2008 7,,,,,,, Samuelson (1954),,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,, :,, () :,;,, Samuelson (1954),, Tiebout (1956),,,, Buchanan Tullock (1962) Wicksel,,, -

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1 : :,, Besley,,, : (Qian and Weingast,1997 ;Qian, Roland and Xu,1998 ;,2006 ; ), (,2007),,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Arrow (1951),Buchanan (1962),,,,, (,2006 ;,2007),,,, :2004, : edu. cn ;,, :510420, : gdufs. edu. cn,(07bgj007) ; ( GW2006Q006) ;, 78

2 2008 7,,,,,,, Samuelson (1954),,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,, :,, () :,;,, Samuelson (1954),, Tiebout (1956),,,, Buchanan Tullock (1962) Wicksel,,, - - -,,,, 19,,,,,,;,,,, 79

3 :,,, Clarke (1971, 197) Groves Ledyard (1977),(AGV ),,,, Oates (1972), ;Stiglitz (1978),,,,, Dewatripont Maskin (1995) DM,,,,, Qian Roland (1998),,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Reza (2002),,,,, (,2007 ;,2005),,Bardhan Mookerjee (1998),,,,,, (),, (Down,1957),Besley Coate (1997) Osborne Slivinski (1996),,,, (1980),, Reza (2002) ,,, 80

4 Ghatak (2001),,,,,,,Coate (200),,,,,,, Tiebout (1956),,,,,,,,,,,, Besley(200),, i {1,2} x i g i,,: x i + [ (1 - ) b ( g i ) + b ( g - i ) ],,, [ 0,1Π2 ], b ( g i ) g i, p, p 2 ( g 1 + g 2 ), m 1 m 2, : S ( g 1, g 2 ) = [ m 1 (1 - ) + m 2 ] b ( g 1 ) + [ m 2 (1 - ) + m 1 ] b ( g 2 ) - p ( g 1 + g 2 ),, : p = [ m 1 (1 - ) + m 2 ] b ( g i ), b ( g 1 ) = b ( g 2 ),,, = 0,, = 1Π2,,,,,, 81

5 :, g, : x i + [ (1 - ) b ( g i ) + b ( g ) ], : S ( g 1, g 2, g ) = [ m 1 (1-1 ) b ( g 1 ) + m 1 1 b ( g ) ] + [ m 2 (1-2 ) b ( g 2 ) + m 2 2 b ( g ) ] - p ( g 1 + g 2 + g ),, p ( g 1 + g 2 ), p ( g ) : p = m 1 (1-1 ) b ( g 1 ) = m 2 (1-2 ) b ( g 2 ) = ( m m 2 2 ) b ( g ) g g 1 g 2,,,, (),,, 1, : 1 G( g) - C c 1 L ( g) - C l, ( ),,, : 1 L ( g) - C l ( g) > 0, 1 L ( g) - C l ( g) - 1 G( g) + C c ( g) > 0,,,,,, 1980,,,, g 1 g 2,:,,, g,,,,gdp,,,,,,,: S l ( g 1, g 2, g ) = [ 1 (1-1 ) L 1 ( g 1 ) G( g ) ] + [ 1 (1-2 ) L 2 ( g 2 ) G( g ) ] - C l,1 ( g 1 ) - C l,2 ( g 2 ), :,200 :,,,,, g DM, 82

6 S C ( g 1, g 2, g ) = [ 1 (1 - ) (1-4 ) L 1 ( g 1 ) + 4 L 2 ( g 2 ) ) + 1 G( g ) ] - C c ( g ) - C t, 4 : g 1 + g 2 + g =,, AGV2Arrow,, C t ( ) AGV2Arrow,,, AGV,, : t ( 1, 2 ),(BB) : ( g 1, g 2, g ) argmax [ 1 (1 - ) (1-4 ) L 1 ( g 1 ) + 4 L 2 ( g 2 ) + 1 G( g ) ] g, g, g t ( ) - C c ( g, ) - C t ( g 1, g 2,g 1,g 2 ) (1) s. t. g 1 + g 2 + g =, t ( ) = C t ( g 1, g 2,g 1,g 2 ) ; g 1 g 2, AGV,, ( IR) ( IC), Groves(197) AGV, t i ( ^ ) = E - i j {1,2}, j 1, V j ( g,^ j ) + i ( ^ - i ), i ( ^ - i ) = - C ct,^,v m ( g,^ ) ; E- i,,,, ;, 4 1 2, 4,1 > 0, 4,2 > 0,, (1) : 1 (1 - ) (1-4 ) L 1 ( g 1 ) - = 0, 1 (1 - ) 4 L 2 ( g 2 ) - = 0, 1 G ( g ) - C c, g ( g, ) - = 0,,L 1 ( g 2 ) = ln g 1, L 1 ( g 2 ) = ln g 2, G( g ) = ln g, C c, g ( g, ) = ln g,, < 1, < 1, : ,,,,, (BB), (2002) P240,, 8

7 : g 1 = 1 (1 - ) (1-4 ) 1 -, g2 = 1 (1 - ) 4 1 -, g = (2), g : g, = ,, g, : 2 = > (2) 1 :,,,, 1,,,,,,,,,, 4,: g 1, 4 = - 1 (1 - ) 1 - < 0 g 2, = 1 (1 - ) > 0 g, = 0 () 4 (),,, 4 015,(2) g 1 g 2,, : 2 :AGV,,, (),,,,,, : ( g 1, g 2, g ) argmax S l ( g 1, g 2, g ) = argmax[ 1 (1-1 ) L 1 ( g 1 ) G( g ) ] g, g, g g, g, g [ 1 (1-2 ) L 2 ( g 2 ) G( g ) ] - C l,1 ( g 1 ) - C l,2 ( g 2 ) s. t. g 1 + g 2 + g = GDP,,,, 84

