yelowitz 1999 20 80 Medicaid 17. 7% 5. 2% Atella et al. 2005 Guariglia & Rossi 2004 Chou et al. 2003 1995 National Health Insurance 8. 6% - 13. 7% Wagstaff & Pradhan 2005 2010 1 Keynesian 1936 1 Modigliani 1954 Friedman 1957 2 Hall 1978 3 Flavin 1981 Campbell & Deaton 1989 Deaton 1991 Zeldes 1989 Carroll 1992 76
2012 7 CHNS 2004 2006 Bai et al. 2010 5. 5% 1998 2003 2007 79 2007 1 1 2007 2008 1 2007 13. 26% 2008 24. 46% 22. 4% 16% 1 2007 2008 % % 4346 13. 26 6374 24. 46 14402 43. 95 11800 45. 29 2305 7. 03 730 2. 80 4386 13. 38 2977 11. 43 7331 22. 37 4173 16. 02 32770 100 26054 100 2 2008 11 60. 39% 2007 43. 81% 2007 67. 93% 2008 74. 52% 2 % 2007 2007 37. 89 67. 93 43. 81 2008 55. 54 74. 52 60. 39 1 2007 11 2008 10 2 = / 1 2009 2008 1 19 77
2009 3 3 700 1000 300 450 1000 100 250 1000 50 600 1000 100 400 1000 100 200 1000 50 2007 2008 79 7 9 1 2007 42 100 141 11674 32989 2008 11099 32207 9649 26145 82. 65% 79. 32% 4 2008 2007 2008 2 2007 2008 23196 25678 1% 4 2007 24760. 38 27407. 25 23196. 35 *** 29416. 24 25678. 23 26116. 02 2924. 368 6822. 265 3036. 254 7390. 646 2858. 709 6465. 362 1495. 536 14240. 53 1233. 249 16548. 01 1649. 457 12691. 87 17292. 71 17911. 89 16030. 06 *** 19588. 77 18033. 69 16808. 25 3047. 769 10574. 1 2896. 782 6797. 736 3136. 375 12259. 92 1 *** ** 1% 5% 5 2 2007 2008 2 2007 1 78 2 2007 8 2007 11 2008 1 2008 11 2008 8 2007 8
2012 7 2008 2007 79. 61% 85. 80% 75. 69% 74. 71% 5 2 52 43% 30858 33743 53% 1 DID FE 2 DID Ln y it = β 0 + β 1 T t + β 2 X i + β 3 T t * X i + β 4 Z it + β 5 W i + ε it 1 y it i t T t 2008 1 X i 2007 11 1 2008 7 31 1 T t * X i DID Z it 3 W i ε it β 1 β 2 2007 1 2009 33% 57% 79% 45 54 55 64 65 52 2 DID DID 2008 24. 68% 23. 88% 22. 95 19. 26% 9. 23% 3 DID FE 79
5 52. 31 13. 96 51. 22 *** 14. 12 53. 15 13. 78 = 1 = 0 0. 69 0. 46 0. 68 ** 0. 47 0. 70 0. 46 = 1 = 0 0. 83 0. 37 0. 85 *** 0. 35 0. 82 0. 39 0. 23 0. 42 0. 27 *** 0. 44 0. 21 0. 41 0. 32 0. 47 0. 32 0. 47 0. 32 0. 47 0. 27 0. 44 0. 27 0. 44 0. 27 0. 45 0. 18 0. 38 0. 15 *** 0. 36 0. 20 0. 40 0. 43 0. 50 1. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 32490. 14 38789. 20 30858. 87 *** 42978. 50 33743. 23 35185. 64 0. 53 0. 50 0. 51 *** 0. 50 0. 55 0. 50 1. 29 1. 04 1. 04 *** 1. 01 1. 47 1. 02 0. 09 0. 37 0. 07 *** 0. 32 0. 10 0. 40 2. 85 1. 14 3. 11 *** 1. 14 2. 65 1. 10 β 3 6 10% Lin et al. 2009 2007 2008 12. 2% 2008 2009 2007 828 2008 915 10. 5% 9. 7% 1% 0. 32% 1% 30 30 15. 9% 1% 15. 5% 86. 4% 1% 80
