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6 Jalan Pandu Baru No.2 Tanjung PinangSenggarang, Dapo or Chaopo 1779 Tanjung PinangSenggarang, Dapo or Chaopo 1811 Tanjung PinangSenggarang, Dapo or Chaopo 1832 Tanjung PinangXiaopo 1857

7 Tanjung PinangSenggarang, Dapo or Chaopo

8 Tanjung PinangXiaopo 1876 Tanjung PinangXiaopo 1876/77 Jalan Pandu Baru No Jalan Pandu Baru No Jalan Pandu Baru No

9 Tanjung PinangXiaopo 1909 or 1969 Tanjung PinangXiaopo early 1910 or 1970 Jalan Pandu Baru No

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11 Tanjung PinangXiaopo 1916 Jalan Pandu Baru No WIHARA ARIYA SATYANI Jalan Pandu Baru No.2 11

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13 MALACCA Temple Street, 1786 MALACCA Temple Street, 1809 MALACCA Temple Street, 1816 MALACCA Temple Street, 1816 MALACCA Jonker Street

14 KELANTAN Kota Bharu 1868 KELANTAN Kota Bharu MALACCA Jonker Street 1871

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16 KELANTAN Kota Bharu 1880 KELANTAN Kota Bharu 1880 PENG AND WELLESLEY Penang in Pitt Street 1885/6

17 SABAH Sandakan 1887 SABAH Sandakan 1887 KUALA LUMPUR High Street

18 MALACCA Jonker Street 1888 SARAWAK Kuching located at 38, Carpenter Street 1888 MALACCA Jonker Street 1889 SELANGOR Kuala Selangor Pasir Penambang 1892 SELANGOR Kuala Selangor in Jalan Batu Burok 1893/4

19 PAHANG Kuala Lipis 1898 KUALA LUMPUR Sungei Besi Road 1901 PAHANG Pekan

20 NEGERI SEMBILAN Seremban, Fu-Jungin Bukit Road 1904 PAHANG Kuantan in Bukit Ubi Road TRENGGANU Kemasek, Ayer Jerneh 1906

21 JOHORE Muar 1908 PAHANG Kuantan in Bukit Ubi Road 1908 PAHANG Kuantan in Bukit Ubi Road 1908 KUALA LUMPUR Sultan Street

22 JOHORE Kota Tinggi 1917/18 KUALA LUMPUR Sungei Besi Road 1934 SELANGOR Klang in Jalan Tungku Dia Udin, 1953 PAHANG Temerloh 1956 PENG AND WELLESLEY Penang in Muntri Street 90

23 1958 PAHANG Kuantan in Bukit Ubi Road

24 PAHANG Mentekab in Main Street 1960,

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46 Nahhon si thammerat 1887 Nahhon si thammerat Nahhon si thammerat Prachinburi Singburi ( ) 1895

47 Singburi ( ) Bangkok Bangrak Ranong PhuketThanon Krabi

48 PhuketThanon Krabi Prachinburi early 1963

49 Prachinburi Prachinburi Singburi ( ) 1969 Rat(Cha)buri

50 Rat(Cha)buri PhuketThanon Krabi

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52 A Comparison of Traditional Townhouses in Hoi-An and Lu-Gang \ Lan-shiang Huang Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Taiwan History I. Introduction This paper attempts to study the formative factors and characteristics of townhouses in Hoi-An through the comparison of traditional townhouses in Hoi-An, Vietnam and in Lu-Gang, Taiwan, in terms of their architectural style and spatial layout. Generally speaking, a townhouse refers to a place of residency in the town. However, in many cases, this place of abode serves also as a place of business. Thus, such townhouse is sometimes called 'shophouse' which indicates the dual functions it performs. Most of the townhouses discussed in this paper are of this type where the household run business as well as live on the same premises. II. Hoi-An and Lu-Gang Hoi-An in Vietnam was originally an international trade port and flourished from the early 17th century as a result of the mass influx of Chinese refugees following the downfall of the Ming Dynasty. Chinese inhabitants of Hoi-An were mainly immigrants from Fukien and Canton. Even though the population of Chinese from the southeast coastal regions of China and local Vietnamese are around the same with few Japanese ever settled in Hoi-An, this small town can still be seen as an early \ Paper presented at International Workshop on Current Vietnam Studies, held by Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei., June 18-19, 1998.

