1933 1934,,,,,,,,,,, 1933 1934,, 1,,,,,, 1,, 80
,, 1933 7,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,, (1991 ) ; ( 1996 2 ),, :,, 1947,18 :,,71 :,,71,1991,332 81
2003 5,,,,,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (1933 9 10 ),: 2,, 1984, 397 :, : 45,1964,76,:1,, 1984,209,11,, 1984,234, 1934,11,1 2 82
,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,:,,, (1933 10 17 ),,1937,3,12,,3,13 :,,124 3,1935,1852 83
2003 5!!,,,,,,,,,,,, 18 19, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,1933 11,, :,,196 :,,19 :, (1933 10 17 ),,3,12 (1933 7 28 ), 2,391 (1933 11 18 ),,4,21 84
,,,,,,,,,,,, 1934 4,5300, 573, 4244, 922,5000,,,,,, 4 7,,,,,,, (1933 11 19 ),,4,21 (1933 11 19 ),,4,21,, 1934 6,31,,35,,,, 1937,35 85
2003 5,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,:,1981,185,2,27 :, ()4,1934 7 :1932 1939,1980,61, 1993,227 86
,,,,,,,, 1934 9,,,,, ;,,,,,,,,,, 1934 3, 11,, (1934 3 13 ), 2,402 (1934 5 1 ), 2,403 (1934 5 1 ), : 5 1, (4),1994,322 (1934 9 19 ),5 1, (4),109 5 1, (4),269 :,,1982,95, 3 1,3 2 1, 87
2003 5,,,,,,,6 20,,,,,,, 13,,,,,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (1933 1937),1987,184 (1934 3 12 ),,7,10, 5 1, (4),46,7,24 88
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1933 4, 5000,,,1933 1934, :, ()6,1934 7 :,1983,71 72 :,1994,410 89
2003 5 6000,,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1,,,,( (1936 ),, 1988,103 104,188 : (1934 4 3 ),, 1991,324 90
),, 1933,,,,,,,,,, 69 9, 50 55 7, 4,,7. 6,3,,,1982,370,1931 5,,,,,, (, 1982,241 ) 1934,: (, () 58,1934 5 5 ),,,29 4 ( ),30, 24 2 91
2003 5 10, 28 5, 1/ 5,,,,,,,988, 10755, 1 11,,,,,,,,,,,,,,3,7 (1933 6 ), 9, 1991,226,,,5,16 92
,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1934 1,,,,,,1,,,,,, 3,,, 3,,,,,,,,,,6,23, 1996,230 :1932 1939,55 (1934 1 16 ),,6,2 (1934 1 22 ),,6,2 93
2003 5,,,,,,,,, 1,,,,,,,,, 2 2,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (1934 1 22 ),,6,3 (1934 1 26 ), 5 1, (4),26 (1934 1 29 ),,6,16 (1934 2 2 ),,6,17 (1934 2 2 ),,6,17 94
:,,,,,,,,,,, 2,,, 1934 2,, 17,,,,,,, 18,, 22,,,,,, 2 25 3 6,,,,,, (1934 2 2 ),,6,17 (1934 2 3 ),,6,17 (1934 2 17 ), 5 1, (4),293 (1934 2 18 ), 5 1, (4),293,5 1, (4),294 95
2003 5,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,:,,, 5 1, (4),165 :, ( ) 49 50,1933 8 96
,,,,, 300,,1933 1933 5 7,5,1933 8 1934 7 11. 2,16, 1/ 4,, 1933 : (16 45 ) 407,320,79 % ; 1319,1018,77 %,,1934 4, 61670,, :,1994,12 :, () 10,1933 5 1,54,1934 7 22,,1982,351, 203,1934 6 16,,,, 1934 1000,1988,238 ;, 194,1934 5 28 97
2003 5,,,1934,,,,,,,,,,,1934 1575, :,,,,,,,,,,,, () 60,1934 5 19 :,,, 193,1934 5 25 : (), 195,1934 5 30, 204,1934 6 19, 206,1934 6 23 :, () 54,1934 4 7, 143,1934 1 16 98
, 1933, 1934 5,,5 20 20 %,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, (, ) 1933 11,,,,, () 41,1934 1 5 (1934 5 26 ), () 63,1934 6 9,1. 2, 2500,223 :, () 38,1933 12 12 :, () 24,1933 8 29 99
2003 5,, 1934 4,16 1 %,40 4 %,,,,,,,,,, ( ),,, :, :,!,,,,,,,, :, () 37,1933 12 5, 234,1934 9 16 :,,1936,279 :, 45,191 (1933 1937),1987,266 267 :1932 1939,50,8,59 100
,,,,1933,,1934,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1934,,2,,, :,,198 :, () 45,1934 2 2,,11,24,,11,48 (1934 8 9 ), (1933 1936),1984,46, 10, 1991,82 101
2003 5 3,,,,,,, 10 (1 16 ),, 1933 12,,,,, 24 60,, 1934 2,,,, gλυ,, 146,1934 2 6, 158,1934 3 6, 168,1934 3 29 :, 200,1934 6 9,1996,102, 1987,23 :, () 45,1934 2 2, 209,1934 :, () 49,1934 gλυ 6 30 3 2, 155,1934 2 27 102
24 1934 7,8,7,,,,,,,,,,,, 1 1,1/ 4,,,,,,,,, 155,1934 2 27 :, 223,1934 8 8 :, 218,1934 7 24, 210,1934 7 5 :, () 49,1934 3 2,,308,,350 (1934 6 2 ),5 1, (4),204 103
2003 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1934,,,,,,, :,,,,,, () 60,1934 5 19 :,1981,320 :, () 53,1934 3 31,1998,146 (1934 5 11 ),5 1, (4),190 (1934 8 13 ),5 1, (4),239 104
,,,, :,,, :,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 1933,,,,,,, 1992,52,8,57,5 1, (3),50,245 105
2003 5,,!,1933,,,,,,,,,7 %,,,,,,,,,,,,,1,674 1933,206866, 13828, 7 %(, 106,1933 8 31 ) 10,1454, 7000, 7 % (, 61,1934 5 26 ),4,1991,1250 106
