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2 28 CIP / 26 4 ISBN Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ F CIP www tjup com mm 21mm

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9 corporate struc-

10 4 ture 1 2 3

11 5 1

12 6 2 3 Donaldson Stigle and Friedthan

13 market-oriented systems 1-1 Van Hulle 1997

14 8 1 network-oriented sysems 1 Albert 1991 Coffee Aoki Bratton Hansmann Gugler

15 9 7 8 an incomplete contract residual claim residual control

16 1 11

17 11 2 9

18

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20 14 corporate governance

21 15

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23 17 1

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27 21 { { { { { { { { 2

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29 23 2 3

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31 25 1 1

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36 3

37 31 2

38 32 3 4

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40 34 Enron Worldcom Arthur Andersen Parmalate

41 35 EBSCO Wiley Kluwer Google ~ 5 Cho Dong Sung ERC GNP 1

42 36 19 Townley 1992 Mc- Garvey Purcell % 5 39% Louis Harris 1966 Drucker

43 GE Townley 1992 Ian 2 1 Corporate ethics codes Has the time come ABA Journal 1963

44 38 Bavaria Sarbanes-Oxley Act http / /www cg org cn /theory/zltx/zltx-zthgt asp

45 39 Adrian Cadbury Archie Ann

46

47 41 Smith Levi Strauss & Company Levi SA8 SA8 SAI Milton Friedman

48 42 CSR Kok et al 21 Snider 23 CSR Kok et al 21 CEO Beatty 21 Coleman 199

49 43 Mackenzie Beatty 21 Spiller 24 SA8

50 COLEMAN J Press 199 Foundations of social theory Cambridge Harvard University 2 DRUCKER P Is business letting young people down Cambridge Harvard Busi-

51 45 ness Review GUNTHER M Money and morals at GE Fortune Europe HIRSCHMAN A Exit voice and loyalty Cambridge Harvard University Press IAN WILSON The new rules ethics social responsibility and strategy & leadership Bavaria Steven Business Horizons KOK P MCKENNA R BROWN A A corporate social responsibility audit within a quality management framework Journal of Business Ethics BROOKS L J Corporate codes of ethics Journal of Business Ethics MACKENZIE C Moral sanctions ethical norms as a solution to corporate governance problems Insight Investment 24 autumn 9 MC GARVEY R New corporate ethics World Trade POTTS S Article ID 82 the ethics resource center 23-2 http / /www ethics org 11 PURCELL T Work psychology and business values a triad theory of work motivation Personnel Psychology SMITH A Theory of moral sentiments Cambridge UK Cambridge University Press SNIDER JAMIE Corporate social responsibility in the 21st century a view from the worlds most successful firms Journal of Business Ethics SPILLER R Investing in governance Chartered Accountants Journal TOWNLEY P Business ethics an oxymoron Editorial Canadian Business Review

52 46

53

54 A B C D E F

55 49 P % 1 95% 1% 2 51% ~ 94% 51% 3 5% 4 49% θ 1 θ = 1

56 5 2 θ = 3 < θ < % % 24 5% % 1

57 ~ % % % % % ~ ~ ~ % % % % % % % % % % Ⅲ

58 ~ ~ % 42 9% 1 5% 2 8

59 % J P W H S

60 % 2 88% %

61 UAI 21% 58% Sanjose CDMA IT ~ % ~ 2% 1966 ~ % 42%

62 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ % ~ % % % 1% 1 25% % 1 1 Reich R Who is Us in The Evolving Global Economy-Making Sense of the New World Order Kenichi Ohmae ed p &

63 57 Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅰ

64 58 Ⅱ

65 59 MSV 1998 q 5% 5% ~ 25% 25% Demsetz Levy 1983 Claessens Mock McConnell

66 6 / / ROA / 5 7% 7% Ⅲ Ⅱ Rw = PQ - t PQ - Cw P Q t Cw

67 61 Rz = t PQ - Cz t Q P P A B A A B

68 62

69 firm life cycle Ichak Adizes L 1999 E E L 1999

70

71 65 1 L 1

72 66 2 3

73

74

75 69 1

76 7 2 2

77

78 L

79

80

81 75 OECD 1999 Claessens Djankov Lang 1999 Beaver 1968 Forster 1978 Wruch 199 Gertner Scharfsteirn

82 76 1 Agrawal Mandelker 199 Schleifer Vishny 1986 Pound efficient monitoring hypothesis 2 conflict-of-interest hypothesis 3 strategy alignment hypothesis McConnell Swrvas 199