53 example of a Chinatown where overseas Chinese settled because of the dominant Chinese culture. The townhouses built during the 18th and 19th centuries reflected the influence of Chinese culture. They bear some resemblance to those found in Lu-Gang which also developed as an immigrant society. Lu-Gang was originally inhabited by plains aborigines. Nowadays, the inhabitants are descendants of the immigrants from the coastal regions of China who settled there in the 18 th century. These new settlers almost changed completely the lifestyle of plains aborigines who became sinicized gradually. All in all, Hoi-An and Lu-Gang have similar development histories which show evidence of the influence of immigrants from China. (Fig.1;Fig.2) III. Townhouses in Hoi-An and Lu-Gang Traditional townhouses which remained in today's Hoi-An and Lu-Gang were constructed almost in the same period with inhabitants being mainly immigrants from the southeast coastal areas of China. A comparison between the townhouses in both places would shed light on the influence behind the similarities and contrasts exhibited. (1) Architectural Scale & Spatial Layout Townhouses in both places are of a long narrow structure composing of three parts: front and rear houses separated by a open courtyard in the middle. The front house structure always features double gable roofs with a valley in between. Valleys can also be found between the covered passage next to the open courtyard and the eaves of the front and rear houses. Larger townhouses in Lu-Gang bear a similar structure but of a larger scale and a longer length. Between the front and rear houses, there may be more than one courtyards separated by houses in between. For townhouses in Hoi-An, there are usually only backyards behind the rear houses. (Fig.3-1;Fig.3-2;Fig.4) Regarding the spatial layout of townhouses in Hoi-An, the three compartments of the front house serve as the shop, the warehouse and the reception room. The covered passage next to the open courtyard is also the accountant office. The rear house contains the living rooms and bedrooms while the kitchen, bathroom and toilet can be found in the backyard. (Fig.5) 53

54 In contrast, townhouses in Lu-Gang, the front house serves the functions as a place for business, a shrine for ancestral tablets, and the master bedroom. The courtyard, where the well is normally located, has a wall on one side and a corridor on the other. The rear house contains the place for ancestral worship and the bedrooms of the senior members of the family. In short, townhouses in both places feature a long narrow structure with houses and courtyards. Differences in terms of layout include the independent accountant office found only in Hoi-An townhouses. Kitchen and bathroom facilities are situated in the backyard for Hoi-An townhouses while those can be found in the open courtyard of Lu-Gang townhouses. The place for ancestral worship is found on the first floor of Lu-Gang townhouses but on the second floor of the one in Hoi-An. (2) The Aisle in the Center and on the Side With few exceptions, townhouses in Hoi-An feature a long aisle passing through the whole length of the house, like the central axis. This 'thoroughfare' passage serves the purpose for goods to be transported from the back to the front house for sale. This confirms the usual practice for goods to be loaded from the back, stored inside and sold at the front. (Fig.3-1;Fig.3-2) Seniors in Lu-Gang and other parts of Taiwan recalled townhouses of a similar design, for goods to be loaded, stored and sold, as those in Hoi-An. However, examples of the layout with a central aisle, can hardly be found nowadays and there are conflicting evidences in literature. While some scholars deny the existence of such townhouses, others propose a possibility of transformation. It has been suggested that townhouses with a central aisle and symmetric layout on both sides were built during the late Ching Dynasty under the influence of Chinese. However, western influence, the limitation of the long narrow structure and the need of a entrance in the center for the shrine in the rear house, resulted in the change to a asymmetric layout with the aisle relocated to the side. These side aisles can either be a 'thoroughfare' passage against the side wall or a 'zig-zag' passage winding through the various parts of the house.(fig.6) (3) Roof Structure The roof structure of the townhouses in the two places shows much difference. As mentioned, the roof structure of front houses in Hoi-An have double gable roofs.

55 The bigger compartment of the front house has a unique feature of interlocking rafters at the crest, while the smaller compartment facing the courtyard is made up of three horizontal beams supported by five melon-shaped short posts, similar to the structure of temples in Fukien and Canton. (Fig.7-0) Such roof structure can also be found in Hue residences and is a characteristic feature for houses in central Vietnam. (Fig.7) Another special feature is wooden posts for support found in the side walls. This a very common practice in northern and central Vietnam. Temples in Hanoi and palaces in Hue also exhibit the same characteristic. Since brick walls on the side do not provide structural support, they only serve as partitions. In fact, studies on traditional Vietnamese architectural practice reveal that only wooden posts are originally used for the framework of the structure with partitioning brick walls added at a later stage. Even though posts half hidden in walls can be seen also in elaborate structures or temples of Taiwan, whether there exists any relationship between the Chinese and Vietnamese practice needs further examination. On the other hand, instead of supporting the house with wooden posts or wooden framework, townhouses in Lu-Gang have stone walls built all the way to the roof crest with parallel wooden girders lying on the two sides of the gable wall. Not only does it give a different interior appearance of the house, it also allows the flexibility for attics to be added easily. (Fig.4) Despite the fact that townhouses in Hoi-An are influenced by Chinese culture strongly, the difference in roof structure between them and those in Lu-Gang hints that Hoi-An has come under greater influence from the architectural style in central Vietnam. (4) Quadrangle Opening in the First Floor Ceiling A common feature found in townhouses of both Hoi-An and Lu-Gang is the quadrangle opening in the first floor ceiling of the two-storeyed front house with a stairway to the side. Apart from Lu-Gang, a few examples of such can be found elsewhere in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the location of the opening varies. In Hoi-An, the first floor is the 'thoroughfare passage' and the opening is in the center right above the four main posts. In most cases, ancestral tablets and statues of deities are placed on the second floor. Whether such opening serves as the function to link the two floors in ceremonial worship or to transport goods between the floors remains to be examined. (Fig.8) 55