,,,, ;,, ;, 1933,,, 1512, 2124,,,,,,,,,,, 85,1933 6 14 :, () 24,1933 8 29 :, () 34,1933 11 12 :, 181,1934 4 28 :, () 64,1934 6 16,, 164,1934 3 20 :, () 67,1934 7 10 107
2003 5,,,,, ( ),,,,,,,,,, 1934,,,, 96,1933 7 26, 124,1933 11 11 :, 168,1934 3 29 :?, () 39,1933 12 19 (1934 4 3 ), 173,1934 4 10 :?, () 39,1933 12 19, 154,1934 2 24 (1934 4 3 ), 137,1934 4 10 108
10 %,, ;,,, 1934 5,,, (,AB, AB ),,,,,,,,,, :,,, 193,1934 5 25, 199,1934 6 7, 180,1934 4 26 :, () 67,1934 7 10 109
2003 5,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 10, () () () :, () 53,1934 3 31 1933 1934,,,, 1 :, 1986,41 :?, 208, 1934 6 28,1934 15. 7 %, 30 %, ( :3,1990,105 ) :?, () 39,1933 12 19 110
,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,,,,, :, () 24,1933 8 29, 150,1934 2 16, 173,1934 4 10 :, () 53,1934 3 31, 173,1934 4 10,, () 41,1934 1 5, 134,1933 12 11 111
2003 5 :,, ;, ;, ;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,51?, 238,1934 9 26, 1987,318 (1933 1937),272 273,, () 34,1933 11 12, 234,1934 9 16 1,1991,136 112
,,,,, 100006 : 2003 9,jdsyj - jd @ cass. org. cn, 2003 8 28 113
described asthe Party is in the upper classes, but not in the lower classes ; the Party is in the cities, but not in the countryside ; the Party is on the coast, but not in the interior. Before the War, the majority of the Guomindang s party members were from the middle or upper classes. The Guomindang did not edu2 cate its party members to be a model for all society, but recruited people who al2 ready were or had potential to be in power. A study of prewar public opinion s view of the Guomindang can help us revise the idea that the Guomindang s loss of support among the people only became clear during the late war years and postwar period. Reasons for t he Failure of t he Fift h Anti2encirclement Campaign : An Investigation not Focusing on t he Chinese Communist Party s Military St rategy Huang Daox uan (80) The Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party s fifthencirclementand Anti2encirclementcampaigns from 1933 to 1934 constituted a total war be2 tween two political powers with independent territories, governments and social organizations. The war ended in failure for the CCP. Aside from the widely known problem of unwise military strategy, the failure of the CCP was related to changes in the Guomindang s strategies and tactics. Not only that, quite apart from left2leaningsubjective factors, the mistakes in the CCP s military strate2 gy were themselves also closely related to pressure from the Guomindang. As a protracted war of attrition waged by the Guomindang and met by the CCP, the campaign found the Soviet Area hard put to provide the personnel, material and other war resources needed for a protracted campaign of attrition. The erosion of the CCP s political resources under theleftist leadership further prevented the CCP from making full use of its fighting abilities. All of these factors affected the ultimate outcome of the war to some extent. The Representatives of t he Communist International and t he Anti2 Christian Movement in China Tao Feiya (114) The Anti2Christian Movement in China in the 1920s was a political struggle directed by the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Far Eastern Bu2 reau of the Communist International, sponsored and led by the CCP and joined by members of the Guomindang and other organizations. The Russian Communist Party and the Communist International regarded the steady development of Christianity and growing pro2american feeling among Chinese youths as obstacles to getting the Chinese people to follow the Russian road of revolution. Therefore, the aim of the Anti2Christian Movement was to combat Western religious forces in China, weaken the West s influence, arouse nationalist feelings in young Chi2 nese, and extend the influence of the Communist Party among Chinese youths. The movement s policy was to use the fight against Christianity to achieve its 2