2012 7 6 DID 7 DID 1 2 3 0. 142 0. 087 0. 12 0. 031 *** 0. 030 *** 0. 028 *** - 0. 023 0. 081 0. 097 0. 038 0. 036 ** 0. 037 *** * 0. 028 0. 016 0. 015 0. 054 0. 051 0. 049 0. 359 0. 317 0. 019 *** 0. 021 *** 0. 011-0. 014 0. 007 0. 007 ** 0 0 0. 000 ** 0. 000 *** - 0. 027-0. 02 0. 029 0. 028 0. 219 0. 159 0. 040 *** 0. 038 *** 0. 077 0. 06 0. 036 ** 0. 035 * 0. 079 0. 059 0. 039 ** 0. 039 0. 214 0. 155 0. 044 *** 0. 044 *** 0. 864 0. 026 *** 0. 025 0. 012 ** 0. 068 0. 014 *** 0. 134 0. 035 *** 11428 11428 11428 R 2 0 0. 11 0. 2 1 2 3 0. 04 0. 002 0. 001 0. 014 *** 0. 010 0. 010-0. 179-0. 035-0. 085 0. 019 *** 0. 013 *** 0. 014 *** * 0. 147 0. 133 0. 130 0. 027 *** 0. 020 *** 0. 019 *** 0. 607 0. 552 0. 009 *** 0. 011 *** 0. 013 0. 011 0. 002 *** 0. 003 *** 0 0 0. 000 *** 0. 000 *** - 0. 030-0. 025 0. 010 *** 0. 010 ** 0. 087 0. 074 0. 015 *** 0. 015 *** 0. 035 0. 050 0. 014 ** 0. 014 *** 0. 073 0. 096 0. 015 *** 0. 015 *** 0. 150 0. 171 0. 017 *** 0. 018 *** - 0. 023 0. 010 ** 0. 039 0. 005 *** 0. 030 0. 006 *** 0. 061 0. 014 *** 15528 15528 15528 R 2 0. 01 0. 47 0. 50 1 * ** *** 10% 5% 1% 2 6. 8% 13. 4% 1% 81
7 DID 13. 0% 20 80 Medicaid 5. 2% Gruber & Yelowitz 1999 1995 National Health Insurance 8. 6% - 13. 7% Chou et al. 2004 1 17. 1% 1% - 0. 0235% 2. 3% 2 6. 1% 3. 0% 3. 9% 8 9. 6% 10% 3 4 DID - 0. 014 2007 2008 12. 5% 1% 82 1 2 3 4 2428 2008 1. 165 1. 25 9320 2007 20045 Fogel 1999 1. 6 0. 2 0. 3 0. 7 1. 1 1. 4
2012 7 8 DID 9 DID - 0. 01-0. 056 0. 027 0. 035 0. 058 0. 012 ** 0. 007 0. 008 0. 007-0. 175-0. 334-0. 06 0. 023 0. 014 0. 019 0. 042 *** 0. 094 *** 0. 015 *** - 0. 144-0. 078 0. 003 * 0. 096 0. 014 0. 125 0. 027 *** 0. 020 *** 0. 027 0. 057 * 0. 124 0. 021 *** * 0. 202 0. 126 0. 022 Yes Yes Yes 0. 037 *** 0. 027 *** 0. 036 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 6210 1610 15202 Yes Yes Yes R 2 0. 16 0. 4 0. 44 4502 6898 4128 R 2 0. 35 0. 22 0. 26 1200 25% 1200 3000 50% 3000 25% 9 20. 2% 12. 6% 1% 2. 2% 2007 14. 4% 7. 8% 21. 6% 12. 4% 1% 18 10 DID 2007 2008 7. 8% 1% 10 11. 2% 2008 8 11 2008 8 11 11 83
2008 8 11 11 10. 0% 7 13. 0% 2008 8 11 10 11 DID * 0. 100 0. 002 0. 006 0. 018 *** 0. 010 0. 011-0. 018-0. 09 0. 021 0. 020 *** * 0. 078 0. 112 0. 028 *** 0. 027 *** Yes Yes Yes Yes 11766 12314 R 2 0. 49 0. 5 DID * 0. 057 0. 055 * 0. 045 0. 115 * 0. 094 0. 020 *** * 0. 039 0. 047 80 13. 0% 20. 2% 12. 6% 2007 84 2009 2000 11 2010 10 2001 6 2007 12 2010 6 1999 11 2007 20 90 4
2012 7 1999 5 Atella V. F. C. Rosati and M. Rossi. 2005 Precautionary Saving and Health Risk Evidence from Italian Households using a Time Series of Cross Sections SSRN. Bai Chongen Hongbin Li and Binzhen Wu 2010 Insurance Consumption and Trust Evidence from China s New Cooperative Medical Scheme working paper. Carroll C. D. 1992 The Buffer-Stock Theory of Saving Some Macroeconomic Evidence Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Vol. 1992 61 156. Carroll C. D. 1995 How Important is Precautionary Saving NBER Working Paper No 5194. Carroll C. D. 1994 How Does Future Income Affect Current Consumption Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 