56 However, for townhouses in Lu-Gang, the quadrangle opening tends to be located closer to the front. Another contrast is that the place for sacrificial worship is on the first floor and not on the second as in Hoi-An. Hence, the opening is right above where sacrificial rituals take place. This together with the matching decorations of the shrine and the rails along the opening imply some relation between such structure and worship. Can this be sufficient as an alternative explanation to the traditional belief that such openings are made to provide better lighting in the house? As a whole, quadrangle opening in the ceiling is a common feature in traditional townhouses of Chinese communities. However, the reasons behind having such need further investigation. (5) Positions of Ancestral Tablets Almost with no exceptions, all ancestral tablets including those in Lu-Gang are placed in the center facing the door with symmetric positioning on the sides. However, it is surprising to find in Hoi-An ancestral tablets facing the house, the left or the right while some are placed in the center with asymmetric positioning on the sides. It is found that almost all ancestral tablets are facing the river which borders the city. Probably feng-shui has played a role in such positioning. (Fig.7) (6) Narrow Central Post Bay Hoi-An townhouses, despite being built under the influence of Chinese culture, feature a narrow central post bay that different from the traditional Chinese architectural practice. The width of central post bay is shorter than those at both side post bays. Although the house may have a length of m, the facade may only have a width of 5-6m. Since many compartments such as bedrooms, warehouse, shrine for ancestral tablets and accountant office need to be located on both sides of the aisle, there leaves only a narrow passage for the transport of goods from the back. Although townhouses in Hoi-An are influenced by the architectural style in the central part of Vietnam, this feature of a narrow central aisle is not found in traditional houses of Hue or the palaces. Hence, how this feature arises remains obscure. IV. Conclusion The period of town development in Hoi-An and Lu-Gang are different. Yet what remains today can be regarded as the architecture of the same period. In addition,

57 most of the inhabitants are immigrants from the southeast coastal areas of China, then why do these houses exhibit different features? In fact, though Hoi-An is a Chinatown in today's Vietnam with plenty of Chinese inhabitants, there is also a sizable Vietnamese population residing there. Moreover, townhouses in Hoi-An are much influenced by the traditional architectural style in central Vietnam while Lu-Gang though formally inhabited by natives have come totally under Chinese influence. Thus, the difference in cultural background may possibly result in the different architectural characteristics displayed. 57

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63 Confucian Temple in Hanoi \ Ron-guey Chu Assistant Research Fellow, Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy Located at the heart of Hanoi, Van Mieu (Temple of Culture, or Confucian Temple) is a serene presence in the bustling city and remains as the foremost symbol of Vietnamese culture and identity. Van Mieu is also the most noticeable landmark of Hanoi. Recently the city government of Hanoi chose the famous ceremonial arch of the Confucian Temple as the city emblem.van Mieu has a continuous history of more than five hundred years, while the date of its initial founding is in dispute. Surrrounded by small walls, Van Mieu is impressive in size, 350 m by 70 m, but not imposing. Most of its space is filled with ponds and gardens. It is a real pleasure to wonder about in its precinct. The latest renovation of Van Mieu took place in When I visited Van Mieu in March 1997, the halls and pagodas looked anciet and august, as Confucian temple should. However, the images of Confucian sages housed in the hall appeared gaudy to this traveler and must be much more recent inventions. In this brief paper I will reflect on my first encounter with Van Mieu and on its history in larger Asian perspective. Scholarship on Hanoi s Van Mieu is quite substantial. Perhaps it is safe to say that Van Mieu s history is not as old as Vietnamese official historical records would like us to believe, which claim that Van Mieu was founded in twelfth century. Van Mieu as we know it today probably dated back to fifteenth century and the 82 stelae bearing the names of those who passed the civil service examinations are the most telling witness of its history and of its importance in Vietnamese society. The Confucian temple in Hanoi was established to unify the thought and endeavors of scholars and to give legitemacy to the ruling dynasty, as its counterparts in China, Korea, Japan and Ryukyu served similar goals. However, the stelae in Hanoi s \ Paper presented at International Workshop on Current Vietnam Studies, held by Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei., June 18-19,

64 Confucian temple is unique and it is worthwhile to look into what symbolic meaning they represent in the minds of Vietnames scholars in the past. Equally unique and striking is the fact that Van Mieu uses images of Confucian sages on the altar instead of spirit tablets, which has become standard practice since sixteenthth century. This probably is also the result of recent renovation, because we do not have any good reason to suggest that Vietnam would want to depart from the universal practice of Confucian temple. In the main hall there are Vietnamese scholars who are enshrined on the side altars. It is nothing unusual to canonize local scholars in Confucian temple. Korea and Japan did it to give recognition to their native sons, but the scholars so honored were inducted to the side chambers of the Confucian temple, rather than placed in the main hall, which is considered to be the inner sanctum. Equally striking is the fact that the image of Duke of Chou is enshrined in the main hall. This clearly reflects that Vietnamese are following T ang rituals rather than the rituals codified by Ming dynasty. As far as I know, no other Confucian temple confer such a high ritual honor to the Duke of Chou. I do not think this is a simple case of anachronism. Whatever political purpose the Duke of Chou represents for Vietnam, the enshrinement of the Duke suggests that Vietnamese adoptation of Chinese culture is selective, rather than slavish or unreflective. I came away with amazement regarding to the degree with which Vietnamese have been adapting Chinese culture and institutions. Its relative remote location from the cultural center of China may be an important factor for the Vietnamese to create something new and suitable to their local needs. Nowadays incense is burned in Van Mieu and the access to it is open to the public. Some of the space in the Confucian temple is used for public lectures. It will be interesting to see how a place like this, which is vested with history and respect, plays any role in the rapidly modernizing society in Vietnam. If creative adaptation is the pattern of the development of Confucianism in Vietnam, I will not be surprised that Confucian tradition continues to strive for a meaning place in the life of modern Vietnamese people. The goal of my research is to investigate how Confucianism adapts to the Vietnamese society both in the past as well as in more recent history. One important function of Confucian temple is its role in educating the ruling elite and in formulating an ideology to unify the thought of the intellectuals. There was a school called Goc Gu Giam (Imperial College) attached to Van Mieu, until it was moved to Hue in Today only the street in front of Van Mieu, which is called Goc Gu giam Road, reminds us of its former existence. However, in the

