992 Bo Huang Lazear & Gibbs % 2. 23%

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1 * D630 A * skeng073@ 63. com 204 CXJJ Nomenclature 204 Heilmann & Kirchberger 2000 Burns

2 992 Bo Huang Lazear & Gibbs % 2. 23%

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4 Li & Zhou 2005 Eric Maskin Maskin et al Li & Zhou

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10 Laffont & Tirole 993 Lazear 998 Laffont & Martimort 2002 Lazear & Gibbs 2009 Personnel Economics Lazear & McNabb 2004 Lazear et al. 20. A B A A B Noise Lazear & Gibbs

11 Signaling 2 Lazear & Gibbs 2009 Lazear & Gibbs Lazear & Rosen Lazear & Gibbs 2009 Credible Commitment Edward P. Lazear Lazear Tournament Theory Prize Lazear & Rosen 98 Lazear

12 Cai & Treisman 2005 Lazear & Gibbs 2009 Sorting Lazear / Tournament Lazear & Rosen 98 CEO CEO 37

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16 4 GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP P 2. GDP GDP Landry et al / Lazear & Gibbs 2009 Chapter 6 4

17 Flat Hierarchical Lazear http / /hlj. sina. com. cnnewsgnzh / / _2. html http / /www. brookings. edu /zh - cn /research /papers /200 /02 /china - leadership - li GDP

18 Bo Z Chinese Provincial Leaders Economic Performance and Political Mobility since949. Armonk NY M. E. Sharpe. Burns J. P China's Nomenclatura System. Problems of Communist Cai H. & Treisman D Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments Decentralization Globaization and Public Policy. American Economics Review Dittmer L Chinese Informal Politics. The China Journal Heilmann S. & Kirchberger S The Chinese Nomenclatura in Transition. Available at Oct http / /chinapolitik. de /files /analysisl. pdf. Huang Y Managing Chinese Bureaucrats An Institutional Economics Perspective. Political Studies Laffont J - J. & Martimort D Princeton NJ Princeton University Press. The Theory of Incentives The Principal - Agent Model. Laffont J - J. & Tirole J A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge MA & London MIT Press. Landry P. F. Lü X. & Duan H Does Performance Matter Evaluating Political Selection along the Chinese Administrative Ladder. APSA 204 Annual Meeting Paper. Available 43

19 at 0ct https / /ssrn. com /abstract = or http / /dx. doi. org / / ssrn Lazear E. P. & Rosen S. 98. Rank - Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts. Journal of Political Economy Lazear E. P. & Gibbs M Personnel Economics in Practice. Hoboken NJ John Wiley & Sons. Lazear E. P. & McNabb R. Eds Personnel Economics. Cheltenham UK & Northampton MA Edward Elgar. Lazear E. P Personnel Economics for Managers. New York John Wiley & Sons. Lazear E. P. Altmann S. & Zimmermann K. F. Eds. 20. Inside the Firm Contributions to Personnel Economics. Oxford & New York Oxford University Press. Li H. & Zhou L. - A Political Turnover and Economic Performance The Incentive Role and Personnel Control in China. Journal of Public Economics Maskin E. Qian Y. & Xu C Incentives Information and Organizational Form. Reviews of Economic Studies

20 services is needed. The reform paths include the following aspects. First the state must develop social assistance services and establish the assistance service system for needy families. Secondly the state must adopt the idea of social investment and expand the scope of benefits of social services. Third based on social services the state must establish a social security system with Chinese characteristics to promote the construction of a social service state in China. Key Words Social Service State Social Service Benefits in Cash Social Policy Social Investment Sorting and Incentives Why Do We Need More Thresholds in China's Government Hierarchies Lingna Zhong Shu Keng & Wei Chen Abstract While clearly divided administrative levels in the Chinese government exist thispaper shows further divided ranks and levels inside each administrative level. Why does the Chinese government need these additional ranks and levels in its governmental hierarchies Using the theories of personnel economics this paper gives two theoretical explanations for the additionally established ranks and levels. First the incorporation of more assessments of an official's abilities gives the candidate more incentivesto pass the assessments. Second additional levels reduce the chance of competition among unequal candidates and thus increases incentives. Using personnel transfer data at the provincial level after the 5 th National Congress of the CCP to test these two theoretical hypotheses the paperfurther illustrates the economic logic of the structural design of Chinese government. Key Words Incentives Sorting Hierarchies Bureaucracy Chinese Government Jurisdiction Size and External Political Efficacy A Study Based on China's County Data Yanhua Deng & Jian Huang Abstract The body of literature on political efficacy is large. But most studies explore its formation and consequences with individual factors. What's ignored for the most part are the macro and structural factors. Using the 200 CGSS data and relevant county information this paper explores the impact of county size on political efficacy. We find that on average external political efficacy declines with the size of the county's jurisdiction. Via a quantile perspective we observe heterogeneity in the effect of county 207

83 2004 2007 2010 / / / Kornai1993 hierarchy Weber1958 Williamson 1979 chain of command Downs 1994 Tullock 1992 Lazear1998 Li & Zhou 2005 2008 promoti

2014 5 175 2014 9 Comparative Economic & Social Systems No. 5 2014 Sep. 2014 D08 A 1003-3947 2014 05-0082-14 1 / 2 1 Bo 2002 2010 2 20 80 2008 2013 83 2004 2007 2010 / / / Kornai1993 hierarchy Weber1958