83 Jensen Meckling 1976 convergence of interest hypothesis Jensen Ruback 1983 entrenchment hypothesis anti-takeover behavior Yeh Lee Woidtke Yeh Lee Woidtke 21 23

84 78 3 Williamson 1987 substitution hyphothesis Patton Baker ~ 11 Lipton Lorsch CEO Donaldson Davis 1991 Daily Dalton Fama Jensen 1983 Rosenstein Wyatt

85 IH / 2 BH + / 3 CB 4 SB 5 BN 6 CEO 1 2

86 ΔOR - / 2 ΔLN - 3 LO /

87 IH BH Jensen Meckling 1976 Jensen Ruback 1983 anti-takeover behavior CB SB

88 BN CEO Potton Baker 1987 CEO Rechner Dalton

89 % % 21 62% 33% 1 ΔOR % ΔLN % ΔLO % IH % BH % CB SB BN CEO OR LN LO IH BH CB SB BN CEO - 46% 3% - 2% 667% 66 7%

90 84 variance inflation factors VIF VIF VIF 1 3 Pearson 2 VIF IH BH CB SB BN CEO VIF VIF i = 1 - R 2 i 1 1 PO i = α i + β 1 IH i + β 2 BH i + β 3 CB i + β 4 SB i + β 5 BN i + β 6 CEO i + ε i 2 LN i = α i + β 1 IH i + β 2 BH i + β 3 CB i + β 4 SB i + β 5 BN i + β 6 CEO i + ε i 3 LO i = α i + β 1 IH i + β 2 BH i + β 3 CB i + β 4 SB i + β 5 BN i + β 6 CEO i + ε i

91 85 3 IH BH CB SB BN CEO IH BH CB SB BN CEO 5 α = 1 α = 5 α = α = α = Jensen 1993

92 86 4 t P-value R 2 Adj - R 2 F P-value α = 1 α = 5 α = α =

93 87 5 t P-value R 2 Adj - R 2 F P-value α = 1 α =

94 88 6 t P-value R 2 Adj - R 2 F P-value α = 5 α = 1

95 89 α = AGRAWAL A MANDELKER G Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers the case of antitakeover charter amendments Journal of Financial and

96 9 Quantitative Analysis BEAVER W H Alternative accounting measures as predictors of failure Accounting Review CLAESSENS S DJANKOV S LANG L H P Who control East Asian corporation Policy Research Working The World Bank FAMA E F JENSEN M C Separation of ownership and control Journal of Law and Economics GERTNER R SCHARFSTEIN D A theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law Journal of Finance JENSEN M C MECKLING W H Theory of the firm managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure Journal of Financial Economics JENSEN M C RUBACK R S The market for corporate control the scientific evidence Journal of Financial Economics LIPTON M L JAY W A modest proposal for improved corporate governance MCCONNELL J SERVAES H Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value Journal of financial economics PATTON A BAKERJ C Why wont directors rock the boat Harvard Business Review POUND J Proxy contents and the efficiency of shareholder oversight Journal of Financial Economics STEIN R STUART W J G Outside directors board independence and shareholder wealth Journal of Financial Economics SCHLEIFER A VISHNY R Large shareholders and corporate control Journal of Political Economy WRUCK K H Financial distress reorganization and organizational efficiency Journal of Financial Economics 199

97

98 corporate governance 1 Stephen Prigge H Schmidt

99 94 AG GmbH OHG KG GmbH AG

100 95 AGs AG AG 2% 1 AG GmbH KG AGs AG AG % % GmbH % % KG % % OHG % l% % % % % % % Statisches Bundesamt AG 2

101 ~ H schmidt et al tie-breaking vote

102 ~ ~ 3 4 ~ 5 43% % 9 7% 4 3% 9 9% 13 5% 35 2% 2 CEO CEO 1 Korn /Ferry International Bundesverband deutscher banken

103 98 Schmidt ~ 7 73 TeWildt 1996 AG 3 % % % % % % % Deutche Bundesbank

104 % % Konzerne AGs 96 6% 98 83% Aallianz Deutsch Bank DresdnerBank Aallianz Deutsch Bank 4 87% 3 43% Prigge AGs 25% 85% 79% 16% Nibler attributed shares