65 imperial palace in Hue we can still see the building of imperial college, which now is turned into a museum. Confucian temple was not only important as the ritual center of the nation, where ritual respect was paid to Confucian and distinguished scholars canonized there twice a year, but also served as the training ground for the prince and the elite. Whether Vietnamese political institutions in 19th century or earlier were based on Chinese model remains an open question. But we could not discount Chinese influences on Vietnamese education, statecraft and historiography, even if Vietnamese imperial court did not operate exactly as its Chinese counterpart did. Van Mieu is where Confucian impact on Vietnam was at its peak and at its best. 65

66 Coping with Corruption in Indonesia: the Perspective of Taiwanese Businessmen \ Jiann-fa Yan Research Fellow, Institute for National Policy Research The Spread of Taiwanese Capital toward Indonesia In the early 1980s, while the US current account balance went from bad to worse, the Asia-Pacific region, especially the NIEs, experienced fairly rapid growth. Since 1986, the US has paid attention to trade friction and trade balances and, among other policies, pressed Taiwan for liberalization. The previous rises in wage levels, education, and labor consciousness were intensified by the appreciation of the NT dollar. Suitated at the semiperipheral position of the international division of labor, Taiwan s manufacturing industries then faced dual pressures, both from advanced countries highly competitive technology and from the rise of newly developing countries labor-intensive industries. Adding labor-management disputes and domestic environmental protests, Taiwanese small-to-medium enterprises had no choice but to transfer the less competitive production facilities to developing countries. Because of their geographical proximity, abundant of natural resources, plentiful labor supply, relatively cheap land, and great potential for economic development, Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia, became attractive places for Taiwanese investment. Indonesia is one of the Southeast Asian countries which are saddled with sunstantial external debt. Taiwanese investments, then, are much welcomed by \ Paper presented at Workshop on Ethnic Chinese Business in Southeast Asia, held by Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, November 17-18,1998.

67 Indonesian authorities. Demand creates change. In October 1989, the ROC s representative office in Jakarta changed its name to "Taipei Economic and Trade Office." In December 1990, Taipei and Jakarta also signed an investment agreement. 1 In 1991, Taiwan became the top foreign investor in Indonesia, having injected $1,056.5 million into the country s economy, representing 12 percent of the total foreign investments in the country in that year. As of February 1994 Taiwan had invested a total of $4 billion, just behind Japan and Hong Kong. 2 In 1994, the Ministry of Economic Affairs of ROC formed a "Special Committee for Economic and Trade in Southeast Asia" to facilitate Taiwan s economic cooperation with that region. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam were officially selected as the key aid recipient countries. It is estimated that Taiwan s assistance to Indonesia reached US$40 million in Although Taiwan s investments in the Southeast Asian countries had declined somewhat since early 1990 s, due to the soaring attractiveness of the Chinese market, Indonesia is still the number one country in Southeast Asia for Taiwanese investors with $12.6 billion in gross investment from Taiwan. 4 Furthermore, due to progressive accumulation of profits, increasing reliance on the supports from local resources, more familiarity with the local market, and the promising prospects of the AFTA, Taiwanese businesses in Indonesia tend to greater degree of indigenization. Hence, Studies of Indonesia obviously are important for Taiwan, either for practical uses or academic interests. In this research project, the author attempts to use business studies as a tool to approach the nature of Indonesian society. The author tries to draw some sociological observations found not only inside but also outside the factories. It is an unverified conventional wisdom among the small-to-medium businesses community that most of the business networks and channels are built by investors themselves, without any substantial aid from the government. This interpretation not only breaks the myth of the ROC's southbound policy, but also raises the interesting question: how can businessmen earn money and cope with difficulties in dealings? After listening to serveral Taiwanese investors in Indonesia in research interviews held in November of 1994 in Indonesia, "corruption " then emerged and was selected as a key concept and issue for research. All of the interviewed businessmen maintained that bribery is an 1 Teh-Chang Lin, The ROC's Foreign Aid and the Southward Policy, Issue & Studies, Vol.31, No.10, Oct 1995,p.20 2 Gerald Chan, "Sudpolitik: the Political Economy of Taiwan's Trade with Southeast Asia,", The Pacific Review, Vol.9, No.1, 1996, pp Samuel C.Y. Ku, The Political Economy of Taiwan s Relations with Southeast Asia: the Southward Policy, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No.3,December 1995,p Export Import Bank of the Republic of China Financial Bi-monthly(in Chinese), September, 1997, pp

