2006 12 : 3 :,,, ;, : 3,, :100871, :zhoula @gsm. pku. edu. cn,wyzhang @gsm. pku. edu. cn ;, ;, Lonnie Magee ( 70533020),,,,,, (Akerlof,1970 ; Kreps,1990),, ( Klein, 1997 ;,2003), Shapiro (1983), (premium),,, :,, ;, ( ), ( ebay, ),,,,,,, :, ;,,,,,,,, 81
: :,,,,,,,, ebay ebay,, Lucking2Reiley (2000) Houser Wooders (2001) Kalyanam McIntyre (2001) Melnik Alm (2002) Dewan Hsu (2004) Dewally Ederington (2006), ( ),,,,, :, ebay ( ) ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ), (www. eachnet. com) Livington (2005),,, ebay,, 7,, 24,,,,,,,,,,,,, 82
2006 12,, C2C,,,,, ebay,,,,,, ( ),,,,,, (bidder) (buyer), ( ),,,, 7 14,, :,,,,, ;,,,,,,, ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,,,, 83
: : ( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,, Lucking2Reiley (2000) Melnik Alm (2002) Dewan Hsu (2006),, Eaton (2002),, Heckman : probit,, Heckman, ( = 0),,, Heckman (1979), (inverse Mill s ratio), OLS,,,, White (1980),,,,,,,,,, ( ) Livington (2005),,,,,, 84
2006 12, Π,,,,,,,,, 262,,,,,,, Lucking2Railey (2000),, ; Ba Pavlou (2002),,, Π,, ( ),,,,,,, ( ),, ( 0 1 ),, ( 1, 0),, Bajari Hortacsu (2000) ebay,,,, ( ),, (last minute bidding) ( Melnik and Alm(2002) Livingston (2005) ),, :1), ( ), ;2), ( ),, ( ),,,,,,,,,,, 85
: :, ;,,,,,,,,,,,, Heckman :,,,,,, Heckman ( ),,,,,,,,,, ;,, 2002 12 1 2003 3 31, 1, ( 1), 182853, 3113 % (59432 ), 1115 %(20098 ),,5610 % (102398 ) ( 2), 52363, 2513 % (13260 ),914 %(4928 ),,6513 %(34175 ),, 10 1 2 ( 1),, ( ) 5 ( ),509 ; 0167 ; 0183,,, 1,,,,,,,,, 45 (, ) 86
2006 12 7515 %,1819 %, ( ),, 516 % 2,, ( 1), 45, 2203, - 3,,,,,, 2, 118, 1, 1 ( ) ( = 1) 182853 01560 01496 0 1 182853 5091105 14251876 2 49979198 ( ) 182853 01670 01337 01011 1 ( ) 182853 01830 01321 01001 1 ( ) 182853 01755 01430 0 1 ( ) 182853 01189 01392 0 1 ( ) 182853 01025 01157 0 1 ( ) 182853 01029 01168 0 1 182853 451182 1021668-3 2207 ( ) 182853 21249 11828-11386 71700 182853 01831 01222 0 1 182853 01242 01828 0 10 182853 01243 01490 0 3 (, = 1) 182853 01552 01497 0 1 ( ) 102405 01929 01139 01075 1 : ( ), 0, 1 ;, 1, 2, ( 10 %, ),, ( 22 %, ), 1 2 3, 10 50 100, 4, 0 1 2 3, 0,, 55 % ( 1),, 87
: : 2 ( ) ( = 1) 52363 01653 01476 0 1 ( ) 52363 21822 21628 0 101779 ( ) 52363 01870 01302 01001 1 ( ) 52363 01698 01459 0 1 ( ) 52363 01213 01409 0 1 ( ) 52363 01033 01179 0 1 ( ) 52363 01053 01223 0 1 52363 1171908 3321596-4 2328 ( ) 52363 21608 21056-11609 71753 52363 01856 01210 0 1 52363 01211 01772 0 14 52363 01246 01508 0 3 (, = 1) 52363 01576 01496 0 1 ( ) ( ) 34171 11297 11460 0 51687 3 4 3, (1), ; (2), (inverse Mill s ratio) (2) (4), Heckman (1979),, (2) (4),,,,,, Π, (, ),,,, 3, (2), ( ) 01012 : ( 451182), ( ) 1, 01012[ln (461182) - ln (451182) ] = 0100026, (509 ), 01013 ; 5, 509 0164 01111, (8311 %),, 1 %, 010011, 509 0156 ; 9114 %( 8311 % 10 %), 88
2006 12 417, 1 % 3 3, (1), probit ( ) (marginal effect), ( ) ( ) 01065,, ( ) (451182) 5, 0168 % 01568, (8311 %),, 1 %, 0157 % ;, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 9114 % ( 10 %) ( ), 5, 0156, 9 % ( ), 3 (1) R 2 01257,,R 2 01158, ( ) 01099, R 2 (2), R 2 3815 % 01335, Inverse Mill s Ratio (1) : ( = 1) Probit - 01066 3 3 3 (01003) - 11419 3 3 3 (01013) 01516 3 3 3 (01011) 01837 3 3 3 (01045) 01918 3 3 3 (01060) 01845 3 3 3 (01058) 01015 3 (01009) 01167 3 3 3 (01002) 11455 3 3 3 (01019) 01090 3 3 3 (01004) - 01401 3 3 3 (01007) 01087 3 3 3 (01004) (2) : - 01006 3 3 (010004) 01099 3 3 3 (01002) 01022 3 3 3 (01011) 01026 3 3 3 (01045) 01018 3 3 3 (01060) 01006 (01010) 01015 3 (01009) 01111 3 3 3 (01004) 01011 3 3 3 (010005) - 01030 3 3 3 (01001) 01013 3 3 3 (01001) 01120 3 3 3 (01003), R 2 182853 102405 01326, 01009, R 2 01257 01335 R 2 217 % (,, ) 01099 01009 ( ) (1) (2) : (1), (2) White (1980) (1) (2) 262 ( ) 29 45,, 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 % 5 % 10 % ( 4 ), 89
