( * H H (?? ( ( :Cheung 1974 * (70425002 Konrad Hagedorn Volker Beckmann Justus Wesseler - 39 -
(Williamson1999;Ruiter 2005 (Williamson Buitelaar(2004;2007 1985;Beckmann2000 ; ; 3 : 3 4 5 6 3 3 5 (Williamson1979; Simon1991 1 (Probit Logic ; ( (sample selection bias 2 ( - 40 -
( X α β e 1 e 2 G 1 Pr(TC(G 1 <TC(G 2 =Pr(e 1 -e 2 <(β-αx X 3 (β-α Probit Logit ( 3 : Probit Logit (β-α/σ (σ ( σ ( 1. ( Probit Logit (inverse Mill s ratio ( (Heckman1979;Lee1979 (3 ( (4 7 G 2 G 1 X ( G 1 G 2 G 1 Maddala(1983 (Masten et al.1991 2. G 1 TC(G <TC(G (1 G 1 2 1 TC(G 1 <TC(G 2 (3 G { * = G G 2 TC(G 1 TC(G * = 2 { (2 G 2 TC(G 1 TC(G 2 (4 TC(G 1 =αx+e 1 ;TC(G 2 =βx+e 2 TC(G 1 =αx+e;tc(g 2 =N.A. (1 (2 G * TC(G 1 TC(G 2 G 1 G 2-41 -
H 8 H 83 ( 5 9 H 1 ( 10 1 10 (1 10 : = ( + 輥輯訛 1 輥輰訛 1. 2 3 Probit 3 (1 3 Williamson(1999 SECURITY HUMAN ( - 42 -
( ( EXTERNALITY Williamson(1999 PROBITY (2 Williamson(1996 ( FVCCONTROL FVCCONTROL LAWCONFLICT (3 G h α e 1 ( U e 2 ( 輥輱訛 2. 3 : (1 (G h σ 12 =0 ; 2 3 G h ( LAMBDA( 輥輲訛 (2 Maddala(1983 3 (2 (G m (G h FVCCONTROL PROBITY PROBITY G h Williamson(1999 Probit HUMAN Probit SECURITY EXTERNALI- TY LAWCONFLICT (2005 ( Probit σ 1 σ 2 σ 12 (G m (β 3 輥輳訛 G m β σ 12 =0 G m Ruiter - 43 -
PROBITY (1 (2 (2 HUMAN SECU- RITY EXTERNALITY FVCCONTROL LAWCON- FLICT (1 Probit 3. 83 ( 4-44 - 58 50 25 4 54 5 28.34% 1.3 260 11 4 ( 51 44 ( 32 3.4 11.3% H 5 83 11 26 34 35 36 38 45 50 57 62 81 83
( 4 21 32 41 47 ( 11 ( 4 H ( 51 ( 32 83 H ( ( ( - 45 -
3? H H 11.3% 83 : 1 Williamson (1985;1996;1999 2 Yvrande-Billon Saussier(2004 Masten (1991 Maddala (1983 Heckman(1979 Lee(1979 3 4 5 6 Williamson(1999 Ruiter(2005 7 Maddala(1983-46 - 8 9 83
996. 10 (7Maddala G. S. 1983 Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 輥輯訛 (8Masten S. E. Meehan J. W. Snyder E. A. 1991 The ( H Cost of Organization The Journal of Law Economic and Organization Vol. 7 pp.1~25. (9Ruiter D. W. P. 2005 Is Transaction Cost Economics Applicable To Public Governance? European Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 20 pp. 287~303. (10Simon H. A. 1991 Organizations and Markets Journal Of Economic Perspectives 5 pp.25~44 (11Williamson O. E. 1979 Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations Journal of Law and 輥輰訛 Economics Vol. 22 pp.233~261. (12Williamson O. E. 1985 The Economic Institutions of ; Capitalism New York: The Free Press. (13Williamson O. E. 1996 The Mechanisms of Governance New York: Oxford University Press. ( (14Williamson O. E. 1999 Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Journal of 1 Law Economics and Organization Vol. 15 pp. 306~342. (HUMAN ; (15Yvrande-Billon A. Saussier S. 2004 Do Organization Choices Matter? Assessing the Importance of Governance (FVC- CONTROAL ; through Performance Comparisons In: J. Harvey (Ed. New 1 Ideas In Contraction And Organizational Economics Research 輥輱訛 Norwell MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 輥輲訛 (inverse Mill s ratio Probit :λ=f (z/f (zz ( H ( Probit (β-αxf F 1 輥輳訛 t Maddala(1983pp.223~228 (1Beckmann V. 2000 Transaktionskosten Und Institutionelle Wahl in Der Landwirtschaft Zwischen Markt Hybrid Und Hierarchie Berlin: Edition Sigma. (2Buitelaar E. 2004 A Transaction-Cost Analysis of the Land Development Process Urban Studies Vol. 41 pp. 2539~2553. (3Buitelaar E. 2007 The Cost of Land Use Decisions: Applying Transaction Cost Economics to Planning and Development Blackwell Publisher. (4Cheung S. N. S. 1974 A theory of Price Control Journal of Law and E- conomics Vol. 17 pp. 53~71. (5Heckman J. J. 1979 Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error Econometrica Vol. 47 pp. 153~161. (6Lee L. F. 1979 Identification And Estimation In Binary Choice Models With Limited (Censored Dependent Variables Econometrica vol. 47 pp. 977 ~ - 47 -