68 unvoidable matter in deals, but bribery was not condemned, nor did it make Taiwanese investors feel uncomfortable. They treated it as a part of business costs or as service fees. Rather than reproaching corruption, they used it instead. The author attempts to analyze corruption matters in terms of a politico-economic approach. In the analysis, interview data are an important part. Though basic interview data were collected in November 1994, 5 subsequent observations in Taiwan have been continued through personal contacts with busniessmen here in Taiwan. II. Structural Roots of Indonesian Corruption The general image of corruption as a prevalent social phenomenon acquired during the interviews with Taiwanese businessmen led this author to the necessity of penetrating beyond superficial legislation deep into the very nature of power in Indonesia. As a matter of fact, "corruption" has been a major politico-economic issue in Indonesia for a long time. It has been a major motive for the anti-government movements. 6 Riots and sporadic attacks in Jakarta and other towns during this May s election campaign have been interpreted as a form of resistance against political corruption and bureaucratic constraints. 7 Further, the disastrous smog imputed to plantation owners' illegally burning forest for land-clearing also raised accusations of corruption. A representative comment states, If a local official tries to enforce the ban, you just bribe him. At the most, you promise to give him some shares. 8 But why have corruption phenomena persisted? We may have to inquire deep into Indonesian political structures--the Guided Democracy which term was coined by Sukarno. He claimed to have created a different kind of democracy suited to the uniqueness of Indonesia: Pancasila democracy. 9 Under Sukarno's charismatic rule, the parliamentary model was formally replaced with a presidential system in Since then, political power was to reside firmly in the hands of the President and the officials of the state. 5 The interviewed factories in a small-to-medium scale include shoemaker, textile, furniture, animal feed, and gas stove. One interviewed company is a branch of a big business group in Taiwan. Interviews were held in Jarkata and Bandung during November 8-13, Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, A Publication of Asia Studies Association of Australia, Australian National University,1988,Fourth Impression,p Margot Cohen, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 29, Margot Cohen & Murray Hiebert, Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2, Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, Gary Rodan, eds., Southeast Asia in the 1990s-Authoritarianism, democracy and capitalism, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993, p.43. The National ideology, Pancasila, has five principles: a belief in one supreme God, justice and civility among peoples, the unity of Indonesia, democracy through deliberation and consensus among representatives, and social justice for all. 10 Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, Gary Rodan, eds., 1993, p.43

69 Suharto took power from Sukarno in His stress on economy rather than politics for national development strategies was distinctly different from Sukarno's. However, Suharto's 'New Order' ideal was not completely divorced from the political line of the Guided Democracy. The Constitution bestows upon the Indonesian president tremendous power, especially as the supreme commander of the armed forces. The 1993 Golkar Congress gave a clear indication that the chief supervisor was supreme and was the real decision maker. It assisted a further concentration of power in the hands of Suharto. Over more than 30 years in power, Suharto and the presidency have become synonymous. 11 Even when keterbukaan (openness) was promoted, it is Suharto who has been in control of the process. With the control of the military, Suharto has become the patriarch, the dominant political force in Indonesia, taking the top down pattern of decision-making. The Indonesian constitution acknowledges that monopolies are permissible, if controlled by the government with the intention of bringing benefits to as many people as possible. The national interest legitimizes Suharto's deeds and provides pretexts to evade the people's demand for the enactment of an anti-monopoly law. Suharto seems to have ignored past criticism over the corrupt practices of the presidential family s business empire and the concentration of economic power in the hands of his cronies. 12 Although Suharto s rule had produced better living standards by the early 1980s, the undercurrent of commentary during the May election campaign this year signaled that a majority wishes Suharto step down. 13 Since the 1970s, Suharto has set up numerous tax-free charitable foundations (yayasan) which control Indonesia's financial resources. The president has granted monopolies to certain Indonesian conglomerates in return for enormous contributions to these funds. These foundations, headed by his family members, have provided Suharto with enormous funds for his personal and political activities. 14 Ideally, as an organ for policy execution, bureaucracy should be freed from involvement in politics, but in Indonesia, virtually every top government echelon, from cabinet members to village heads, are functionaries of the ruling party, Golkar. Under the guided democratic framework, a nationalistic strategy of industrial planning gives state bureaucrats a strategic grip of authority over the market and over 11 Leo Suryadinata, "Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto s Indonesia," Asian Survey,Vol.XXXVII, No.3, March 1997,pp Jacques Bertrand, Business as Usual in Suharto s Indonesia,Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVII, No. 5, May 1997,p Ibid.,p Leo Suryadinata 1997,p.275 & Kevin Hewison,Richard Robison, Gary Rodan,eds., 1993, p.48 69