: :, 4, ( ),, ( ) ( 1, ( ),), ( - 11419),,,,, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),, ( ) ( ), ( ), :, ( ) ( ), Inverse Mill s Ratio (3) : ( = 1) Probit - 01452 3 3 3 (01003) 01748 3 3 3 (01024) 01866 3 3 3 (01045) 01905 3 3 3 (01060) 01820 3 3 3 (01058) 01026 3 3 3 (01009) 01105 3 3 3 (01005) 11549 3 3 3 (01042) 01104 3 3 3 (01009) - 01251 3 3 3 (01018) - 01088 3 3 (01019) (4) : ( ) - 01577 3 3 3 (01006) 01090 3 3 3 (01013) 01092 3 3 3 (01014) 01090 3 3 3 (01014) 01010 3 3 3 (01004) 01082 3 3 3 (01004) 01133 3 3 3 (01045) 01191 3 3 3 (01009) - 01158 3 3 3 (01019) 01036 3 3 (01015) 01603 3 3 3 (01034), 52363 34171 R 2 01326 01556 (, ) 01078 01006 ( ) ( ),, : (3), (4) White (1980) (3) (4) 262 ( ) 29 45,, (1) (2),,,,, 7 10,, (, ),,,, 90
2006 12 4, (3) (4), 3, Reiley (2000) Melnik Alm (2002) Dewan Hsu (2006),,(),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2003 :, Akerlof, G., 1970, The Market for Lemons : Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84. Ba, S. and P. A. Pavlou, 2002, Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building Technology in Electronic Markets : Price Premiums and Buyer Behaviour, MIS Quarterly 26 : 243 268. Dewally, M. and L. H. Ederington, 2006, Reputation, Certification, Warranties and Information as Remedies for Seller2buyer Information Asymmetries : Lessons from the Online Comic Book Market, Journal of Business, 79 (2). Dewan, S. and V. Hsu, 2004, Adverse Selection in Electronic Markets : Evidence from Online Stamp Auctions, Journal of Industrial Economics 52 (4) : 497 516. Eaton, D. H., 2002, Valuing Information : Evidence from Guitar Auctions on ebay, Working Paper, Murray State University. Heckman, J., 1979, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error, Econometrica 47 :153 161. Hidvegi, Z., W. Wang, and A. B. Whinston, 2003, Buy2price English Auction, Working Paper. Houser, D. and J. Wooders, 2001, Reputation in Auctions : Theory and Evidence from ebay, Working Paper. Kalyanam, K. and S. McIntyre, 2001, Return on Reputation in Online Auction Markets, Working Paper, Santa Clara University. Klein, Daniel (ed. ), 1997, Reputation, The University of Michigan Press. Kirkegaard, R. and P. B. Overgaard, 2003, Buy2out Prices in Online Auctions : Multi2unit Demand, Working Paper, University of Aarhus. Kreps, D., 1990, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, ed. by James E. Alt, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. ( 124 ) 91
2006 2006, ( ), ( 91 ) Lou, X. and H. Zhong, 2003, When to Use Buy2price Auction?,Working Paper, Oxford University. Melnik, M. I. and J. Alm, 2002, Does a Seller s Ecommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from ebay Auctions, Journal of Industrial Economics, L, 337 349. Livingston, J., 2005, How Valuable is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions, Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (3) : 453 465. Lucking2Reiley, D.L., D. Bryan and D. Reeves, 2000, Pennies from ebay : the Determinants of Price in Online Auctions, Working Paper, Vanderbilt University. Shapiro, C., 1983, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 : 659 680. White, H., 1980, A Heteroskedasticity2consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48. The Value of Reputation : Evidence from Online Auctions Zhou Li an a, Zhang Weiying a, Gu Quanlin b and Shen Yi c (a : Guanghua School of Management,PKU ;b : Institute of Business Research,PKU ;c :e2business Center,PKU) Abstract :Using a large online transaction dataset from Eachnet, this paper empirically examines the effect of seller reputation on market transactions. We find that seller reputation has a significantly positive impact both on the probability of successful transaction and on the transaction price. As a major finding of our paper, we also show that the positive effect on the probability of successful transaction seems to be larger than that on the transaction price. These findings provide evidence on positive role of reputation in a laissez faire virtual market. Key Words :Reputation ;Market Transactions ;Online Auctions JEL Classification :L140, L150 ( : ) ( : ) 124