105 DAX 63 5% Prigge Jensen 15

106 11 Edwards % % 1 11% 6 95% 84 26% Baums and Fraune AG AG GDP % % % % % % % % % % % % % 1994 Deutsche Borse and Deutsche Bundesbank % % 5 8 8% Kopp Deutsche Borse

107 12 Frank Mayer Franks and Mayers CORBETT J JENKINSON T How is investment financed a study of Germany Japan the United Kingdom and the United States Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies DIETI H M Capital markets and corporate governance in Japan Germany and the United States organizational responses to market insufficiencies London and New York EDWARDS J FISCHER K Banks finance and investment in Germany London Cambridge University Press EDWRDS J NIBLER M Corporate governance banks verse ownership concentration in Germany Economic Policy GOTON G SCHMIDT F Universal banking and the performance of German firms Journal of Financial Economics NIBLER M Bank control and corporate performance in Germany the evidence W P No 48 St Johns College Cambridge PRIGGE S A survey of German corporate governance in comparative corporate governance the state of the art and emerging research Oxford Clarence Press 8 SHLEIFER A VISHN R A survey of corporate governance NBER Working Paper TeWildt CEO turnover and corporate performance the German case University of Kiel 1996

108 13

109 14 5% A B 6% B C 4% C A 1% A B C C A C % 2 / % 11 11% 6 9% 84 9% 1

110 % 44 19% 5% % Gerschenkron 1962

111 16 A B 1 A B A B A 3% B B A 3% A 17 2 B B 17 2 A 3 1 A B Wenger 25% A B X Y 1% 2% A B 3% A B 5%

112 % 9% 5% 2 3

113 GERSCHENKRON A Economic backwardness in historical perspective Cambridge Harvard University Press BAMUS TAND F C Institutionelle anleger and publikumsgersellschaft Die Aktiengesellschaft ADAMS Crossholdings in Germany JITE

114 19 2 9

115 German Corporate Governance Code 1

116

117

118

119

120 EU regulation international accounting standards

121 116 5% 1% 25% 5% 75% 2 1%

122

123

124 119

125 12 1 2

126

127

128

129

130

131 126 7

132 127

133

134

135 13 Cadbury report Greebury report Hampel report 1991 Cadbury committee /3 CEO

136 131 1 CEO CEO CEO 2 CEO 3

137 PIRC

138 133 2% % 43% 4 4 Ernst & Young

139 134 Charli David % 77% 79% 21% 83% 3 42% 4% 42% 78% 75% Gerakl Russell % 64%

140 135 1 WEIR C LIANG D Governance structures director independence and corporate performance in the UK European Business Review The Cadbury Report London Gee Publishing The Greenbury Report London Gee Publishing 1995

141 FRC Audit Committees-Combined Code Guidance Smith COGA Smith 22 7 FRC combined codes 22 9 FRC Robert Smith Audit Committees-Combined Code Guidance Smith Smith

142 137 COGA Smith Smith

143

144 Smith independent non-executive director Smith Higgs

145 14 2 Smith 1 2

146 141 1 Smith 2 Smith

147 142 Higgs 23 non-executive director NED 2 9

148 143 P Davis 1998 Combined Code Higgs 23 23

149 144 selected information duty of care and skill

150 145 21

151 % 1%

152

153 149 A

154

155 La Porta La Porta

156 Demsetz Demsetz 1983 Demsetz Lehn

157 153 Demsetz Lehn 1985 La Porta 2

158

159 155 Vishny & Shleifer 24 23

160

161 A CCER Tobin Q = F 2 Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q = / Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q Tobin Q asset lev EPS Gov Law

162 158 Gov Tobin Q Law Tobin Q 1 CEO Cdir CEO 1 Out dir 2 ds dm cm 3 S1 S2-1 4 com 5 3 1

163 159 1 Constant Ln asset lev EPS com Gov law S S con Cdir Out dir ds dm cm F R Adj-R square D W t 1 5 1

164 16 1 CEO 1 Adj-R square F

165 BYRD J HICKMAN K Do outside directors monitor managers evidence from tender offer bids Journal of Finance Economics DEMSETZ H The structure of ownership and the theory of firm Journal of Law and Economics DEMSETZ H LEHN K The structure of corporate ownership cause and consequence Journal of Political Economics DEMSETZ H VILLALONG A Ownership structure and corporate performance Journal of Corporate Finance JENSEN M MECKLING W H Theory of the firm managerial behavior agency

