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赴穹鲍
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1 207 4 * % % Shleifer & Vishny % Landry 2008 Xu 20 Qian & Weingast 997 Qian & Roland 998 Li & Zhou Olson 982 * liangph5@ mail. sysu. edu. cn n. aarongao@ zuel. edu. cn

2 2 Lieberthal & Lampton Bengt Holmstrom % % /. 8% http / /news. sina. com. cn /c /nd / /doc - ifxncyar shtml 36

3 207 4 Shleifer & Vishny Qian & Xu 993 M 2004 Li & Zhou Persson & Zhuravskaya 206 Jia et al. 205 real power Acemoglu & Robinson 2008 Acemoglu et al Francois et al. 205 Huang 2000 Shih 2004 Shih et al

4 Shirk Gilli & Li 203 logrolling Gilli et al. 205 Gao et al Olson 965 Bates 990 Milgrom & Roberts Holmstrom 984 Goltsman et al P A 2 A A 2 A 2 A 2 G G A A 2 2 θ θ 2 x x 2 Crawford & Sobel 982 U V U = - x - θ 2 - G x 2 - θ 2 2 V = - x - θ - b 2 2 V 2 = - G x 2 - θ 2 - b b b 2 0 θ θ 2 P 38

5 207 4 θ θ 2 A i θ i + b i i = 2 A i 0 θ θ 2 A A 2 P θ ~ U 0 θ i 0 θ θ 2 x i 0 P X i 0 A i A i θ i x i X i Holmstrom 984 X * i A i b i P - A i 3 { 0 - b i ifb i [ 0 2 ] X i = i = ifb i > 2 b i [ 0 2 ] x i θ i x i = θ i + b i ifθ i 0-2b i { i = b i otherwise Holmstrom 984 P A i b i [ 0 2 ] P A i - b i A i 4 P A i P /2 4 2 Goltsman et al b i [ 0 2 ] 2 P A i 2 P A i b i [ 0 2 ] EU = 4 ( 3 b - ) b 2 + G( 4 3 b 2 - ) b EV = b3 EV 2 = b3 2G P 39

6 -2b EU = - b 2 dθ - - b - θ 2-2b2 dθ + G - -2b b 2 2 dθ - 0 ( ) 0 ( ) -2b 2 - b 2 - θ 2 dθ = 4 3 b - b 2 + G 4 3 b 2 - b 2 2 A i EU 2 5 = - 2b b + 4b 2 < 0 EU = b 2-2b 2 + 4b 2 2 G < 0 EU2 b 2 G = - 2b 2 + 4b 2 2 < A 2 G > 2 x i = θ i + b i G

8 Lu % http / /news. 0jqka. com. cn / /c shtml

9 207 4 GDP GDP / log log / / log log log log log log / GDP 2 % % GDP GDP 43

10 GDP /GDP / 5% / Lu OLS log log / / / /GDP / *** t *** * ** ** GDP t ** t ** * * *** t *** ** *** *** t *** ** log t ** Log t * ** *** % 5% 0% / 5 6

11 207 4 GDP 2. 5%. 8% 9% Wu & Heerink 206 Chen & Kung OLS log log / / / GDP ** t ** * * * GDP 4 5% 2 0% % 0. 80% 3 4 % 0. 54%

12 2 4. 4% 3. 9% 4 OLS log log log log log * t ** * * *** / t *** ** ** t ** ** *** ** ** ** ** Probit OLS t ** ** *** t *** t *** t NO Yes NO Yes NO Yes NO Yes NO Yes NO Yes GDP % 4% 46

13 207 4 A A 2 G > A % %

14 Persson & Zhuravskaya Acemoglu Daron and James Robinson 2008 Persistence of Power Elites and Institutions American Economic Review Acemoglu Daron Georgy Egorov and Constantin Sonin 2008 Coalition Formation in Non-democracies Review of Economic Studies Bates Robert 990 Macro-political Economy in the Field of Development in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy ed. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle Cambridge Cambridge University Press. Chen Ting and James Kai-sing Kung 206 Do Land Revenue Windfalls Create a Political Resource Curse Evidence from China Journal of Development Economics Crawford Vincent and Joel Sobel 982 Strategic Information Transmission Econometrica Francois Patrick Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi 205 How Is Power Shared in Africa Econometrica Gao Nan Cherry Xiaoning Long and Lixin Colin Xu 206 Collective Leadership Career Concern and the Housing Market in China The Role of Standing Committee Review of Development Economic Gilli Mario and Li Yuan 203 A Model of Chinese Central Government Economics of Transition Gilli Mario Yuan Li and Jiwei Qian 206 Logrolling under Fragmented Authoritarianism Theory and Evidence from China Working Paper. Goltsman Maria Johannes Horner Gregory Pavlov and Francesco Squintani 2009 Mediation Arbitration and Negotiation Journal of Economic Theory