70 alliances between themselves and corporate capitalist clients. 15 On the one hand the state intervenes in mercantilist fashion to protect national enterprises and national economic agendas; on the other, its officials appropriate state resources and authority on behalf of specific political and corporate interests. 16 Officials are able to appropriate the power to allocate licenses for import, credit, forestry concessions, construction and supply contracts. Large numbers of bureaucrat families have directly entered the world of business to ensure capital accumulation. 17 Indonesia has long had a legal weapon, the 1971 Anti Corruption Law, to combat this phenomenon, but the law is seldom enforced. The head of the Financial Audit Board, Umar Wirahadkusuma, publicly admitted in 1981 that no departments are free of corruption. 18 The above analysis also unveils a further dimension, that state-capital relations are basically exercised on the basis of specific and personal relationships between a set of vested individuals. This patron-client framework is naturally conducive to a economy dominated by a few conglomerate owners which control over 70 percent of the country's business assets. From this angle, the mere introduction of modern management systems or legal regulations into the bureaucracy, which actions are now being pursued by the government can hardly eradicate the corruption culture. Ironically, seeking extra income or sidelines for better living or pleasure has also been prevalent in lower social strata, such as clerks, workers, and even homeless people,and so on. 19 This signifies that the roots of corruption can also be traced to the very base of society. As one comment in the local newspaper stated that the bureaucracy could not be entirely blamed for the current condition because the practice of paying off government officials often was started by the people themselves. 20 III. Corruption as a Constitutive Part of the BusinessWorld It is obvious that hierarchical structures based on patron-client relations exist behind the modern economy. The haves control most of the resources, and in turn 15 Kevin Hewison,Richard Robison, Gary Rodan,eds., 1993, pp & Ibid., p Kevin Hewison,Richard Robison, Gary Rodan,eds., 1993, p Richard Robison 1988,pp This is quite an interesting topic worth being inquired later after this paper. 20 Jarkata Times,

71 manipulate the have-nots. The linkage of money and power has shaped an autonomous entity which always supersedes the legal system. Bribery, then, has become a part of daily life and operates beyond legal constraints. While Suharto could boast in the early 1980s of his having produced better living standards, in the 1990s issues of political modernization, such as the openness of the political system and growing liberalization, have become important in the Indonesian political thinking. 21 For critics, the bureaucracy is counterproductive to Indonesian national development. If, for instance, to get an export permit we need one hundred signatures, and every signature means money, we can imagine what will happen for this country in the long run. 22 The degree of corruption in Indonesia has been persistently criticized by the World Bank, international business, and free-market economists. Corruption constitutes a sizeable leakage of funds which might potentially be more constructively invested. At the same time it imposes substantial costs and frustrations on investors. It is indicated that up to 20% of projected investment has been spent on investment licences. International capital is convinced that corruption is a major problem for investors. Corruption also constitutes a major obstacle to effective tax-collecting. 23 Certainly, in Indonesia, indigenous small entrepreneurs have also had to cope with endemic corruption. Local government officials and police and military officers will often knock on the doors of businesses to ask for contributions just as Taiwanese investors experience as will be stated below. Small businesses are compelled to pay, fearing the possible consequences of refusal. Businesses pay a plethora of other fees, both official and unoffcial. While there is a small official fee for business licences, many indigenous small enterpreneurs say they pay up to 200 times the set rate in order to have their applications processed in a reasonable amount of time. The bribe is known as a kind of service fee. Recent studies by the research groups Akatiga, Cemsed, and the Asia Foundation found that for small enterprises in Java and Bali these payments consume at least 5% of annual gross income, and in some cases as much as 20% Jacques Bertrand 1997,p Jarkata Times, Richard Robison1988,p Hetifah Sjaifudian, Far Eastern Economic Review,October ,p Ibid. 71

72 Medium- and large-scale businesses are by no means immune to the need to grease palms. Indeed, they spend billions of rupiah each year on entertaining government officials and on gifts for favors. However, large businesses are better equipped to exploit bureaucrats with payment to win tenders. 25 Besides, as with liberalization, the government push to reduce taxes and expedite business investment and access to markets has so far benefited only larger enterprises rather than small-to-medium ones. 26 IV. Taiwanese Businesses' Interpretations and Strategy toward Bribery and Extortion 27 Investment regulations are very well codified in Indonesia. But the legal provisions are disarticulated with the economic reality, which gap provides officers access to bribery. The salaries of officials are relatively low, so that bribery becomes a useful supplement. The approval of investment applications, for example to satisfy environmental protection, noise, sewage, fire, and public security regulations, is also conducive to bribery. As the interviewed Taiwanese businessmen attest, The concerned officials will come to offer consultancy services as private consultants. Different negotiated prices will determine different speeds and qualities of application process. Usually, officials have a two-sided name card. One side is for official use, the other side is for private consultancy use. Officials are approvers and brokers as well. The fees businessmen pay are partly for procedure and partly for social activities. There is a rule, but the ratio is negotiable. Sometimes, brokers raise the fee at the very crucial moment. Ambiguity leaves room for personal wisdom. Agencies (a specialized firm for handling customs clearance) are a necessary factor in all exportation and importation affairs. They become a bridge between firms and the bureaucratic administration. Officials charge some kickbacks for special favor from the agencies; firms pay the agency which assumes all the procedures necessary. Firms may apply for permission to act as their own agency, but they are doomed to fail. They will definitely not be approved since the concerned departments have overlapping interests with the agencies; thus, the agencies monopolize importation 26 Ibid. 27 This section is mainly based upon Interview data.