166 162 costs and ownership structure Journal of Finance Economics LA P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Corporate ownership a- round world Journal of Finance LA P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Legal determinants of external finance Journal of Finance LA P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Law and finance Journal of Political Economics LA P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Agency problems and dividend policies around the world Journal of Finance LA P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Investor protection and corporate value Journal of Finance 2b SHLEIFER A VISHNY R Large shareholders and corporate control Journal of Political Economics SHLEIFER A VISHNY R A survey of corporate governance Journal of Finance R A D

167 ~ ~ 21 3%

168 164 42% Danone 1996 ~ Alstom Promotion ILO 2 The Role of Labor Standards in Industrial Restructuring Participation Protection and Socially Responsible Enterprise Restructuring Working Paper ILO Geneva 1999

169 % 1998 ~ % 15% 29% % % 75% % European Economy Supplement A Economic Trends No 5 /6 2 World Investment Report 2 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development UNCTAD October 2

170 % 199 ~ corporate governance Privatization Trends in Financial Marker Trends No 72 OECD February

171 167 1 Myer OECD 2 OECD Clarkson OECD OECD 1999

172 Clarkson Max A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance p Academy of Management Review

173 % 16% % 71% 85% 25% 5 1

174

175 Cascio 1 1 Cascio Wayne F Responsible Restructuring Creative and Profitable Alternatives to Layoffs Berrett-Koehler Publication 22

176 172 2

177

178

179 social intelligent restructuring The Role of Labor Standards in Industrial Restructuring Participation Protection and Promotion ILO

180 176 2 Socially Responsible Enterprise Restructuring Working Paper ILO Geneva European Economy Supplement A Economic Trends No 5 /6 2 5 World Investment Report 2 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development UNCTAD October 2 6 Privatization Trends in Financial Marker Trends No 72 OECD February OECD OECD 1999

181 Shlerifer Vishny Jensen Meckling Demsetz Lehn Shepherd Brealey Myers 1995

182 178 5 Fama Jensen Coase 1937 Williamson Jensen Meckling Roe 1994 Pedersen Thomsen Fama & Jensen 1983 Williamson Fama & Jensen 1983

183 179 Demsetz Lehn 1985 Demsetz Lehn 1985 Putterman 1993 Hansmann 1988 Demsetz Lehn 1985 Zeckhouser Pound 199 Roe 1994 Roe Prowse 1995 North 199 Roe 1994 Bhide % 2

184 18 2% 5% Safarian 1966 Turner Pedersen Torben & Steen Thomsen 1997

185 Vernon 1971 Franko 1976 Chandler 199 Franco 2 1 1

186 Pedersen Toben & Steen Thomsen % ISIC 4 3 Pedersen Thomsen GDP GDP 2 5

187 Logistic 4 x R 2 66% 66% Logistic 5 GDP Pedersen Toben & Steen Thomsen 1997

188 184 Perdersen Thomsen COASE RONALD H The nature of the firm Economica 4 New Series DEMSETZ H KENNETH L The structure of corporate ownership causes and

189 185 consequences Journal of Political Economy FAMA E F MICHAEL C Agency problems and residual claims Journal of Law and Economics JENSEN M WILLIAMSON H MECKLING Theory of the firm managerial behavior agency costs and ownership structure Journal of Financial Economics PEDERSEN T STEEN T European patterns of corporate ownership a twelvecountry study Journal of International Business Studied

190 WTO

191

192 188 5 ~

193

194 % 66 2% 63 7% 58 5% 59 4% 23 1%

195 191 3

196

197

198

199 ~ 219

200 % 3% 4% 4% 5% 5% 6% 6%

201 197 93% 5% 1% l% /3 2 1 /

202

203

204

205

206 22 M

207 23

208 ALL Cadbury OECD

209 OECD 24

210 26 22

211 27 22

212 28 1 E 21 2 M

213 29

214 21 1 2

215 211

216

217

218 214 6%

219 215 SEC FASB

220 CPA 1929

221 CEO CFO

222

223

224 22 investor relations IR

225 221 NIRI Andy Neely Chris Adams Mike Kennerley 22 Brown Lo and Lys 1999

226 p69 Francis Schipper 1999 the association of investment management research AIMR 1992 Zarzeski 1996 Street Shaughnessey AICPA Jenkins Jenkins

227 223 measures that matter 35% 35% Ittner 13% % CEO Ittner et al 1997 AAA FASC 22 Banker et al 2 Ittner and Larcker 1998 FASB AAA FASC

