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1 ,, ;, ; : ; ; 38

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43 Modern Chinese History Studies No. 5, 2003 The Hong Kong and Macao Main Bureau of t he Royalist Society and the Movement to Rescue the Emperor S ang B ing (1) During the movement to rescue the Emperor in 1900, the Royalist Society established its main bureau in Hong Kong and Macao. With the substantive sup2 port of He Dong, He Tingguang and other prominent people in Hong Kong and Macao, the bureau took advantage of this favorable location to pursue such pro2 jects as raising money, gathering its members together, and buying and trans2 porting weapons. The bureau also tried every means possible to coordinate and manage its internal relations and its relations with other reformist elements, with revolutionaries, and with the British authorities in Hong Kong. In order to carry out these important tasks, the Society concentrated many of its key members in the Hong Kong and Macao main bureau to work together in a coordinated fash2 ion, and continually strengthened their forces. Unfortunately, Kang Youwei s students were not able men, and their relations were very complicated and ridden with conflicts. The various directors of the bureau were not up to their responsi2 bilities, and as a result the members of the Royalist Society could not communi2 cate well or cooperate with each other. Incompetent management and ineffectual leadership not only made them miss the opportunity to successfully pursue the movement to rescue the Emperor, but also sewed the seeds for the incessant inner conflicts of the Royalist Society s later years. The Guomindang s Organizational Degeneration after t he 1927 Purge W ang Qisheng (38) In the historiography of the 1927 purge, the Guomindang praises it asa movement to safeguard the Party and save the nation, while the Chinese Com2 munist Party denounces it asa counterrevolutionary coup d etat. Both parties focus on the heavy blow this movement dealt the CCP, and ignore its direct im2 pact upon the Guomindang itself. For the Guomindang, the purge was an elimi2 nation of able men in the Party. The injury to the Guomindang over the course of the purge was no less than the loss to the CCP. After the purge, there was no one to whom local party power could be entrusted, and local tyrants, evil gentry, opportunists and corrupt elements were allowed to encroach upon the local power base, and use the Party to oppress local society. On the eve of World War II, the Guomindang s rank and file still had not recovered its pre2purge membership. The geographical distribution of party members did not match the Party s region2 al political power bases. The state of Party affairs and organization has been aptly 1

44 described as the Party is in the upper classes, but not in the lower classes ; the Party is in the cities, but not in the countryside ; the Party is on the coast, but not in the interior. Before the War, the majority of the Guomindang s party members were from the middle or upper classes. The Guomindang did not edu2 cate its party members to be a model for all society, but recruited people who al2 ready were or had potential to be in power. A study of prewar public opinion s view of the Guomindang can help us revise the idea that the Guomindang s loss of support among the people only became clear during the late war years and postwar period. Reasons for t he Failure of t he Fift h Anti2encirclement Campaign : An Investigation not Focusing on t he Chinese Communist Party s Military St rategy Huang Daox uan (80) The Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party s fifthencirclementand Anti2encirclementcampaigns from 1933 to 1934 constituted a total war be2 tween two political powers with independent territories, governments and social organizations. The war ended in failure for the CCP. Aside from the widely known problem of unwise military strategy, the failure of the CCP was related to changes in the Guomindang s strategies and tactics. Not only that, quite apart from left2leaningsubjective factors, the mistakes in the CCP s military strate2 gy were themselves also closely related to pressure from the Guomindang. As a protracted war of attrition waged by the Guomindang and met by the CCP, the campaign found the Soviet Area hard put to provide the personnel, material and other war resources needed for a protracted campaign of attrition. The erosion of the CCP s political resources under theleftist leadership further prevented the CCP from making full use of its fighting abilities. All of these factors affected the ultimate outcome of the war to some extent. The Representatives of t he Communist International and t he Anti2 Christian Movement in China Tao Feiya (114) The Anti2Christian Movement in China in the 1920s was a political struggle directed by the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Far Eastern Bu2 reau of the Communist International, sponsored and led by the CCP and joined by members of the Guomindang and other organizations. The Russian Communist Party and the Communist International regarded the steady development of Christianity and growing pro2american feeling among Chinese youths as obstacles to getting the Chinese people to follow the Russian road of revolution. Therefore, the aim of the Anti2Christian Movement was to combat Western religious forces in China, weaken the West s influence, arouse nationalist feelings in young Chi2 nese, and extend the influence of the Communist Party among Chinese youths. The movement s policy was to use the fight against Christianity to achieve its 2

,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, :,, (1991 ) ; ( ),, :,, 1947,18 :,,71 :,,71,1991,332 81

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