BRIFE COMMENTARIES The Effect of Income the Coase Theorem and the Harmonious Society ( by Feng Ruofei Yan Hongzhong and Ma Jianhua Technological and Scientific Policy Analysis with the Relationship between Innovation Rate and Economic Growth by Yao Yongling Global Economiy Imbalance and Finance Crisis by Zhu yue The Foresighted Study on China s Banking Crises and Monetary Crises in the Context of the Present Global Financial Turmoil by Chen Hong and Peng Dawei The Main Conclusions and Prospects Made by the Study from the 4-dimentional Angles concerning Enterprises Property Rights on the Distribution of Enterprise Income by Li Quanlun The Construction of the System of the Ethics of Small- and Medium-sized Firms by Chen Aiqing A Case Study on the Economic Fluctuations in the Regional Structure in China s Building Industry by Yang Youzhi The Growth of Enterprises in China s Economic Transition by Zhou Wen and Li Xiaohong A Comparative between China and America Study on the Consumption of Sports Goods for Popular Physical Exercise by Diao Li Li Zhaoxi and Liang Song ABSTRACTS IN ENGLISH The Boundary between the Function of the Market and That of the Government: Choosing the Governance Structure of the Non-agricultural Use of Farmland by Tan Rong and Qu Futian How to ascertain the functional scope of the market and that of the government has been the focus to which the Chinese government has been paying close attention in China s economic transition. Theoretically the boundary between the function of the market and that of the government can be easily and distinctly drawn but in practice it is hard to do so. Starting from the comparison between the transaction costs of different governance structures transaction cost economics has provided a new perspective for in practice the determination of the said boundary. In this article we have extended the content of transaction cost from the traditional private domain to the public domain that is the non-agricultural use of farmland (NAUOF which China pays close attention to at present and have constructed the theoretic framework for the governance structure of NAUOF. Then we have applied this framework to a certain city chosen an appropriate way of governance for this city for the fulfillment of the concrete task of NAUOF in this city and fixed the said boundary. At the same time from the point of view of clarifying the functions of the market and the government and from the angle of the reduction of the transaction costs of the government control we have offered our suggestions which differ from the argument for blind markets about the increase of the performance of China s NAUOF. Does Interdependence Asymmetry always Jeopardize Relationship Quality? Ren Xingyao Liao Juanan and Qian Liping In the marketing channels area scholars have long been interested in the link between dependence and relationship quality. Prior empirical research generally has provided substantial support for the negative relationship between interdependence asymmetry and relationship quality. However it is difficult to answer the question: "Does interdependence asymmetry always jeopardize relationship quality?" Accordingly this study investigates how interdependence asymmetry in channel relationships affects the weaker's perception of the stronger's opportunism and the weaker's evaluation of their relational performance. We empirically test and identify how third -party - 187 -