228 224 2 Barry Brown Easley OHara 2 Diamond Verrecchia 1991 Kim Verrecchia 1994 Diamond 1985 Bhushan 1989 Lang Lundhom 1996 Healy Palepu 21 Jovanovic 1982 Verrecchia 1983 Botosan 1997 e g Botosan Harris 2 Healy et al 1999 Lang Lundholm 1996 Amir Lev 1996 Paul Coram 1 2 3

229 225 AICPA FASB 3 Hope 23 SEC 2 Sean W G Robb 21 Healy Palepu 1994 Choi 1973 Adhikari Tondkar Foster 1986 Healy Palepu 1994

230 226 Jensen Meckling 1976 Leftwich Watts Zimmerman Gray 1988 Perera 1989 Gray Vint 1994 Zarzeski 1996 Adhikari et al 1998 Gray 1988 Radebaugh Gray 1993 Adhikari et al 1998 Robb 21 Ann Vanstraelen 23 Robb 21 Sean W G Robb Jenkins 3 Verrecchia 1983 proprietary competitive disadvantage and political Cooke Choi Mueller 1992 Chap 7

231 227 5 Akerlof 197 Foster 1986 p 32 6 Cooke Gray 1993 Saudagaran Biddle Buzby Falk 1978 Rockness Williams 1988 Harte 1991 Rockness Williams Marc J Epstein Martin Freedman 1994 Ittner

232 228 Larcker 1998 Banker AAA FASC 22

233

234 23 1 GRAY S Towards a theory of cultural influence on the development of accounting systems internationally Abacus RADEBAUGH L H GRAY S J International accounting and multinational enterprise Wiley LEUZ C NANDA D WYSOCKI P D Investor protection and earnings management an international comparison Working paper University of Pennsylvania Duke University and MIT Sloan School of Management 22 4 La P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Legal determinants of external finance Journal of Finance La P R LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F SHLEIFER A et al Law and finance Journal of Political Economics ROBB S SINGLE L ZARSESKI M Non-financial disclosures across angle-american countries Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation VANSTRAELEN A ZARZESKI M T ROBB S W G Corporate non-financial disclosure practices and financial analyst forecast ability across three European countries Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting ABDEL-KHALIK A R Why do private companies demand auditing A case for organizational loss of control Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance 9 American Institute of Certified Public Accounting AICPA Improving Business Reporting-A Customer Focus New York

235

236 233 SOES Neo-corporatist Neo-liberal Mckinnon 1994 Nolan 1995 Sachs Woo 1997 Jefferson Singh 1999 Cook Yao Zhuang 2 Lin Zhu 21

237 234 9 Jefferson Singh 1999 Cook Yao Zhuang 2 Liu 2 Chen Wills corporatisation programme Broadman 1996 Hu 1996 World Bank Country Study 1997 Jefferson Rawski 1999 Qian 1996 Chen Wills

238 235 Qian 1996 Chen Wills

239 236 Lin Zhu Megginson Netter 21 Jensen Meckling 1976 Shleifer Vishny % IPO IPO He 1998 CEO

240 CEO He 1998 Shleifer Vishny

241

242 239 Zhang 1998 He GDP 54% He

243 Chen 22 Wang Xu Zhu 21

244 241 Wen rwegasira and bilderbeek 22 CEO CEO Chen 24

245 242

246 243

247 244 1 Beijing Youth Daily December BROADMAN H G Policy options for reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises World Bank Discussion Paper CHEN J J Determinants of capital structure - empirical evidence from Chinese company panel data Journal of Business Research CHEN J J WILLS D Agency theory and corporate governance the Chinese state-owned enterprises The proceedings of 1st international conference of corporate governance the business school University of Birmingham UK CHEN S SUN Z WANG Y Evidence from China on whether harmonised accounting standards harmonise accounting practices Accounting Horizons FAMA E F JENSON M C Separation of ownership and control Journal of Law and Economics HART O D Corporate governance some theory and implications The Economic Journal HU X Reducing State-Owned Enterprises social burdens and establishing a social insurance system' in policy options for reform of Chinese State-Owned enterprises World Bank Discussion Paper JEFFERSON G H SINGH I Enterprise reform in China Oxford University Press JEFFERSON G H RAWSKI T G Chinas industrial innovation ladder a model of endogenous reform Oxford University Press JENSEN M MECKLING W Theory of the firm managerial behaviour agency costs and ownership structure Journal of Financial Economics LIN Y ZHU T Ownership restructuring in Chinese state industry an analysis of evidence on initial organisational changes China Quarterly

