1 a b (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996) (Barberis et al, 1996) (Shleifer, 1998) (Megginson and Netter 2001) 1 70432002/G02 a b 1
(Megginson and Netter 2001) Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001 Williamson 1975 Fama and Jensen 1983 Hermalin and Weisbach 1998 Monks and Minow 2000 Hermalin Weisbach 1988 CEO CEO CEO Denis Sarin 1999 Hermalin Weisbach 1988 CEO CEO Lehn Patro Zhao 2004 1935 2000 81 Boone Field Karpoff Raheja 2004 1019 1988 1992 CEO 1998 188 2002 A 2
1997 1999 CCER 1998 2003 1267 1057 1 9 9 1 1998 2003 33% 1997 12 2001 8 2002 2 2003 1/3 2 13.9% 1998 21.8% 2003 10.7% 3 1998 2003 Chen and Xiong, 2001 1998 45.4% 2003 38.7% 4 5 3
Herfindahl 5 1998 0.302 2003 0.223 1998 49.8% 2003 43.3% 5 6 5 6 50% Schleifer and Vishny 1986 Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 5 6 1 2 5 6 3 4
4 (panel regression) I = β herf + λ control + ε I = β p + λ control + ε I herf 5 Herfindahl p 1 0 control I = β herf c + β herf (1 c) + ε 1 2 I = β herf p + β herf (1 p) + ε 3 4 50 c 1 0 β1 β 2 β3 β 4 panel probit regression prob = β herf + λ control + ε prob = β p + λ control + ε prob = β herf c + β herf (1 c) + ε 1 2 prob = β herf p + β herf (1 p) + ε 1 2 prob 1 0 5 6 5
7 U 8 U 9 10 U panel regression I = β state+ λ social+ ε I = β state + β state + λ social + λ social +ε 2 2 1 1 1 2 state social panel probit regression prob = β state + λ social + ε prob = β state + β state + λ social + λ social +ε 2 2 1 1 1 2 Denis and Sarin, 1999 Boyd, 1995 6
7 8 1 7 Hirfindahl -0.997 1% 2 8 Hirfindahl -0.16-1.539-1.069-0.147-0.092 3 4 0.063 5 0.39 1-1.146-0.978-1.280 1 5 6 7-2.518 5 2.582 5 8 7-0.952 1 9 7
3 20 8 10 U 7 8, 8
1. Boone, A. L., L. C. Field, J. M. Karpoff and C. G. Raheja (2004), The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis, Working Paper. 2. Claessens, S., S. Djankov and L. H.P. Lang (2000), The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81-112. 3. Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985), The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Cause and Consequences, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 4. Denis, D. J. and A. Sarin (1999), Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations, Journal of Finance, 52, 187-223. 5. Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen (1983), Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325. 6. Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (1988), The Determinants of Board Composition The Rand Journal of Economic, 19 (4), 589-606. 7. Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach (2003), Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 9 (1), 7-26. 8. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer (1999), Corporate Ownership around the World, 9. Lehn, K., S. Patro and M. Zhao (2004), Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards: 1935-2000, University of Pittsburgh Working Paper. 10. McConnell J. J. and H. Servaes (1995), Equity Ownership and Two Faces of Debt, Journal of Financial Economics, 39, 139-157. 11. Ross, S. (1977), The Determination of Capital Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach, Bell Journal of Economics, 8, 23-40. 12. Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1986), Large Shareholder and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 96, 461-488. 13. Tenev, S. and C. Zhang (2002), Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China, World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. 14.Xu X. N. and Y. Wang (1999), Ownership Structure Reform and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies Chinese Economic Review, 10 75-98. 15. 1998 8 21-28 16. 2002 3 26-30 9
1 9.628 2.460 9 4 19 1.319 1.484 0 0 7 0.136 0.151 0 0 1 9.616 2.746 9 5 19 1998 0.057 0.384 0 0 4 0.005 0.034 0 0 0.375 9.591 2.676 9 4 19 1999 0.058 0.384 0 0 4 0.005 0.033 0 0 0.333 9.426 2.578 9 5 19 2000 0.106 0.471 0 0 4 0.010 0.043 0 0 0.333 9.385 2.550 9 4 19 2001 0.628 1.087 0 0 6 0.064 0.110 0 0 0.500 9.874 2.299 9 5 19 2002 2.293 0.784 2 0 6 0.239 0.082 0.222 0 0.667 9.796 2.136 9 5 19 2003 3.157 0.859 3 0 7 0.325 0.070 0.333 0 1 2 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 0.139 0.218 0.175 0.135 0.108 0.1 0.107 10
3 0.417 0.263 0.48 0.000 0.890 0.195 0.237 0.08 0.000 0.910 0.388 0.129 0.37 0.040 1.000 0.454 0.273 0.54 0.000 0.890 1998 0.187 0.242 0.05 0.000 0.910 0.359 0.136 0.33 0.090 1.000 0.456 0.269 0.54 0.000 0.890 1999 0.180 0.239 0.04 0.000 0.910 0.364 0.131 0.33 0.090 1.000 0.425 0.261 0.49 0.000 0.890 2000 0.191 0.237 0.08 0.000 0.910 0.384 0.131 0.36 0.040 1.000 0.416 0.257 0.47 0.000 0.890 2001 0.190 0.234 0.08 0.000 0.910 0.394 0.127 0.37 0.090 1.000 0.406 0.258 0.46 0.000 0.850 2002 0.196 0.235 0.09 0.000 0.910 0.398 0.126 0.38 0.090 1.000 0.387 0.262 0.44 0.000 0.850 2003 0.212 0.239 0.11 0.000 0.850 0.401 0.125 0.38 0.090 1.000 4 Herfindahl 5 Herfindahl 5 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Herfindahl 0.258 0.302 0.300 0.268 0.255 0.248 0.223 0.458 0.498 0.498 0.466 0.453 0.443 0.433 11
5 t 50 t 192 0.17 0.09 865 0.15 0.09 406 0.15 0.09 651 0.16 0.09 2.89 0.00 2.30 0.02 6 t 50 t 192 0.17 0.36 865 0.12 0.31 406 0.12 0.32 651 0.14 0.35 3.47 0.00 2.26 0.02 12
7 Leverage lnat herf 5 50 c 1 0 p 1 state social ***,**,* 1%,5%,10% 1 2 3 4 5 6 leverage ***0.054 ***0.053 ***0.054 ***0.066 ***0.057 ***0.057 lnat ***0.143 ***0.143 ***0.144 ***0.182 ***0.139 ***0.137 herf ***-0.997 herf c ***-1.069 herf (1 c) ***-1.539 herf p ***-1.146 herf (1 p) ***-0.978 p **0.063 state ***-1.280 ***-1.308 sq_state 0.063 social ***-0.952 ***-0.531 sq_social ***-0.642 R square 0.254 0.265 0.183 0.177 0.222 0.225 13
8 Leverage lnat herf 5 50 c 1 0 p 1 0 state socialperson ***,**,* 1%,5%,10% 1 2 3 4 5 6 leverage 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.074 0.069 0.068 lnat ***-0.22 ***-0.22 ***-0.22 ***-0.22 ***-0.21 ***-0.23 herf -0.16 herf c -0.147 herf (1 c) -0.092 herf p 0.985 herf (1 p) -0.193 p ***0.390 state sq_state -0.444 **-2.518 **2.582 social 0.100 1.068 sq_social -2.086 Wald 18.44 18.45 21.40 24.95 23.75 28.12 P 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 14