33 1 2015 01 Tribune of Political Science and Law Vol. 33 No. 1 Jan. 2015 * Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss 1 Diamond and Dybvig 1983 D D 2 * 1 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information The American Economic Review Vol. 71 No. 3 pp. 393-410 198. 2 Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig Banks runs deposit insurance and liquidity Journal of Political Economy Vol. 91 No. 3 pp. 401-419 1983.
4 2015 1 Hyman P. Minsky hedge - financed firm speculative - financed firm Ponzi firm 2 1929-1932 1933 Glass - Steagall Act of 1933 Banking Act of 1933 66 1999 1999 Gramm - Leach - Bliley Act of 1999 Public Law 106-102 3 1933 1933 1999 66 1 7 2007 4 2010 Dodd - Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 Public Law 111-203 5 2 P. 41 3 1990-2011 4 1 2004 1 2 Hyman P. Minsky The Financial Instability Hypothesis The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper May 1992 No. 74 pp. 1-8. 3 Gramm - Leach - Bliley Act of 1999 Public Law 106-102 SEC. 101. Glass - Steagall Act Repeals. a Section 20 Repealed. - Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933 12 U. S. C. 377 commonly referred to as the Glass - Steagall Act is repealed. b Section 32 Rpealed. - Section 32 of the Banking Act of 1933 12 U. S. C. 78 is repealed. 4 Michael S. Barrf The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform Yale Journal on Regulation 29 Vol. 91 p. 92 2012. 5 John C. Coffee Jr. Systemic Risk after Dodd - Frank Contingent Capital and The Need For Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight Columbia Law Review Vol. 111 No. 4 795 pp. 802-803 2011.
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6 2015 1 James R. Barth Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine 2 61 61 5 6 1. 1 2013 1 2014 4 2 James R. Barth Gerard Caprio Jr. and Ross Levine Bank Regulation and Supervision What Works Best Journal of Financial Intermediation Vol. 13 pp. 205 248 2004.
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8 2015 1 2005 2 2 2014 5 3 2013 3 4 1 9 10 11 2013 62. 33% 64. 81% 12 1 2 3 4 2010 90 2005 7 2014 127 2013 8
1 9 2003 1995 3 2003 1 2003 2 2003 3 13 14 3 43 4 13 1. 3 43 3 43 43 43 3 3 1 1998 11 1995 6 1992 10 1998 12 2003 3 10 2003 4 28 2003 12 2 2003 12 22 2004 1 19 3 3 4 43
10 2015 16 1 2 13 3 2. 13 13 10 1 5 000 13 10 1 5 000 4 < > 5 1 2014 1 2 1 3 Volcker Vickers Liikanen 1000 15% ~ 25% 2014 16 4 CHINA LAW 2014 /02 5 2012 1 2013 1 1 2018 < >
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12 2015 1. 4 33 4 33 30 2. 31 17 2013 62. 33% 64. 81% 12
1 13 18 16 1 14 2013 76. 6 9. 3 13. 9% 31. 2 41. 0 4. 6 12. 8% 12 1 1 20 80 1980 ~ 1994 15 1617 1295 9240 2013 24
14 2015 2 19 3 1989 1997 2007 1978 2 2 1978-2013 1. 1993-1995 1994 24. 1% 1995 17. 1% 20 P. 315
1 15 2-3 21 1995 39 75% 1 39 2013 74. 47% 12 21 39 75% 22 23 2 2014 7 1 39 39 2. 34 1 39 8% 75% 25% 10% 2 2014 34
16 2015 1 2 3 4 3 3 24
1 17 25 26 2014 2013 21 5 1. 65 555. 43 3. 26% 12 2013 45% 60% 27 28 29 30 34 31 34
18 2015 2014 11 30 1 3 32 2 5 50 2013 50 99. 63% 50 2 33 1. 6 1 2014 11 30 2 2009 20 99. 2% 37. 8% 2010 16
1 19 1 2. 7 3. 9 1. 2. 3. 2 1995 2003 34 1 2001 4 50% 2003 9 2 GDP 30% 27% 2000 4
20 2015 1978 1 17 66 124 2005 5 2 2001 3 3 19 2002 7 4 20 2012 2013 11 5 2013 3 22 2008 3 6 23 2009 5 7 24 2007 10 8 2007 2 2012 1 9 2007 2 2009 4 10 2014 20 28 2013 3 11 29 2006 5 2014 2 12 2013 2006 5 2014 13 2013 6 14 32 2000 2 15 33 2006 6 16 34 2003 1 2013 5 18 2005 2 2001 1 2012 9 21 2013 12 2014 15 1990 11 25 26 27 2008 3 30 31 2008 2 2001 5 1999 11 2004 1