248 MEGGINSON W L Netter J M From state to market a survey of empirical studies on privatisation Journal of Economic Literature NOLAN P Chinas rise Russias fall New York St Martins Press QIAN Y Enterprise reform in China agency problems and political control E- conomics of Transition SHLEIFER A VISHNY R W Large shareholders and corporate control Journal of Political Economy SHLEIFER A VISHNY R W A survey of corporate governance Journal of Finance WANG X XU L C ZHU T State-Owned Enterprises going public the case of China Research Report Hong Kong University of Science and Technology WEN Y RWEGASIRA K BILDERBEEK J Corporate governance and capital structure decision of the Chinese fisted firms Corporate Governance An International Review Chinas management of enterprise assets The state as shareholder World Bank Country Report World Bank Washington D C ZHANG X Practical demands to update the company law Hong Kong Law Journal

249

250 247 moral hazard 18 adverse selection Welker 1995 Brown 2

251

252 ARC IAS32 - IAS IFRS1 SICs

253

254

255 252 3

256 253 CEPA IOSCO IOSCO

257 254 1 IASC IASB Brown S LO K LYS T Use of R-squared in accounting research measuring changes in value relevance over the last four decades Journal of Accounting and

258 255 Economics WELKER M Disclosure policy information asymmetry and liquidity in equity markets Contemporary Accounting Research

259 256 corporate governance 1 2

260 Poly Peck BCCI Maxwell CEO

261 258 CEO 3

262 259 4

263 26 CEO

264

265

266 CEO 3 ~ 4 2 ~ 5 4

267 264 3 ~ % Vienot 1996 Marini IBM CEO

268 European company statute ECS %

269

270

271

272

273 Perorming French corporate governance a return to the two tire board George Washington Journal of International Law & Economics Can the German system of corporate governance help Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative law Journal Some reflection on German corporate governance a glimpse at German supervisory boards Tulane Law Review

274

275 Lindon Travers Bob Tricker 1982 PRONED

276 273

277 % ~ 9% A 44 68% 5% 89

278

279

280

281 ~

282 /3 2 /3 2 / /3

283

284 281

285

286

287 ~ Denis McConnell

288

289 Hossain et al 2 CEO Weisbach 1988 Hermalin Weisbach 21 Beasley 1996

290 287 Beasley 2 Abbott et al 2 Agrawal Chadha 24 Xie Perry 1999 Yermack 22 Rosenstain Wyatt 1997 Gerety Lehn

291 ST

292 ~ 23 A CSMAR SYSTEM CSMAR CSMAR CSMAR

293 Beasley Vafeas De Aanglo

294 Logistic 1 EXCEL SAS Logistic LN ( ) P OP = P OP = 1 = α + β 1OUTBD + β 2 DRSH + β 3 DCON + β 4 AGE + β 5 SIZE + β 6 DUAL + β 7 MTG + β 8 TOPCTR + β 9 TOPKD + β 1 TOPDIFF + β 11 RIGHT1 + β 12 RIGHT2 + β 13 CR + β 14 LEV+ β 15 ROA + β 16 LNAT + β 17 BIG4 + β 18 SWITCH + β 19 YR1 + β 2 YR2 + ε TOPCTR 23 TOPKD TOP- DIFF

295 RIGHT RIGHT2 CR LEV ROA DeAanglo 1981 BIG4 21 SWITCH 1 OP OUTBD 1 1 OP 1 2 OP OP 1 OP 2 OP 3

296 293 AGE DRSH DCON 1 SIZE MEET DUAL 1 TOPCTR 5% 1 TOPKD 1 TOPDIFF RIGHT1 ROE 1% 1 RIGHT2 ROE 6% 7% 1 CR LEV ROA LNAT BIG4 1 SWITCH 1 YR YR2 22 1

297 % % % % 14 T 1 46% 3 26% 5 63% 89 65% % 7 88% 3 99% 1 4% 1% % 7 57% 3 51% 1 39% 1% % 1 77% 2 39% 1 59% 1% % 5 63% 3 26% 1 46% 1% % 33%