73 and exportation businesses. Some businesses grants also result in monopoly and then distort the regular business channels. For instance, an application for a telephone line is difficult and the procedures are complicated and time-consuming. Usually officials will suggest the applicants, for convenience, buy mobile phones at the designated shops. The officials may get kickbacks from the shops, or they may be among the share holders of the shop. Likewise, since electricity supply is limited by the volume of electricity meters for the sake of energy conservation, a factory has to set more electricity meters if it needs more electricity supply. The application for electricity meter entails extra bribes for special services. In addition to the protection of police, factories also have to worry about depredations from the army and from gangsters. Without a factory s consent, the army will send some soldiers to patrol it. The factory will have to pay for this service. Of course, they also have to continue to pay the police. As for gangsters, they will regularly claim charges for protection. It will be useless to report to the police, since gangsters will come after the policemen leave. Moreover, the policemen will also take the opportunity to charge a fee. As a result, factories usually resign themselves to the reality in order to maintain their operations. One the other hand, factories can make use of guanxi networks when needed. For instance, one factory which was suffering from thefts of materials by its workers used gangsters to catch them. The above description makes investment in Indonesia appear to be very complicated. But the opposite seems to be the case. In fact, the money game is very clear: as long as the players follow the rules, all will go smoothly. Any criticism of the game is politically unacceptable, and as such may lead to denial of access to business contracts and licenses. 28 Most Taiwanese businessmen see bribes as a part of the investment expenditure. Taiwanese businessmen even see bribery as a positive thing, since the bribed Indonesian officials can thereby be counted on to accomplish their obligation. By contrast, in China investors can only passively anticipate fewer nuisances from the officials when they give bribes; the system is filled with uncertainties in China. For Taiwanese businessmen, Indonesians are tamed. They are easily to deal with as long as foreigners respect them and preserve their face. As for anti-chinese sentiment, it is not a daily conflict, but a cyclical one, due to the unequal distribution of wealth 28 Richard Robison 1988, p

74 between ethnic Indonesian and ethnic Chinese people. The best policy is to keep a low profile during a protest movement. From a pragmatic point of view, the system of life needs money to support it, and foreign investors provide the necessary lubricant for its smooth operation. As part of the state s support for economic development, the introduction of foreign investment will be greatly encouraged; this will reinforce the kickback game. Although Indonesian society provides a favorable environment for bribery, not every business can operate well in dealing with bribery. Taiwanese small-to-medium businesses actually can play the game relatively easily. The basic nature of Taiwanese small-to-medium businesses is that managers and owners are identical so that managers can respond to situations immediately and make quick decisions. Further, they are experienced with bribery due to the environment they previously encountered during the incipient stage of industrialization in Taiwan. Small-to-medium businesses are good at seeking advantage for themselves by some means or other. Conversely, big businesses stress operating according to the law. Big businesses tend to be prudent, since their investment amount is more substantial. Furthermore, staff in such businesses usually act in a conservative manner in order to avoid any possible risk or mistake, which tendency is compounded by to centralization of power, where the overseas branches have to report to headquarters for instructions. But the problem is that the line between public and private interests is sometimes vague, and the staff of overseas branches will be afraid of any suspicion or mistake by the headquarters. As a result, they become reluctant to engage in bribery. They would rather follow the legal rules as much as possible although that may result in wasted time or even lost business opportunities. V. Concluding Remarks Suharto government's tolerance towards criticism without touching on sensitive issues, political succession for instance, is regarded to be not ready yet for genuine democracy. 29 Obviously, the state and its military and civil bureaucracies will remain a strong political force in forceseeable future. Above all, in the absence of a serious external threat, the military will focus on internal security. Pressure originating from civil society to push Indonesian democratization forward is still weak. Intellectuals, students, NGOs, and the press have consistently pushed for political change, but they 29 Leo Suryadinata, 1997,p.277

75 have not posed any real threat to the regime since the early 1970s. The problem is that the state can rely on a conservative and nationalist middle class to carry out the intellectual, technical and managerial functions of the state. The Golkar civilian leadership is largely middle class and devoted to the Pancasila ideal. 30 Furthermore, economic development has created a more self-confident middle class that is asking for a greater political role to protect their status quo interests; the business class has become more conservative. Both Chinese and indigenous businessmen have relied on a strong, patrimonial state, so they worry that democratization could erode their interests. 31 Hence, the phrase high-cost economy, referring to the price of corruption, nepotism, and public-service inefficiency, does not make much sense for the priviledged strata which relies upon privileged access to special interests. Nor does it for those established Taiwanese businesses which have interwoven themselves with the local interests. The recent political developments have generated concern among analysts. Although some progress toward more open political debate, a freer press, and a higher degree of tolerance for opposing groups was made in the early 1990s, there has been a sharp reversal since the closure of three major newspapers and news magazines in The trend seems to be a shift away from economic liberalization and back to state intervention. 32 In sum, with their advantageous geographical and economic position linking Northeast Asia with Southeast Asia, Taiwanese businesses can easily maneuver their natural and human resources to search for new markets and rise toward the upper ranks of the international division of labor. On the other hand, the durability and flexibility innate in Taiwanese entrepreneurs and enterprises also makes them readily able to exploit indigenous resources in Indonesia and skillfully evade risks or uncertainties. The argument of a French historian, Fernand Braudel, therefore aptly depicts the features of Taiwanese businesses in Indonesia: "the chief privilege of capitalism, today as in the past, remains the ability to choose and the freedom to adapt." 33 The features are: dominant positions in the international division of labor; advantages in technology, financial operation, management, and marketing networks; excellence in durability, sensibility, and flexibility in market situations; and experienced skills in human contacts and cultural adaptation. 30 Kevin Hewison,Richard Robison, Gary Rodan,eds., 1993, p Jacques Bertrand, 1997,pp R.William Liddle and Rizal Mallarangeng, Indonisia in 1996-Pressures from Above and Below,, Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVII, No. 2, February 1997,p Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism 15-18th Century: The Perspective of the World, Vol.3, N.Y.: Harper & Row Publishers, 1997, pp