147. Campbell J. Y. and A. S. Deaton 1989 Why is Consumption So Smooth Review of Economic Studies Vol. 56 357 373. Chou S. Y. J. T. Liu and J. K. Hammitt 2003 National Health Insurance and Precautionary Saving Evidence from Taiwan Journal of Public Economics Vol 87 1873 1894. Chou S. Y. J. T. Liu and C. Huang 2004 Health Insurance and Savings over The Life Cycle A Semiparametric Smooth Coefficient Estimation Journal of Applied Econometrics 295 322. Deaton A. S. 1991 Saving and Liquidity Constraints Econometrica Vol. 59 1221 1248. Flavin M. A. 1981 The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income Journal of Political Economy Vol. 89 974 1009. Fogel R. W. 1999 Catching Up with the Economy American Economic Review Vol. 89 No. 1 1 21. Gruber J. and A. Yelowitz 1999 Public Health Insurance and Private Savings Journal of Political Economy 1999 Vol 107 1249 1274. Guariglia A. and M. Rossi 2004 Private Medical Insurance and Saving Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey Journal of Health Economics Vol. 23 4 761 783. Hall R. E. 1978 Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis Theory and Evidence Journal of Political Economy Vol. 86 971 987. Hubbard R. G. J. Skinner and S. P. Zeldes 1995 Precautionary Saving and Social Insurance Journal of Political Economy Vol. 103 360 399. Leland H. E. 1968 Saving an Uncertainty The Precaution Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 82 465 473. Lin W. GG. Liu and G. Chen 2009 The Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance A Landmark Reform Step towards Universal Insurance Policy in China Health Economics Volume 18 Issue S2 July 2009 83 96. The Effect of Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance on Household Consumption Zang Wenbin a Liu Guoen b Xu Fei b and Xiong Xianjun c a Southwestern University of Finance and Economics b Peking University c China Health Insurance Research Association Abstract Using the China Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance Annual Survey URBMI this paper analyzes the effects of URBMI on household consumption in urban China. The Difference-in-Differences estimates show that participating families would increase their annual non-medical consumption by about 13%. However their medical expenditures remain unchanged. When non-medical expenditures are separated into subcategories the effect of URBMI is most statistically significant for daily and other expenditure followed by changes in educational expenditures. In addition URBMI increases the non-medical consumption of low-income families by 20. 2% mid- income families by 12. 6% and has no effect on high-income families. Key Words Urban Residents Basic Medical Insurance Precautionary Saving Consumption JEL Classification I11 I18 H40 85