298 295 1 /3 23 7% 21 33% 23 18% % 28 9% % 22 3% ~ 2 5% 21 ~ 23 8% 3 86% OUTBD AGE DRSH DCON

299 ~ 8 Vafeas ~ 6 1% 1997 ~ 2 4% ~ 17% 23 4 OUTBD AGE DRSH DCON SIZE MEET DUAL TOPCTR TOPKD TOPDIFF RIGHT RIGHT CR LEV ROA LNAT BIG SWITCH % 4 36%

300 297 7% 7% 11% % 1% 3% 4 7% 14% 21 ~ T WIL- COXON 5% 2 25% 18% 7% 87% 81% 5 T/Z T/Z n = 2883 n = 333 n = 364 n = 152 OUTBD AGE DRSH DCON SIZE

301 298 T/Z T/Z n = 2883 n = 333 n = 364 n = MEET DUAL TOPCTR TOPKD TOPDIFF RIGHT RIGHT CR LEV ROA LNAT BIG SWITCH T WILCOXON 1% 5% 1%

302 299 4% 27% 71% 63% 1% 12% 4% Pearson

303 3 6 P e a rso n O P1 S IZ E O U T B D M E E T A G E D R S H D U A L D C O N T O P C T R T O P K D T O P D IF F R IG H T 1 R IG H T 2 C R L E V R O A L N A T B IG 4 S W IT C H O P S IZ E - 4 O U T B D - 1 M E E T A G E D R S H D U A L D C O N T O P C T R T O P K D T O P D IF F R IG H T R IG H T C R L E V R O A L N A T B IG S W IT C H O P 1 O P O P 1 O P

304 % Pseudo R-SQ 19 1% - 4 5% 5% 5% 5%

305 32 7 LOGISTIC OUTBD - H AGE - H DRSH - H DCON - H SIZE MEET DUAL TOPCTR TOPKD TOPDIFF RIGHT RIGHT CR LEV ROA LNAT BIG SWITCH YR YR OP = N Pseudo R-SQ % 85 3% 84 4% 84 2% 1 1% 5% 1%

306 33 1% 23 1%

307 LOGISTIC 1 2 OUTBD - H AGE - H DRSH - H DCON - H

308 SIZE MEET 5 3 DUAL 1 2 TOPCTR TOPKD TOPDIFF RIGHT RIGHT CR LEV ROA LNAT BIG SWITCH YR1 12 YR2 63 N Pseudo R-SQ % 78 1% 1 1% 5% 1% 2 OP n = 2883 OP 1 n = 181 OP 2 n = 15 OP 3 n = % Pseudo R-SQ 13

309 36 1% 1%

310 ST ABBOTT L J PARK Y PARKER S The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud Managerial Finance

311 38 17 BEASLEY M S CARCELLO J V HERMANSON D R et al Fraudulent financial reporting consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms Accounting Horizons BEASLEY EY M S An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud The Accounting Review 19 DEAANGLO L E Auditor size and audit quality Journal of Accounting and E- conomics GERETY M LEHN K The causes and consequences of accounting fraud Managerial and Decision Economics HERMALIN B E WEISBACH M S Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution a survey of the economic literature Working paper HOSSAIN M CAHAN S F ADAMS M B The investment opportunity set and the voluntary use of outside directors New Zealand Evidence European Business Management School EBMS Working Paper 2 23 ROSENSTAIN S WYATT J G Inside directors board effectiveness and shareholder wealth Journal of Financial Economics VAFEAS N Board meeting frequency and finn performance Journal of Financial Economics WELSBACH M Outside directors and CEO turnover Journal of Financial Economics XIE B DAVIDSON III DADALT P J Earnings management and corporate governance The role of the board and the audit committee Journal of Corporate Finance DENIS D K MCCONNELL J J International corporate governance Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

312 39 Demsetz Lehn

313 31 Berle Means 1932 stock having excessive voting power La Porta 1998 Claessens S&P 21

314 311 Deminor CLSA Dyck A Zingales L

315 IPO

316

317 %

318 315 CSGI = α i U i CSGI α i i = U i i = <

319 CSGI U 1 U 2 U 3 U % % % %

320 % 84 44% 4 29% 34 76% 37 88% 22 96% 19 1% %

321 % 8% 7 52% 2% 85 88% 1% 11 3% % 84% 1% 2 15% 5% 18 34% % 29 72% 12 55% 1 94% 22 1% 4 37%