8 : g 2 = 1 [ 2 1 (1-2 ) - ] ( ) - ( ) < 1, < 1, < 1, 1 < 1, 1 : 2 = ( 1 1 (1-1 ) - ) = 2 ( ) g 1 (1-1 ) (4) 1 (2) g 2 = 1 (1 - ) 4 1 -, 4 = 015, 2 = 1 (1 - ) (5) g ,, > 1 (5) (4) :,, 1 (1-1 ) - 1 > 1 (1 - ),2 1-1 > 2 1 -, 1 (4) (5),,,,,,: < 1, < < 1,,,,, < 1 - ( 0 ),, 1,,,,,,,,,,,, ;,, 1, : 2 (1-1 ) - g 1 2 = (6) 1 2,1,, 85

9 : 2 > 1,,,, 1, (6) 1 (1-1 ), (6) (4),,,,,, ;, 1 :,,,;, : : (1),, ;; (2) (voice) ( Hirschman,1970),, (),,,,,( ),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (2006),,, 86

10 ,, g S 1 g S,g S 1 g S 1994,,,,,,,,,, 2 :, (,2007),,,,,,,;,,,, ( ),,,, ( ), (),,,,,,, (,200),,, ( ),: : ; ;,,,,,,, 2006,5,,,2010, 87

11 : Qian Roland (1998),,, : ;,,,,,,,(,2007) :,,,, ;,,,,,,,?,,,,,,,,,, typescript.,2005 :?, 6,2006 :, 6,2007 ::, 1,2007 :, 1,200 :,,200 : :,,2007 :?,,2006 :, ( ) 5 1,2007 :, 7 Arrow, KJ., 1951, Social Choice and Individual Values, John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Bardhan, P. and Dilip Mookerjee, 1998,Expenditure Decentralization and the Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries, Besley, T. and Stephen Coate, 1997,An Economic Model of Representative Democracy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 1, Besley, T. and Stephen Coate, 200,Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods : A Political Economy Approach, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 87,

12 Besley, T and M. Ghatak, 2001,Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods, Quarterly Journal of Economics,vol. 116 (4) : Buchanan, James M., 1968, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand. Mcnally & Company. Buchanna, James M., and Tullock, Gordon, 1962, The Calculus of Consent : Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press. d Aspremont, C., and L. A. Gerard2Varet, 1979,Incentive and Incomplete Information, Journal of Public Economics, vol.. 11, Clarke, Edward H., 1971,Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice, vol. 11, 17. Clarke, Edward H., 197,Some Aspects of the Demand2Revealing Process, Public Choice, vol. 29,7 49. Dewatripont, M. and E. Maskin, 1995,Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 621 No. 4, Downs, A., 1957, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York : Harper Collins. Fudenberg D., and Jean Tirole, 1991, Game Theory, Cambridge Mass. : MIT Press. Groves, T.,197,Incentives in Teams, Econometrica, vol. 41, Groves, T., and J. Ledyard, 1977,Optimal Allocation of Public Goods : A Solution to thefree Rider Problem, Econometrica, vol. 45, Hart, O. D., and John Moore, 1990,Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, Hirschman,Albert, 1970, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Harvard University Press. Lau, Lawrence, J., Eytan, Sheshinski, and Joseph E. Stigliz, 1978,Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of Public Goods, Econometrica, vol. 46, No. 2, Qian, Y. and Gerald Roland., 1998,Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint, American Economic Review, vol. 88, No. 5, 114 Qian,Y. and B. Weingast, 1997,Federalism As a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11, No4,8 92. Oates, Wallace E., 1969,The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values : An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 77, No Osborne, Martin J. and Al Slivinski, 1996,A Model of Political Competition with Citizen Candidates, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXI, Reza B., 2002,Social Sector Spending in a Panel Countries, IMF Working Paper, WPΠ02Π5. Samuelson, P., 1954,The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, Review of Economic and Statistics, Vol. 6, Tiebout, Charles M.,1956,A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 641 No 5, Government Preference, Public Goods Supply and Fiscal Decentralization in Economic Transition Ding Juhong and Deng Kebin (China Centre for Economic Studies, Fudan University ;School of Management, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies) Abstract : In economic transition the different preference between the central government and local government deeply affects fiscal decentralization and the incentive structure. This paper analyses the course of the difference based on Besley s model and designs an incomplete contract model of central and local government. It explains the decision of decentralization in China. This paper proves that in the early development of economy because of under2decentralization the local government asks central government to increase the degree of decentralization. But with the development of economy, it will be over2decentralization and the local government will ask centre government to decreases the degree. However, if the economy goes a step further, the decentralization will achieve a equilibrium. The paper also discusses that with more people and worse economy, the degree of decentralization will increase ; while with less people and better economy the degree will decrease. Key Words : Government Preference ; Public Goods ; Fiscal Decentralization JEL Classification : H11, H41, H77 ( :) ( : ) 89

GDP % See Jin Hehui Qian Yingyi B. R. Weingast Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentiv

GDP % See Jin Hehui Qian Yingyi B. R. Weingast Regional Decentralization and Fiscal incentiv Peking University Law Journal Vol. 24 No. 4 2012 pp. 782-799 20 * 20 1 1908 2 1949 1978 * 1 5 1977 275 2 10 2009 1 782 09CFX002 83 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1978 GDP 20 90 1993 3 2003 219 4 90% 5 1996 325 6 See Jin