15 207 4 Holmstrom Bengt 984 On the Theory of Delegation in Bayesian Models in Economic Theory eds. Marcel Boyer and Richard Kihlstrom Amsterdam North-Holland Publishing Co. Huang Jing 2000 Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics Cambridge Cambridge University Press. Jia Ruixue Masa Kudamatsu and David Seim 205 Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China Journal of European Economic Association Lieberthal Kenneth G and David M. Lampton 992 Bureaucracy Politics and Decision-making in Post-Mao China Berkeley CA University of California Press. Landier Augustin Julien Sauvagnat. David Sraer. and David Thesmar 202 Bottom-up Corporate Governance Review of Finance Landry Pierre F 2008 Decentralized Authoritarianism in China The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era Cambridge Cambridge University Press. Li Hongbin and Li-an Zhou 2005 Political Turnover and Economic Performance The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China Journal of Public Economics Lu Xiaobo 2000 Cadres and Corruption The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party Stanford CA Stanford University Press. Milgrom Paul and John Roberts 988 An Economic Approach to Influence Activities and Organizational Responses American Journal of Sociology 94 S54 S79. Milgrom Paul and John Roberts 990 Bargaining Costs Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy ed. By James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle Cambridge Cambridge University Press. Olson Mancur 965 The Logic of Collective Action Cambridge MA Harvard University Press. Olson Mancur 982 The Rise and Decline of Nations Economic Growth Stagflation and Social Rigidities. New Haven CO Yale University Press. Persson Petra and Zhuravskaya Ekaterina 206 The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism Evidence from China Journal of European Economic Association Qian Yingyi and Chenggang Xu 993 M-Form Hierarchy and China's Economic Reform European Economic Review Qian Yingyi and Barry Weingast 997 Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives Journal of Economic Perspectives Qian Yingyi and Gerald Roland 998 Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint American Economic Review Shih Victor 2004 Factions Matter Personal Networks and the Distribution of Bank Loans in China Journal of Contemporary China Shih Victor Christopher Adolph and Mingxing Liu 202 Getting ahead in the Communist Party Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China American Political Science Review Shleifer Andrei and Robert W. Vishny 2002 The Grabbing Hand Government Pathologies and Their Cures Cambridge MA Harvard University Press. Shirk Susan 993 The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China Berkeley CA University of California Press. Shirk Susan 204 The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Security Policies in the Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia ed. S. Pekkanen J. Ravenhill And R Foot Oxford Oxford University Press. Wu Yan and Nico Heerink 206 Foreign Direct Investment Fiscal Decentralization and Land Conflicts in China China Economic Review Xu Chenggang 20 The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development Journal of Economic Literature

16 Real Political Power Structure and Local Government Behavior Theory and Empirical Study Liang Pinghan a and Gao Nan b a Sun Yat-Sen University b Zhongnan University of Economics and Law Summary The decentralized authoritarism that combines political centralization and economic decentralization is considered as an important factor underlying China's remarkable economic growth over the past four decades. In this framework the central government provides strong incentives to local government officials to stimulate economic development and local government officials respond by encouraging investment. The local government plays the role of providing a helping hand. Although a political structure is centralized at the highest level of government many political science researchers point out that decision making in local governments and government branches is becoming increasingly fragmented. Various divisions take into account their own divisional interests and cronyism becomes a serious challenge. In the context of streamlining administration and restricting executives to promote comprehensively deepening reform it is important to remove the interference and obstacles from vested interest groups. In this paper we set up an optimal delegation model following Holmstrom 984 in which a government consists of two divisions. We mainly focus on the consequences of interest divergence between divisions. The model indicates that larger interest divergence is associated with organizational efficiency loss which increases with respect to the importance of the division. Examining the model predictions empirically the interest divergence biases government policy through the real political power structure which represents the importance of division in the model. The model implies that in the absence of external monitoring and under the principle of collective leadership the interest divergence based on the divisions may affect policymaking through the real political power structure. Therefore government policy could be biased toward government insiders which would cause more interference in the market economy and reduce the social welfare. We manually collect information on provincial party standing committee members from 992 to 20 and construct indicators to measure standing committee diversity to measure the interest divergence and real power structure of local governments. Using a fixed effect model we find that if the local standing committee diversity indicator increases by one standard deviation public employment will increase by % in the next year private investment will decrease by 4. 4 percentage points and the total social investment will decrease by 3. 9 percentage points. At the same time the amount of illegally used land will increase by 2. 5% and the land leasing revenue of the local government over fiscal revenue will increase by. 8%. This evidence is consistent with the tendency of interest divergence within a local government to distort policy and lead to the expansion of public employment increasing illegal land use and reliance on land finance and exerting adverse effects on private firms and economic development. This paper's contribution is that it treats the local government as a collection of agents instead of a single agent as in the literature. Our study shows that the real political power structure inside a local government is dynamic and shapes policy outcomes at the local level. Hence any top-down attempts to implement policy directives should take this power structure into account. We suggest that improving external monitoring and restricting executives' discretionary authority is the fundamental way to protect the economy from opportunism. Eliminating fragmented decision-making processes properly centralizing power and increasing the accountability of local officials may reduce the negative effect of divisional interests improve efficiency and strengthen economic growth. Key Words Real Political Power Structure Local Government Behavior Government Size Land Finance JEL Classification H D7 D78 C23 50

JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS Wild t % 50% 15% % 19 17%

JOURNAL OF NANJING UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS Wild t % 50% 15% % 19 17% ( ) 2017 4 ( 206 ) 361005,,,, Wild t,,, ; ; ; Wild F062. 6 A 1672-6049 2017 04-0036-11 1-2 3-4 Persson and Zhuravskaya 5 Li and Zhou 6 4 7 8 Opper et al. 9 10 GDP 2017-04-20 2017-06-05 1988 36 JOURNAL