322 319 2% 17 81% 34 45% % % % % % %

323 % % % % %

324 % 52 14% 48 99% 44 2% 46 82% 48 52%

325

326 KHANNA T PALEPU K The future of business groups in emerging markets long run evidence from chile Academy of Management Journal LA P Corporate ownership around the world Journal of Finance QIU L D SPENCER B J Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment "Implications for market-opening trade policy " Working Paper Series Hong Kong University of Science & Technology and University of British Columbia 21 4 STIJIN C The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations Journal of Financial Economics STIJN C Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings Journal of Finance

327 panel data

328 Lipton Lorsch ~ 9 Yermack ~ Q ~ 19 Yermack Lipton Martin Jay W Lorsch A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance Business Lawyer Hermalin Weisbach The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance Financial Management

329 General Electirc Exxon Mobil Corp Wal-Mart Stores Lucent IBM Coca-Cola Citi Group Merk & Co

330 K K = / 1 1 5% 77 3% 3% ~ 5% 13 3% 9 6% /

331 328 1 ~ 6 3 Morck Q ~ 5% Q 5% ~ 25% Q 25% Q Morck ~ 5% 25% alignment entrenchment 5% ~ 25% 5% Morck Randall et al Management Ownership and Market Valuation Journal of Financial Economics

332 X NACD Jensen Michael C William H Meckling Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure Journal of Financial Economics

333 33 1 McConnell Servaes 2 3 Morck McConnell ROE Q ~ 3% 1 5% 3% ~ 1 5% 2 Morck 4 5% 1 Demsetz H Lehn K The Structure of Corporate Ownership Causes and Consequences Journal of Political Economy Mc Connell J Servaes H Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt Journal of Financial Economics Tobin James A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory Journal of Money Credit and Banking

334 A 3 Berg Smith 2 Cannella Lubatkin Mallette Fowler Chaganti 3 Rechner Dalton 4 5 Boyd Rechner Dalton CEO Duality and Organizational Performance A Longitudinal Analysis J Strategic Management Journal Boyd B K CEO Duality and Firm Performance a Contingency Model Strategic Management Journal

335

336 % 31% 96%

337 334

338 335 PT PT ~

339 U ~ SPSS panel data

340 337 ST PT 1 t 1 ARO- E t t ACPM t ACPM t 2 DN CS DS ID ES MS MN D 1 t 2 t 22

341 ~ ACPM AROE DN CS / ID / DS / MN ES / MS / SS / D R R = 1 ~ 7 S S = /

342 % % % % % ~ 11 8% % 21 86% 23 13% 5 DN N

343 34 Valid Yr 22 Yr 22 6 Valid Yr 21 Yr 21 Valid Yr 2 Yr 2 Valid % ~ %

344 % 195% 22 1 / % 7 DS N 2 % % % ~ % 5 2% 51 8% 8 C S N 2 % % % % 2 9% 9 ID 1 N

345 MN N MS N 22 % % %

346 ES N 22 % % % D % - 9% 8% 14 SS 3 22 N % %

347 % 22 85% 15 S N 22 % % % % % 22 Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 22 9 Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 18 8

348 % Sig 2 - tailed % N Pearson Correlation % 17 8 Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Correlation is significant at the 1 level 2 - tailed Correlation is significant at the 5 level 2 - tailed % % 21 Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N

349 % % 21 Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 36 2 Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 34 2 Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 33 2 Sig 2 - tailed N % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation 3-13 Sig 2 - tailed N % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Correlation is significant at the 1 level 2 - tailed Correlation is significant at the 5 level 2 - tailed

350 % % 2 Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 3 19 Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 25 5 Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation % 21 7 Sig 2 - tailed N % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N

351 % % 2 % Pearson Correlation Sig 2 - tailed N Correlation is significant at the 1 level 2 - tailed Correlation is significant at the 5 level 2 - tailed U 3 U 4 5 U % 8

352 ~ % 95% -

353

354 BAYSINGER B D BUTTER Corporate governance and the board of directors performance effects of changes on board composition Journal of Law Economics and Organization BERLE A A The modern corporation and private property New York Commerce Clearing House Inc BOYD B K CEO duality and firm performance a contingency model Strategic Management Joumal KREPS D M MILGROM P ROBERTS J et al Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners dilemma Journal of Economics Theory DEMSETZ H The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm Journal of Law and Economics DEMSETZ H LEHN K The structure of corporate ownership causes and consequences Journal of Political Economy FAMA E F JENSEN M C Separation of ownership and control Journal of Law and Economics