76 (Kelabit) (Murut) Lun Bawang (Murut) Lun Bawang (Pa) (Kelabit) Kelabit Pa Labit(Labit ) ,603 ( 3,821 Lun Bawang 9,783 ) 3,000 Kerayan-Kelabit Lun Bawang (Lawas ) Lun Dayeh (Lawas )Lun Lod ( Lun Dayeh )Lun Ba ( )Lun Tana Luun Lun Dayeh Lun BawangBawang

77 Lun Bawang Lun Bawang Rang Dungo( ) Rang Dungo Teror Cho ( ) Rang Dungo Rang Dungo Rang Dungo Rang Dungo Rang Dungo Lun Bawang (1) Kelalan Trusan Lawas (350 ) (2) Limbang Murud Adang Miri Baram Limbang Ukong Trusan Lun Bawang Limbang (3) Padas Long MioLong Pa'Sia Pa Matang Mengalong 77

78 (tawa) (dalam) Lun Bawang (ruma kadang) (1) Takep uang ruma ( ) (2) Sikang (3) Bitaran sikang (4) dapur tatal () takep Lun Bawang Bario Lun Bawang (sawah padi) ngerupan ngerupan (patun lellang) Ngerupan (burak) (baya) ngerupan kerjasama

79 (salt spring) ilad ilad Lun Bawang (ngelalang) (abang abpa) (laleng isut) (laleb ba) ruyud 10 musang ngerupan Musang ngerupan musang ngerupan ngesul musang ngerupan AB A B B A A B A A umum ngumum Lun Bawang 79

80 (for) (with) (1) (spiritually hot)( ) (2) ( ) (1) (dolmen) (2) (nabung) (3) (kawang) ( ) ()Burak Ate ( ) burak () Nulang ( ) burak

81 (nabang kawang) nabang kawang Lun Bawang (1) lun mebala (binaweh) (2) lun tap-tap (3) lun dat demulun petabpar Lun Bawang 81

82 (irau) irau Irau Irau (dolmen) irau irau ( ) (Burak Lua) (1)Ngutek (2)Nui Ulung ulung ulung ulung ulung (3)Ngebpar Anak ulung () sarong (4)Nuwat Anak (batu pian) (iyo tu'uh)daren (uwat) (belu'ing) (bugo) (5)Ngelua Anak parang

83 (6)Naru Ngadan () (a) Tidan Pirak () Lipang Angit () ( ) (b) Agan ( ) (c) Tidan Pirak Lipang Angit Agan Kapong Raja Sina Kapong Raja Agan Kapong (d) Lipang Angit Semera Langit Sina Semera Langit Semera Langit Merium Tepun Sina Semera Langit Pun Midang Aran (e) Agan Awing Lihan Benjamin Agan Kapong Awing Lihan Benjamin Kapong Raja Sina Kapong Raja Raja Siwa Sina Raja Siwa Benjamin Agan Paran Siwa Reberuh Tepun (f) Benjamin Dayang Maran Apui Benjamin Agan Dayang Maran Apui Raja Siwa Sina Raja Siwa Balang Lipang Sina Balang Lipang Apui Balang Pu'un Bala Doo' Inan Lun Bawang ( kudin ) 83

84 Ignatius Sandyawan Sumardi Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan Tim Relawan

85 Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto Huaren Indonesian Crisis Center Underground net NGO transnational publicness 85

86 ICANet (Aware) Tulay

87 ICANet( Brown ) ICANet 1000 (teach-in) Northwestern University, Coalition 300 Against Persecution in Indonesia World Chinese Organization CSSA-UCLA Twnet Broadcasting Networks ICANet Washington DC Demonstration 400 Committee CSSA, University of Toronto Chinese Benevolent Association of Canada Association of Overseas Hong Kong for Democracy and Human Rights Ottawa Por-China group, Pro-Taiwan group CSSA, Helsinki Auckland Yellow Ribbon Campaign Calgary Calgary Coalition against Human Rights Violation in Indonesia Association of Chinese Students and Scholars Indonesians of Chinese Hertitage Foundation ICANet and local Bay Area Candlelight vigil communities Canadian Concern about Ethnic Violence in Indonesia (CCEVI), Ontario Indonesian Chinese Association (OICA) Memorial Service Aware The Coalition Against Human Rights Candlelight vigil Violation in Indonesia